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CHARACTERISTICKS.

VOLUME II.

An Inquiry concerning VIRTUE and MERIT.

The MORALISTS; a Philosophical Rhapsody.



Printed in the Year M.DCC.XXXII.



T R E A T I S E IV.

VIZ.

A N

I N Q U I R Y

CONCERNING


Virtue, or Merit.

Formerly Printed from an Imperfect Copy :
Now Corrected, and Publish'd intire.

— *Amoto queramus seria ludo.*
Hor. Sat. I.

Printed first in the Year M.DC.XC.IX.





A N
INQUIRY, &c.

BOOK I.

PART I.

SECT. I.

REILIGION and VIRTUE appear in many respects so nearly related, that they are generally presum'd inseparable Companions. And so willing we are to Vol. 2. A 3 believe

*Occasion of
this IN-
QUIRY.*

124185

Book 1. believe well of their *Union*, that we hardly
allow it just to speak, or even think of 'em
Occasion of this IN- apart. It may however be question'd,
QUIRY whether the Practice of the World, in this
respect, be answerable to our Speculation.
'Tis certain that we sometimes meet with
Instances which seem to make against this
general Supposition. We have known
People, who having the Appearance of
great Zeal in *Religion*, have yet wanted
even the common Affections of *Humanity*,
and shewn themselves extremely degene-
rate and corrupt. Others, again, who
have paid little regard to Religion, and
been consider'd as mere **A T H E I S T S**, have
yet been observ'd to practise the Rules of
Morality, and act in many Cases with such
good Meaning and Affection towards Man-
kind, as might seem to force an Acknow-
ledgment of their being *virtuous*. And,
in general, we find mere moral Principles
of such weight, that in our dealings with
Men, we are seldom satisfy'd by the ful-
lest Assurance given us of their Zeal in
Religion, till we hear something further
of their Character. If we are told, a Man
is religious; we still ask, "What are his
"Morals?" But if we hear at first that he
has honest moral Principles, and is a Man
of natural Justice and good Temper, we
seldom think of the other Question, "Whe-
"ther he be *religious* and *devout?*"

THIS

THIS has given occasion to enquire,
“ What *Honesty* or *VIRTUE* is, consi- §. 1.
“ der’d by it-self; and in what manner it
“ is influenc’d by Religion: How far
“ Religion necessarily implies *Virtue*; and
“ whether it be a true Saying, *That it is*
“ *impossible for an Atheist to be virtuous,*
“ *or share any real degree of Honesty, or*
“ *MERIT.*”

AND here it cannot justly be wonder’d at, if the *Method* of explaining Things shou’d appear somewhat unusual; since the *Subject-Matter* has been so little examin’d, and is of so nice and dangerous Speculation. For so much is the religious part of Mankind alarm’d by the Freedom of some late Pens; and so great a Jealousy is rais’d every-where on this Account; that whatever an Author may suggest in favour of *Religion*, he will gain little Credit in the Cause, if he allows the least Advantage to any other Principle. On the other side, the Men of Wit and Raillery, whose pleasantest Entertainment is in the exposing the weak sides of Religion, are so desperately afraid of being drawn into any serious Thoughts of it, that they look upon a Man as guilty of foul Play, who assumes the air of a *Free Writer*, and at the same time preserves any regard for the Principles of Natural Religion.

Book i.ligion. They are apt to give as little
~~Occasion of~~ quarter as they receive: And are resolv'd
~~this IN-~~ to think as ill of the Morals of their An-
~~QUIRY.~~tagonists, as their Antagonists can possi-
bly think of theirs. Neither of 'em, it
seems, will allow the least Advantage to
the other. 'Tis as hard to persuade one
sort, that there is any Virtue in Religion,
as the other, that there is any Virtue out
of the Verge of their particular Commu-
nity. So that, between both, an Author
must past his time ill, who dares plead for
Religion and *Moral Virtue*, without lessening
the force of either; but allowing to
each its proper Province, and due Rank,
wou'd hinder their being made Enemys by
Detraction.

H O W E V E R it be: If we wou'd pre-
tend to give the least new light, or ex-
plain any thing effectually, within the
intended Compass of this *Inquiry*; 'tis ne-
cessary to take Things pretty deep; and
endeavour, by some short Scheme, to re-
present the Original of each Opinion, whe-
ther natural or unnatural, relating to the
D E I T Y. And if we can happily get
clear of this thorny part of our Philoso-
phy; the rest, 'tis hop'd, may prove more
plain and easy.

S E C T. II.

Part I.
 ~~~~~  
 §. 2.

**I**N THE Whole of Things (or in the *State of Opinions.* Universe) either all is according to a good Order, and the most agreeable to a general Interest: or there is that which is otherwise, and might possibly have been better constituted, more wisely contriv'd, and with more advantage to the general Interest of Beings, or of the Whole.

IF every thing which exists be according to a good Order, and *for the best*; then of necessity there is no such thing as real ILL in the Universe, nothing ILL with respect to the Whole.

WHATSOEVER, then, is so as that it cou'd not really have *been* better, or any way *better order'd*, is perfectly *good*. Whatsoever in the Order of the World can be call'd ILL, must imply a possibility in the nature of the thing to have been better contriv'd, or order'd. For if it cou'd not; it is perfect, and as it shou'd be.

WHATSOEVER is *really* ILL, therefore, must be caus'd or produc'd, either by *Design*, (that is to say, with Knowledge and Intelligence) or, in defect of this, by Hazard, and mere *Chance*.

## Book I.

*State of Opinions.* IF there be any thing ILL in the Universe from *Design*, then that which disposes all things, is no one good designing Principle. For either the *one* designing Principle is it-self corrupt; or there is some *other* in being which operates contrarily, and is ILL.

IF there be any ILL in the Universe from mere *Chance*; then a designing Principle or Mind, whether Good or Bad, cannot be the Cause of *all* things. And consequently, if there be suppos'd a designing Principle, who is the Cause only of Good, but cannot prevent the Ill which happens from Chance, or from a contrary ill Design; then there can be suppos'd in reality no such thing as a superior good Design or Mind, other than what is impotent and defective: For not to correct, or totally exclude that Ill of Chance, or of a contrary ill Design, must proceed either from *Impotency*, or *Ill-Will*.

WHATSOEVER is superior in any degree over the World, or rules in Nature with Discernment and a Mind, is what, by universal Agreement, Men call GOD. If there are several such superior Minds, they are so many Gods: But if that single, or those several Superiors are not in

in their nature necessarily good, they rather take the name of DÆMON.

Part 1.  
S. 2.

To believe therefore that every thing is govern'd, order'd, or regulated *for the best*, by a designing Principle, or Mind, necessarily good and permanent, is to be a perfect THEIST.

To believe nothing of a designing Principle or Mind, nor any Cause, Measure, or Rule of Things, but *Chance*; so that in Nature neither the Interest of *the Whole*, nor of any *Particulars*, can be said to be in the least design'd, pursu'd, or aim'd at; is to be a perfect ATHEIST.

To believe no *one* supreme designing Principle or Mind, but rather *two*, three, or more, (tho in their nature *good*) is to be a POLYTHEIST.

To believe the governing Mind, or Minds, not absolutely and necessarily good, nor confin'd to what is best, but capable of acting according to mere Will or Fancy; is to be a DÆMONIST.

THERE are few who think always consistently, or according to one certain Hypothesis, upon any Subject so abstruse and intricate as the *Cause of all Things*, and the *OEconomy or Government of the Universe*:

Book 1. *verse.* For 'tis evident in the Case of the  
 most devout People, even by their own  
<sup>State of</sup>  
<sub>Opinions.</sub> Confession, that there are Times when  
 their Faith hardly can support 'em in the  
 Belief of a supreme Wisdom ; and that they  
 are often tempted to judg disadvantageously  
 of a Providence, and just Administration  
 in the Whole.

THAT alone, therefore, is to be call'd  
 a Man's Opinion, which is of any other  
 the most habitual to him, and occurs upon  
 most occasions. So that 'tis hard to pro-  
 nounce certainly of any Man, that *he is an*  
*Atheist*; because unless his whole Thoughts  
 are at all Seasons, and on all Occasions,  
 steddy bent against all Supposition or Imagi-  
 nation of *Design in Things*, he is no *per-  
 fect Atheist*. In the same manner, if a  
 Man's Thoughts are not at all times sted-  
 dy and resolute against all Imagination of  
*Chance, Fortune, or ill Design* in Things,  
 he is no *perfect Theist*. But if any-  
 one believes more of Chance and Confu-  
 sion than of Design; he is to be esteem'd  
 more *an Atheist* than *a Theist*, from  
 that which most predominates, or has the  
 ascendent. And in case he believes more  
 of the Prevalency of an ill-designing Prin-  
 ciple, than of a good one, he is rather a  
*Dæmonist*; and may be justly so call'd,  
 from the Side to which the Balance of his  
 Judgment most inclines.

ALL these sorts both of *Dæmonism*, *Polytheism*, *Atheism*, and *Theism*, may be ~~mix'd.~~ §. 2.

\* mix'd. Religion excludes only *perfect Atheism*. Perfect *Dæmonists* undoubtedly there are in Religion; because we know whole Nations who worship a *Devil* or *Fiend*, to whom they sacrifice and offer Prayers and Supplications, in reality on no other account than because they *fear him*. And we know very well that, in some Religions, there are those who expressly give no other Idea of *God*, than

\* As thus :

1. Theism with *Dæmonism*: 2. *Dæmonism* with *Polytheism*: 3. Theism with *Atheism*: 4. *Dæmonism* with *Atheism*: 5. *Polytheism* with *Atheism*: 6. Theism (as it stands in opposition to *Dæmonism*, and denotes Goodness in the superior *Deity*) with *Polytheism*: 7. The same Theism or *Polytheism* with *Dæmonism*: 8. Or with *Dæmonism* and *Atheism*.

1. As when *the one* chief Mind, or Sovereign Being, is (in the Believer's sense) divided between a good and an ill Nature, by being the *Cause* of Ill as well as Good: Or otherwise, when *Two* distinct and contrary Principles subsist; one, the Author of all Good, the other of all Ill.

2. As when there is not *one*, but *several* corrupt Minds who govern; which Opinion may be call'd *Polydæmonism*.

3. As when Chance is not excluded, but God and Chance divide.

4. As when an evil *Dæmon* and Chance divide.

5. As when many Minds and Chance divide.

6. As when there are more principal Minds than one, but agreeing in Good, with one and the same Will and Reason.

7. As when the same System of *Deity* or corresponding *Deity* subsists, together with a contrary Principle, or with several contrary Principles or governing Minds.

8. As when the last Case is, together with Chance.

Book I. of a Being arbitrary, violent, causing Ill,  
 ~~ and ordaining to Misery ; which in effect  
<sup>State of</sup>  
<sub>Opinions.</sub> is the same as to subtitute a DÆMON, or  
*Devil*, in his room.

Now since there are these several Opinions concerning *a superior Power* ; and since there may be found perhaps some Persons, who have no form'd Opinion at all upon this Subject ; either thro' *Scepticism*, Negligence of Thought, or Confusion of Judgment : the Consideration is, how any of these Opinions, or this want of any certain Opinion, may possibly consist with *VIRTUE* and *MERIT* ; or be compatible with an *honest* or *moral* Character.

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## P A R T II.

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### S E C T. I.

*A Confusion.* **W**HEN we reflect on any ordinary Frame or Constitution either of Art or Nature ; and consider how hard it is to give the least account of a particular *Part*, without a com-

competent Knowldg of the *Whole*: we Part 2. need not wonder to find our-selves at a <sup>l</sup><sup>o</sup><sup>f</sup><sup>s</sup> in many things relating to the Constitution and Frame of *Nature* her-self. For <sup>Whole and Parts.</sup> §. 1. to what End in Nature many things, even whole Species of Creatures, refer; or to what purpose they serve; will be hard for any-one justly to determine: But to what End the many Proportions and various Shapes of Parts in many Creatures actually serve; we are able, by the help of Study and Observation, to demonstrate, with great exactness.

WE know that every Creature has a private Good and Interest of his own; which Nature has compel'd him to seek, by all the Advantages afforded him, within the compass of his Make. We know that there is in reality a right and a wrong State of every Creature; and that his right-one is by Nature forwarded, and by himself affectionately sought. There being therefore in every Creature a certain *Interest or Good*; there must be also <sup>Interest or End in Creatures.</sup> a certain END, to which every thing in his Constitution must naturally refer. To this END, if any thing, either in his Appetites, Passions, or Affections, be not conducing, but the contrary; we must of necessity own it ill to him. And in this manner he is ill, *with respect to himself*; as he certainly is, *with respect to others*

Book i. of his kind, when any such Appetites or ~~Interest of the Species.~~ Passions make him any-way injurious to them. Now, if by the natural Constitution of any rational Creature, the same Irregularitys of Appetite which make him ill *to Others*, make him ill also *to Himself*; and if the same Regularity of Affections, which causes him to be good in one sense, causes him to be good also in *the other*; then is that Goodness by which he is thus useful to others, a real Good and Advantage to himself. And thus *Virtue* and *Interest* may be found at last to agree.

OF this we shall consider particularly in the latter part of our *Inquiry*. Our first Design is, to see if we can clearly determine what that Quality is to which we give the Name of *Goodness*, or *VIRTUE*.

*Private Good.*

SHOU'D a Historian or Traveller describe to us a certain Creature of a more solitary Disposition than ever was yet heard of; one who had neither Mate nor Fellow of any kind; nothing of his own Likeness, towards which he stood well-affected or inclin'd; nor any thing without, or beyond himself, for which he had the least Passion or Concern: we might be apt to say perhaps, without much hesitation, "That this was doubtless a very melancholy Creature, and that in this

"unfo-

“ unsociable and fullen State he was like Part 2.  
 “ to have a very disconsolate kind of w  
 “ Life.” But if we were assur’d, that §. 1.  
 notwithstanding all Appearances, the Creature  
 enjoy’d himself extremely, had a great relish of Life, and was in nothing wanting to his own Good; we might acknowledg perhaps, “ That the Creature  
 “ was no *Monster*, nor absurdly constitu-  
 “ ted *as to himself*.” But we shou’d hard- <sup>Private</sup> *SYSTEM.*  
 ly, after all, be induc’d to say of him,  
 “ That he was *a good Creature*.”

However, shou’d it be urg’d against us,  
 “ That such as he was, the Creature was  
 “ still *perfect in himself*, and therefore to  
 “ be esteem’d good: *For what had he to*  
 “ *do with others?*” In this sence, indeed, we might be forc’d to acknowledg,  
 “ That he was *a good Creature*; if he  
 “ cou’d be understood to be absolute and  
 “ compleat in himself; without any real  
 “ relation to any thing in the Universe  
 “ besides.” For shou’d there be any where in Nature *a System*, of which this living <sup>System of</sup> *Creature* was to be consider’d as *a Part*; <sup>the Species.</sup> then cou’d he no-wise be allow’d *good*; whilst he plainly appear’d to be such *a Part*, as made rather to the harm than good of that System or *Whole* in which he was included.

IF therefore in the Structure of this or any other Animal, there be any thing which

Book 1. which points beyond himself, and by which  
he is plainly discover'd to have relation to  
some other Being or Nature besides his  
own ; then will this Animal undoubtedly  
be esteem'd *a Part* of some other System.  
For instance, if an Animal has the Proportion-  
tions of a Male, it shews he has relation to  
a Female. And the respective Proportions  
both of the Male and Female will be al-  
low'd, doubtless, to have a joint-relation  
to another Existence and Order of things  
beyond themselves. So that the Creatures  
are both of 'em to be consider'd as Parts of  
*another System* : which is that of a parti-  
cular Race or Species of living Creatures,  
who have some one *common Nature*, or are  
provided for, by some one *Order* or *Con-  
stitution* of things subsisting together, and  
co-operating towards their Conservation,  
and Support.

*Animal  
System.*

IN the same manner, if a whole Species  
of Animals contribute to the Existence or  
Well-being of some other ; then is that  
whole Species, in general, *a Part* only of  
some other System.

FOR instance ; To the Existence of the  
Spider, that of the Fly is absolutely ne-  
cessary. The heedless Flight, weak Frame,  
and tender Body of this latter Insect, fit  
and determine him as much *a Prey*, as the  
rough Make, Watchfulness, and Cunning  
of

of the former, fit him for Rapine, and the Part 2.  
ensnaring part. The Web and Wing are ~~are~~  
suited to each other. And in the Structure §. I.  
of each of these Animals, there is as appa-  
rent and perfect a relation to the other, as  
in our own Bodys there is a relation of  
Limbs and Organs; or, as in the Branches  
or Leaves of a Tree, we see a relation of  
each to the other, and all, in common, to  
one Root and Trunk.

IN the same manner are Flies also necef-  
sary to the Existence of other Creatures,  
both Fowls and Fish. And thus are other  
Species or Kinds subservient to one ano-  
ther; as being *Parts of a certain System*,  
and included in one and the same *Order* of  
Beings.

So that there is a System of all Animals;  
an *Animal-Order* or *OEconomy*, according  
to which the animal Affairs are regulated  
and dispos'd.

Now, if the whole System of Animals, <sup>System of</sup> *the Earth.*  
together with that of Vegetables, and all  
other things in this inferior World, be  
properly comprehended in *one System* of a  
Globe or Earth: And if, again, this *Globe* <sup>Planetary</sup> *System.*  
*Earth* it-self appears to have a real De-  
pendence on something still beyond; as,  
for example, either on its Sun, the Ga-  
laxy, or its Fellow-Planets; then is it in  
I reality

Book I. reality a PART only of some other System. And if it be allow'd, that there is in *Universal System.* like manner a SYSTEM of all Things, and a Universal Nature; there can be no particular Being or System which is not either good or ill in that general one of the Universe: For if it be insignificant and of no use, it is a Fault or Imperfection, and consequently ill in the general System.

THEREFORE if any Being be wholly and really ILL, it must be ill with respect to the Universal System; and then the System of the Universe is ill, or imperfect. But if the Ill of one private System be the Good of others; if it makes still to the Good of the general System, (as when one Creature lives by the Destruction of another; one thing is generated from the Corruption of another; or one planetary System or Vortex may swallow up another) then is the Ill of that private System no real Ill in it-self; any more than the pain of breeding Teeth is ill, in a System or Body which is so constituted, that without this occasion of Pain, it wou'd suffer worse, by being defective.

So that we cannot say of any Being, that it is wholly and absolutely ill, unless we can positively shew and ascertain, that what we call ILL is no where GOOD besides, in any other System, or with respect

spec<sup>t</sup> to any other Order or Oeconomy Part 2.  
whatsoever.

~~~~~  
§. I.

BUT were there in the World any intire Species of Animals destructive to every other, it may be justly call'd an *ill Species*; as being ill in the *Animal-System*. And if in any Species of Animals (as in *Men*, for example) one Man is of a nature pernicious to the rest, he is in this respect justly styl'd *an ill Man*.

WE do not however say of any-one, that he is an *ill Man* because he has the Plague-Spots upon him, or because he has convulsive Fits which make him strike and wound such as approach him. Nor do we say on the other side, that he is *a good Man*, when having his Hands ty'd up, he is hinder'd from doing the Mischief he designs; or (which is in a manner the same) when he abstains from executing his ill purpose, thro' a fear of some impending Punishment, or thro' the allurement of some exterior Reward.

So that in a sensible Creature, that which is not done thro' any Affection at all, makes neither Good nor Ill in the nature of that Creature; who then only is suppos'd *Good*, when the Good or Ill of the System to which he has relation, is the immediate Object of some Passion or Affection moving him.

SINCE

Book I.

 SINCE it is therefore by Affection merely that a Creature is esteem'd good or ill, *natural* or *unnatural*; our busines will be, to examine which are the *good* and *natural*, and which the *ill* and *unnatural* Affections.

S E C T. II.

*Private
or Self-
Affection.*

IN the first place then, it may be observ'd, that if there be an Affection towards any Subject consider'd as private Good, which is * not really such, but imaginary; this Affection, as being superfluous, and detracting from the Force of other requisite and good Affections, is in it-self vicious and ill, even in respect of the private Interest or Happiness of the Creature.

IF there can possibly be suppos'd in a Creature such an Affection towards Self-Good, as is actually, in its natural degree, conducing to his private Interest, and at the same time inconsistent with the publick Good; this may indeed be call'd still a vicious Affection: And on this Supposition a Creature * cannot really be good and natural in respect of his Society or Publick, without being ill and unnatural toward himself. But if the Affection be

* *Infra, pag. 79, &c. 163, 4, &c.*

then

then only injurious to the Society, when it Part 2. is immoderate, and not so when it is moderate, duly temper'd, and allay'd; then is *§. 2.* the immoderate degree of the Affection truly vicious, but not the moderate. And thus, if there be found in any Creature a more than ordinary Self-concernment, or Regard to private Good, which is inconsistent with the Interest of the Species or Publick; this must in every respect be esteem'd an ill and vicious Affection. And this is what we commonly call * SELFISHNESS, and disapprove so much, in whatever Creature we happen to discover it.

ON the other side, if the Affection towards private or Self-good, however *selfish* it may be esteem'd, is in reality not only consistent with publick Good, but in some measure contributing to it; if it be such, perhaps, as for the good of the Species in general, every Individual ought to share; 'tis so far from being ill, or blameable in any sense, that it must be acknowledg'd absolutely necessary to constitute a Creature *Good*. For if the want of such an Affection as that towards Self-preservation, be injurious to the Species; a Creature is ill and unnatural as well thro' this Defect, as thro' the want of any other natural Affection. And this no-one wou'd

* VOL. I. pag. 120.

Book I. doubt to pronounce, if he saw a Man who
Private or Self-Affection. minded not any Precipices which lay in his way, nor made any distinction of Food, Diet, Clothing, or whatever else related to his Health and Being. The same wou'd be aver'd of one who had a Disposition which render'd him averse to any Commerce with Womankind, and of consequence unfitted him thro' *Illness of Temper* (and not merely thro' a *Defect of Constitution*) for the propagation of his Species or Kind.

THUS the Affection towards Self-good, may be a good Affection, or an ill-one. For if this private Affection be too strong, (as when the *excessive Love of Life* unfits a Creature for any generous Act) then is it undoubtedly vicious; and if vicious, the Creature who is mov'd by it, is viciously mov'd, and can never be otherwise than vicious in some degree, when mov'd by that Affection. Therefore if thro' such an earnest and passionate *Love of Life*, a Creature be accidentally induc'd to do Good, (as he might be upon the same terms induc'd to do ILL) he is no more a good Creature for this Good he executes, than a Man is the more an honest or good Man either for pleading a just Cause, or fighting in a good one, for the sake merely of his Fee or Stipend.

WHATSOEVER therefore is done which happens to be advantageous to the Species, thro' an Affection merely towards Self-good, does not imply any more Goodness in the Creature than as the Affection it-self is good. Let him, in any particular, act ever so well; if at the bottom, it be that selfish Affection alone which moves him; he is in himself still vicious. Nor can any Creature be consider'd otherwise, when the Passion towards Self-good, tho' ever so moderate, is his real Motive in the doing that, to which a natural Affection for his Kind ought by right to have inclin'd him.

AND indeed whatever exterior Helps or *Temper*, Succours an ill-dispos'd Creature may find, to push him on towards the performance of any one good Action; there can no Goodness arise in him, till his *Temper* be so far chang'd, that in the issue he comes in earnest to be led by some immediate Affection, *directly*, and not *accidentally*, to Good, and against Ill.

FOR instance; if one of those Creatures suppos'd to be by Nature tame, gentle, and favourable to Mankind, be, contrary to his natural Constitution, fierce and savage; we instantly remark the Breach of *Temper*, and own the Creature to be unnatural and corrupt. If at any time afterwards,

Book I. wards, the same Creature, by good Fortune or right Management, comes to lose his *Temper.* Fierceness, and is made tame, gentle, and treatable, like other Creatures of his Kind; 'tis acknowledg'd that the Creature thus restor'd becomes good and natural. Suppose, now, that the Creature has indeed a tame and gentle Carriage; but that it proceeds only from *the fear of his Keeper;* which if set aside, his predominant Paffion instantly breaks out: then is his Gentle-ness not his real Temper; but, his true and genuine *Nature* or *natural Temper* remaining just as it was, the Creature is still as ill as ever.

NOTHING therefore being properly either Goodness or Illness in a Creature, except what is from *natural Temper*; "A good Creature is such a one as by the natural Temper or Bent of his Affections is carry'd *primarily and immediately*, and not *secondarily and accidentally*, to Good, and against Ill:" And an ill Creature is just the contrary; viz. "One who is wanting in right Affections, of force enough to carry him *directly* towards Good, and bear him out against Ill; or who is carry'd by other Affections directly to Ill, and against Good."

WHEN in general, all the Affections or Passions are futed to the publick Good, or good

good of the Species, as above-mention'd; Part 2, then is the *natural Temper* intirely good. *~~~~~*
If, on the contrary, any requisite Passion *§. 2.*
be wanting; or if there be any one super-
numerary, or weak, or any-wise disservice-
able, or contrary to that main End; then
is the natural Temper, and consequently
the Creature himself, in some measure cor-
rupt and ill.

THERE is no need of mentioning either *Envy*, *Malice*, *Frowardness*, or other such hateful Passions; to shew in what manner they are ill, and constitute an *ill* Creature. But it may be necessary perhaps to remark, that even as to *Kindness* and *Love* of the most natural sort, (such as that of any Creature for its Offspring) if it be immoderate and beyond a certain degree, it is undoubtedly vicious. For thus over-great *Tenderness* destroys the Effect of *Love*, and excessive *Pity* renders us incapable of giving succour. Hence the Excess of motherly Love is own'd to be a *vicious Fondness*; over-great Pity, *Effeminacy and Weakness*; over-great Concern for Self-preservation, *Meanness and Cowardice*; too little, *Rashness*; and none at all, or that which is contrary, (*viz.* a Passion leading to Self-destruction) a *mad and desperate Depravity*.

S E C T. III.

BUT to proceed from what is esteem'd mere *Goodness*, and lies within the reach and capacity of all *sensible Creatures*, to that which is call'd *VIRTUE* or *MERIT*, and is allow'd to *Man* only.

Reflex Affection. IN a Creature capable of forming general Notions of Things, not only the outward Beings which offer themselves to the Sense, are the Objects of the Affection ; but the very *Actions* themselves, and the *Affections* of Pity, Kindness, Gratitude, and their Contrarys, being brought into the Mind by Reflection, become Objects. So that, by means of this reflected Sense, there arises another kind of Affection towards those very Affections themselves, which have been already felt, and are now become the Subject of a new Liking or Dislike.

THE Case is the same in *mental* or *moral* Subjects, as in ordinary *Bodys*, or the common Subjects of *Sense*. The Shapes, Motions, Colours, and Proportions of these latter being presented to our Eye ; there necessarily results a * Beauty or Deformity, according to the different Measure, Ar-

* *Infra*, pag. 414.

rangement

rangement and Disposition of their several Part 2. Parts. So in *Behaviour* and *Actions*, when ~~the~~ presented to our Understanding, there must §. 3. be found, of necessity, an apparent Difference, according to the Regularity or Irregularity of the Subjects.

THE MIND, which is Spectator or Auditor of other *Minds*, cannot be without its *Eye* and *Ear*; so as to discern Proportion, distinguish Sound, and scan each Sentiment or Thought which comes before it. It can let nothing escape its Censure. It feels the Soft and Harsh, the Agreeable and Disagreeable, in the Affections; and finds a *Foul* and *Fair*, a *Harmonious* and a *Dissonant*, as really and truly here, as in any musical Numbers, or in the outward Forms or Representations of sensible Things. Nor can it * with-hold its *Admiration* and *Extasy*, its *Aversion* and *Scorn*, any more in what relates to one than to the other of these Subjects. So that to deny the common and natural Sense of a SUBLIME and BEAUTIFUL in Things, will appear an † Affectation merely, to any-one who considers duly of this Affair.

Now as in the *sensible* kind of Objects, the Species or Images of Bodys, Colours, and Sounds, are perpetually moving before

* *Infra*, pag. 415, 418, 419, &c.

† VOL. I. p. 90, 91, 2, 3. VOL. III. p. 32, &c.

Book I. our Eyes, and acting on our Senses, even ^{Moral}
^{Beauty}
^{and De-}
^{formity.} when we sleep ; so in the *moral* and *intellectual* kind, the Forms and Images of Things are no less active and incumbent on the Mind, at all Seasons, and even when the real Objects themselves are absent.

IN these vagrant Characters or Pictures of *Manners*, which the Mind of necessity figures to it-self, and carrys still about with it, the Heart cannot possibly remain neutral ; but constantly takes part one way or other. However false or corrupt it be within it-self, it finds the difference, as to Beauty and Comeliness, between one *Heart* and another, one *Turn of Affection*, one *Behaviour*, one *Sentiment* and another ; and accordingly, in all disinterested Cases, must approve in some measure of what is natural and honest, and disapprove what is dishonest and corrupt.

THUS the several Motions, Inclinations, Passions, Dispositions, and consequent Carriage and Behaviour of Creatures in the various Parts of Life, being in several Views or Perspectives represented to the Mind, which readily discerns the Good and Ill towards the Species or Publick ; there arises a new Trial or Exercise of the Heart : which must either rightly and soundly affect what is just and right, and disaffect what is contrary ; or, corruptly
affect

affect what is ill, and disaffect what is worthy and good.

Part 2.
~~~~~  
§. 3.

AND in this Case alone it is we call *Publick Good an Object.* any Creature *worthy* or *virtuous*, when it can have the Notion of a publick Interest, and can attain the Speculation or Science of what is morally good or ill, admirable or blameable, right or wrong. For tho we may vulgarly call an ill Horse *vicious*, yet we never say of a good one, nor of any mere Beast, Idiot, or Changeling, tho ever so good-natur'd, that he is *worthy* or *virtuous*.

So that if a Creature be generous, kind, constant, compassionate; yet if he cannot reflect on what he himself does, or sees others do, so as to take notice of what is *worthy* or *honest*; and make that Notice or Conception of *Worth* and *Honesty* to be an Object of his Affection; he has not the Character of being *virtuous*: for thus, and *GOODNESS* no otherwise, he is capable of having *a Sense of Right or Wrong*; a Sentiment or *JUDGMENT* of what is done, thro' just, equal, and good Affection, or the contrary.

WHATSOEVER is done thro' any unequal Affection, is *iniquous*, *wicked*, and *wrong*. If the Affection be equal, sound, and good, and the Subject of the Affection such as may with advantage to Society

Book 1. ciety be ever in the same manner prosecu-  
 ~~~~~~ted, or affected ; this must necessarily con-  
 stitute what we call *Equity* and *Right* in
 any Action. For, **WRONG** is not such
 Action as is barely the Cause of Harm,
 (since at this rate a dutiful Son aiming at
 an Enemy, but by mistake or ill chance
 happening to kill his Father, wou'd do a
Wrong) but when any thing is done thro'
 insufficient or unequal Affection, (as when
 a Son shews no Concern for the Safety of
 a Father ; or, where there is need of Suc-
 cour, prefers an indifferent Person to him)
 this is of the nature of *Wrong*.

*Impair'd
Sense.*

NEITHER can any Weakness or Im-
 perfection in the Senses be the occasion of
Iniquity or *Wrong* ; if the Object of the
 Mind it-self be not at any time absurdly
 fram'd, nor any way improper, but su-
 table, just, and worthy of the Opinion
 and Affection apply'd to it. For if we
 will suppose a Man, who being sound and
 intire both in his Reason and Affection,
 has nevertheless so deprav'd a Constitu-
 tion or Frame of Body, that the natural
 Objects are, thro' his Organs of Sense, as
 thro' ill Glasses, falsely convey'd and mis-
 represented ; 'twill be soon observ'd, in
 such a Person's case, that since his Failure
 is not in his principal or leading Part ;
 he cannot in himself be esteem'd *iniquous*,
 or unjust.

TIS

'Tis otherwise in what relates to *Opinion*, Belief, or Speculation. For as the Extravagance of Judgment or Belief is such, that in some Countrys even Monkeys, Cats, Crocodiles, and other vile or destructive Animals, have been esteem'd *holy*, and worship'd even as *Deitys*; shou'd it appear to any-one of the Religion or Belief of those Countrys, that to fave such a Creature as a Cat, preferably to a Parent, was *Right*; and that other Men, who had not the same religious Opinion, were to be treated as Enemys, till converted; this wou'd be certainly *Wrong*, and wicked in the Believer: and every Action, grounded on this Belief, wou'd be an *iniquous*, wicked, and vicious Action.

AND thus whatsoever causes a Misconception or Misapprehension of the Worth or Value of any Object, so as to diminish a due, or raise any undue, irregular, or unsocial Affection, must necessarily be the occasion of *Wrong*. Thus he who affects or loves a Man for the sake of something which is reputed honourable, but which is in reality vicious, is himself vicious and ill. The beginnings of this Corruption may be noted in many Occurrences: As when an ambitious Man, by the Fame of his high Attempts, a Conqueror or a Pirate by his boasted Enterprizes, raises in another Person

§. 3.
*Corrupt
Opinion.*

Book I. Person an Esteem and Admiration of that
 ~~~~~ immoral and inhuman Character, which  
<sup>Right and</sup> <sub>Wrong.</sub> deserves Abhorrence: 'tis then that the  
 Hearer becomes corrupt, when he secretly  
 approves the Ill he hears. But on the o-  
 ther side, the Man who loves and esteems  
 another, as believing him to have that Vir-  
 tue which he has not, but only counter-  
 feits, is not on this account either vicious  
 or corrupt.

A MISTAKE therefore *in Fact* being  
 no Cause or Sign of ill Affection, can be  
 no Cause of Vice. But a Mistake of *Right*  
 being the Cause of unequal Affection, must  
 of necessity be the Cause of vicious Action,  
 in every intelligent or rational Being.

BUT as there are many Occasions where  
 the matter of *Right* may even to the most  
 discerning part of Mankind appear difficult,  
 and of doubtful Decision, 'tis not a slight  
 Mistake of this kind which can destroy the  
 Character of *a virtuous or worthy Man*. But  
 when, either thro' Superstition or ill Custom,  
 there come to be very gross Mistakes in the  
 assignment or application of the Affection;  
 when the Mistakes are either in their nature  
 so gross, or so complicated and frequent,  
 that a Creature cannot well live in a natu-  
 ral State; nor with due Affections, compa-  
 tible with human Society and civil Life;  
 then is the Character of VIRTUE forfeited.

AND

AND thus we find how far WORTH and VIRTUE depend on a knowledg of <sup>§. 3.</sup> Right and Wrong, and on a use of Reason, <sup>VICE in Opinion.</sup> sufficient to secure a right application of the Affections ; that nothing horrid or unnatural, nothing unexemplary, nothing destructive of that natural Affection by which the Species or Society is upheld, may, on any account, or thro' any Principle or Notion of Honour or Religion, be at any time affected or prosecuted as a good and proper object of Esteem. For such a Principle as this must be wholly vicious : and whatsoever is acted upon it, can be no other than Vice and Immorality. And thus if there be any thing which teaches Men either Treachery, Ingratitude, or Cruelty, by divine Warrant ; or under colour and pretence of any present or future Good to Mankind : if there be any thing which teaches Men to \* persecute their Friends thro' Love ; or to torment Captives of War in sport ; or to offer † human Sacrifice ; or to torment, macerate, or mangle themselves, in a religious Zeal, before their God ; or to commit any sort of Barbarity, or Brutality, as amiable or becoming : be it Custom which gives Applause, or Religion which gives a Sanc-  
tion ; this is not, nor ever can be *Virtue*,

\* VOL. I. p. 18, 19, 20. VOL. III. p. 115.  
† VOL. III. p. 124.

Book I. of any kind, or in any sense; but must remain still horrid Depravity, notwithstanding any Fashion, Law, Custom, or Religion; which may be ill and vicious *it-self*, but can never alter the *eternal Measures*, and immutable independent Nature of *Worth* and *VIRTUE*.

## S E C T. IV.

*Sensible  
and ratio-  
nal Ob-  
jects.*

UPON the whole. As to those Creatures which are only capable of being mov'd by *sensible Objects*; they are accordingly *good* or *vicious*, as the sensible Affections stand with them. 'Tis otherwise in Creatures capable of framing *rational Objects* of moral Good. For in one of this kind, shou'd the *sensible Affections* stand ever so much amiss; yet if they prevail not, because of those other *rational Affections* spoken of; 'tis evident, the Temper still holds good in the main; and the Person is with justice esteem'd virtuous by all Men.

*Trial of  
Virtue.*

MORE than this. If by Temper any one is passionate, angry, fearful, amorous; yet resists these Passions, and notwithstanding the force of their Impression, adheres to *Virtue*; we say commonly in this case, *that the Virtue is the greater*: and we say well. Tho if that which restrains the Person, and holds him to a virtuous-like Behaviour,

haviour, be no Affection towards Goodness Part 2.  
or Virtue it-self, but towards private Good         
merely, he is not in reality the more vir-  
tuous; as has been shewn before. But  
this still is evident, that if voluntarily, and  
without foreign Constraint, an angry Tem-  
per bears, or an amorous one refrains, so  
that neither any cruel or immodest Action  
can be forc'd from such a Person, tho ever  
so strongly tempted by his Constitution; we  
applaud his Virtue above what we shou'd  
naturally do, if he were free of this Temptation,  
and these Propensitys. At the same  
time, there is no body will say that a Pro-  
pensity to Vice can be an Ingredient in Vir-  
tue, or any way necessary to compleat a  
virtuous Character.

THERE seems therefore to be some kind of difficulty in the Case: but it amounts only to this. If there be any part of the Temper in which ill Passions or Affections are seated, whilst in another part the Affections towards moral Good are such as absolutely to master those Attempts of their Antagonists; this is the greatest *Proof* imaginable, that a strong Principle of Virtue lies at the bottom, and has possess'd it-self of the natural Temper. Whereas if there be no ill Passions stirring, a Person may be indeed more *cheaply virtuous*; that is to say, he may conform himself to the known Rules of Virtue,

Book i. without sharing so much of a virtuous Principle as another. Yet if that other Person, who has the Principle of Virtue so strongly implanted, comes at last to lose those contrary Impediments suppos'd in him, he certainly loses nothing in Virtue; but on the contrary, losing only what is vicious in his Temper, is left more intire to Virtue, and possesses it in a higher degree.

*Degrees of Virtue.* THUS is *Virtue* shar'd in different degrees by rational Creatures; such at least as are call'd *rational*; but who come short of that found and well-establish'd Reason, which alone can constitute a *just Affection*, a uniform and steddy *Will* and *Resolution*. And thus Vice and Virtue are found variously mix'd, and alternately prevalent in the several Characters of Mankind. For it seems evident from our *Inquiry*, that how ill soever the Temper or Passions may stand with respect either to the sensible or the moral Objects; however passionate, furious, lustful, or cruel any Creature may become; however vicious the Mind be, or whatever ill Rules or Principles it goes by; yet if there be any Flexibleness or favourable Inclination towards the least moral Object, the least appearance of moral Good, (as if there be any such thing as *Kindness*, *Gratitude*, *Bounty*, or *Compassion*) there is still something of *Virtue* left;

left ; and the Creature is not wholly vicious  
and unnatural.

Part 2.  
~~~~~  
§. 4.

Thus a Ruffian, who out of a sense of Fidelity and Honour of any kind, refuses to discover his Associates ; and rather than betray them, is content to endure Torments and Death ; has certainly some Principle of Virtue, however he may misapply it. 'Twas the same Case with that Malefactor, who rather than do the Office of Executioner to his Companions, chose to keep 'em company in their Execution.

IN short : As it seems hard to pronounce of any Man, " That he is *absolutely an Atheist* ;" so it appears altogether as hard to pronounce of any Man, " That he is *absolutely corrupt or vicious* ;" there being few, even of the horridest Villains, who have not something of *Virtue* in this imperfect sense. Nothing is more just than a known saying, " *That it is as hard to find a Man wholly Ill, as wholly Good :*" because wherever there is any good Affection left, there is certainly some *Goodness* or *Virtue* still in being.

AND, having consider'd thus of VIRTUE, *What it is in it-self* ; we may now consider how it stands *with respect to the Opinions concerning a DEITY*, as above-mention'd.

P A R T

P A R T III.

S E C T. I.

*Causes of
VICE.* **T**HE Nature of VIRTUE consisting (as has been explain'd) in a certain just Disposition, or proportionable Affection of a rational Creature towards the moral Objects of Right and Wrong; nothing can possibly in such a Creature exclude a Principle of Virtue, or render it ineffectual, except what,

1. E I T H E R takes away the *natural* and *just* Sense of Right and Wrong :

2. O R creates a *wrong* Sense of it :

3. O R causes the right Sense to be oppos'd, by *contrary* Affections.

Of VIR- **O**N the other side, nothing can assist, TUE. or advance the Principle of Virtue, except what either in some manner nourishes and promotes a Sense of Right and Wrong; or preserves it genuine and uncorrupt; or causes it, when such, to be obey'd, by subduing

subduing and subje^ctⁱng the other Affec- Part 3,
tions to it.

§. 1.

WE are to consider, therefore, how any of the above-mention'd Opinions on the Subject of a DEITY, may influence in these Cases, or produce either of these three Effects.

I. As to the first Case; THE TAKING ^{Loss of}
AWAY THE NATURAL SENSE OF ^{Moral}
RIGHT AND WRONG. ^{Sense,}

IT will not surely be understood, that by this is meant *the taking away the Notion of what is good or ill in the Species, or Society.* For of the Reality of such a *Good* and *Ill*, no rational Creature can possibly be insensible. Every one discerns and owns a publick Interest, and is conscious of what affects his Fellowship or Community. When we say therefore of a Creature, " That he has wholly lost the Sense of Right and Wrong ;" we suppose that being able to discern the *Good* and *Ill* of his Species, he has at the same time no Concern for either, nor any Sense of Excellency or Baseness in any moral Action, relating to one or the other. So that except merely with respect to a private and narrowly confin'd Self-good, 'tis suppos'd there is in such a Creature no *Liking* or

Book I. *Dislike* of Manners ; no Admiration, or
 ~~~ Love of any thing as morally good ; nor  
 Hatred of any thing as morally ill, be it  
 ever so unnatural or deform'd.

*Moral  
Sense.*

THERE is in reality no rational Creature whatsoever, who knows not that when he voluntarily offends or does harm to any-one, he cannot fail to create an Apprehension and Fear of like harm, and consequently a Resentment and Animosity in every Creature who observes him. So that the Offender must needs be conscious of being liable to such Treatment from every-one, as if he had in some degree offended All.

THUS Offence and Injury are always known as punishable by every-one ; and equal Behaviour, which is therefore call'd MERIT, as rewardable and well-deserving from every-one. Of this even the wickedest Creature living must have a *Sense*. So that if there be any further meaning in this *Sense* of Right and Wrong ; if in reality there be any *Sense* of this kind which an absolute wicked Creature has not ; it must consist in a real Antipathy or Aversion to *Injustice* or *Wrong*, and in a real Affection or Love towards *Equity* and *Right*, for its own sake, and on the account of its own natural Beauty and Worth.

[Tis

"Tis impossible to suppose a mere sensible Creature originally so ill-constituted, and unnatural, as that from the moment he comes to be try'd by sensible Objects, he shou'd have no one good Passion towards his Kind, no foundation either of Pity, Love, Kindness, or social Affection. "Tis full as impossible to conceive, that a rational Creature coming first to be try'd by rational Objects, and receiving into his Mind the Images or Representations of Justice, Generosity, Gratitude, or other Virtue, shou'd have no *Liking* of these, or *Dislike* of their contrarys; but be found absolutely indifferent towards whatsoever is presented to him of this sort. A Soul, indeed, may as well be without *Sense*, as without Admiration in the Things of which it has any knowledg. Coming therefore to a Capacity of seeing and admiring in this new way, it must needs find a Beauty and a Deformity as well in Actions, Minds, and Tempers, as in Figures, Sounds, or Colours. If there be no *real* Amiability or Deformity in moral Acts, there is at least *an imaginary one* of full force. Tho perhaps the Thing itself shou'd not be allow'd in Nature, the Imagination or Fancy of it must be allow'd to be from Nature alone. Nor can any thing besides Art and strong Endeavour, with long Practice and Meditation, over-

Book I. come such a *natural Prevention*, or \* *Pre-  
~ ~ possession* of the Mind, in favour of this  
*Moral Sense.* moral Distinction.

*How im-  
pair'd:*

*By opposite  
Affection,  
or Anti-  
pathy;*

SENSE of Right and Wrong therefore being as natural to us as *natural Affection* itself, and being a first Principle in our Constitution and Make; there is no speculative Opinion, Persuasion or Belief, which is capable *immediately* or *directly* to exclude or destroy it. That which is of original and pure Nature, nothing beside contrary Habit and Custom (a second Nature) is able to displace. And this Affection being *an original one* of earliest rise in the Soul or affectionate Part; nothing beside contrary Affection, by frequent check and controul, can operate upon it, so as either to diminish it in part, or destroy it in the whole.

'TIS evident in what relates to the Frame and Order of our *Bodys*; that no particular odd Mein or Gesture, which is either natural to us, and consequent to our Make, or accidental and by Habit acquir'd, can possibly be overcome by our immediate Disapprobation, or the contrary Bent of our Will, ever so strongly set against it. Such a Change cannot be effected without extraordinary Means, and the intervention of Art and Method, a strict Attention, and repeated Check. And

\* *Infra*, pag. 412, 420, 421.

even

even thus, Nature, we find, is hardly maf- Part 3.  
ter'd; but lies fullen, and ready to revolt, w  
on the first occasion. Much more is this §. 2.  
*the Mind's* Cafe in respect of that natural  
Affection and anticipating Fancy, which  
makes the sene of Right and Wrong.  
'Tis impossible that this can instantly, or  
without much Force and Violence, be ef-  
fac'd, or struck out of the natural Temper,  
even by means of the most extravagant Be-  
lief or Opinion in the World.

*Not by  
Opinion  
merely.*

NEITHER *Theism* therefore, nor *A-theism*, nor *Dæmonism*, nor any religious or irreligious Belief of any kind, being able to operate immediately or directly in this Cafe, but indirectly, by the intervention of opposite or of favourable Affections ca-  
sually excited by any such Belief; we may consider of this Effect in our last Cafe, where we come to examine the Agree-  
ment or Disagreement of other Affections with this natural and moral one which re-  
lates to Right and Wrong.

## S E C T. II.

II. AS to the second Cafe, viz. THE <sup>Corruption</sup> <sub>of Moral Sense.</sub> WRONG SENSE OR FALSE IMAGINATION OF RIGHT AND WRONG.

THIS can proceed only from the Force of Custom and Education in opposition to

D 3                      Nature;

Book I. Nature; as may be noted in those Countrys where, according to Custom or politick Institution, certain Actions naturally foul and odious are repeatedly view'd with Applause, and Honour ascrib'd to them. For thus 'tis possible that a Man, forcing himself, may eat the Flesh of his Enemys, not only against his Stomach, but against his Nature; and think it nevertheless both right and honourable; as supposing it to be of considerable service to his Community, and capable of advancing the Name, and spreading the Terror of his Nation.

*Causes of  
this Cor-  
ruption.*

*Custom.*

*Supersti-  
tion.*

BUT to speak of the Opinions relating to a DEITY; and what effect they may have in this place. As to *Atheism*, it does not seem that it can directly have any effect at all towards the setting up a false Species of Right or Wrong. For notwithstanding a Man may thro' Custom, or by licentiousness of Practice, favour'd by Atheism, come in time to lose much of his natural *moral Sense*; yet it does not seem that Atheism shou'd *of it-self* be the cause of any estimation or valuing of any thing as fair, noble, and deserving, which was the contrary. It can never, for instance, make it be thought that the being able to eat Man's Flesh, or commit Bestiality, is good and excellent in *it-self*. But this is certain, that by means of corrupt Religion, or SUPERSTITION, many things the most

most horridly unnatural and inhuman, Part 3.  
come to be receiv'd as excellent, good, and laudable in themselves. §. 2.

NOR is this a wonder. For where-ever any-thing, in its nature odious and abominable, is by Religion advanc'd, as the suppos'd Will or Pleasure of *a supreme Deity*; if in the eye of the Believer it appears not indeed in any respect the less ill or odious on this account; then must *the Deity* of necessity bear the blame, and be consider'd as a Being naturally ill and odious, how-ever courted, and follicited, thro' Mistrust and Fear. But this is what Religion, in the main, forbids us to imagine. It every-where prescribes Esteem and Honour in company with Worship and Adoration. Whensoever therefore it teaches the Love and Admiratio[n] of a DEITY, who has any apparent Chara[ct]er of *Ill*; it teaches at the same time a Love and Admiratio[n] of *that Ill*, and causes that to be taken for good and amiable, which is in it-self horrid and detestable.

FOR instance: if JUPITER be He who is ador'd and reverenc'd; and if his History represents him amorously inclin'd, and permitting his Desires of this kind to wander in the loosest manner; 'tis certain that his Worshippers, believing this History to be literally and strictly true, must of

Book i. course be taught a greater Love of amorous and wanton Acts. If there be a Religion which teaches the Adoration and Love of a God, whose Character it is to be captious, and of high resentment, subject to Wrath and Anger, furious, revengeful ; and revenging himself, when offended, on others than those who gave the Offence : and if there be added to the Character of this God, a fraudulent Disposition, encouraging Deceit and Treachery amongst Men ; favourable to a few, tho for slight causes, and cruel to the rest : 'tis evident that such a Religion as this being strongly enforc'd, must of necessity raise even an Approbation and Respect towards the Vices of this kind, and breed a suitable Disposition, a capricious, partial, revengeful, and deceitful Temper. For even *Irregularitys* and *Enormitys* of a heinous kind must in many cases appear illustrious to one, who considers them in a Being admir'd and contemplated with the highest Honour and Veneration.

THIS indeed must be allow'd ; that if in the *Cult* or Worship of such a Deity there be nothing beyond common Form, nothing beside what proceeds from mere Example, Custom, Constraint, or Fear ; if there be, at the bottom, no real Heartiness, no Esteem or Love imply'd ; the Worshiper perhaps may not be much

misled as to his Notion of Right and Part 3.  
Wrong. If in following the Precepts of ~~the~~  
his suppos'd God, or doing what he e- §. 2.  
steems necessary towards the satisfying of  
such his DEITY, he is compel'd only by  
Fear, and, contrary to his Inclination, per-  
forms an Act which he secretly detests as  
barbarous and unnatural; then has he an  
Apprehension or Sense still of Right and  
Wrong, and, according to what has been  
already observ'd, is sensible of Ill in the  
Character of his God; however cautious  
he may be of pronouncing any thing on  
this Subject, or so thinking of it, as to  
frame any formal or direct Opinion in the  
case. But if by insensible degrees, as he  
proceeds in his religious Faith and devout  
Exercise, he comes to be more and more  
reconcil'd to the Malignity, Arbitrariness,  
Partiality, or Revengefulness of his be-  
liev'd DEITY; his Reconciliation with  
these Qualitys themselves will soon grow in  
proportion; and the most cruel, unjust, and  
barbarous Acts, will, by the power of this  
Example, be often consider'd by him, not  
only as just and lawful, but as divine, and  
worthy of imitation.

FOR whoever thinks there is a God,  
and pretends formally to believe that he  
is *just* and *good*, must suppose that there is  
independently such a thing as *Justice* and  
*Injustice*, *Truth* and *Falshood*, *Right* and  
*Wrong*;

Book 1. *Wrong*; according to which he pronounces  
 that *God is just, righteous, and true*. If  
~~Supersti-~~  
 the mere *Will, Decree, or Law* of God  
 be said absolutely to constitute *Right* and  
*Wrong*, then are these latter words of no  
 significance at all. For thus if each part of  
 a Contradiction were affirm'd for Truth by  
 the supreme Power, they wou'd conse-  
 quently become *true*. Thus if one Person  
 were decreed to suffer for another's fault,  
 the Sentence wou'd be *just* and *equitable*.  
 And thus, in the same manner, if arbitrarily,  
 and without reason, some Beings were  
 destin'd to endure perpetual Ill, and others  
 as constantly to enjoy Good; this also  
 wou'd pass under the same Denomination.  
 But to say of any thing that it is *just* or *un-  
 just*, on such a foundation as this, is to say  
 nothing, or to speak without a meaning.

AND thus it appears, that where a real  
 Devotion and hearty Worship is paid to  
 a supreme Being, who in his History or  
 Character is represented otherwise than  
 as really and truly just and good; there  
 must ensue a Loss of Rectitude, a Dis-  
 turbance of Thought, and a Corruption  
 of Temper and Manners in the Believer.  
 His Honesty will, of necessity, be sup-  
 planted by his Zeal, whilst he is thus un-  
 naturally influenc'd, and render'd thus im-  
 morally devout.

## Part 3.

To this we need only add, that as the *ill Character* of a GOD does injury to the *Affections* of Men, and disturbs and impairs the natural Sense of Right and Wrong; so, on the other hand, nothing can more highly contribute to the fixing of right Apprehensions, and a found Judgment or Sense of Right and Wrong, than to believe a God who is ever, and on all accounts, represented such as to be actually a true Model and Example of the most exact Justice, and highest Goodness and Worth. Such a View of divine Providence and Bounty, extended to *All*, and express'd in a constant good Affection towards *the Whole*, must of necessity engage us, within our Compafs and Sphere, to act by a like Principle and Affection. And having once the Good of our Species or Publick in view, as our End or Aim, 'tis impossible we shou'd be misguided by any means to a false Apprehension or Sense of Right or Wrong.

As to this second Case therefore; RELIGION (according as the kind may prove) is capable of doing great Good, or Harm; and ATHEISM nothing positive in either way. For however it may be indirectly an occasion of Mens losing a good and sufficient Sense of Right and Wrong; it will not, as *Atheism merely*,  
be

Book I. be the occasion of setting up a false Species of it; which only false Religion, or fantastical Opinion, deriv'd commonly from Superstition and Credulity, is able to effect.

## S E C T. III.

*Opposition  
of the Af-  
fections.*

**N**OW as to the last Case, THE OPPOSITION MADE BY OTHER AFFECTIONS TO THE NATURAL SENSE OF RIGHT AND WRONG.

'T IS evident, that a Creature having this sort of SENSE or *good Affection* in any degree, must necessarily act according to it; if it happens not to be oppos'd, either by some settled sedate Affection towards a conceiv'd *private Good*, or by some sudden, strong and forcible Passion, as of *Lust* or *Anger*; which may not only subdue the Sense of Right and Wrong, but the very Sense of private Good it-self; and overrule even the most familiar and receiv'd Opinion of what is conduced to Self-interest.

BUT it is not our busines in this place to examine the several Means or Methods by which this Corruption is introduc'd or increas'd. We are to consider only how the Opinions concerning a *Deity* can influence one way or another.

T H A T

Part 3.

THAT it is possible for a Creature capable of using Reflection, to have a Lik<sup>ing</sup> or Dislike of moral Actions, and consequently a Sense of Right and Wrong, before such time as he may have any settled Notion of A GOD, is what will hardly be question'd: it being a thing not expected, or any-way possible, that a Creature such as *Man*, arising from his Childhood, slowly and gradually, to several degrees of Reason and Reflection, shou'd, at the very first, be taken up with those Speculations, or more refin'd sort of Reflections, about the Subject of GOD's Existence.

§. 3.  
*Rise of Moral Sense.*

LET us suppose a Creature, who wanting Reason, and being unable to reflect, has, notwithstanding, many good Qualitys and Affections; as Love to his Kind, Courage, Gratitude, or Pity. 'Tis certain that if you give to this Creature a reflecting Faculty, it will at the same instant approve of Gratitude, Kindness, and Pity; be taken with any shew or representation of the social Passion, and think nothing more amiable than this, or more odious than the contrary. And this is *to be capable of VIRTUE*, and *to have a Sense of RIGHT and WRONG.*

BEFORE

## Book I.

*Rise of Moral Sense.* BEFORE the time, therefore, that a Creature can have any plain or positive Notion one way or other, concerning the Subject of A GOD, he may be suppos'd to have an Apprehension or Sense of *Right* and *Wrong*, and be possess'd of *Virtue* and *Vice* in different degrees; as we know by Experience of those, who having liv'd in such places, and in such a manner as never to have enter'd into any serious Thoughts of Religion, are nevertheless very different among themselves, as to their Characters of Honesty and Worth: some being naturally *modest*, *kind*, *friendly*, and consequently Lovers of *kind* and *friendly Actions*; others *proud*, *harsh*, *cruel*, and consequently inclin'd to admire rather the Acts of *Violence* and mere *Power*.

*DEITY.* Now, as to the Belief of a DEITY, and how Men are influenc'd by it; we may consider, in the first place, on what account Men yield Obedience, and act in conformity to such a supreme Being. It must be either *in the way of his Power*, as presupposing some Disadvantage or Benefit to accrue from him: or *in the way of his Excellency and Worth*, as thinking it the Perfection of Nature to imitate and resemble him.

IF, as in the first Case, there be a Belief or Conception of a DEITY, who is consider'd only as *powerful* over his Creature, and inforsing Obedience to his *absolute Will* by particular Rewards and Punishments; and if on this account, thro' hope merely of *Reward*, or fear of *Punishment*, the Creature be incited to do the Good he hates, or restrain'd from doing the Ill to which he is not otherwise in the least degree averfe; there is in this Case (as has been already shewn) no Virtue or Goodnes whatsoever. The Creature, notwithstanding his good Conduct, is intrinsically of as little Worth, as if he acted in his natural way, when under no dread or terror of any sort. There is no more of *Rectitude*, *Piety*, or *Sanctity* in a Creature thus reform'd, than there is *Meekness* or *Gentleness* in a Tiger strongly chain'd, or *Innocence* and *Sobriety* in a Monkey under the Discipline of the Whip. For however orderly and well those Animals, or Man himself upon like terms, may be induc'd to act, whilst the Will is neither gain'd, nor the Inclination wrought upon, but *Awe* alone prevails and forces Obedience; the Obedience is *servile*, and all which is done thro' it, merely *servile*. The greater degree of such a Submission or Obedience, is only the greater *Servility*; whatever may

Book I. may be the Object. For whether such a  
 ~~~~~ Creature has a good Master, or an ill one,  
 Fear. he is neither more or less servile in his own
 nature. Be the Master or Superior ever
 so perfect, or excellent, yet the greater
 Submission caus'd in this Case, thro' this
 sole Principle or Motive, is only the lower
 and more abject Servitude ; and implies
 the greater Wretchedness and Meanness in
 the Creature, who has those Passions of Self-
 love so predominant, and is in his Tem-
 per so vicious and defective, as has been
 explain'd.

Honour and Love. As to the second Case. If there be a
 Belief or Conception of a DEITY, who
 is consider'd as *worthy* and *good*, and admir'd and reverenc'd as such ; being under-
 stood to have, besides mere Power and
 Knowldg, the highest Excellence of Na-
 ture, such as renders him justly amiable to
 All : and if in the manner this Sovereign
 and mighty Being is represented, or, as he
 is historically describ'd, there appears in
 him a high and eminent regard to what is
 good and excellent, a Concern for the
 good of *All*, and an Affection of Benevo-
 lence and Love towards *the Whole* ; such
Divine Example. an Example must undoubtedly serve (as
 above explain'd) to raise and increase the
 Affection towards Virtue, and help to sup-
 mit and subdue all other Affections to that
 alone.

NOR is this Good effected by *Example* merely. For where the Theistical Belief is intire and perfect, there must be a steady Opinion of the Superintendency of a Supreme Being, a Witness and Spectator of human Life, and conscious of whatsoever is felt or acted in the Universe: So that in the perfectest Recess, or deepest Solitude, there must be *One* still presum'd remaining with us; whose Presence singly must be of more moment than that of the most august Assembly on Earth. In such a *Pre-Divine Presence.* sence, 'tis evident, that as the *Shame* of guilty Actions must be the greatest of any; so must the *Honour* be, of well-doing, even under the unjust Censure of a World. And in this Case, 'tis very apparent how conduced a *perfect Theism* must be to Virtue, and how great Deficiency there is in *Atheism*.

WHAT the FEAR of future Punish- *Fear and*
ment, and HOPE of future Reward, ad- *Hope.*
ded to this Belief, may further contribute towards Virtue, we come now to consider more particularly. So much in the mean while may be gather'd from what has been said above; That neither this Fear or Hope can possibly be of the kind call'd *good Affections*, such as are acknowledg'd the Springs and Sources of all Actions truly *good*. Nor can this Fear or

Book I. Hope, as above intimated, consist in reality with Virtue, or Goodness ; if it either stands as *essential* to any moral Performance, or as a *considerable Motive* to any Act, of which some better Affection ought, alone, to have been a *sufficient Cause*.

Self-love, IT may be consider'd withal ; That, in this religious sort of Discipline, the Principle of *Self-love*, which is naturally so prevailing in us, being no-way moderated or restrain'd, but rather improv'd and made stronger every day, by the exercise of the Passions in a Subject of more extended Self-interest ; there may be reason to apprehend lest the Temper of this kind shou'd extend it-self in general thro' all the Parts of Life. For if the Habit be such as to occasion, in every particular, a stricter Attention to Self-good, and private Interest ; it must insensibly diminish the Affections towards publick Good, or the Interest of Society ; and introduce a certain Narrowness of Spirit, which (as some pretend) is peculiarly observable in the devout Persons and Zealots of almost every religious Persuasion.

*Its Effects
in Religion.* THIS, too, must be confess'd ; That if it be true Piety, to love GOD for his own sake ; the over-solicitous regard to private Good expected from him, must of necessity prove a diminution of Piety.

ty. For whilst *God* is belov'd only as Part 3.
the Cause of private Good, he is no o-therwise belov'd than as any other Instru- §. 3.
ment or Means of Pleasure by any vi-
tious Creature. Now the more there is
of this violent Affection towards *private*
Good, the less room is there for the other
sort towards *Goodness it-self*, or any good
and deserving Object, worthy of Love
and Admiration for its own sake; such as
God is universally acknowledg'd, or at
least by the generality of civiliz'd or re-
fin'd Worshipers.

"Tis in this respect that the strong
Desire and *Love of Life* may also prove
an Obstacle to Piety, as well as to Vir-
ture and publick Love. For the stronger
this Affection is in any-one, the less will
he be able to have true *Resignation*, or
Submission to the Rule and Order of
THE DEITY. And if that which he ^{False Re-}
calls *Resignation* depends only on the ex-^{signation.}
pe^ctation of infinite Retribution or Re-
ward, he discovers no more Worth or Vir-
ture here, than in any other Bargain of
Interest: The meaning of his Resigna-
tion being only this, " That he resigns
" his present Life and Pleasures, condi-
" tionally for THAT, which he himself
" confesses to be beyond an Equivalent;
" eternal living in a State of highest Plea-
" sure and Enjoyment."

Book I.

~~~ BUT notwithstanding the Injury which the Principle of Virtue may possibly suffer, by the Increase of the selfish Passion, in the way we have been mentioning ; 'tis certain, on the other side, that the *Belief of future Life* ; and *Hope of future Reward*, how mercenary or servile soever it may be accounted, is yet, in many Circumstances, a great Advantage, Security, and Support to *Virtue*.
How ad-
vanta-
geous.

Support-
ing.

IT has been already consider'd, that notwithstanding there may be implanted in the Heart a real Sense of Right and Wrong, a real good Affection towards the Species or Society ; yet by the violence of Rage, Lust, or any other counter-working Passion, this good Affection may frequently be controul'd and overcome. Where therefore there is nothing in the Mind capable to render such ill Passions the Objects of its Aversion, and cause them earnestly to be oppos'd ; 'tis apparent how much a good Temper in time must suffer, and a Character by degrees change for the worse. But if Religion interposing, creates a Belief that the ill *Passions* of this kind, no less than their consequent *Actions*, are the Objects of a Deity's Animadversion ; 'tis certain, that such a Belief must prove a seasonable Remedy against

against Vice, and be in a particular manner advantageous to Virtue. For a Belief of this kind must be suppos'd to tend considerably towards the calming of the Mind, and disposing or fitting the Person to a better Recollection of himself, and to a stricter Observance of that good and virtuous Principle, which needs only his Attention, to engage him wholly in its Party and Interest.

AND as this Belief of a future Reward *Saving.* and Punishment is capable of supporting those who thro' *ill Practice* are like to apostatize from Virtue; so when by *ill Opinion* and wrong Thought, the Mind it-self is bent against the honest Course, and debauch'd even to an Esteem, and deliberate Preference of a vicious one; the Belief of the kind mention'd may prove on this occasion the only Relief and Safety.

A PERSON, for instance, who has much of Goodness and natural Rectitude in his Temper, but withal, so much Softness, or Effeminacy, as unfits him to bear Poverty, Crosses or Adversity; if by ill Fortune he meets with many Trials of this kind, it must certainly give a Sourness and Distaste to his Temper, and make him exceedingly averse to that which he may falsely presume the occasion

Book I. of such Calamity or Ill. Now if his own *Belief of future Life*; Thoughts, or the corrupt Insinuations of other Men, present it often to his Mind,

“ That his HONESTY is the occasion of this Calamity, and that if he were deliver'd from this Restraint of VIRTUE and HONESTY, he might be much happier : ” 'tis very obvious that his Esteem of these good Qualitys must in proportion diminish every day, as the Temper grows uneasy, and quarrels with it-self. But if he opposes to this Thought the Consideration, “ That Honesty carrys with it, if not a present, at least a future Advantage, such as to compensate that Loss of private Good which he regrets ; ” then may this injury to his good Temper and honest Principle be prevented, and his Love or Affection towards Honesty and Virtue remain as it was before.

Improv-ing.

In the same manner, where instead of *Regard* or *Love*, there is rather *an Aversion* to what is good and virtuous, (as, for instance, where *Lenity* and *Forgiveness* are despis'd, and *Revenge* highly thought of, and belov'd) if there be this Consideration added, “ That *Lenity* is, by its Rewards, made the caufe of a greater Self-good and Enjoyment than what is found in *Revenge* ; ” that very Affection of *Lenity* and *Mildness* may come to be industriously nourish'd, and the contrary Passion

fion depress'd. And thus *Temperance, Modesty, Candour, Benignity*, and other good Affections, however despis'd at first, may come at last to be valu'd for their own Sakes, the contrary Species rejected, and the good and proper Object belov'd and prosecuted, when the Reward or Punishment is not so much as thought of.

THUS in a civil STATE or PUBLICK, Rewards and Punishments, we see that a virtuous Administration, and an equal and just Distribution of Rewards and Punishments, is of the highest service; not only by restraining the Vicious, and forcing them to act usefully to Society; but by making Virtue to be apparently the Interest of every-one, so as to remove all Prejudices against it, create a fair reception for it, and lead Men into that path which afterwards they cannot easily quit. For thus a People rais'd from Barbarity or despotick Rule, civiliz'd by Laws, and made virtuous by the long Course of a lawful and just Administration; if they chance to fall suddenly under any Misgovernement of unjust and arbitrary Power, they will on this account be the rather animated to exert a stronger Virtue, in opposition to such Violence and Corruption. And even where, by long and continu'd Arts of a prevailing Tyranny, such a People are at last totally oppress'd, the scatter'd Seeds of Virtue will

Book I. will for a long time remain alive, even
~~~~~ to a second Generation; ere the utmost  
*Rewards and Punishments.* Force of misapply'd Rewards and Punish-  
ments can bring them to the abject  
and compliant State of long-accustom'd  
Slaves.

BUT tho a right Distribution of Justice  
in a Government be so essential a cause  
of Virtue, we must observe in this Case,  
that it is *Example* which chiefly influences  
Mankind, and forms the Character and  
Disposition of a People. For a virtuous  
Administration is in a manner necessarily  
accompany'd with Virtue in the Magistrate.  
Otherwise it cou'd be of little effect, and  
of no long duration. But where it is sin-  
cere and well establish'd, there Virtue and  
the Laws must necessarily be respected and  
belov'd. So that as to Punishments and  
Rewards, their Efficacy is not so much  
from the Fear or Expectation which  
they raise, as from a natural Esteem of  
*Virtue*, and Detestation of *Villany*, which  
is awaken'd and excited by these publick  
Expressions of the Approbation and Ha-  
tred of Mankind in each Case. For in  
the publick Executions of the greatest  
Villains, we see generally that the Infamy  
and Odiousness of their Crime, and the  
Shame of it before Mankind, contribute  
more to their Misery than all besides; and  
that it is not the immediate Pain, or Death  
it-

it-self, which raises so much Horror either Part 3.  
in the Sufferers or Spectators, as that igno- ~~minious~~  
minious kind of Death which is inflicted §. 3.  
for publick Crimes, and Violations of Jus-  
tice and Humanity.

AND as the Case of Reward and Punish- *In the Fa-*  
ment stands thus in the Publick, so, in the *mily.*  
same manner, as to *private Familys.* For  
Slaves and mercenary Servants, restrain'd  
and made orderly by Punishment, and the  
Severity of their Master, are not on this  
account made good or honest. Yet the  
same Master of the Family using proper  
Rewards and gentle Punishments towards  
his Children, teaches them Goodnes ; and  
by this help instructs them in a Virtue,  
which afterwards they practise upon other  
grounds, and without thinking of a Penali-  
ty or Bribe. And this is what we call *a Liberal Education* and *a Liberal Service* :  
the contrary Service and Obedience, whe-  
ther towards God or Man, being *illiberal*,  
and unworthy of any Honour or Commen-  
dation.

IN the Case of Religion, however, it *In Reli-*  
must be consider'd, that if by the *Hope of* <sup>gion.</sup>  
*Reward* be understood the Love and De-  
sire of virtuous Enjoyment, or of the very  
Practice and Exercise of Virtue in another  
Life ; the Expectation or Hope of this  
kind is so far from being derogatory to

Book I. Virtue, that it is an Evidence of our ~~loving~~ loving it the more sincerely and *for its own sake*. Nor can this Principle be justly call'd *selfish*: for if the Love of Virtue be not mere Self-Interest, the Love and Desire of Life for Virtue's sake cannot be esteem'd so. But if the Desire of Life be only thro' the Violence of that natural Aversion to Death; if it be thro' the Love of something else than virtuous Affection, or thro' the Unwillingness of parting with something else than what is purely of this kind; then is it no longer any sign or token of real Virtue.

THUS a Person loving Life for Life's sake, and Virtue not at all, may by the Promise or Hope of Life, and Fear of Death, or other Evil, be induc'd to practise Virtue, and even *endeavour* to be truly virtuous, by a Love of what he practises. Yet neither is *this very Endeavour* to be esteem'd *a Virtue*: For tho' he may intend to be virtuous, he is not become so, for having only intended, or aim'd at it, thro' love of the Reward. But as soon as he is come to have any Affection towards what is morally good, and can like or affect such Good *for its own sake*, as good and amiable *in itself*; then is he in some degree good and virtuous, and not till then.

Part 3.

SUCH are the Advantages or Disadvantages which accrue to Virtue from Reflection upon private Good or Interest. §. 3. Security to Virtue.

For tho the Habit of *Selfishness*, and the Multiplicity of *interested Views*, are of little Improvement to real *Merit* or *Virtue*; yet there is a necessity for the preservation of *Virtue*, that it shou'd be thought to have no quarrel with *true Interest*, and *Self-enjoyment*.

WHOEVER therefore, by any strong Persuasion or settled Judgment, thinks in the main, *That Virtue causes Happiness, and Vice Misery*, carrys with him that Security and Assistance to Virtue which is requir'd. Or tho he has no such Thought, nor can believe Virtue his real Interest, either with respect to his own Nature and Constitution, or the Circumstances of human Life; yet if he believes any supreme Powers concern'd in the *present Affairs* of Mankind, and *immediately* interposing in behalf of the Honest and Virtuous, against the Impious and Unjust; this will serve to preserve in him, however, that just Esteem of Virtue, which might otherwise considerably diminish. Or shou'd he still believe little of the *immediate Interposition* of Providence in the Affairs of *this present Life*; yet if he believes a God dispensing Rewards and Punishments to Vice and Virtue in

Book i. in *a future*; he carrys with him still the  
*Caution.* fame Advantage and Security; whilst his  
Belief is steddy, and no-wise wavering or  
doubtful. For it must be observ'd, that  
an Expectation and Dependency, so mira-  
culous and great as this, must naturally  
take off from other inferior Dependency's  
and Encouragements. Where infinite Re-  
wards are thus inforc'd, and the Imagination  
strongly turn'd towards them, the o-  
ther common and natural Motives to Good-  
ness are apt to be neglected, and lose much  
by Dis-use. Other Interests are hardly so  
much as computed, whilst the Mind is  
thus transported in the pursuit of a high  
Advantage and Self-Interest, so narrowly  
confin'd within our-selves. On this ac-  
count, all other Affections towards Friends,  
Relations, or Mankind, are often slightly  
regarded, as being *worldly*, and of little  
moment, in respect of the Interest of *our  
Soul*. And so little thought is there of  
any immediate Satisfaction arising from  
such good Offices of Life, that it is custo-  
mary with many devout People zealously

*Imprudent  
Zeal.* to decry all temporal Advantages of Good-  
ness, all natural Benefits of Virtue; and  
magnifying the contrary Happiness of a  
vicious State, to declare, " That except  
" only for the sake of future Reward, and  
" fear of future Punishment, they wou'd  
" divest themselves of all Goodness at  
" once, and freely allow themselves to be  
" most

"most immoral and profligate." From Part 3. whence it appears, that in some respects there can be nothing more \* fatal to Virtue, than the weak and uncertain Belief of a future Reward and Punishment. For the stress being laid wholly here, if this Foundation come to fail, there is no further Prop or Security to Mens Morals. And thus Virtue is supplanted and betray'd.

Now as to ATHEISM: tho it be plainly deficient and without remedy, in the case of *ill Judgment on the Happiness of Virtue*; yet it is not, indeed, of necessity the Cause of any such *ill Judgment*. For without an absolute Assent to any Hypothesis of *Theism*, the Advantages of Virtue may possibly be seen and own'd, and a high Opinion of it establish'd in the Mind. However, it must be confess'd, that the natural Tendency of Atheism is very different.

"Tis in a manner impossible, to have any great opinion of the Happiness of Virtue, without conceiving high thoughts of the Satisfaction resulting from the generous Admiration and Love of it: And nothing beside the Experience of such a Love is likely to make this Satisfaction credited. The chief Ground and Support therefore of this Opinion of *Happiness in Virtue*, must arise from the powerful feeling of this ge-

\* VOL. I. p. 97, &c.

Book I. neros moral Affection, and the knowledg  
 of its Power and Strength. But this is cer-  
 tain, that it can be no great strengthning to  
 the moral Affection, no great support to  
 the pure Love of Goodnes and Virtue, to  
 suppose there is neither *Goodnes* nor *Beau-*  
*ty* in the WHOLE it-self; nor any Exam-  
 ple, or Precedent of good Affection in any  
 superior Being. Such a Belief must tend  
 rather to the weaning the Affections from  
 any thing amiable or self-worthy, and to  
 the suppressing the very Habit and familiar  
 Custom of admiring natural Beautys, or  
 whatever in the Order of things is according  
 to just Design, Harmony, and Proportion.  
 For how little dispos'd must a Person be, to  
 love or admire any thing as *orderly* in the  
 Universe, who thinks the Universe it-self a  
 Pattern of *Disorder*? How unapt to reve-  
 rence or respect any particular subordinate  
 Beauty of *a Part*; when even THE WHOLE  
 it-self is thought to want Perfection, and  
 to be only a vast and infinite Deformity?

NOTHING indeed can be more melan-  
 choly, than the Thought of living in a  
 distracted Universe, from whence many  
 Ills may be suspected, and where there is  
 nothing good or lovely which presents it-  
 self, nothing which can satisfy in Contem-  
 plation, or raise any Passion besides that  
 of Contempt, Hatred, or Dislike. Such  
 an Opinion as this may by degrees im-  
 bitter

bitter the Temper, and not only make the Part 3.  
Love of Virtue to be less felt, but help to ~~the~~  
impair and ruin the very Principle of Vir- §. 3.  
tue, viz. *natural and kind Affection.*

UPON the whole; whoever has a firm *Theism.*  
Belief of a GOD, whom he does not merely  
*call* good, but of whom in reality he  
*believes* nothing beside *real Good*, nothing  
beside what is truly suitable to the exactest  
Character of Benignity and Goodness; such  
a Person believing Rewards or Retribu-  
tions in another Life, must believe them  
annex'd to real Goodness and Merit, real  
Villany and Baseness, and not to any acci-  
dental Qualities or Circumstances; in which  
respect they cannot properly be styl'd *Re-  
wards* or *Punishments*, but *capricious Dis-  
tributions of Happiness or Unhappiness to  
Creatures.* These are the only Terms, on  
which the Belief of a World to come can  
happily influence the Believer. And on  
these Terms, and by virtue of this Belief,  
Man perhaps may retain his Virtue and In-  
tegrity, even under the hardest Thoughts  
of human Nature; when either by any ill  
Circumstance or untoward Doctrine, he is  
brought to that unfortunate Opinion of *Virtue's being naturally an Enemy to Happiness  
in Life.*

THIS, however, is an Opinion which  
cannot be suppos'd consistent with found

*Book I. Theism.* For whatever be decided as to a future Life, or the Rewards and Punishments of hereafter; he who, as a sound *Theist*, believes a reigning Mind, sovereign in Nature, and ruling all things with the highest perfection of Goodness, as well as of Wisdom and Power, must necessarily believe Virtue to be naturally good and advantageous. For what cou'd more strongly imply an unjust Ordinance, a Blot and Imperfection in the general Constitution of Things, than to suppose Virtue the natural Ill, and Vice the natural Good of any Creature?

*Atheism  
and The-  
ism.*

AND now last of all, there remains for us to consider a yet further Advantage to Virtue, in the *Theistical* Belief above the *Atheistical*. The Proposition may at first sight appear over-refin'd, and of a sort which is esteem'd too nicely philosophical. But after what has been already examin'd, the Subject perhaps may be more easily explain'd.

*Effects of  
each.*

THERE is no Creature, according to what has been already prov'd, who must not of necessity be ill in some degree, by having any Affection or Aversion in a stronger degree than is suitable to his own private Good, or that of the System to which he is join'd. For in either Case the Affection is ill and vicious. Now if a rational

tional Creature has that Degree of Aver-Part 3.  
sion which is requisite to arm him against ~~any~~ any particular Misfortune, and alarm him §. 3.  
against the Approach of any Calamity ;  
this is regular and well. But if after the  
Misfortune is happen'd, his Aversion con-  
tinues still, and his Passion rather grows  
upon him ; whilst he rages at the Acci-  
dent, and exclaims against his private For-  
tune or Lot ; this will be acknowledg'd  
both vicious *in present*, and *for the fu-*  
*ture* ; as it affects the Temper, and dis-  
turbs that easy Course of the Affections  
on which Virtue and Goodness so much  
depend. On the other side, the patient  
enduring of the Calamity, and the bear-  
ing up of the Mind under it, must be ac-  
knowledg'd *immediately* virtuous, and *pre-*  
*servative of Virtue*. Now, according to *Of Athe-*  
the Hypothesis of those who exclude a *ijsm.*  
general Mind, it must be confess'd, there  
can nothing happen in the Course of  
things to deserve either our Admiration,  
and Love, or our Anger, and Abhorrence.  
However, as there can be no Satisfaction  
at the best in thinking upon what *Atoms*  
*and Chance* produce ; so upon disasterous  
Occasions, and under the Circumstances  
of a calamitous and hard Fortune, 'tis  
scarce possible to prevent a natural kind of  
Abhorrence and Spleen, which will be en-  
tertain'd and kept alive by the Imagina-  
tion of so perverse an Order of Things.

Book I. But in another Hypothesis (that of perfect ~~Theism~~) it is understood, "That whatever Of Theism. " the Order of the World produces, is in "the main both just and good." Therefore in the Course of Things in this World, whatever Hardship of Events may seem to force from any rational Creature a hard Censure of his private Condition or *Lot*; he may by Reflection nevertheless, come to have Patience, and to acquiesce in it. Nor is this all. He may go further still in this Reconciliation; and from the same Principle may make the *Lot* itself an Object of his good Affection; whilst he strives to maintain this generous Fealty, and stands so well-dispos'd towards the Laws and Government of his higher Country.

SUCH an Affection must needs create the highest Constancy in any State of Sufferance, and make us in the best manner support whatever Hardships are to be endur'd for Virtue's sake. And as this Affection must of necessity cause a greater Acquiescence and Complacency with respect to ill Accidents, ill Men, and Injuries; so of course it cannot fail of producing still a greater Equality, Gentleness, and Benignity in the Temper. Consequently the Affection must be a truly good one, and a Creature the more truly good and virtuous, by possessing it. For what-

whatsoever is the occasion or means of Part 3. more affectionately uniting a rational Creature to his PART in Society, and causes ~~§. 3.~~ him to prosecute the publick Good, or Interest of his Species, with more Zeal and Affection than ordinary; is undoubtedly the Cause of more than ordinary Virtue in such a Person.

THIS too is certain; That the Admiration and Love of Order, Harmony and Proportion, in whatever kind, is naturally improving to the Temper, advantageous to social Affection, and highly assistant to *Virtue*; which is it-self no other than the Love of Order and Beauty in Society. In the meanest Subjects of the World, the Appearance of *Order* gains upon the Mind, and draws the Affection towards it. But if *the Order of the World* it-self appears just and beautiful; the Admiration and Esteem of *Order* must run higher, and the elegant Passion or Love of Beauty, which is so advantageous to Virtue, must be the more improv'd by its Exercise in so ample and magnificent a Subject. For 'tis impossible that such a *Divine Order* shou'd be contemplated without \* Extasy and Rapture; since in the common Subjects of Science, and the liberal Arts, whatever is according to just

\* *Infra*, pag. 394, 400, &c. And VOL. III. p. 30, &c.

Book I. Harmony and Proportion, is so transporting to those who have any Knowldg or Practice in the kind.

Now if the Subject and Ground of this divine Passion be not really just or adequate, (the Hypothesis of *Theism* being suppos'd false) the Passion still in it-self is so far natural and good, as it proves an Advantage to Virtue and Goodness; according to what has been above demonstrated. But if, on the other side, the Subject of this Passion be really adequate and just, (the Hypothesis of *Theism* being real, and not imaginary) then is the Passion also just, and becomes absolutely *due* and *requisite* in every rational Creature.

*Conclusion.* HENCE we may determine justly the Relation which VIRTUE has to PIETY; the first being not compleat but in the latter: Since where the latter is wanting, there can neither be the same Benignity, Firmness, or Constancy; the same good Composure of the Affections, or Uniformity of Mind.

AND thus the Perfection and Height of VIRTUE must be owing to *the Belief of a God.*

BOOK

## BOOK II.

## PART I.

## SECT. I.

WE have consider'd *what VIRTUE is*, and to whom the Character belongs. It remains to inquire, *What Obligation there is to VIRTUE*; or what Reason to embrace it.

WE have found, that to deserve the name of *good* or *virtuous*, a Creature must have all his Inclinations and Affections, his Dispositions of Mind and Temper, suitable, and agreeing with the Good of his *Kind*, or of that *System* in which he is included, and of which he constitutes a PART. To stand thus well affected, and to have one's Affections *right* and *intire*, not only in respect of one's self, but of Society and the Publick: This is *Rectitude, Integrity, or VIRTUE*. And to be wanting in any of these, or to have their

F 3 Contrarys,

Book 2. Contrarys, is *Depravity, Corruption, and  
Vice.*

*Difficulty stated.* IT has been already shewn, that in the Passions and Affections of particular Creatures, there is a constant relation to the Interest of *a Species*, or *common Nature*. This has been demonstrated in the case of *natural Affection*, parental Kindness, Zeal for Posterity, Concern for the Propagation and Nurture of the Young, Love of Fellowship and Company, Compassion, mutual Succour, and the rest of this kind. Nor will any-one deny that this Affection of a Creature towards the Good of the Species or common Nature, is as *proper* and *natural* to him, as it is to any Organ, Part or Member of an Animal-Body, or mere Vegetable, to work in its known Course, and regular way of Growth. 'Tis not more *natural* for the Stomach to digest, the Lungs to breathe, the Glands to separate Juices, or other Intrails to perform their several Offices; however they may by particular Impediments be sometimes disorder'd, or obstructed in their Operations.

*Union with a Kind or Species.*

THERE being allow'd therefore in a Creature such Affections as these towards *the common Nature*, or *System of the Kind*, together with those other which regard *the private Nature*, or *Self-system*; it will appear that in following the *first* of these Affections,

fections, the Creature must on many Occasions contradict and go against the latter. *Part 1.*  
 How else shou'd the Species be preserv'd? *§. 1.*  
 Or what wou'd signify that implanted *natural Affection*, by which a Creature thro' so many Difficultys and Hazards preserves its Offspring, and supports its Kind?

IT may therefore be imagin'd, perhaps, that there is a plain and absolute Opposition between these *two* Habits or Affections. It may be presum'd, that the pursuing the common Interest or publick Good thro' the Affections of *one kind*, must be a hindrance to the Attainment of private Good thro' the Affections of *another*. For it being taken for granted, that Hazards and Hardships, of whatever sort, are naturally the *Ill* of the private State; and it being certainly the Nature of those publick Affections to lead often to the greatest Hardships and Hazards of every kind; 'tis presently infer'd, "That 'tis the Creature's "Interest to be without any publick Affection whatsoever."

THIS we know for certain; That all social Love, Friendship, Gratitude, or whatever else is of this generous kind, does by its nature take place of the self-interested Passions, draws us out of ourselves, and makes us disregardful of our own Convenience and Safety. So that

F 4 according

Book 2. according to a known \* way of reasoning  
 on *Self-interest*, that which is of a social  
<sup>Opposition</sup>  
<sub>from Self-interest.</sub> kind in us, shou'd of right be abolish'd.  
 Thus Kindness of every sort, Indulgence,  
 Tenderness, Compassion, and in short, all  
 natural Affection shou'd be industriously  
 suppress'd, and, as mere Folly, and Weak-  
 ness of Nature, be resisted and overcome ;  
 that, by this means, there might be no-  
 thing remaining in us, which was contrary  
 to a direct *Self-end*; nothing which might  
 stand in opposition to a steady and delibe-  
 rate Pursuit of the most narrowly confin'd  
*Self-interest.*

ACCORDING to this extraordinary Hypothesis, it must be taken for granted,  
 " That in the System of a Kind or Species,  
 " the Interest of *the private Nature* is di-  
 " rectly opposite to that of *the common*  
 " *one* ; the Interest of *Particulars* directly  
 " opposite to that of *the Publick in gene-*  
 " *ral.*" —— A strange Constitution ! in  
 which it must be confess'd there is much  
 Disorder and Untowardnes ; unlike to what  
 we observe elsewhere in Nature. As if in  
 any vegetable or animal Body, the *Part* or  
 Member cou'd be suppos'd in a good and  
 prosperous State *as to it-self*, when under  
 a contrary Disposition, and in an unnatural  
 Growth or Habit *as to its WHOLE.*

\* VOL. I. p. 90, &c. 116, 117, 118, 119, 120.

Now

## Part I.

Now that this is in reality quite other-<sup>wise,</sup> we shall endeavour to demonstrate; <sup>S. 2.</sup> so as to make appear, "That what Men <sup>Reconcili-  
ation.</sup> represent as an ill Order and Constitu-  
tion in the Universe, by making moral  
Rectitude appear *the Ill*, and Depravity  
*the Good* or Advantage of a Creature, is  
in Nature just the contrary. That to  
be well affected towards the *Publick*  
*Interest* and *one's own*, is not only con-  
sistent, but inseparable: and that mo-  
ral Rectitude, or *Virtue*, must accor-  
dingly be the Advantage, and *Vice* the  
*Injury* and Disadvantage of every Crea-  
ture."

## S E C T. II.

**T**HREE are few perhaps, who when they consider a Creature void of natural Affection, and wholly destitute of a communicative or social Principle, will suppose him, at the same time, either tolerably happy in himself, or as he stands abroad, with respect to his Fellow-Creatures or Kind. 'Tis generally thought, that such a Creature as this, feels slender Joy in Life, and finds little Satisfaction in the mere sensual Pleasures which remain with him, after the Loss of social Enjoyment, and whatever can be call'd *Humanity* or *Good-nature*. We know that to such

Book 2. a Creature as this, 'tis not only *incident*, to be morose, rancorous and malignant; but that, *of necessity*, a Mind or Temper thus destitute of Mildness and Benignity, must turn to that which is contrary, and be wrought by Passions of a different kind. Such a Heart as this must be a continual Seat of perverse Inclinations and bitter Aversions, rais'd from a constant ill Humour, Sourness, and Disquiet. The Consciousness of such a Nature, so obnoxious to Mankind, and to all Beings which approach it, must overcloud the Mind with dark Suspicion and Jealousy, alarm it with Fears and Horror, and raise in it a continual Disturbance, even in the most seeming fair and secure State of Fortune, and in the highest degree of outward Prosperity.

*In whole.* THIS; as to the *compleat* immoral State, is what, of their own accord, Men readily remark. Where there is this *absolute* Degeneracy, this *total* Apostacy from all Candour, Equity, Trust, Sociableness, or Friendship; there are few who do not see and acknowledg the Misery which is consequent. Seldom is the Case misconstru'd, when *at worst*. The misfortune is, we look not on this Depravity, nor consider how it stands, *in less degrees*. The Calamity, we think, does not of necessity hold proportion with the Injustice or Iniquity. As if to be *absolutely* immoral and inhuman,

*In part.*

inhuman, were indeed the greatest misfor-Part 1.  
tune and misery; but that to be so, in a ~~little~~  
~~degree,~~ shou'd be no misery nor harm §. 2.  
at all! Which to allow, is just as reasonable as to own, that 'tis the greatest Ill of a Body to be in the utmost manner distorted and maim'd; but that to lose the use only of *one* Limb, or to be impair'd in some *one single* Organ or Member, is no Inconvenience or Ill worthy the least notice.

THE Parts and Proportions of *the Mind*, <sup>Inward Proportions</sup> their mutual Relation and Dependency, the Connexion and Frame of those Passions which constitute the Soul or Temper, may easily be understood by any-one who thinks it worth his while to study this inward Anatomy. 'Tis certain that the Order or Symmetry of this *inward Part* is, in it-self, no less real and exact, than that of the *Body*. However, 'tis apparent that few of us endeavour to become *Anatomists* of this sort. Nor is any-one ashame of the deepest Ignorance in such a Subject. For tho the greatest Misery and Ill is generally own'd to be from *Disposition*, and *Temper*; tho 'tis allow'd that *Temper* may often change, and that it actually varys on many occasions, much to our disadvantage; yet how this Matter is brought about, we inquire not. We never trouble our-selves to consider thorowly by what means or methods our *inward Constitution* comes at

Book 2. any time to be impair'd or injur'd. The *Solutio Continui*, which bodily Surgeons talk of, is never apply'd in this case, by Surgeons of another sort. The Notion of *a Whole* and *Parts* is not apprehended in this Science. We know not what the effect is, of straining any Affection, indulging any wrong Passion, or relaxing any proper and natural Habit, or good Inclination. Nor can we conceive how a particular Action shou'd have such a sudden Influence on the whole Mind, as to make the Person an immediate Sufferer. We suppose rather that a Man may violate his Faith, commit any Wickedness unfamiliar to him before, engage in any Vice or Villany, without the least prejudice to himself, or any Misery *naturally* following from the ill Action.

"Tis thus we hear it often said, " Such a Person has done ill indeed: But what is he the worse for it?" Yet speaking of any Nature thorowly savage, curst, and inveterate, we say truly, " Such a one is a plague and torment to himself:" And we allow, " That thro' certain *Humours*, or *Passions*, and from *Temper* merely, a Man may be compleatly miserable; let his outward *Circumstances* be ever so fortunate." These different Judgments sufficiently demonstrate that we are not accustom'd to think with much coherency

rency on these moral Subjects ; and that Part I.  
our Notions, in this respect, are not a little ~~wav~~  
confus'd, and contradictory. §. 2.

Now if the Fabrick of the Mind or <sup>Fabrick or</sup> Temper appear'd such to us as it really is; <sup>System of</sup> <sup>the Affec-</sup> if we saw it impossible to remove hence <sup>tions.</sup> any one good or orderly Affection, or introduce any ill or disorderly one, without drawing on, *in some degree*, that dissolute State, which *at its height* is confess'd to be so miserable: 'twou'd then undoubtedly be own'd, that since no ill, immoral, or unjust Action cou'd be committed without either a new inroad and breach on the Temper and Passions, or a farther advancing of that Execution already begun; whoever did ill, or acted in prejudice of his Integrity, Good-nature, or Worth, wou'd of necessity act with greater Cruelty towards himself, than he who scrupled not to swallow what was poisonous, or who with his own hands shou'd voluntarily mangle or wound his outward Form or Constitution, natural Limbs or Body.



## S E C T. III.

*SYSTEM  
explain'd.*

**I**T has been shewn before, that no Animal can be said properly to *act*, otherwise than thro' Affections or Passions, such as are proper to an Animal. For in convulsive Fits, where a Creature strikes either himself or others, 'tis a simple Mechanism, an Engine, or Piece of Clock-work, which acts, and not the Animal.

*Spring of  
Actions.*

W H A T S O E V E R therefore is done or acted by any Animal *as such*, is done only thro' some Affection or Passion, as of Fear, Love, or Hatred moving him.

A N D as it is impossible that a weaker Affection shou'd overcome a stronger, so it is impossible but that where the Affections or Passions are strongest in the main, and form in general the most considerable Party, either by their Force or Number; thither the Animal must incline: And according to this *Balance* he must be govern'd, and led to Action.

*Affections,  
three  
kinds.*

T H E Affections or Passions which must influence and govern the Animal, are either,

i. T H E *natural Affections*, which lead to the Good of T H E P U B L I C K.

2. OR

2. OR the *Self-affections*, which lead only to the Good of THE PRIVATE. §. 3.

3. OR such as are neither of these; nor tending either to any Good of THE PUBLICK or PRIVATE; but contrary-wise: and which may therefore be justly styl'd *unnatural Affections*.

So that according as these Affections stand, a Creature must be virtuous or vicious, good or ill.

THE latter sort of these Affections, 'tis evident, are wholly vicious. The *two former* may be vicious or virtuous, according to their degree.

IT may seem strange, perhaps, to speak *Degrees of Affection.* of natural Affections as *too strong*, or of Self-affections as *too weak*. But to clear this Difficulty, we must call to mind what has been already explain'd, " That *natural Affection* may, in particular Cases, be excessive, and in an unnatural degree:" As when Pity is so overcoming as to destroy its own End, and prevent the Succour and Relief requir'd; or as when Love to the Offspring proves such a Fondness as destroys the Parent, and consequently the Offspring it-self. And notwithstanding it may seem harsh to call that

Book 2. that *unnatural* and *vicious*, which is only  
*an Extreme of some natural and kind Affection.* <sup>Degrees of</sup> yet 'tis most certain, that where-  
ever any single good Affection of this sort  
is over-great, it must be injurious to the  
rest, and detract in some measure from  
their Force and natural Operation. For a  
Creature possess'd with such an immoderate  
Degree of Passion, must of necessity allow  
too much to that *one*, and too little to *others*  
of the same Character, and equally natural  
and useful as to their End. And this must  
necessarily be the occasion of Partiality and  
Injustice, whilst only *one Duty or natural Part* is earnestly follow'd; and *other Parts or Dutys* neglected, which shou'd accom-  
pany it, and perhaps take place and be  
prefer'd.

THIS may well be allow'd true in all  
other respects; since even RELIGION it-  
self, consider'd as *a Passion*, not of the *selfish*  
but *nobler* kind, may in some Characters be  
strain'd beyond its natural Proportion, and  
be said also to be *in too high a degree*. For  
as the End of Religion is to render us  
more perfect, and accomplish'd in all mo-  
ral Dutys and Performances; if by the  
height of devout Extasy and Contempla-  
tion we are rather disabled in this respect,  
and render'd more unapt to the real Dutys  
and Offices of civil Life; it may be said  
that RELIGION indeed is then *too strong*  
in

in us. For how, possibly, can we call this Part I: SUPERSTITION, whilst the Object of the ~~VIRTUE~~ Devotion is acknowledg'd just, and the §. 3. Faith orthodox? "Tis only the Excess of Zeal, which, in this Case, is so transporting, as to render the devout Person more remiss in secular Affairs, and less concern'd for the inferior and temporal Interests of Mankind.

Now as in particular Cases, *publick Affection*, on the one hand, may be *too high*; so *private Affection* may, on the other hand, be *too weak*. For if a Creature be self-neglectful, and insensible of Danger; or if he want such a degree of Passion in any kind, as is useful to preserve, sustain, or defend himself; this must certainly be esteem'd vicious, in regard of the Design and End of Nature. She her-self discovers this in her known Method and stated Rule of Operation. "Tis certain, that her provisionary Care and Concern for the whole Animal, must at least be equal to her Concern for a single Part or Member. Now to the several Parts she has given, we see proper Affections, suitable to their Interest and Security; so that even without our Consciousness, they act in their own Defense, and for their own Benefit and Preservation. Thus *an Eye*, in its natural State, fails not to shut together, of its own accord, unknowingly to us, by a

Book 2. peculiar Caution and Timidity ; which if it wanted, however we might intend the *Degrees of Affection.* Preservation of our Eye, we shou'd not in effect be able to preserve it, by any Observation or Forecast of our own. To be wanting therefore in those principal Affections, which respect the Good of the whole Constitution, must be a Vice and Imperfection, as great surely in the principal part, (the Soul or Temper) as it is in any of those inferior and subordinate parts, to want the self-preserving Affections which are proper to them.

AND thus the Affections towards private Good become necessary and essential to Goodness. For tho no Creature can be call'd good, or virtuous, merely for possessing these Affections ; yet since it is impossible that the publick Good, or Good of the System, can be preserv'd without them ; it follows that a Creature really wanting in them, is in reality wanting in some degree to Goodness and natural Rectitude ; and may thus be esteem'd vicious and defective.

'Tis thus we say of a Creature, in a kind way of Reproof, that he is *too good* ; when his Affection towards others is so warm and zealous, as to carry him even beyond his *Part* ; or when he really acts beyond it, not thro' too warm a Passion of

of that sort, but thro' an over-cool one of Part I. another, or thro' want of some Self-passion ~~to restrain him within due Bounds.~~ §. 3.

IT may be objected here, that the having the natural Affections too strong, (where the Self-affections are over-much so) or the having the Self-affections defective or weak, (where the natural Affections are also weak) may prove upon occasion the only Cause of a Creature's acting honestly and in moral proportion. For, thus, one who is to a fault regardless of his Life, may with the smallest degree of natural Affection do all which can be expected from the highest Pitch of social Love, or zealous Friendship. And thus, on the other hand, a Creature excessively timorous may, by as exceeding a degree of natural Affection, perform whatever the perfectest Courage is able to inspire.

To this it is answer'd, That whenever we arraign any Passion as *too strong*, or complain of any as *too weak*; we must speak with respect to a certain Constitution or *OEconomy* of a particular Creature, or Species. For if a Passion, leading to any right end, be only so much the more serviceable and effectual, for being strong; if we may be assur'd that the strength of it will not be the occasion of any disturbance

Book 2. bance within, nor of any disproportion between it-self and other Affections ; then consequently the Passion, however strong, cannot be condemn'd as vicious. But if to have *all* the Passions in equal proportion with it, be what the Constitution of the Creature cannot bear ; so that only *some* Passions are rais'd to this height, whilst *others* are not, nor can possibly be wrought up to the same proportion ; then may those strong Passions, tho' of the better kind, be call'd excessive. For being in unequal proportion to the others, and causing an *ill Balance* in the Affection at large, they must of course be the occasion of Inequality in the Conduct, and incline the Party to a wrong moral Practice.

*OEconomy  
of the  
Passions.* BUT to shew more particularly what is meant by the *OEconomy of the Passions*, from Instances in the Species or \* Kinds below us. As for the Creatures who have no manner of Power or Means given them by Nature for their defense against Violence, nor any-thing by which they can make themselves formidable to such as injure or offend them ; 'tis necessary they shou'd have an extraordinary degree of Fear, but little or no Animosity, such as might cause 'em to make resistance, or incline 'em to delay their Flight. For in this their Safety

\* *Infra*, p. 131, 307, 8, 9, &c. And VOL. III. p. 216,  
217, &c.

lies,

lies, and to this the Passion of Fear is ser-Part 1.  
viceable, by keeping the Senses on the ~~the~~ watch, and holding the Spirits in readiness §. 3.  
to give the start.

AND thus *Timorousness*, and an habitual strong Passion of Fear, may be according to the *OEconomy* of a particular Creature, both with respect to himself, and to the rest of his Species. On the other hand, *Courage* may be contrary to his *OEconomy*, and therefore vicious. Even in one and the same Species, this is by Nature differently order'd, with respect to different Sexes, Ages, and Growths. The tamer Creatures of the grazing kind, who live in Herds, are different from the wilder, who herd not, but live in Pairs only, apart from Company, as is natural and suitable to their rapacious Life. Yet is there found, even among the former inoffensive kind, a *Courage* proportionable to their Make and Strength. At a time of danger, when the whole Herd flies, the *Bull* alone makes head against the Lion, or whatever other invading Beast of Prey, and shews himself conscious of his *Make*. Even the Female of this kind is arm'd, we see, by Nature, in some degree, to resist Violence; so as not to fly a common Danger. As for a Hind, or Doe, or any other inoffensive and mere defenceless Creature; 'tis no way unnatural or vicious in them, when the Enemy approaches, to

Book 2. desert their Offspring, and fly for Safety.

But for Creatures who are able to make Resistance, and are by Nature arm'd offensively; be they of the poorest Insect-kind, such as Bees or Wasps; 'tis natural to 'em to be rouz'd with Fury, and at the hazard of their Lives, oppose any Enemy or Invader of their Species. For by this known Passion in the Creature, the Species it-self is secur'd; when by Experience 'tis found that the Creature, tho' unable to repel the Injury, yet voluntarily exposes his Life for the Punishment of the Invader; and suffers not his Kind to be injur'd with Impunity. And of all other Creatures, *Man* is in this Sense the most formidable: since if he thinks it just and exemplary, he may possibly in his own, or in his Country's Cause, revenge an Injury on any-one living; and by throwing away his own Life (if he be resolute to that degree) is almost certain Master of another's, however strongly guarded. Examples of this nature have often serv'd to restrain those in Power, from using it to the utmost Extent, and urging their Inferiors to Extremity.

*Measure.  
Tone.*

UPON the whole: It may be said properly to be the same with the Affections or Passions in an Animal-Constitution, as with the Cords or Strings of a Musical Instrument. If these, tho' in ever so just proportion one to another, are strain'd beyond

yond a certain degree, 'tis more than the Part 1.  
Instrument will bear: The Lute or Lyre ~~~~~~~  
is abus'd, and its Effect lost. On the o- §. 3.  
ther hand, if while some of the Strings  
are duly strain'd, others are not wound up  
to their due proportion; then is the Instru-  
ment still in disorder, and its Part ill per-  
form'd. The several Species of Creatures  
are like different sorts of Instruments:  
And even in the same Species of Creatures  
(as in the same sort of Instrument) *one* is  
not intirely like the *other*, nor will the  
same Strings fit each. The same degree  
of Strength which winds up *one*, and fits  
the several Strings to a just Harmony and  
Concert, may in *another* burst both the  
Strings and Instrument it-self. Thus Men  
who have the liveliest Sense, and are the  
easiest affected with Pain or Pleasure, have  
need of the strongest Influence or Force of  
other Affections, such as Tenderness, Love,  
Sociableness, Compassion, in order to pre-  
serve *a right BALANCE within*, and to *Balance.*  
maintain them in their Duty, and in the  
just performance of their Part: whilst o-  
thers, who are of a cooler Blood, or lower  
Key, need not the same Allay or Counter-  
part; nor are made by Nature to feel those  
tender and indearing Affections in so exqui-  
site a degree.

IT might be agreeable, one wou'd think,  
to inquire thus into the different *Tunings*

Book 2. of the Passions, the various Mixtures and  
Allays by which Men become so different  
*TEM-*  
*PER.*  
*Besf or*  
*worſt in*  
*Man.*  
from one another. For as the highest Improvements of Temper are made in human kind; so the greatest Corruptions and Degeneracys are discoverable in this Race. In the other Species of Creatures around us, there is found generally an exact Proportionableness, Constancy and Regularity in all their Passions and Affections; no failure in the care of the Offspring, or of the Society, to which they are united; no Prostitution of themselves; no Intemperance, or Excess, in any kind. The smaller Creatures, who live as it were in Citys (as Bees and Ants) continue the same Train and Harmony of Life: Nor are they ever false to those Affections, which move them to operate towards their Publick Good. Even those Creatures of Prey, who live the farthest out of Society, maintain, we see, such a Conduet towards one another, as is exactly suitable to the Good of their own Species. Whilst Man, notwithstanding the Assistance of Religion, and the Direction of Laws, is often found to live in less conformity with Nature; and, by means of Religion itself, is often render'd the more barbarous and inhuman. Marks are set on Men: Distinctions form'd: Opinions decreed, under the severest Penaltys: Antipathys instill'd, and Aversions rais'd in Men against

gainst the generality of their own Species. Part I.  
So that 'tis hard to find in any Region a         
human Society which has *human* Laws. §. 3.  
No wonder if in such Societys 'tis so hard  
to find a Man who lives NATURALLY,  
and as a Man.

BUT having shewn what is meant by *State of*  
a Passion's being *in too high*, or *in too low* <sup>the Argu-</sup>  
a degree; and that, "To have any na-  
" tural Affection too high, or any Self-  
" affection too low," tho' it be often ap-  
prov'd as *Virtue*, is yet, strictly speaking,  
a *Vice* and *Imperfection*: we come now to  
the plainer and more essential part of *VICE*,  
and which alone deserves to be consider'd *as*  
*such*: that is to say.

1. " WHEN either the publick Affec-  
" tions are weak or deficient.

2. " OR the private and Self-affections  
" too strong.

3. " OR that such Affections arise as  
" are neither of these, nor in any degree  
" tending to the Support either of the  
" publick or private System."

OTHERWISE than *thus*, it is impossi-  
ble any Creature can be such as we call  
ILL or VITIOUS. So that if once we  
prove

*Book 2.* prove that it is really not the Creature's  
 Interest to be thus *vitiouſly* affected, but  
<sup>State of</sup>  
 contrariwise; we shall then have prov'd,  
 " That it is his Interest to be wholly  
 " GOOD and VIRTUOUS:" Since in a  
 wholesome and sound State of his Affec-  
 tions, such as we have describ'd, he can-  
 not possibly be other than sound, *good* and  
*virtuous*, in his Action and Behaviour.

OUR Businesſ, therefore, will be, to  
 prove;

I. " THAT to have THE NATURAL,  
 " KINDLY, or GENEROUS AFFEC-  
 " TIONS strong and powerful towards the  
 " Good of the Publick, is to have the chief  
 " Means and Power of Self-enjoyment."  
 And, " That to want them, is certain Mi-  
 " sery and Ill."

II. " THAT to have THE PRIVATE  
 " or SELF-AFFECTIONS too strong, or  
 " beyond their degree of Subordinacy to the  
 " kindly and natural, is also miserable.".

III. AND, " That to have THE UN-  
 " NATURAL AFFECTIONS (viz. such  
 " as are neither founded on the Interest  
 " of the Kind, or Publick; nor of the  
 " private Person, or Creature himself) is  
 " to be miserable in the highest degree."

## P A R T II.

## S E C T. I.

**T**O begin therefore with this Proof, FIRST  
“ THAT TO HAVE THE NATURAL AFFECTIONS (such as are founded in Love, Complacency, Good-will, and in a Sympathy with the Kind or Species) IS TO HAVE THE CHIEF MEANS AND POWER OF SELF-ENJOYMENT: And THAT TO WANT THEM IS CERTAIN MISERY AND ILL.”

WE may inquire, first, what those are, which we call *Pleasures* or *Satisfactions*; from whence Happiness is generally computed. They are (according to the common distinction) *Satisfactions* and *Pleasures* either of the Body, or of the Mind.

THAT the latter of these *Satisfactions* are the greatest, is allow'd by most People, and may be prov'd by this: That whenever the Mind, having conceiv'd a high Opinion,

Book 2. Opinion of the Worth of any Action or  
Behaviour, has receiv'd the strongest Im-  
pression of this sort, and is wrought up  
to the highest pitch or degree of Passion  
towards the Subject; at such time it sets  
itself above all bodily Pain as well as  
Pleasure, and can be no-way diverted  
from its purpose by Flattery or Terror of  
any kind. Thus we see *Indians*, *Barba-  
rians*, *Malefactors*, and even the most ex-  
ecrable *Villains*, for the sake of a particular  
Gang or Society, or thro' some cherish'd  
Notion or Principle of Honour or Gallan-  
try, Revenge, or Gratitude, embrace any  
manner of Hardship, and defy Torments  
and Death. Whereas, on the other hand,  
a Person being plac'd in all the happy Cir-  
cumstances of outward Enjoyment, sur-  
rounded with every thing which can allure  
or charm the Sense, and being then actu-  
ally in the very moment of such a pleasing  
Indulgence; yet no sooner is there any  
thing amiss *within*, no sooner has he con-  
ceiv'd any *internal Ail* or *Disorder*, any  
thing *inwardly* vexatious or distemper'd,  
than instantly his Enjoyment ceases, the  
pleasure of Sense is at an end; and every  
means of that sort becomes ineffectual, and  
is rejected as uneasy, and subject to give  
Distaste.

*Inference.* THE *Pleasures of the Mind* being al-  
low'd, therefore, superior to those of the  
*Body*;

Body; it follows, " That whatever can Part 2.  
 " create in any intelligent Being a constant wave.  
 " flowing Series or Train of mental Enjoy- §. 1.  
 " ments, or Pleasures of the Mind, is more  
 " considerable to his Happiness, than that  
 " which can create to him a like constant  
 " Course or Train of sensual Enjoyments,  
 " or Pleasures of the Body."

Now the mental Enjoyments are either *Mental*  
 actually the very natural Affections them- *Enjoy-*  
*themselves in their immediate Operation: Or* *ments,*  
 they wholly in a manner proceed from *whence.*  
*them, and are no other than their Effects.*

If so; it follows, that the natural Affections duly establish'd in a rational Creature, being the only means which can procure him a constant Series or Succession of the mental Enjoyments, they are the only means which can procure him a certain and solid *Happiness*.

NOW, in the first place, to explain, *Energy of*  
 " How much the natural Affections are in *natural*  
 " themselves the highest Pleasures and En- *Affections.*  
 " joyments :" There shou'd methinks be little need of proving this to any-one of human Kind, who has ever known the Condition of the Mind under a lively Affection of Love, Gratitude, Bounty, Generosity, Pity, Succour, or whatever else is of a social

Book 2. cial or friendly sort. 'He who has ever so  
 little Knowldg of human Nature, is sensi-  
 ble what pleasure the Mind perceives when  
 it is touch'd in this generous way. The  
 difference we find between Solitude and  
 Company, between a common Company  
 and that of Friends ; the reference of al-  
 most all our Pleasures to mutual Converse,  
 and the dependence they have on Society  
 either present or imagin'd ; all these are  
 sufficient Proofs in our behalf.

How much the social Pleasures are su-  
 perior to any other, may be known by  
 visible Tokens and Effects. The very  
 outward Features, the Marks and Signs  
 which attend this sort of Joy, are expres-  
 sive of a more intense, clear, and undisturb'd  
 Pleasure, than those which attend  
 the Satisfaction of Thirst, Hunger, and o-  
 ther ardent Appetites. But more particu-  
 larly still may this Superiority be known,  
 from the actual Prevalence and Ascendency  
 of this sort of Affection over all besides.  
 Where-ever it presents it-self with any ad-  
 vantage, it silences and appeases every o-  
 ther Motion of Pleasure. No Joy, merely  
 of Sense, can be a Match for it. Whoever  
 is Judg of both the Pleasures, will ever give  
 the preference to *the former*. But to be  
 able to judg of both, 'tis necessary to have  
 a Sense of each. The honest Man indeed  
 can judg of *sensual Pleasure*, and knows its  
 utmost

utmost Force. For neither is his Taste, or Part 2.  
Sense the duller; but, on the contrary, ~~is~~ the more intense and clear, on the account ~~is~~ §. 1.  
of his Temperance, and a moderate Use  
of Appetite. But the immoral and profligate  
Man can by no means be allow'd a  
good Judg of *social Pleasure*, to which he  
is so mere a Stranger by his Nature.

NO R is it any Objection here; That in  
many Natures the good Affection, tho' re-  
ally present, is found to be of insufficient  
force. For where it is not *in its natural  
degree*, 'tis the same indeed as if it *were  
not*, or had *never been*. The less there is  
of this good Affection in any untoward  
Creature, the greater the wonder is, that  
it shou'd *at any time* prevail; as in the very  
worst of Creatures it sometimes will. And  
if it prevails but for *once*, in any *single*  
Instance; it shews evidently, that if the  
Affection were thorowly experienc'd or  
known, it wou'd prevail *in all*.

THUS *the CHARM* of kind Affection  
is superior to all other Pleasure: since it  
has the power of drawing from every o-  
ther Appetite or Inclination. And thus  
in the Case of Love to the Offspring,  
and a thousand other Instances, *the Charm*  
is found to operate so strongly on the  
Temper, as, in the midst of other Tempt-  
ations, to render it susceptible of this

Book 2. Passion alone ; which remains as the *Master-Pleasure* and *Conqueror* of the rest.

*Energy of  
natural  
Affections.*

THERE is no-one who, by the least progress in Science or Learning, has come to know barely the Principles of *Mathematics*, but has found, that in the exercise of his Mind on the Discoverys he there makes, tho' merely of speculative Truths, he receives a Pleasure and Delight superior to that of Sense. When we have thoroughly search'd into the nature of this contemplative Delight, we shall find it of a kind which relates not in the least to any private Interest of the Creature, nor has for its Object any Self-good or Advantage of the private System. The Admiration, Joy, or Love, turns wholly upon what is exterior, and foreign to our-selves. And tho' the reflected Joy or Pleasure, which arises from the notice of this Pleasure once perceiv'd, may be interpreted a *Self-passion*, or *interested Regard* : yet the original Satisfaction can be no other than what results from the Love of Truth, Proportion, Order, and Symmetry, in the Things without. If this be the Case, the Passion ought in reality to be rank'd with *natural Affection*. For having no Object within the compass of the private System ; it must either be esteem'd superfluous and *unnatural*, (as having no tendency towards the Advantage or Good of

any thing in Nature) or it must be judg'd Part 2.  
to be, what it truly is, \* "A natural Joy w  
" in the Contemplation of those Numbers, §. 1.  
" that Harmony, Proportion, and Concord,  
" which supports the universal Nature, and  
" is essential in the Constitution and Form  
" of every particular Species, or Order of  
" Beings."

BUT this speculative Pleasure, however considerable and valuable it may be, or however superior to any Motion of mere Sense; must yet be far surpass'd by *virtuous Motion*, and the *Exercise of Benignity and Goodness*; where, together with the most delightful Affection of the Soul, there is join'd a pleasing Assent and Approbation of the Mind to what is acted in this good Disposition and honest Bent. For where is there on Earth a fairer Matter of Speculation, a goodlier View or Contemplation, than that of a *beautiful, proportion'd, and becoming Action*? Or what is there relating to us, of which the Consciousness and Memory is more solidly and lastingly entertaining?

WE may observe, that in the Passion of Love between the Sexes, where, together with the Affection of a *vulgar* sort, there is a mixture of the *kind and friendly*, the Sense or Feeling of this latter is

\* VOL. III. p. 30.

Book 2. in reality superior to the former ; since  
 often thro' this Affection, and for the sake  
<sup>Energy of</sup>  
<sub>natural</sub>  
 of the Person belov'd, the greatest Hard-  
 Affections. ships in the World have been submitted  
 to, and even Death it-self voluntarily im-  
 brac'd, without any expected Compensation.  
 For where shou'd the Ground of  
 such an Expectation lie ? Not *here*, in *this*  
*World* surely ; for Death puts an end to all.  
 Nor yet *hereafter*, in *any other* : for who  
 has ever thought of providing a Heaven or  
 future Recompence for the suffering Virtue  
 of Lovers ?

WE may observe, withal, in favour of  
 the natural Affections, that it is not only  
 when Joy and Sprightliness are mix'd with  
 them, that they carry a real Enjoyment  
 above that of the sensual kind. The very  
 Disturbances which belong to natural Af-  
 fection, tho' they may be thought wholly  
 contrary to Pleasure, yield still a Content-  
 ment and Satisfaction greater than the  
 Pleasures of indulg'd Sense. And where a  
 Series or continu'd Succession of the ten-  
 der and kind Affections can be carry'd  
 on, even thro' Fears, Horts, Sorrows,  
 Griefs ; the Emotion of the Soul is still  
 agreeable. We continue pleas'd even with  
 this melancholy Aspect or Sense of Vir-  
 tue. Her Beauty supports it-self under  
 a Cloud, and in the midst of surrounding  
 Calamitys. For thus, when by mere Illu-  
 sion,

sion, as in a *Tragedy*, the Passions of this Part 2.  
kind are skilfully excited in us; we prefer ~~the~~ the Entertainment to any other of equal *§. I.*  
duration. We find by our-selves, that the  
moving our Passions in this mournful way,  
the engaging them in behalf of Merit and  
Worth, and the exerting whatever we  
have of social Affection, and human Sympathy,  
is of the highest Delight; and affords a greater Enjoyment in the way of  
*Thought* and *Sentiment*, than any thing  
besides can do in a way of *Sense* and *common Appetite*. And after this manner it  
appears, “How much the mental Enjoy-  
“ments are actually the very natural Af-  
“fections themselves.”

NOW, in the next place, to explain, *Effects of*  
“How they proceed from them, as their *natural*  
“natural Effects”; we may consider first,  
That the EFFECTS of Love or kind Affection,  
in a way of mental Pleasure, are,  
“An Enjoyment of Good by Communication:  
“A receiving it, as it were by Reflection,  
“or by way of Participation in the Good  
“of others:” And “A pleasing Conscious-  
“ness of the actual Love, merited Esteem or  
“Approbation of others.”

How considerable a part of Happiness arises from the former of these Effects, will be easily apprehended by one who is not

Book 2. exceedingly ill natur'd. It will be consider'd how many the Pleasures are, of *Effects of natural Sharing Contentment and Delight with others*; of receiving it in Fellowship and Company; and gathering it, in a manner, from the pleas'd and happy States of those around us, from accounts and relations of such Happinesses, from the very Countenances, Gestures, Voices and Sounds, even of Creatures foreign to our Kind, whose Signs of Joy and Contentment we can any-way discern. So insinuating are these Pleasures of Sympathy, and so widely diffus'd thro' our whole Lives, that there is hardly such a thing as Satisfaction or Contentment, of which they make not an essential part.

As for that other *Effect* of social Love, viz. *the Consciousness of merited Kindness or Esteem*; 'tis not difficult to perceive how much this avails in mental Pleasure, and constitutes the chief Enjoyment and Happiness of those who are, in the narrowest sense, *voluptuous*. How natural is it for the most selfish among us, to be continually drawing some sort of Satisfaction from a Character, and pleasing our-selves in the Fancy of deserv'd Admiration and Esteem? For tho' it be mere Fancy, we endeavour still to believe it Truth; and flatter our-selves, all we can, with the Thought of *Merit* of some kind, and the Persuasion of

of our deserving well from some few at Part 2.  
least, with whom we happen to have a more  
more intimate and familiar Commerce. §. 1.

WHAT Tyrant is there, what Robber, or open Violater of the Laws of Society, who has not a Companion, or some particular Set, either of his own Kindred, or such as he calls Friends ; with whom he gladly shares his Good ; in whose Welfare he delights ; and whose Joy and Satisfaction he makes *his own*? What Person in the world is there, who receives not some Impressions from the Flattery or Kindness of such as are familiar with him? 'Tis to this soothing Hope and Expectation of Friendship, that almost all our Actions have some reference. 'Tis this which goes thro' our whole Lives, and mixes it-self even with most of our Vices. Of this, *Vanity*, *Ambition*, and *Luxury*, have a share ; and many other Disorders of our Life partake. Even the unchastest *Love* borrows largely from this Source. So that were Pleasure to be computed in the same way as other things commonly are ; it might properly be said, that out of these two Branches (viz. *Community or Participation in the Pleasures of others*, and *Belief of meriting well from others*) wou'd arise more than nine Tenths of whatever is enjoy'd in Life. And thus in the main Sum of Happiness, there is scarce a single Article, but what

Book 2. derives it-self from social Love, and depends immediately on the natural and kind Affections.

Now such as CAUSES are, such must be their EFFECTS. And therefore as *natural Affection* or *social Love* is perfect, or imperfect; so must be the Content and Happiness depending on it.

*Partial Affection examin'd.* BUT lest any shou'd imagine with themselves that an *inferior* Degree of natural Affection, or an *imperfect partial* Regard of this sort, can supply the place of an *intire, sincere, and truly moral* one; lest a small Tincture of social Inclination shou'd be thought sufficient to answer the End of Pleasure in Society, and give us that Enjoyment of *Participation* and *Community* which is so essential to our Happiness; we may consider first, That PARTIAL AFFECTION, or social Love *in part*, without regard to a compleat Society or Whole, is in it-self an Inconsistency, and implies an absolute Contradiction. Whatever Affection we have towards any thing besides *our-selves*; if it be not of the *natural sort* towards the System, or Kind; it must be, of all other Affections, the most *diffociable*, and destructive of the Enjoyments of Society: If it be really of the natural sort, and apply'd only to some *one Part of Society,*

ciety, or of a Species, but not to the Species or Society *it-self*; there can be no more account given of it, than of the most odd, capricious, or humourous Passion which may arise. The Person, therefore, who is conscious of this Affection, can be conscious of no *Merit* or *Worth* on the account of it. Nor can the Persons on whom this capricious Affection has chanc'd to fall, be in any manner secure of its Continuance or Force. As it has no Foundation or Establishment *in Reason*; so it must be easily removable, and subject to alteration, *without Reason*. Now the Variableness of such sort of Passion, which depends solely on Capriciousness and Humour, and undergoes the frequent Successions of alternate Hatred and Love, Aversion and Inclination, must of necessity create continual Disturbance and Disgust, give an alloy to what is immediately enjoy'd in the way of Friendship and Society, and in the end extinguish, in a manner, the very Inclination towards Friendship and human Commerce. Whereas, on the other hand, INTIRE AFFECTION (from whence *Integrity* has its name) as it is answerable to it-self, proportionable, and rational; so it is irrefragable, solid, and durable. And as in the case of Partiality, or vicious Friendship, which has no rule or order, every Reflection of the Mind necessarily makes to its disadvantage, and lessens the Enjoyment;

Book 2. so in the case of *Integrity*, the Consciousness of just Behaviour towards Mankind in general, casts a good reflection on each friendly Affection in particular, and raises the Enjoyment of Friendship still the higher, in the way of *Community* or *Participation* above-mention'd.

AND in the next place, as PARTIAL AFFECTION is fitted only to a short and slender Enjoyment of those Pleasures of Sympathy or *Participation with others*; so neither is it able to derive any considerable Enjoyment from that other principal Branch of human Happiness, viz. Consciousness of the actual or merited Esteem of others. From whence shou'd this Esteem arise? The Merit, surely, must in it-self be mean, whilst the Affection is so precarious and uncertain. What Trust can there be to a mere casual Inclination or capricious Liking? Who can depend on such a Friendship as is founded on no moral Rule, but fantastically assign'd to some single Person, or small Part of Mankind, exclusive of Society, and the Whole?

IT may be consider'd, withal, as a thing impossible; that they who esteem or love by any other Rule than that of *Virtue*, shou'd place their Affection on such Subjects as they can long esteem or love. 'Twill be hard for them, in the number of their

their so belov'd Friends, to find any, in Part 2. whom they can heartily rejoice; or whose reciprocal Love or Esteem they can sincerely prize and enjoy. Nor can those Pleasures be found or lasting, which are gather'd from a Self-flattery, and false Persuasion of the Esteem and Love of others, who are incapable of any sound Esteem or Love. It appears therefore how much the Men of narrow or *partial* Affection must be Losers in this sense, and of necessity fall short in this second principal part of mental Enjoyment.

MEAN while *intire Affection* has all the opposite advantages. It is equal, constant, accountable to it-self, ever satisfactory, and pleasing. It gains Applause and Love from the *best*; and in all disinterested cases, from the very *worst* of Men. We may say of it, with justice, that it carrys with it a Consciousness of merited Love and Approbation from all Society, from all intelligent Creatures, and from whatever is original to all other Intelligence. And if there be in Nature any such *Original*; we may add, that the Satisfaction which attends *intire Affection*, is full and noble, in proportion to its *final Object*, which contains all Perfection; according to the Sense of *Theism* above-noted. For this, as has been shewn, is the result of *Virtue*. And to have this **INTIRE AFFECTION or INTEGRITY**

Book 2. of Mind, is *to live according to Nature*,  
 and the Dictates and Rules of *supreme Wisdom*. This is Morality, Justice, Piety, and natural Religion.

BUT lest this Argument shou'd appear perhaps too *scholastically* stated, and in Terms and Phrases, which are not of familiar use; we may try whether possibly we can set it yet in a plainer light.

LET any-one, then, consider well those Pleasures which he receives either in private Retirement, Contemplation, Study, and Converse with himself; or in Mirth, Jollity, and Entertainment with others; and he will find, That they are wholly founded in *An easy Temper, free of Harshness, Bitterness, or Distaste*; and in *A Mind or Reason well compos'd, quiet, easy within itself, and such as can freely bear its own Inspection and Review*. Now such A MIND, and such A TEMPER, which fit and qualify for the Enjoyment of the Pleasures mention'd, must of necessity be owing to the *natural and good Affections*.

TEM-  
PER.

As to what relates to TEMPER, it may be consider'd thus. There is no State of outward Prosperity, or flowing Fortune, where *Inclination and Desire* are always satisfy'd, *Fancy and Humour* pleas'd. There

There are almost hourly some Impediments Part 2:  
or Crosses to the Appetite; some Accidents ~~as~~  
or other *from without*; or something *from within*,  
to check the licentious Course of the  
indulg'd Affections. They are not always  
to be satisfy'd by mere Indulgence. And  
when a Life is guided by *Fancy* only, there  
is sufficient ground of Contrariety and Dis-  
turbance. The very ordinary Lassitudes,  
Uneasinesses, and Defects of Disposition in  
the soundest Body; the interrupted Course  
of the Humours, or Spirits, in the healthiest  
People; and the accidental Disorders com-  
mon to every Constitution, are sufficient,  
we know, on many occasions, to breed  
Uneasiness and Distaste. And this, in time,  
must grow into a Habit; where there is  
nothing to oppose its progres\$, and hinder  
its prevailing on the Temper. Now the  
only sound Opposite to ILL HUMOUR, is  
*natural and kind Affection*. For we may  
observe, that when the Mind, upon reflec-  
tion, resolves at any time to suppress this  
Disturbance already risen in the Temper,  
and sets about this reforming Work with  
heartiness, and in good earnest; it can no  
otherwise accomplish the Undertaking,  
than by introducing into the affectionate  
Part some gentle Feeling of the social and  
friendly kind; some enlivening Motion of  
Kindness, Fellowship, Complacency, or  
Love, to allay and convert that contrary  
Motion of Impatience and Discontent.

## Book 2.

*Temp.* IF it be said perhaps, that in the case before us, *Religious Affection* or *Devotion* is a sufficient and proper Remedy; we answer, That 'tis according as the Kind may happily prove. For if it be of the pleasant and chearful sort, 'tis of the very kind of *natural Affection* it-self: if it be of the \* dismal or fearful sort; if it brings along with it any Affection opposite to Manhood, Generosity, Courage, or Free-thought; there will be nothing gain'd by this Application; and the *Remedy* will, in the issue, be undoubtedly found *worse than the Disease*. The severest Reflections on our *Duty*, and the Consideration merely of what is *by Authority* and *under Penaltys* enjoin'd, will not by any means serve to calm us on this occasion. The more dismal our Thoughts are on such a Subject, the worse our Temper will be, and the readier to discover it-self in Harshness, and Austerity. If, perhaps, by Compulsion, or thro' any Necessity or Fear incumbent, a different Carriage be at any time effected, or different Maxims own'd; the Practice at the bottom will be still the same. If the *Countenance* be compos'd; the *Heart*, however, will not be chang'd. The ill Passion may for the time be with-held from breaking into Action; but will not be subdu'd, or in

\* VOL. I. p. 32, 33, &c. And VOL. III. p. 115, 116,  
124—128.

the

the least debilitated against the next occasion. So that in such a Breast as this, whatever ~~Devotion~~ <sup>ever</sup> there may be; 'tis likely ~~there will in time be little of an easy Spirit,~~ <sup>§. 1.</sup> or good Temper remaining; and consequently few and slender Enjoyments of a mental kind.

IF it be objected, on the other hand, that tho in melancholy Circumstances ill Humour may prevail, yet in a Course of outward Prosperity, and in the height of Fortune, there can nothing probably occur which shou'd thus sour the Temper, and give it such disrelish as is suggested; we may consider, that the most humour'd and indulg'd State is apt to receive the most disturbance from every Disappointment or smallest Ail. And if Provocations are easiest rais'd, and the Passions of Anger, Offence, and Enmity, are found the highest in the most indulg'd State of Will and Humour; there is still the greater need of a Supply from social Affection, to preserve the Temper from running into Savageness and Inhumanity. And this, the Case of Tyrants, and most unlimited Potentates, may sufficiently verify and demonstrate.

NOW as to the other part of our Consideration, which relates to a MIND or Reason well compos'd and easy within it-self; upon

Book 2. upon what account this Happiness may be  
thought owing to *natural Affection*, we  
*Reflection.* may possibly resolve our-selves, after this  
manner. It will be acknowledg'd that a  
Creature, such as Man, who from several  
degrees of Reflection has risen to that Ca-  
pacity which we call Reason and Under-  
standing; must in the very use of this his  
reasoning Faculty, be forc'd to receive Re-  
flections back into his Mind of what passes  
in it-self, as well as in the Affections, or  
Will; in short, of whatsoever relates to his  
Character, Conduct, or Behaviour amidst  
his Fellow-Creatures, and in Society. Or  
shou'd he be of himself unapt; there are  
others ready to remind him, and refresh his  
Memory, in this way of Criticism. We  
have all of us Remembrancers enow to help  
us in this Work. Nor are the greatest Fa-  
vourites of Fortune exempted from this  
Task of Self-inspection. Even Flattery it-  
self, by making the View agreeable, renders  
us more attentive this way, and insnare us  
in the Habit. The vainer any Person is,  
the more he has his Eye inwardly fix'd up-  
on himself; and is, after a certain manner,  
employ'd in this home-Survey. And when  
a true Regard to our-selves cannot oblige us  
to this Inspection, a false Regard to others,  
and a Fondness for Reputation raises a  
watchful Jealousy, and furnishes us suffi-  
ciently with Acts of Reflection on our own  
Character and Conduct.

IN whatever manner we consider of this, we shall find still, that every reasoning or reflecting Creature is, by his Nature, forc'd to endure the *Review* of his own Mind, and Actions; and to have Representations of himself, and his inward Affairs, constantly passing before him, obvious to him, and revolving in his Mind. Now as nothing can be more grievous than this is, to one who has thrown off *natural Affection*; so nothing can be more delightful to one who has preserv'd it with *Sincerity*.

THERE are two Things, which to a *Conscience*: rational Creature must be horridly offensive and grievous; viz. " To have the " Reflection in his Mind of any *unjust* " Action or Behaviour, which he knows " to be naturally *odious* and *ill-deserving*: " Or, of any foolish Action or Behaviour, " which he knows to be prejudicial to his " own *Interest* or *Happiness*."

THE former of these is alone properly *Moral Conscience*; whether in a moral, or religious Sense. For to have Awe and Terror of the Deity, does not, of itself, imply Conscience. No one is esteem'd the more conscientious for the fear of evil Spirits, Conjurations, Enchantments, or whatever may proceed from any unjust, capricious, or devilish Nature. Now to fear  
GOD

Book 2. God any otherwise than as in consequence  
 of some justly blameable and imputable  
<sup>Moral</sup>  
<sup>Conscience.</sup> Act, is to fear *a devilish* Nature, not *a divine* one. Nor does the Fear of Hell, or  
 a thousand Terrors of the DEITY, imply  
 Conscience; unless where there is an Apprehension of what is *wrong*, *odious*, *morally deform'd*, and *ill-deserving*. And  
 where this is the Case, there *Conscience*  
 must have effect, and Punishment of ne-  
 cessity be apprehended; even tho' it be not  
 expressly threaten'd.

AND thus *religious Conscience* supposes  
*moral* or *natural Conscience*. And tho' the  
 former be understood to carry with it the  
 Fear of divine Punishment; it has its force  
 however from the apprehended moral De-  
 formity and Odiousness of any Act, with  
 respect purely to the Divine Presence, and  
 the natural Veneration due to such a sup-  
 pos'd Being. For in such a Presence, the  
 Shame of Villany or Vice must have its  
 force, independently on that farther Appre-  
 hension of the magisterial Capacity of such  
 a Being, and his Dispensation of particular  
 Rewards or Punishments in a future State.

IT has been already said, that no Crea-  
 ture can maliciously and intentionally *do ill*, without being sensible, at the same time,  
 that he *deserves ill*. And in this respect,  
 every sensible Creature may be said to have  
<sup>Conscience.</sup>

Conscience. For with all Mankind, and all Part 2.  
intelligent Creatures, this must ever hold, ~~~  
“ That what they know they deserve from §. 1.  
“ every-one, that they necessarily must fear  
“ and expect from all.” And thus Suspi-  
cions and ill Apprehensions must arise, with  
Terror both of Men and of the DEITY.  
But besides this, there must in every ratio-  
nal Creature, be yet farther Conscience;  
viz. from Sense of *Deformity in what is*  
*thus ill-deserving and unnatural:* and from  
*a consequent Shame or Regret of incurring*  
*what is odious, and moves Aversion.*

THERE scarcely is, or can be any Crea-  
ture, whom Consciousness of Villany, *as*  
*such merely,* does not at all offend; nor any  
thing opprobrious or heinously imputable,  
move, or affect. If there be such a one;  
'tis evident he must be absolutely indiffe-  
rent towards moral Good or Ill. If this  
indeed be his Case; 'twill be allow'd he  
can be no-way capable of natural Affec-  
tion: If not of that, then neither of any  
social Pleasure, or mental Enjoyment, as  
shewn above; but on the contrary, he  
must be subject to all manner of horrid,  
unnatural, and ill Affection. So that to  
want CONSCIENCE, or *natural Sense of*  
*the Odiousness of Crime and Injustice,* is to  
be most of all miserable in Life: but where  
Conscience, or *Sense of* this sort, remains;  
there, consequently, whatever is committed

Book 2. against it, must of necessity, by means of  
 ~~~~~ Reflection, as we have shewn, be conti-  
Moral
Conscience. nually shameful, grievous and offensive.

A MAN who in a Passion happens to kill his Companion, relents immediately on the sight of what he has done. His Revenge is chang'd into Pity, and his Hatred turn'd against himself. And this merely by the Power of the Object. On this account he suffers Agonys; the Subject of this continually occurs to him; and of this he has a constant ill Remembrance and displeasing Consciousness. If on the other side, we suppose him *not* to relent or suffer any real Concern or Shame; then, either he has no Sense of the Deformity of the Crime and Injustice, no natural Affection, and consequently no Happiness or Peace within: or if he has any Sense of moral Worth or Goodness, it must be of a perplex'd, and contradictory kind. He must pursue an inconsistent Notion, idolize some
False Con-science. *false Species* of Virtue; and affect as noble, gallant, or worthy, that which is irrational and absurd. And how tormenting this must be to him, is easy to conceive. For never can such a *Phantom* as this be reduc'd to any certain Form. Never can this *PROTEUS* of *Honour* be held steady, to one Shape. The Pursuit of it can only be vexatious and distracting. There is nothing beside real Virtue, as has been shewn,
 which

which can possibly hold any proportion to Part 2. Esteem, Approbation, or good Conscience.
And he who, being led by false Religion or §. 1.
prevailing Custom, has learnt to esteem or
admire any thing as Virtue which is not
really such ; must either thro' the Incon-
sistency of such an Esteem, and the perpe-
tual Immoralitys occasion'd by it, come at
last to lose all Conscience, and so be miser-
able in the worst way : or, if he retains
any Conscience at all, it must be of a kind
never satisfactory, or able to bestow Con-
tent. For 'tis impossible that a cruel En-
thusiast, or *Bigot*, a Persecutor, a Murderer,
a *Bravo*, a Pirate, or any Villain of less
degree, who is false to the Society of Man-
kind in general, and contradicts natural
Affection ; shou'd have any fix'd Principle
at all, any real Standard or Measure by
which he can regulate his Esteem, or any
solid Reason by which to form his Approb-
ation of *any one* moral Act. And thus
the more he sets up *Honour*, or advances
Zeal ; the worse he renders his Nature, and
the more detestable his Character. The
more he engages in the Love or Admira-
tion of any Action or Practice, as great
and glorious, which is in it-self morally ill
and vicious ; the more Contradiction and
Self-disapprobation he must incur. For
there being nothing more certain than this,
“ That no natural Affection can be contra-
dicted, nor any unnatural one advanc'd,

Book 2. " without a prejudice in some degree to all
 ↗ " natural Affection in general :" it must
^{False Con-}
^{cience,} follow, " That inward Deformity growing
 " greater, by the Incouragement of unnat-
 " ural Affection ; there must be so much
 " the more Subject for dissatisfactory Re-
 " flection, the more any false Principle of
 " Honour, any false Religion, or Supersti-
 " tion prevails."

So that whatever Notions of this kind are cherish'd ; or whatever Character affected, which is contrary to moral Equity, and leads to Inhumanity, thro' *a false Conscience, or wrong Sense of Honour*, serves on-
^{Causes Re-}
^{proach}
^{from true.} ly to bring a Man the more under the lash of *real and just Conscience*, Shame, and Self-reproach. Nor can any one, who, by any pretended Authority, commits one single Immorality, be able to satisfy himself with any Reason, why he shou'd not at another time be carry'd further, into all manner of Villany ; such perhaps as he even abhors to think of. And this is a Reproach which a Mind must of necessity make to it-self upon the least Violation of natural Conscience ; in doing what is *moral deform'd, and ill-deserving* ; tho warranted by any Example or Precedent amongst Men, or by any suppos'd Injunction or Command of higher Powers.

Now

Part 2.

Now as for that other part of Conscience, *viz.* the remembrance of what was at any time unreasonably and foolishly done, in prejudice of one's real Interest or Happiness: This dissatisfactory Reflection must follow still and have effect, wheresoever there is a Sense of moral Deformity, contracted by Crime, and Injustice. For even where there is no Sense of moral Deformity, as such merely; there must be still a Sense of the ill Merit of it with respect to God and Man. Or tho' there were a possibility of excluding for ever all Thoughts or Suspicions of any superior Powers, yet considering that this Insensibility towards moral Good or Ill implies a total Defect in natural Affection, and that this Defect can by no Dissimulation be conceal'd; 'tis evident that a Man of this unhappy Character must suffer a very sensible Loss in the Friendship, Trust, and Confidence of other Men; and consequently must suffer in his Interest and outward Happiness. Nor can the Sense of this Disadvantage fail to occur to him; when he sees, with Regret, and Envy, the better and more grateful Terms of Friendship, and Esteem, on which better People live with the rest of Mankind. Even therefore where natural Affection is wanting; 'tis certain still, that by Immorality, necessarily hap-

Book 2. pening thro' want of such Affection, there must be disturbance from Conscience of this sort, viz. from Sense of what is committed imprudently, and contrary to real Interest and Advantage.

Conclusion drawn from the MENTAL PLEASURES. FROM all this we may easily conclude, how much our Happiness depends on natural and good Affection. For if the chief Happiness be from the MENTAL PLEASURES; and the chief mental Pleasures are such as we have describ'd, and are founded in natural Affection; it follows, "That "to have the natural Affections, is to have "the chief Means and Power of Self-enjoyment, the highest Possession and Happiness of Life."

Pleasures of the SENSE. NOW as to the Pleasures of THE BODY, and the Satisfactions belonging to mere SENSE; 'tis evident, they cannot possibly have their Effect, or afford any valuable Enjoyment, otherwise than by the means of social and natural Affection.

Vulgar Epicurism. To live well, has no other meaning with some People, than to eat and drink well. And methinks 'tis an unwary Concession we make in favour of these pretended good Livers, when we join with 'em, in honouring their way of Life with the Title of living fast. As if they liv'd the fastest who

who took the greatest pains to enjoy least Part 2. of Life : For if our Account of Happiness ~~be~~ be right ; the greatest Enjoyments in Life §. I. are such as these Men pass over in their ^{Pleasures} ~~of the~~ haste, and have scarce ever allow'd them-selves the liberty of tasting.

BUT as considerable a Part of Voluptuousness as is founded in *the Palat*; and as notable as the Science is, which depends on it; one may justly presume that the ^{Imagina-}
^{tion, Fan-}
^{cy.} Ostentation of Elegance, and a certain Emulation and Study how to excel in this sumptuous Art of Living, goes very far in the raising such a high Idea of it, as is observ'd among the Men of Pleasure. For were the Circumstances of a Table and Company, Equipages, Services, and the rest of the Management withdrawn ; there wou'd be hardly left any Pleasure worth acceptance, even in the Opinion of the most debauch'd themselves.

THE very Notion of *a Debauch* (which is a Sally into whatever can be imagin'd of Pleasure and Voluptuousness) carrys with it a plain reference to Society, or Fellowship. It may be call'd a *Surfeit*, or *Excess of Eating and Drinking*, but hardly a *Debauch* of that kind, when the Excess is committed separately, out of all Society, or Fellowship. And one who abuses himself in this way, is often call'd a *Sot*, but

Book 2. never a *Debauchee*. The Courtizans, and even the commonest of Women, who live by Prostitution, know very well how necessary it is, that every-one whom they entertain with their Beauty, shou'd believe there are Satisfactions reciprocal; and that Pleasures are no less *given* than *receiv'd*. And were this Imagination to be wholly taken away, there wou'd be hardly any of the grosser sort of Mankind, who wou'd not perceive their remaining Pleasure to be of slender Estimation.

Who is there can well or long enjoy any thing, when *alone*, and abstracted perfectly, even in his very Mind and Thought, from every thing belonging to Society? Who wou'd not, on such Terms as these, be presently cloy'd by any sensual Indulgence? Who wou'd not soon grow uneasy with his Pleasure, however exquisite, till he had found means to impart it, and make it *truly pleasant* to him, by communicating, and sharing it at least with some *one* single Person? Let Men imagine what they please; let 'em suppose themselves ever so selfish; or desire ever so much to follow the Dictates of that narrow Principle, by which they wou'd bring Nature under restraint: Nature will break out; and in Agonys, Disquiets, and a distemper'd State, demonstrate evidently the

the ill Consequence of such Violence, the Part 2.
Absurdity of such a Device, and the Punish- ~~ment~~ ^{§. 1.}
and horrid Endeavour.

THUS, therefore, not only the *Pleas- Pleasures*
sures of the Mind, but even those of *the Sense,*
Body, depend on natural Affection: info-
much that where this is wanting, they
not only lose their Force, but are in a
manner converted into Uneasiness and Dis-
gust. The Sensations which shou'd na- *Converte-
turally afford Contentment and Delight,* ^{ble into} *Disgust;*
produce rather Discontent and Sournes,
and breed a Wearifomness and Restlesnes
in the Disposition. This we may per-
ceive by the perpetual Inconstancy, and
Love of Change, so remarkable in those *Variable:*
who have nothing communicative or
friendly in their Pleasures. *Good Fellow-
ship*, in its abus'd Sense, seems indeed to
have something more constant and deter-
mining. The Company supports the Hu-
mour. 'Tis the same in *Love*. A certain *Insuppor-
table.*
Tenderness and Generosity of Affection
supports the Passion, which otherwise
wou'd instantly be chang'd. The per-
fectest Beauty cannot, of it-self, retain, or
fix it. And that Love which has no
other Foundation, but relies on this exte-
rior kind, is soon turn'd into Aversion.
Satiety, perpetual Disgust, and Feverish-
ness of Desire, attend those who passio-
nately

Book 2. nately study Pleasure. They best enjoy ~~Pleasures of the Service.~~ it, who study to regulate their Passions. And by this they will come to know how absolute an Incapacity there is in any thing sensual to please, or give contentment, where it depends not on something friendly or social, something conjoin'd, and in affinity with *kind* or *natural Affection.*

Balance of the Affections. BUT ERE we conclude this Article of *social* or *natural Affection*, we may take a general View of it, and bring it, once for all, into the Scale; to prove what kind of * BALANCE it helps to make *within*; and what the Consequence may be, of its *Deficiency*, or *light Weight*.

THERE is no-one of ever so little Understanding in what belongs to a human Constitution, who knows not that without Action, Motion, and Employment, *the Body* languishes, and is oppres'd; its Nourishment turns to Disease; the Spirits, unemploy'd abroad, help to consume the Parts within; and Nature, as it were, preys upon her-self. In the same manner, the sensible and living Part, *the Soul* or *Mind*, wanting its proper and natural

* *Supra*, p. 92, 93, &c.

Exercise, is burden'd and diseas'd. Its Part 2. Thoughts and Passions being unnaturally with-held from their due Objects, turn S. 1. against it-self, and create the highest Impatience and Ill-humour. Balance of the Affetions.

IN * *Brutes*, and other Creatures, which have not the Use of Reason and Reflection, (at least not after the manner of Mankind) 'tis so order'd in Nature, that by *Instance in the animal Kinds.* their daily Search after Food, and their Application either towards the Busines of their Livelihood, or the Affairs of their Species or Kind, almost their whole time is taken up, and they fail not to find full Imployment for their Passion, according to that degree of Agitation to which they are fitted, and which their Constitution requires. If any one of these Creatures be taken out of his natural laborious State, and plac'd amidst such a Plenty as can profusely administer to all his Appetites and Wants; it may be observ'd, that as his Circumstances grow thus luxuriant, his Temper and Passions have the same growth. When he comes, at any time, to have the Accommodations of Life at a cheaper and easier rate than was at first intended him by Nature, he is made to pay dear for 'em in another way; by losing his natu-

* *Supra*, p. 92, 93. And *Infra*, p. 307, 8, 9, &c. And VOL. III. p. 216, 17, &c.

Book 2. ral good Disposition, and the Orderliness of his Kind or Species.

*Balance of
the Affec-
tions.*

*Animal
Kinds.* THIS needs not to be demonstrated by particular Instances. Whoever has the leaſt knowledg of natural History, or has been an Observer of the ſeveral Breeds of Creatures, and their ways of Life, and Propagation, will eaſily understand this Difference of Orderliness between the *wild* and the *tame* of the ſame Species. The latter acquire new Habits; and deviate from their original Nature. They lose even the common Instinct and ordinary Ingenuity of their Kind; nor can they ever regain it, whilſt they continue in this pamper'd State: but being turn'd to ſhift abroad, they resume the natural Affection and Sagacity of their Species. They learn to unite in ſtricter Fellowship; and grow more concern'd for their Offspring. They provide againſt the Seasons, and make the moſt of every Advantage given by Nature for the Support and Maintenance of their particular Species, againſt ſuch as are foreign and hoſtile. And thus as they grow buſy and imploym'd, they grow regular and good. Their Petulance and Vice forſakes them, with their Idleneſs and Eafe.

Mankind. IT happens with *Mankind*, that whilſt ſome are by neceſſity confin'd to Labour, others

others are provided with abundance of Part 2.
all things, by the Pains and Labour of ~~the~~
Inferiors. Now, if among the superior and ~~the~~ §. 1.
easy sort, there be not something of fit
and proper Employment rais'd in the room
of what is wanting in common Labour
and Toil ; if instead of an Application to
any sort of Work, such as has a good
and honest End in Society, (as Letters,
Sciences, Arts, Husbandry, publick Af-
fairs, OEconomy, or the like) there be a
thorow Neglect of all Duty or Employ-
ment ; a settled Idleness, Supineness, and
Inactivity ; this of necessity must occasion
a most relax'd and dissolute State : It must
produce a total Disorder of the Passions,
and break out in the strangest Irregulari-
tys imaginable.

WE see the enormous Growth of Lux-
ury in capital Citys, such as have been
long the Seat of Empire. We see what
Improvements are made in Vice of every
kind, where numbers of Men are main-
tain'd in lazy Opulence, and wanton Plen-
ty. 'Tis otherwise with those who are ta-
ken up in honest and due Employment,
and have been well inur'd to it from their
Youth. This we may observe in the har-
dy remote Provincials, the Inhabitants of
smaller Towns, and the industrious sort of
common People ; where 'tis rare to meet
with any Instances of those Irregularitys,
which

Book 2. which are known in Courts and Palaces,
 and in the rich Foundations of easy and
^{Balance of}
_{the Affec-} pamper'd Priests.
_{tions.}

Now if what we have advanc'd concerning an *inward Constitution* be real and just; if it be true that Nature works by a just Order and Regulation as well in the Passions and Affections, as in the Limbs and Organs which she forms; if it appears withal, that she has so constituted this *inward Part*, that nothing is so essential to it as *Exercise*; and no Exercise so essential as that of *social or natural Affection*: it follows, that where this is remov'd or weaken'd, the *inward Part* must necessarily suffer and be impair'd. Let Indolence, Indifference, or Insensibility, be study'd as an Art, or cultivated with the utmost Care; the Passions thus restrain'd will force their Prison, and in one way or other procure their Liberty, and find full Employment. They will be sure to create to themselves *unusual and unnatural Exercise*, where they are cut off from such as is *natural and good*. And thus in the room of orderly and natural Affection, new and unnatural must be rais'd, and all *inward Order* and *OEconomy* destroy'd.

OEconomy.

ONE must have a very imperfect Idea of the Order of Nature in the Formation and Structure of Animals, to imagine that

so

so great a Principle, so fundamental a Part Part 2.
as that of *natural Affection* shou'd possibly ~~~~
be lost or impair'd, without any inward §. 1.
Ruin or Subversion of the Temper and
Frame of Mind.

WHOEVER is the least vers'd in this moral kind of Architecture, will find the inward *Fabrick* so adjusted, and *the whole Fabrick.* so nicely built; that the barely extending of a single Passion a little too far, or the continuance of it too long, is able to bring irrecoverable Ruin and Misery. He will find this experienc'd in the ordinary Case of Phrenzy, and Distraction; when the Mind, dwelling too long upon *one* Subject, (whether prosperous or calamitous) sinks under the weight of it, and proves what the necessity is, of a due *Balance*, and Counterpoise in the Affections. He will find, that in every different Creature, and distinct Sex, there is a different and distinct *Order, Set, or Suit* of Passions; proportionable to the different Order of Life, the different Functions and Capacitys assign'd to each. As the Operations and Effects are different, so are the Springs and Causes in each System. The inside Work is fitted to the outward Action and Performance. So that where Habits or Affections are dislodg'd, misplac'd, or chang'd; where those belonging to one Species are intermix'd with those belonging

Book 2. longing to another, there must of necessity
 ~~ be Confusion and Disturbance within.

*Balance of
the Affec-
tions.*

ALL this we may observe easily, by comparing the more perfect with the imperfect Natures, such as are imperfect from their Birth, by having suffer'd Violence *within*, in their earliest *Form*, and inmost *Matrix*. We know how it is with *Monsters*, such as are compounded of different Kinds, or different Sexes. Nor are they less *Monsters*, who are mishapen or distorted in an inward Part. The ordinary Animals appear unnatural and monstrous, when they lose their proper Instincts, forsake their Kind, neglect their Offspring, and pervert those Functions or Capacities bestow'd by Nature. How wretched must it be, therefore, for MAN, of all other Creatures, to lose that *Sense*, and *Feeling*, which is proper to him *as a MAN*, and suitable to his Character, and Genius? How unfortunate must it be for a Creature, whose dependence on Society is greater than any others, to lose that *natural Affection* by which he is prompted to the Good and Interest of his Species, and Community? Such indeed is Man's natural Share of this *Affection*, that *He*, of all other Creatures, is plainly the least able to bear Solitude. Nor is any thing more apparent, than that there is naturally in every Man

such a degree of social Affection as in-Part 2: inclines him to seek the Familiarity and ~~~ Friendship of his Fellows. 'Tis here that §. 1. he lets loose a Passion, and gives reins to a Desire, which can hardly by any struggle or inward violence be with-held; or if it be, is sure to create a Sadness, Dejection, and Melancholy in the Mind. For whoever is unsociable, and voluntarily shuns Society, or Commerce with the World, must of necessity be morose and ill-natur'd. He, on the other side, who is with-held by force or accident, finds in his Temper the ill Effects of this Restraint. The Inclination, when suppress'd, breeds Discontent; and on the contrary, affords a healing and enlivening Joy, when acting at its liberty, and with full scope: as we may see particularly, when after a time of Solitude and long Absence, the Heart is open'd, the Mind disburden'd, and the Secrets of the Breast unfolded to a Bosom-Friend.

THIS we see yet more remarkably instanc'd in Persons of the most elevated Stations; even in Princes, Monarchs, and those who seem by their Condition to be above ordinary human Commerce, and who affect a sort of distant Strangeness from the rest of Mankind. But their Carriage is not the same towards *all* Men. The wiser and better sort, it's true, are

Book 2. often held at a distance ; as unfit for
Balance of the Affections. their Intimacy, or secret Trust. But to compensate this, there are others substituted in their room; who, tho' they have the least Merit, and are perhaps the most vile and contemptible of Men, are sufficient, however, to serve the purpose of an imaginary Friendship, and can become *Favourites* in form. These are the Subjects of Humanity in *the Great*. For These we see them often in concern and pain : in These they easily confide : to These they can with pleasure communicate their Power and Greatness, be open, free, generous, confiding, bountiful ; as rejoicing in the Action it-self : having no Intention or Aim beyond it ; and their Interest, in respect of Policy, often standing a quite contrary way. But where neither the Love of Mankind, nor the Passion for Favourites prevails, the tyrannical Temper fails not to shew it-self in its proper colours, and to the life, with all the Bitterness, Cruelty, and Mistrust, which belong to that solitary and gloomy State of un-communicative and un-friendly Greatness. Nor needs there any particular Proof from History, or present Time, to second this Remark.

THUS it may appear, how much NATURAL AFFECTION is predominant ;

nant ; how it is inwardly join'd to us, Part 2. and implanted in our Natures ; how interwoven with our other Passions ; and §. 2. how essential to that regular Motion and Course of our Affections, on which our Happiness and Self-enjoyment so immediately depend.

AND thus we have demonstrated, That as, *on one side*, TO HAVE THE NATURAL AND GOOD AFFECTIONS, IS TO HAVE THE CHIEF MEANS AND POWER OF SELF-ENJOYMENT : So, *on the other side*, TO WANT THEM, IS CERTAIN MISERY, AND ILL.

S E C T. II.

WE are now to prove, That BY SECOND HAVING THE SELF-PASSIONS ^{Proof;} _{from the} TOO INTENSE OR STRONG, A CREA- ^{Self-pas-}_{sions.} TURE BECOMES MISERABLE.

IN order to this, we must, according to Method, enumerate those Home-affections which relate to the private Interest or separate OEcconomy of the Creature : such as *Love of Life* ; — *Resentment of Injury* ; — *Pleasure, or Appetite towards Nourishment, and the Means of Generation* ; — *Interest, or Desire of those Conveniences, by which we are well provided for,*

K 2 and

Book 2. and maintain'd ; — *Emulation*, or *Love of Praise and Honour* ; — *Indolence*, or *Love of Ease and Rest*. — These are the Affections which relate to the private System, and constitute whatever we call *Interestlessness* or *Self-love*.

Now these Affections, if they are moderate, and within certain bounds, are neither injurious to social Life, nor a hindrance to Virtue : but being in an extreme degree, they become *Cowardice*, — *Revengefulness*, — *Luxury*, — *Avarice*, — *Vanity* and *Ambition*, — *Sloth* ; — and, as such, are own'd vicious and ill, with respect to human Society. How they are ill also with respect to the private Person, and are to his own disadvantage as well as that of the Publick, we may consider, as we severally examine them.

Love of Life.

IF THERE were any of these Self-passions, which for the Good and Happiness of the Creature might be oppos'd to *Natural Affection*, and allow'd to overbalance it; THE DESIRE AND LOVE OF LIFE wou'd have the best Pretence. But it will be found perhaps, that there is no Passion which, by having much allow'd to it, is the occasion of more Disorder and Misery.

THERE is nothing more certain, or more universally agreed than this ; “ That *Life* may sometimes be even a Misfortune and Misery.” To inforce the continuance of it in Creatures reduc’d to such Extremity, is esteem’d the greatest Cruelty. And tho Religion forbids that anyone shou’d be his own Reliever ; yet if by some fortunate accident, Death offers *of it-self*, it is embrac’d as highly welcome. And on this account the nearest Friends and Relations often rejoice at the Release of one intirely belov’d ; even tho he himself may have been so weak as earnestly to decline Death, and endeavour the utmost Prolongment of his own un-eligible State.

SINCE *Life*, therefore, may frequently prove a Misfortune and Misery ; and since it naturally becomes so, by being only prolong’d to the Infirmitys of old Age ; since there is nothing, withal, more common than to see Life over-valu’d, and purchas’d at such a Cost as it can never justly be thought worth : it follows evidently, that the Passion it-self (viz. *the Love of Life, and Abhorrence or Dread of Death*) if beyond a certain degree, and over-balancing in the Temper of any Creature, must lead him directly against his own Interest ; make him, upon occasion, become the

Book 2. greatest Enemy to himself; and necessitate
~~him to act as such.~~
^{Love of}
~~Life.~~

BUT tho it were allow'd the Interest and Good of a Creature, by all Courses and Means whatsoever, in any Circumstances, or at any rate, to preserve *Life*; yet wou'd it be against his Interest still to have this Passion in a high degree. For it wou'd by this means prove ineffectual, and no-way conduced to its End. Various Instances need not be given. For what is there better known, than that at all times an excessive *Fear* betrays to danger, instead of saving from it? 'Tis impossible for any-one to act sensibly, and with Presence of Mind, even in his own Preservation and Defense, when he is strongly press'd by such a Passion. On all extraordinary Emergencies, 'tis *Courage* and *Resolution* saves; whilst *Cowardice* robs us of the means of Safety, and not only deprives us of our defensive Faculty, but even runs us to the brink of Ruin, and makes us meet that Evil which of it-self wou'd never have invaded us.

But were the *Consequences* of this Passion less injurious than we have represented; it must be allow'd still that *in itself* it can be no other than miserable; if it be Misery to feel Cowardice, and be haunted by those Specters and Horrors, which

which are proper to the Character of one Part 2.
who has a thorow Dread of Death. For ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~time~~ ^{time} ~~is~~ ^{is} not only when Dangers happen, and ~~the~~ ^{the} Hazards are incur'd, that this sort of Fear oppresses and distracts. If it in the least prevails, it gives no quarter, so much as at the safest stillest hour of Retreat and Quiet. Every Object suggests Thought enough to employ it. It operates when it is least observ'd by others ; and enters at all times into the pleasantest parts of Life ; so as to corrupt and poison all Enjoyment, and Content. One may safely aver, that by reason of this Passion alone, many a Life, if inwardly and closely view'd, wou'd be found to be thorowly miserable, tho attended with all other Circumstances which in appearance render it happy. But when we add to this, the Meanness, and base Condescensions, occasion'd by such a passionate Concern for living ; when we consider how by means of it we are driven to Actions we can never view without Dislike, and forc'd by degrees from our natural Conduct, into still greater Crookednesses and Perplexity ; there is no-one, surely, so disingenuous as not to allow, that *Life*, in this case, becomes a sorry Purchase, and is pass'd with little Freedom or Satisfaction. For how can this be otherwise, whilst every thing which is generous and worthy, even the chief *Relish*, *Happiness*,

Book 2. *pines*, and *Good of Life*, is for *Life's sake*
 ~~~~~ abandon'd and renounc'd?  
*Love of*  
*Life.*

AND thus it seems evident, " That to  
 " have this Affection of DESIRE and  
 " LOVE OF LIFE, too intense, or be-  
 " yond a moderate degree, is against the  
 " Interest of a Creature, and contrary to  
 " his *Happiness and Good.*"

*Reſent-  
ment.*

THERE is another Passion very dif-  
 ferent from that of *Fear*, and which in a  
 certain degree is equally preservative to  
 us, and conduced to our Safety. As *that*  
 is serviceable, in prompting us to shun  
 Danger; so is *this*, in fortifying us against  
 it, and enabling us to repel Injury, and  
 resist Violence when offer'd. 'Tis true,  
 that according to strict Virtue, and a just  
 Regulation of the Affections in a wise and  
 virtuous Man, such Efforts towards Ac-  
 tion amount not to what is justly styl'd  
*Paffion* or *Commotion*. A Man of Courage  
 may be cautious without real *Fear*. And  
 a Man of Temper may resist or punish  
 without *Anger*. But in ordinary Charac-  
 ters there must necessarily be some Mix-  
 ture of the real Passions themselves; which  
 however, in the main, are able to allay  
 and temper one another. And thus  
 ANGER in a manner becomes necessary.  
 'Tis by this Passion that one Creature  
 offering

offering Violence to another, is deter'd Part 2. from the Execution ; whilst he observes ~~~ how the Attempt affects his Fellow ; and §. 2. knows by the very Signs which accompany this rising Motion, that if the Injury be carry'd further, it will not pass easily, or with impunity. 'Tis this Passion withal, which, after Violence and Hostility executed, rouzes a Creature in opposition, and assists him in returning like Hostility and Harm on the Invader. For thus, as *Rage* and *Despair* increase, a Creature grows still more terrible ; and being urg'd to the greatest extremity, finds a degree of Strength and Boldness unexperienc'd till then, and which had never risen, except thro' the height of Provocation. As to this Affection therefore, notwithstanding its immediate Aim be indeed *the Ill or Punishment of another*, yet it is plainly of the sort of those which tend to the Advantage and Interest of the Self-system, *the Animal himself* ; and is withal in other respects contributing to the Good and Interest of the Species. But there is hardly need we shou'd explain how mischievous and self-destructive ANGER is, if it be what we commonly understand by that word : if it be such a Passion as is rash, and violent in the Instant of Provocation ; or such as imprints it-self deeply, and causes a settled *Revenge*, and an eager vindictive Pursuit. No wonder indeed that so much  
is

Book 2. is done in mere *Revenge*, and under the  
~~~~ Weight of a deep *Resentment*, when the  
*Resent-
ment.* Relief and Satisfaction found in that Indulgence is no other than the assuaging of the most torturous Pain, and the alleviating the most weighty and pressing Sensation of Misery. The Pain of this sort being for a-while remov'd or alleviated, by the accomplishment of the Desire, in the Ill of another, leaves indeed behind it the perception of a delicious Ease, and an overflowing of soft and pleasing Sensation. Yet is this, in truth, no better than the *Rack* it-self. For whoever has experienc'd racking Pains, can tell in what manner a sudden Cessation or Respite is us'd to affect him. From hence are those untoward Delights of Perverseness, Frowardness, and an envenom'd malignant Disposition, acting at its liberty. For this is only *a perpetual assuaging of ANGER perpetually renew'd*. In other Characters, the *Passion* arises not so suddenly, or on slight Causes; but being once mov'd, is not so easily quieted. The dormant *Fury*, *REVENGE*, being rais'd once, and wrought up to her highest pitch, rests not till she attains her End; and, that attain'd, is easy, and reposes; making our succeeding Relief and Ease so much the more enjoy'd, as our preceding Anguish and incumbent Pain was of long duration, and bitter sense. Certainly if among *Lovers*, and in the Language of Gallantry,

Gallantry, the Success of ardent Love is Part 2. call'd the *affuaging of a Pain*; this other ~~Success~~ Success may be far more justly term'd so. §. 2. However soft or flattering the former Pain may be esteem'd, this latter surely can be no pleasing one: Nor can it be possibly esteem'd other than found and thorow Wretchednes, a grating and disgusting Feeling, without the least mixture of any thing soft, gentle, or agreeable.

This is not very necessary to mention the ill effects of this Passion, in respect of our *Minds*, or *Bodys*, our private Condition, or *Circumstances* of Life. By these Particulars we may grow too tedious. These are of the moral sort of Subjects, join'd commonly with Religion, and treated so rhetorically, and with such inforc'd repetition in publick, as to be apt to raise the Satiety of Mankind. What has been said, may be enough perhaps to make this evident, " That to be subject to such a Passion as " we have been mentioning, is, in reality, " to be very unhappy :" And, " That the " Habit it-self is a *Disease* of the worst " sort ; from which *Misery* is inseparable."

NOW AS to *Luxury*, and what the World calls PLEASURE: Were it true (as has been prov'd the contrary) that the most considerable Enjoyments were those merely ^{PLEA-SURE.} _{Luxury.}

Book 2. merely of *the Sense*; and were it true, *PLEASURE.* withal, that those Enjoyments of the Sense lay in certain outward things, capable of yielding always a due and certain Portion of Pleasure, according to their degree and quality; it wou'd then follow, that the certain way to obtain Happiness, wou'd be to procure largely of these Subjects, to which Happiness and Pleasure were thus infallibly annex'd. But however fashionably we may apply the Notion of *good Living*, 'twill hardly be found that our inward Facultys are able to keep pace with these outward Supplies of a luxuriant Fortune. And if the natural Disposition and Aptness *from within* be not concurring; 'twill be in vain that these Subjects are thus multiply'd *from abroad*, and acquir'd with ever so great facility.

It may be observ'd in those, who by Excess have gain'd a constant Nauseating and Distaste, that they have nevertheless as constant a Craving or Eagerness of Stomach. But the *Appetite* of this kind is *false* and *unnatural*; as is that of Thirst arising from a Fever, or contracted by habitual Debauch. Now the Satisfactions of the *natural Appetite*, in a plain way, are infinitely beyond those Indulgences of the most refin'd and elegant *Luxury*. This is often perceiv'd by the Luxurious themselves. It has been experienc'd in People bred

bred after the sumptuous way, and us'd ne-Part 2.
ver to wait, but to prevent Appetite ; that when by any new Turn of Life they came to fall into a more natural Course, or for a while, as on a Journy, or a day of Sport, came accidentally to experience the Sweet of a plain Diet, recommended by due Abstinence and Exercize ; they have with freedom own'd, that it was then they receiv'd the highest Satisfaction and Delight which a *Table* cou'd possibly afford.

ON the other side, it has been as often remark'd in Persons accustom'd to an active Life, and healthful Exercise ; that having once thorowly experienc'd this plainer and more natural Diet, they have upon a following Change of Life regretted their Loss, and undervalu'd the Pleasures receiv'd from all the Delicacys of *Luxury*, in comparison with those remember'd Satisfactions of a preceding State. 'Tis plain, that by urging Nature, forcing the Appetite, and inciting Sense, the Keenes of the natural Sensations is lost. And tho thro' Vice or ill Habit the same Subjects of Appetite may, every day, be sought with greater Ardour ; they are enjoy'd with less Satisfaction. Tho the Impatience of abstaining be greater ; the Pleasure of Indulgence is really less. The Palls or *Nauseatings* which continually intervene, are of the worst and most hateful

Book 2. ful kind of Sensation. Hardly is there
 PLEA- any thing tasted which is wholly free from
 SURE. this ill relish of a surfeited Sense and ruin'd
Luxury. Appetite. So that instead of a constant
 and flowing Delight afforded in such a
 State of Life, the very State it-self is in
 reality a Sicknes and Infirmity, a Corrup-
 tion of Pleasure, and destructive of every
 natural and agreeable Sensation. So far is
 it from being true; “ That in this licen-
 tious Course we *enjoy LIFE best*, or are
 “ likely to make the most of it.”

As to the Consequences of such an Indulgence; how fatal to *the Body*, by Diseases of many kinds, and to *the Mind*, by Sottishnes and Stupidity; this needs not any explanation.

THE Consequences *as to Interest* are plain enough. Such a State of impotent and unrestrain'd Desire, as it increases our Wants, so it must subject us to a greater Dependence on others. Our private Circumstances, however plentiful or easy they may be, can less easily content us. Ways and Means must be invented to procure what may administer to such an imperious *Luxury*, as forces us to sacrifice Honour to Fortune, and runs us out into all irregularity and extravagance of Conduct. The Injurys we do our-selves, by Excess and Unforbearance, are then surely apparent,

apparent, when thro' an Impotence of this Part 2.
fort, and an Impossibility of Restraint, we ~~can~~
do what we our-selves declare to be de- ^{§. 2.}
structive to us. But these are Matters ob- ^{PLEA-}
_{SURE.} vious of themselves. And from less than
what has been said, 'tis easy to conclude,
“ That *Luxury, Riot, and Debauch*, are
“ contrary to real Interest, and to the true
“ Enjoyment of Life.”

THERE is another *Luxury* superior *Amours.*
to the kind we have been mentioning, and
which in strictness can scarce be call'd a
Self-passion, since the sole End of it is the
Advantage and Promotion of the Species.
But whereas all other social Affections are
join'd only with a *mental Pleasure*, and
founded in mere Kindness and Love; this
has more added to it, and is join'd with
a *Pleasure of Sense*. Such Concern and
Care has Nature shewn for the Support
and Maintenance of the several Species,
that by a certain *Indigence* and kind of
Necessity of their Natures, they are made
to regard the Propagation of their Kind.
Now whether it be the Interest or Good
of the Animal to feel this *Indigence* beyond
a natural and ordinary degree; is what we
may consider.

HAVING already said so much con-
cerning *natural* and *unnatural Appetite*,

Book 2. there needs less to be said on this occasion. If it be allow'd, that to all other *PLEA-SURE.* *Amours.* Pleasures there is a Measure of Appetite belonging, which cannot possibly be exceeded without prejudice to the Creature, even in his very Capacity of enjoying Pleasure; it will hardly be thought that there is no certain Limit or just Boundary of this other Appetite of *the AMOROUS kind.* There are other sorts of ardent Sensations accidentally experienc'd, which we find pleasant and acceptable whilst they are held within a certain degree; but which, as they increase, grow oppressive and intolerable. *Laughter* provok'd by Titillation, grows an excessive Pain; tho it retains still the same Features of Delight and Pleasure. And tho in the case of that particular kind of *Itch* which belongs to a Distemper nam'd from that effect, there are some who, far from disliking the Sensation, find it highly acceptable and delightful; yet it will hardly be reputed such among the more refin'd sort, even of those who make Pleasure their chief Study, and highest Good.

Now if there be in every Sensation of mere Pleasure, a certain Pitch or Degree of Ardour, which by being further advanc'd, comes the nearer to mere Rage and Fury; if there be indeed a necessity of stopping *somewhere,* and determining on

on *some* Boundary for the Passion ; where Part 2. can we fix our Standard, or how regulate *our-selves* but *with regard to Nature*, beyond which there is no Measure or Rule of things ? Now *Nature* may be known from what we see of the natural State of Creatures, and of Man himself, when unprejudic'd by vicious Education.

WHERE happily any-one is bred to a natural Life, inur'd to honest Industry and Sobriety, and un-accustom'd to any thing immoderate or intemperate ; he is found to have his Appetites and Inclinations of this sort at command. Nor are they on this account less able to afford him the Pleasure or Enjoyment of each kind. On the contrary ; as they are more sound, healthy, and un-injur'd by Excess and Abuse, they must afford him proportionate Satisfaction. So that were both these Sensations to be experimentally compar'd ; that of *a virtuous Course* which belong'd to one who liv'd a natural and regular Life, and that of *a vicious Course* which belong'd to one who was relax'd and dissolute ; there is no question but Judgment wou'd be given in favour of the former, without regard to Consequences, and only with respect to the very Pleasure of Sense it-self.

Book 2.

PLEA-
SURE. As to the Consequences of this Vice,
with respect to the Health and Vigour of
Amours. the *Body*; there is no need to mention any
thing. The Injury it does *the Mind*, tho'
less notic'd, is yet greater. The Hind-
rance of all Improvement, the wretched
Waste of Time, the Effeminacy, Sloth,
Supineness, the Disorder and Looseness of
a thousand Passions, thro' such a relaxation
and enervating of the Mind; are all of
them Effects sufficiently apparent, when
reflected on.

WHAT the Disadvantages are of this
Intemperance, in respect of Interest, So-
ciety, and the World; and what the Ad-
vantages are of a contrary Sobriety, and
Self-command, wou'd be to little pur-
pose to mention. 'Tis well known there
can be no Slavery greater than what is
consequent to the Dominion and Rule of
such a Passion. Of all other, it is the
least manageable by Favour or Conces-
sion, and assumes the most from Privi-
lege and Indulgence. What it costs us in
the Modesty and Ingenuity of our Natures,
and in the Faith and Honesty of our Cha-
racters, is as easily apprehended by any-
one who will reflect. And it will from
hence appear, " That there is no Passion,
" which in its Extravagance and Excess
" more

" more necessarily occasions Disorder and Part 2.
" Unhappiness." S. 2.

NOW AS to that Passion which is ^{INTE-}
esteem'd peculiarly *interesting*; as having ^{REST.}
for its Aim the Possession of Wealth, and
what we call a *Settlement* or *Fortune* in
the World: If the Regard towards this
kind be moderate, and in a reasonable de-
gree; if it occasions no passionate Pursuit,
nor raises any ardent Desire or Appetite;
there is nothing in this Case which is not
compatible with Virtue, and even suitable
and beneficial to Society. The publick as
well as private System is advanc'd by the
Industry, which this Affection excites.
But if it grows at length into a real *Passion*;
the Injury and Mischief it does the Pub-
lick, is not greater than that which it
creates to the Person himself. Such a one
is in reality a Self-oppressor, and lies
heavier on himself than he can ever do on
Mankind.

How far a COVETING or AVARI-
TIOUS TEMPER is miserable, needs
not, surely, be explain'd. Who knows
not how small a Portion of worldly Mat-
ters is sufficient for a Man's single Use
and Convenience; and how much his
Occasions and Wants might be con-
tracted and reduc'd, if a just Frugality
L 2 were

Book 2. were study'd, and Temperance and a natural Life came once to be pursu'd with Interest. half that Application, Industry and Art, which is bestow'd on Sumptuousness and Luxury? Now if Temperance be in reality so advantageous, and the Practice as well as the Consequences of it so pleasing and happy, as has been before express'd; there is little need, on the other side, to mention any thing of the Miserys attending those covetous and eager Desires after things which have no Bounds or Rule; as being out of *Nature*, beyond which there can be no Limits to Desire. For where shall we once stop, when we are beyond this Boundary? How shall we fix or ascertain a thing wholly *unnatural* and *unreasonable*? Or what Method, what Regulation shall we set to mere Imagination, or the Exorbitancy of Fancy, in adding Expence to Expence, or Possession to Possession?

HENCE that known Restlessness of *covetous* and eager Minds, in whatever State or Degree of Fortune they are plac'd; there being no thorow or real Satisfaction, but a kind of Infatianleness belonging to this Condition. For 'tis impossible there shou'd be any *real Enjoyment*, except in consequence of *natural* and *just Appetite*. Nor do we readily call that an *Enjoyment* of Wealth or of Honour, when thro'

Cove-

Covetousnes or Ambition, the Desire is still Part 2. forward, and can never rest satisfy'd with ~~the~~ its Gains. But against this Vice of Co- §. 2. VETOUSNESS, there is enough said continually in the World; and in our common way of speaking, "A covetous, and a miserable Temper, has, in reality, one and the same Signification."

NOR IS there less said, abroad, as to *Emulation*, the Ills of that other aspiring Temper, which exceeds an honest *Emulation*, or *Love of Praise*, and passes the Bounds even of *Vanity* and *Conceit*. Such is that Passion which breaks into an enormous PRIDE and AMBITION. Now if we consider once the Ease, Happiness, and Security which attend a *modest Disposition* and *quiet Mind*, such as is of easly Self-command, fitted to every Station in Society, and able to sute it-self with any reasonable Circumstances whatever; 'twill, on the first view, present us with the most agreeable and winning Character. Nor will it be found necessary, after this, to call to mind the Excellence and Good of *Moderation*, or the Mischief and Self-injury of immoderate Desires, and conceited fond Imaginations of personal Advantage, in such things as Titles, Honours, Precedencys, Fame, Glory, or *vulgar Aftonishment*, *Admiration*, and *Applause*.

Book 2.

Emula- *tion.* THIS too is obvious, that as the Desires of this kind are rais'd, and become impetuous, and out of our command; so the Aversions and Fears of the contrary part, grow proportionably strong and violent, and the Temper accordingly suspicious, jealous, captious, subject to Apprehensions from all Events, and incapable of bearing the least Repulse or ordinary Disappointment. And hence it may be concluded, " That all Rest and Security " *as to what is future*, and all Peace, Con- " tentedness and Ease *as to what is present*, " is forfeited by the aspiring Passions of " this emulous kind; and by having the " Appetites towards Glory and outward " Appearance thus transporting and beyond " command."

Indolence.

THERE is a certain Temper plac'd often in opposition to those eager and aspiring Aims of which we have been speaking. Not that it really excludes either the Passion of Covetousness or Ambition; but because it hinders their Effects, and keeps them from breaking into open Action. 'Tis this Passion, which by soothng the Mind, and softning it into an EXCESSIVE LOVE of REST and INDOLENCE, renders high Attempts impracticable, and represents as insuperable the Difficultys

Difficultys of a painful and laborious Course Part 2.
towards Wealth and Honours. Now tho ~~the~~ an Inclination to Ease, and a Love of moderate Recess and Rest from Action, be as natural and useful to us as the Inclination we have towards Sleep ; yet an excessive Love of Rest, and a contracted Aversion to Action and Imploym't, must be a Disease in the Mind equal to that of a Lethargy in the Body.

How necessary Action and Exercise are to the Body, may be judg'd by the difference we find between those Constitutions which are accustom'd, and those which are wholly strangers to it ; and by the different Health and Complexion which Labour and due Exercise create, in comparison with that Habit of Body we see consequent to an indulg'd State of Indolence and Rest. Nor is the lazy Habit ruinous to *the Body* only. The languishing Disease corrupts all the Enjoyments of a vigorous and healthy Sense, and carrys its Infection into *the Mind* ; where it spreads a worse Contagion. For however the Body may for a-while hold out, 'tis impossible that the Mind, in which the Distemper is seated, can escape without an immediate Affliction and Disorder. The Habit begets a Tedium and Anxiety, which influences the whole Temper, and converts the unnatural Rest

Book 2. into an unhappy sort of Activity, ill Humour, and Spleen: of which there has been enough said above, where we consider'd the want of a due *Balance* in the Affections.

'Tis certain, that as in *the Body*, when no Labour or natural Exercise is us'd, the Spirits which want their due Employment, turn against the Constitution, and find work for themselves in a destructive way; so in *a Soul, or Mind*, unexercis'd, and which languishes for want of proper Action and Employment, the Thoughts and Affections being obstructed in their due Course, and depriv'd of their natural Energy, raise Disquiet, and foment a rancorous Eagerness and tormenting Irritation. The Temper from hence becomes more impotent in Passion, more incapable of real Moderation; and, like prepar'd Fuel, readily takes fire by the least Spark.

As to *Interest*, how far it is here concern'd; how wretched that State is, in which by this Habit a Man is plac'd, towards all the Circumstances and Affairs of Life, when at any time he is call'd to Action; how subjected he must be to all Inconveniences, wanting to himself, and depriv'd of the Assistance of others; whilst being unfit for all Offices and Dutys of Society,

Society, he yet of any other Person most Part 2.
needs the help of it, as being least able to ~~himself~~ assist or support himself; all this is ob- §. 2.
vious. And thus 'tis evident, " That to
" have this over-biasing Inclination to-
" wards Rest, this *lothful, soft, or effe-*
" *minate Temper, averse to Labour and*
" *Implyoment, is to have an unavoidable*
" *Mischief, and attendant Plague."*

THUS have we consider'd the *Self-passions*; and what the Consequence is of ^{Self-passions in} _{general} their rising beyond a moderate degree. These Affections, as self-interested as they are, can often, we see, become contrary to our real Interest. They betray us into most Misfortunes, and into the greatest of Unhappinesses, that of a profligate and abject Character. As they grow imperious and high, they are the occasion that a Creature in proportion becomes mean and low. They are original to that which we call *Selfishness*, and give rise to that sordid Disposition of which we have already spoken. It appears there can be nothing so miserable in it-self, or so wretched in its Consequence, as to be thus impotent in Temper, thus master'd by Passion, and by means of it, brought under the most servile Subjection to the World.

Book 2.

Tis evident withal, that as this Selfishness increases in us, so must a certain Subtlety, and feignednes of Carriage, which naturally accompanys it. And thus the Candour and Ingenuity of our Natures, the Ease and Freedom of our Minds must be forfeited; all Trust and Confidence in a manner lost; and Suspicions, Jealousys, and Envy's multiply'd. A separate End and Interest must be every day more strongly form'd in us; generous Views and Motives laid aside: And the more we are thus sensibly disjoin'd every day from Society and our Fellows; the worse Opinion we shall have of those uniting Passions, which bind us in strict Alliance and Amity with others. Upon these Terms we must of course endeavour to silence and suppress our natural and good Affections: since they are such as wou'd carry us to the good of Society, against what we fondly conceive to be our private Good and Interest; as has been shewn.

Now if these SELFISH PASSIONS, besides what other Ill they are the occasion of, are withal the certain means of losing us our natural Affections; then (by what has been prov'd before) 'tis evident,
 " That they must be the certain means of
 " losing us the chief Enjoyment of Life,
 " and

" and raising in us those horrid and *un-* Part 2.
 " *natural Passions*, and that Savageness of ~~the~~
 " Temper, which makes THE GREA- §. 3.
 " TEST OF MISERYS, and the most
 " wretched State of Life :" as remains
 for us to explain.

S E C T. III.

THE Passions therefore, which, in the *THIRD*
 last place, we are to examine, are ^{Proof;} *from the*
 those which lead neither to *a publick* nor ^{unnatural} *Affections.*
a private Good ; and are neither of any ad-
 vantage to the Species in general, or the
 Creature in particular. These, in opposi-
 tion to the *social and natural*, we call the
 UNNATURAL AFFECTIONS.

OF this kind is that UNNATURAL <sup>Inhu-
 man</sup> and INHUMAN DELIGHT *in beholding* ^{nity.}
Torments, and in viewing Distress, Cala-
 mity, Blood, Massacre and Destruction,
 with a peculiar Joy and Pleasure. This
 has been the reigning Passion of many
 Tyrants, and barbarous Nations ; and be-
 longs, in some degree, to such Tempers
 as have thrown off that Courteousness of
 Behaviour, which retains in us a just Re-
 verence of Mankind, and prevents the
 Growth of Harshness and Brutality. This
 Passion enters not where Civility or affa-
 ble Manners have the least place. Such is
 the Nature of what we call *good Breeding*,
 that

Book 2. that in the midst of many other Corruptions, it admits not of IN HUMANITY, or *savage Pleasure*. To see the Sufferance of an Enemy with cruel Delight, may proceed from the height of Anger, Revenge, Fear, and other extended Self-passions: But to delight in the Torture and Pain of other Creatures indifferently, Natives or Foreigners, of our own or of another Species, Kindred or no Kindred, known or unknown; to feed, as it were, on Death, and be entertain'd with dying Agonys; this has nothing in it accountable in the way of Self-interest or private Good above-mention'd, but is wholly and absolutely unnatural, as it is horrid and miserable.

Petulancy. THERE is another Affection nearly related to this, which is *a gay and frolicksome Delight* in what is injurious to others; a sort of WANTON MISCHIEVOSNESS, and Pleasure in what is destructive; a Passion which, instead of being restrain'd, is usually encourag'd in Children: so that 'tis indeed no wonder if the Effects of it are very unfortunately felt in the World. For 'twill be hard, perhaps, for any-one to give a reason why that Temper, which was us'd to delight in Disorder and Ravage, when in a Nurser ry; shou'd not afterwards find delight in other Disturbances, and be the occasion of

of equal Mischief in Familys, amongst Part 2. Friends, and in the Publick it-self. But ~~as~~ of this Paffion there is not any foundation §. 3. in Nature ; as has been explain'd.

MALICE, MALIGNITY, or ILL-*Malignity.* WILL, such as is grounded on no Self-consideration, and where there is no Subject of Anger or Jealousy, nor any thing to provoke or cause such a Desire of doing ill to another ; this also is of that kind of Paffion.

ENVY too, when it is such as arises *Envvy.* from the Prosperity or Happiness of another Creature no ways interfering with ours, is of the same kind of Paffion.

THERE is also among these, a sort of *Moroseness.*
HATRED OF MANKIND AND SOCIETY; a Paffion which has been known perfectly reigning in some Men, and has had a peculiar Name given to it. A large share of this belongs to those who have long indulg'd themselves in a habitual *Moroseness,* or who by force of ill Nature, and ill Breeding, have contracted such a Reverse of Affability, and civil Manners, that to see or meet a Stranger is offensive. The very Aspect of Mankind is a disturbance to 'em, and they are sure always to hate at first sight. The Distemper of this kind is sometimes found to be in a man-

Book 2.ner *National*; but peculiar to the more savage Nations, and a plain *Characteristick* of unciviliz'd Manners, and Barbarity. This is the immediate Opposite to that noble Affection, which, in antient Language, was term'd * *Hospitality*, viz. extensive Love of Mankind, and Relief of Strangers.

Superstition.

WE may add likewise to the number of the *unnatural Passions*, all those which are rais'd from **SUPERSTITION**, (as before-mention'd) and from the *Customs* of barbarous Countrys: All which are too horrid and odious in themselves, to need any proof of their being miserable.

Unnatural Lusts.

THERE might be other Passions nam'd, such as *unnatural Lusts*, in *foreign Kinds or Species*, with other Perversions of the amorous Desire within *our own*. But as to these Depravitys of Appetite, we need add nothing here; after what has been already said, on the Subject of the more *natural Passions*.

SUCH as these are the only Affections or Passions we can strictly call *unnatural*, ill, and of no tendency so much as to any separate or private Good. Others indeed there are which have this tendency, but are so exorbitant and out of measure, so

* VOL. III. p. 153, 154. in the Notes.

beyond

beyond the common Bent of any ordinary Part 2.
Self-passion, and so utterly contrary and abhorrent to all *social* and *natural Affection*, that they are generally call'd, and may be justly esteem'd, *unnatural* and *monstrous*. §. 3.

AMONG these may be reckon'd such *Tyranny*.
 an ENORMOUS PRIDE or AMBITION,
 such an ARROGANCE and TYRANNY,
 as wou'd willingly leave nothing eminent,
 nothing free, nothing prosperous in the
 World: such an ANGER as wou'd sacrifice
 every thing to it-self: such a REVENGE as is never to be extinguish'd,
 nor ever satisfy'd without the greatest
 Crueltys: such an INVETERACY and
 RANCOUR as seeks, as it were, occasion
 to exert it-self; and lays hold of the least
 Subject, so as often to make the weight of
 its Malevolence fall even upon such as are
 mere Objects of Pity and Compassion.

TREACHERY and INGRATITUDE *Treachery,*
 are in strictness mere negative Vices; and, *Ingrati-*
 in themselves, no real Passions; having
 neither Aversion or Inclination belonging
 to them; but are deriv'd from the Defect,
 Unsoundness, or Corruption of the
 Affections in general. But when these
 Vices become remarkable in a Character,
 and arise in a manner from Inclination
 and Choice; when they are so for-
 ward

Book 2. ward and active, as to appear of their own accord, without any pressing occasion ; 'tis apparent they borrow something of the mere *unnatural Passions*, and are deriv'd from *Malice*, *Envy*, and *Inveteracy*; as explain'd above.

Unnatural Pleasure in general. IT MAY be objected here, that these Passions, *unnatural* as they are, carry still a sort of *Pleasure* with them ; and that however barbarous a *Pleasure* it be, yet still it is a *Pleasure* and *Satisfaction* which is found in Pride, or Tyranny, Revenge, Malice, or Cruelty exerted. Now if it be possible in Nature, that any-one can feel a barbarous or malicious Joy, otherwise than in consequence of mere Anguish and Torment, then may we perhaps allow this kind of Satisfaction to be call'd *Pleasure* or *Delight*. But the Case is evidently contrary. To love, and to be kind ; to have social or natural Affection, Complacency and Good-will, is to feel immediate Satisfaction and genuine Content. 'Tis in it-self *original Joy*, depending on no preceding Pain or Uneasiness ; and producing nothing beside Satisfaction merely. On the other side, Animosity, Hatred and Bitterness, is *original Misery* and *Torment*, producing no other *Pleasure* or *Satisfaction*, than as the unnatural Desire is for the instant satisfy'd by something

thing which appeases it. How strong soever this Pleasure, therefore, may appear; *Part 2.* it only the more implies the Misery of that State which produces it. For as the cruellest bodily Pains do by intervals of Assuagement, produce (as has been shewn) the highest bodily Pleasure; so the fiercest and most raging Torments of the Mind, do, by certain Moments of Relief, afford the greatest of mental Enjoyments, to those who know little of the truer kind.

THE Men of gentlest Dispositions, and best of Tempers, have at some time or other been sufficiently acquainted with those Disturbances, which, at ill hours, even small occasions are apt to raise. From these slender Experiences of Harshness and Ill-humour, they fully know and will confess the ill Moments which are pass'd, when the Temper is ever so little gall'd or fretted. How must it fare, therefore, with those who hardly know any better hours in Life; and who, for the greatest part of it, are agitated by a thorow active Spleen, a close and settled Malignity, and Rancour? How lively must be the Sense of every thwarting and controuling Accident? How great must be the Shocks of Disappointment, the Stings of Affront, and the Agonys of a working Antipathy, against the multiply'd Objects of Offence? Nor can it be wonder'd at, if to Persons

*Unnatural
State.*

Book 2. thus agitated and oppres'd, it seems a high
 ~~~~~ Delight to appease and allay for the while  
<sup>Unnatural</sup>  
<sub>State.</sub> those furious and rough Motions, by an  
 Indulgence of their Passion in Mischief and  
 Revenge.

Now as to the Consequences of this *unnatural State*, in respect of Interest, and the common Circumstances of Life; upon what Terms a Person who has in this manner lost all which we call *Nature*, can be suppos'd to stand, in respect of the Society of Mankind; how he feels himself in it; what Sense he has of his own Disposition towards others, and of the mutual Disposition of others towards himself; this is easily conceiv'd.

WHAT Injoyment or Rest is there for one, who is not conscious of the merited Affection or Love, but, on the contrary, of the Ill-will and Hatred of every human Soul? What ground must this afford for Horror and Despair? What foundation of Fear, and continual Apprehension from Mankind, and from superior Powers? How thorow and deep must be that *Melancholy*, which being once mov'd, has nothing soft or pleasing from the side of Friendship, to allay or divert it? Wherever such a Creature turns himself; whichever way he casts his Eye; every thing around must appear ghastly and horrid; every

every thing hostile, and, as it were, *bent* Part 2.  
against a private and single Being, who is *thus* §. 3.  
thus divided from every thing, and at de-  
fiance and war with the rest of Nature.

'T IS thus, at last, that A MIND becomes *a Wilderness*; where all is laid waste, every thing fair and *goodly* remov'd, and nothing extant beside what is savage and deform'd. Now if Banishment from one's Country, Removal to a foreign Place, or any thing which looks like Solitude or Desertion, be so heavy to endure; what must it be to feel this *inward Banishment*, this real *Estrangement* from human Commerce; and to be after this manner in a Desert, and in the horridest of Solitudes, even when in the midst of Society? What must it be to live in this *Disagreement* with every thing, this *Irreconcilableness* and *Opposition* to the Order and Government of the Universe?

HENCE it appears, That the greatest of Miserys accompanys *that State* which is consequent to the Loss of natural Affection; and That TO HAVE THOSE HORRID, MONSTROUS, AND UNNATURAL AFFECTIONS, IS TO BE MISERABLE IN THE HIGHEST DEGREE.

~~ CONCLUSION.

**T**HUS have we endeavour'd to prove what was propos'd in the beginning. And since in the common and known Sense of *Vice* and *Illness*, no-one can be vicious or ill, except either,

i. By the Deficiency or Weakness of *natural Affections*;

Or, 2. by the Violence of *the selfish*;

Or, 3. by such as are plainly *unnatural*:

IT must follow, that if each of these are pernicious and destructive to the Creature, insomuch that his compleatest State of Misery is made from hence; **TO BE WICKED OR VITIOUS, IS TO BE MISERABLE AND UNHAPPY.**

AND since every vicious Action must in proportion, more or les, help towards this Mischief, and *Self-ill*; it must follow, **THAT EVERY VITIOUS ACTION MUST BE SELF-INJURIOUS AND ILL.**

ON the other side; *the Happiness and Good of VIRTUE* has been prov'd from the contrary Effect of other Affections, such

such as are according to *Nature*, and the Part 2.  
OEconomy of the Species or Kind. We ~~have~~  
have cast up all those Particulars, from  
whence (as by way of Addition and Sub-  
traction) the main *Sum* or general Account  
of Happiness, is either augmented or dimi-  
nish'd. And if there be no Article excep-  
tionable in this Scheme of *Moral Arithme-  
tick*; the Subject treated may be said to  
have an Evidence as great as that which is  
found in Numbers, or Mathematicks. For  
let us carry *Scepticism* ever so far, let us  
doubt, if we can, of every thing about us; we  
cannot doubt of what passes *within our-  
selves*. Our Passions and Affections are  
known to us. They are certain, whatever  
the Objects may be, on which they are em-  
ploy'd. Nor is it of any concern to our  
Argument, how these exterior Objects  
stand; whether they are Realitys, or mere  
Illusions; whether we wake or dream. For  
*ill Dreams* will be equally disturbing. And  
a good *Dream*, if Life be nothing else,  
will be easily and happily pass'd. In this  
Dream of Life, therefore, our Demonstrations  
have the same force; our *Balance* and  
OEconomy hold good, and our Obligation  
to VIRTUE is in every respect the same.

UPON the whole: There is not, I pre-  
sume, the least degree of Certainty wanting  
in what has been said concerning the Pre-  
ferableness of *the mental Pleasures to the  
sensual*;

*Book 2.* *sensual*; and even of the *sensual*, accompa-  
 ny'd with good *Affection*, and under a tem-  
 Conclu- perate and right use, to those which are no  
 sion. ways restrain'd, nor supported by any thing  
 social or affectionate.

NOR is there less Evidence in what has been said, of the *united Structure and Fabric* of the *Mind*, and of those Passions which constitute the *Temper*, or *Soul*; and on which its Happiness or Misery so immediately depend. It has been shewn, That in *this Constitution*, the impairing of any one Part must instantly tend to the disorder and ruin of other Parts, and of the Whole it-self; thro' the necessary *Connexion* and *Balance* of the Affections: That those very Passions thro' which Men are vicious, are of themselves a Torment and Disease; and that whatsoever is done which is knowingly ill, must be of ill *Consciousness*; and in proportion, as the Act is ill, must impair and corrupt social Enjoyment, and destroy both the *Capacity of kind Affection*, and the *Consciousness of meriting any such*. So that neither can we participate thus in Joy or Happiness with others, or receive Satisfaction from the mutual Kindness or imagin'd Love of others: on which, however, the greatest of all our Pleasures are founded.

If this be the Case of moral Delinquency; and if the State which is consequent

to this Defection from Nature, be of all Part 2. other the most horrid, oppressive, and miserable; 'twill appear, "That to yield or  
"consent to any thing ill or immoral, is a  
"Breach of Interest, and leads to the grea-  
"test Ills:" and, "That on the other  
"side, Every thing which is an Improve-  
"ment of Virtue, or an Establishment of  
"right Affection and Integrity, is an Ad-  
"vancement of Interest, and leads to the  
"greatest and most solid Happiness and En-  
"joyment."

THUS the Wisdom of what rules, and is FIRST and CHIEF in Nature, has made it to be according to the private Interest and Good of every-one, to work towards the general Good; which if a Creature ceases to promote, he is actually so far wanting to himself, and ceases to promote his own Happiness and Welfare. He is, on this account, directly his own Enemy: Nor can he any otherwise be good or useful to himself, than as he continues good to Society, and to that Whole of which he is himself a Part. So that VIRTUE, which of all Excellencys and Beautys is the chief, and most amiable; that which is the Prop and Ornament of human Affairs; which upholds Communitys, maintains Union, Friendship, and Correspondence amongst Men; that by which Countrys, as well as private Familys, flourish and are happy;

M 4 and

Book 2. and for want of which, every-thing come-  
*Conclusion* ly, conspicuous, great and worthy, must  
perish, and go to ruin ; *that single Quality*,  
thus beneficial to all Society, and to Man-  
kind *in general*, is found equally a Happi-  
ness and Good to each Creature *in parti-  
cular* ; and is *that* by which alone Man  
can be happy, and without which he must  
be miserable.

AND, thus, VIRTUE is *the Good*, and  
VICE *the Ill* of every-one.

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T R E A-

T R E A T I S E V.

V I Z.<sup>1</sup>

T H E

M O R A L I S T S,

A

*Philosophical Rhapsody.*

B E I N G

A R E C I T A L of certain  
Conversations on *Natural* and *Moral*  
Subjects.

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—*Inter Silvas Academi querere Verum.*


Horat. Ep. 2. Lib. 2.


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V. p. 182. 190. &amp;c.

S: Gribelin sculps.

# THE MORALISTS, &c.

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## PART I.

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### PHILOCLES *to PALEMON.*

**W**HAT Mortal, if he had never chanc'd to hear your Character, PALEMON, cou'd imagine that a Genius fitted for the greatest Affairs, and form'd amidst Courts and Camps, shou'd have so violent a Turn towards Philosophy and

Part I. and the Schools? Who is there cou'd possibly believe that one of your Rank and Credit in the *fashionable* World, shou'd be so thorowly conversant in the *learned* one, and deeply interested in the Affairs of a People so disagreeable to the Generality of Mankind and Humour of the Age?

I BELIEVE truly, You are the only well-bred Man who wou'd have taken the Fancy to talk Philosophy in such a Circle of good Company as we had round us yesterday, when we were in your Coach together, in *the Park*. How you cou'd reconcile the Objects there, to such Subjects as these, was unaccountable. I cou'd only conclude, that either you had an extravagant Passion for Philosophy, to quit so many Charms for it; or that some of those tender Charms had an extravagant Effect, which sent you to Philosophy for Relief.

IN either Case I pity'd you; thinking it a milder Fate, to be, as I truly was, for my own part, *a more indifferent Lover*. 'Twas better, I told you, to admire Beauty and Wisdom a little more moderately. 'Twas better, I maintain'd, to ingage so cautiously as to be sure of coming off with a whole Heart, and a Fancy as strong as ever towards all the pretty Entertainments and Diversions of the World. For these, methought,

methought, were things one wou'd not Se<sup>t</sup>. I.  
willingly part with, for a fine romantick ~~—~~  
Passion of one of those Gentlemen whom  
they call'd *Virtuoso's*.

THE Name I took to belong in common  
to your *Lover* and *Philosopher*. No mat-  
ter what the Object was; whether Poetry,  
Musick, Philosophy, or *the Fair*. All who  
were enamour'd any-way, were in the same  
Condition. You might perceive it, I told  
you, by their Looks, their Admiration,  
their profound Thoughtfulness, their wa-  
king ever and anon as out of a Dream,  
their talking still of one thing, and scarce  
minding what they said on any other Sub-  
ject.— Sad Indications!

BUT all this Warning serv'd not to de-  
ter you. For you, PALEMON, are one  
of the Adventurous, whom Danger rather  
animates than discourages. And now no-  
thing less will satisfy you than to have our  
Philosophical Adventures recorded. All  
must be laid before you, and summ'd in one  
compleat Account; to remain, it seems, as  
a Monument of that unseasonable Conver-  
sation, so opposite to the reigning Genius  
of *Gallantry* and *Pleasure*.

I MUST own, indeed, 'tis become  
fashionable in our Nation to talk Politicks  
in

Part 1. in every Company, and mix the Discourses  
 of State-affairs with those of Pleasure and  
 Entertainment. However, 'tis certain we  
~~PHILO-~~ approve of no such Freedom in ~~PHILO-~~  
~~SOPHY.~~ ~~sophy.~~ Nor do we look upon *Politicks*  
 to be of her Province, or in the least related  
 to her. So much have we Moderns  
 degraded her, and stripp'd her of her chief  
 Rights:

You must allow me, PALEMON, thus to bemoan *Philosophy*; since you have forc'd me to ingage with her at a time when her Credit runs so low. She is no longer *active* in the World; nor can hardly, with any advantage, be brought upon the publick Stage. We have immur'd her (poor Lady!) in Colleges and Cells; and have set her servilely to such Works as those in the Mines. Empiricks, and pedantick Sophists are her chief Pupils. The *School-syllogism*, and the *Elixir*, are the choicest of her Products. So far is she from producing Statesmen, as of old, that hardly any Man of Note in the publick cares to own the least Obligation to her. If some few maintain their Acquaintance, and come now and then to her Receffes, 'tis as the Disciple of Quality *came* to his Lord and Master; “*secretly, and by night.*”

*Morals.*

BUT as low as *PHILOSOPHY* is reduc'd; if *Morals* be allow'd belonging to her,

her, *Politicks* must undeniably be hers. Sect. 1. For to understand the Manners and Constitutions of Men *in common*, 'tis necessary to study MAN *in particular*, and know the Creature, as he is in himself, before we consider him in Company, as he is interested in the State, or join'd to any City or Community. Nothing is more familiar than to reason concerning Man in his *confederate* State and *national* Relation; as he stands ingag'd to this or that Society, by Birth or Naturalization: Yet to consider him as a *Citizen* or *Commoner of the World*, to trace his Pedegree a step higher, and view his End and Constitution in *Nature* itself, must pass, it seems, for some intricate or over-refin'd Speculation.

IT may be properly alledg'd perhaps, as a Reason for this general Shyness in *moral Inquirys*; that the People to whom it has principally belong'd to handle these Subjects, have done it in such a manner as to put the better Sort out of countenance with the Undertaking. The appropriating this Concern to mere *Scholasticks*, has brought their Fashion and Air into the very Subject: There are formal Set-places, where, we reckon, there is enough said and taught on the Head of these graver Subjects. We can give no quarter to any thing like it in good Company. The least mention of such matters gives us a disgust,

Part 1. and puts us out of humour. If Learning  
 comes a-cross us, we count it *Pedantry*; if  
<sup>Language.</sup> Morality, 'tis *Preaching*.

ONE must own this, however, as a real Disadvantage of our modern Conversations; that by such a scrupulous Nicety they lose those masculine Helps of Learning and sound Reason. Even the *Fair Sex*, in whose favour we pretend to make this Condescension, may with reason despise us for it, and laugh at us for aiming at their peculiar Softness. 'Tis no Compliment to them, to affect their Manners, and be *effeminate*. Our Sense, Language, and Style, as well as our Voice, and Person, shou'd have something of that Male-Feature, and natural Roughness, by which our Sex is distinguish'd. And whatever *Politeness* we may pretend to, 'tis more a Disfigurement than any real Refinement of Discourse, to render it thus delicate.

*Style.*

No Work of Wit can be esteem'd perfect without that Strength and Boldness of Hand, which gives it Body and Proportions. A good Piece, the Painters say, must have good *Muscling* as well as *Colouring* and *Drapery*. And surely no Writing or Discourse of any great moment, can seem other than enervated, when neither strong Reason, nor Antiquity, nor the Records of Things, nor the natural History

ry of Man, nor any-thing which can be Sect. 1.  
call'd *Knowldg*, dares accompany it ; ex-~~—~~  
cept perhaps in some ridiculous Habit,  
which may give it an Air of Play and  
Dalliance.

THIS brings to my mind a Reason I  
have often sought for ; why we Moderns,  
who abound so much in *Treatises* and *E-  
says*, are so sparing in the way of \* *DIA-DIA-  
LOGUE* ; which heretofore was found the *LOGUE*.  
politest and best way of managing even the  
graver Subjects. The truth is ; 'twou'd be  
an abominable Falshood, and belying of the  
Age, to put so much good Sense together  
in any *one* Conversation, as might make it  
hold out steddily, and with plain coherence,  
for an hour's time, till any *one* Subject had  
been rationally examin'd.

To lay Colours, to draw, or describe,  
against the Appearance of Nature and  
Truth, is a Liberty neither permitted the  
Painter nor the Poet. Much less can *the  
Philosopher* have such a Privilege ; espe-  
cially *in his own Case*. If he represents  
his Philosophy as making any figure in  
Conversation ; if he triumphs in the De-  
bate, and gives his own Wisdom the advan-

\* VOL. I. pag. 193, 4, 5, 6, 7, &c. VOL. III. pag.  
290, &c.

Part i. tage over that of the World ; he may be  
 liable to sound Raillery, and possibly be  
 made a *Fable* of.

*A Fable.* 'Tis said of the *Lion*, that being in ci-  
 vil Conference with the *Man*, he wisely re-  
 fus'd to yield the Superiority of Strength to  
 him ; when instead of Fact, the *Man* pro-  
 duc'd only certain Figures and Representa-  
 tions of human Victo'rys over the Lion-  
 kind. These Master-pieces of Art the Beast  
 discover'd to be wholly of human Forge-  
 ry : and from these he had good right to  
 appeal. Indeed had he ever in his life been  
 witness to any such Combats as the *Man*  
 represented to him in the way of Art ; pos-  
 sibly the Example might have mov'd him.  
 But old Statues of a *HERCULES*, a *THE-  
 SEU S*, or other Beast-subduers, cou'd have  
 little power over him, whilst he neither  
 saw nor felt any such living Antagonist ca-  
 pable to dispute the Field with him.

WE need not wonder, therefore, that  
 the sort of moral Painting, by way of  
*Dialogue*, is so much out of fashion ; and  
 that we see no more of these philosophical  
 Portraitures now-a-days. For where are  
 the *Originals* ? Or what tho you, *P A L E-  
 M O N*, or I, by chance, have lighted on  
 such a one ; and pleas'd our-selves with  
 the *Life* ? Can you imagine it shou'd make  
 a good *Picture* ?

Y O U

YOU know too, that in this *Aca-* *Acade-*  
*demick* Philosophy I am to present you *mists.*  
with, there is a certain way of Questioning  
and Doubting, which no-way futes the Ge-  
nius of our Age. Men love to take party  
instantly. They can't bear being kept in  
suspence. The Examination torments 'em.  
They want to be rid of it, upon the easiest  
terms. 'Tis as if Men fanfy'd themselves  
drowning, whenever they dare trust to the  
Current of Reason. They seem hurrying  
away, they know not whither ; and are  
ready to catch at the first Twig. There  
they chuse afterwards to hang, tho ever so  
insecurely, rather than trust their Strength  
to bear 'em above Water. He who has got  
hold of an *Hypothesis*, how flight soever, is  
satisfy'd. He can presently answer every  
Objection, and, with a few Terms of Art,  
give an account of every thing without  
trouble.

'Tis no wonder if in this Age the Philo- *Alchymists*-  
sophy of the *Alchymists* prevails so much : *mists.*  
since it promises such Wonders, and requires  
more the Labour of Hands than Brains.  
We have a strange Fancy to be Creators, a  
violent Desire at least to know the Knack  
or Secret by which Nature does all. The  
rest of our Philosophers only aim at that in  
Speculation, which our Alchymists aspire  
to

Part 1. to in Practice. For with some of these it  
 ~~ has been actually under deliberation how to  
 make *Man*, by other Mediums than Nature  
 has hitherto provided. Every Sect has a  
*Recipe*. When you know it, you are Master  
 of Nature : you solve all her \* *Phæno-*  
*mēna* : you see all her Designs, and can ac-  
 count for all her Operations. If need were,  
 you might, perchance too, be of her La-  
 boratory, and work for her. At least one  
 wou'd imagine the Partizans of each mo-  
 dern Sect had this Conceit. They are all  
 ARCHIMEDES's in their way, and can  
*make* a World upon easier terms than he of-  
 fer'd to *move* one.

*Dogma-  
tists.*

IN short ; there are good Reasons for  
 our being thus superficial, and consequent-  
 ly thus dogmatical in Philosophy. We  
 are too lazy and effeminate, and withal a  
 little too cowardly, to dare *doubt*. The  
 decisive way best becomes our Manners.  
 It futes as well with our Vices as with  
 our Superstition. Which-ever we are fond  
 of, is secur'd by it. If in favour of Re-  
 ligion we have espous'd an Hypothesis,  
 on which our Faith, we think, depends ;  
 we are superstitiously careful not to be  
 loosen'd in it. If, by means of our ill  
 Morals, we are broken with Religion ;  
 'tis the same Case still : We are as much

\* See VOL. III. p. 160.

afraid of *Doubting*. We must be sure to Sect. I.  
say, " *It cannot be* ;" and " *'tis Demon-~~un~~*  
" *strable* : For otherwise *Who knows* ?  
" *And not to know*, is to *yield* !"—

THUS we will needs *know* every thing, and be at the pains of examining nothing. Of all Philosophy, therefore, how absolutely the most disagreeable must *that* appear, which goes upon no establish'd Hypothesis, nor presents us with any flattering Scheme, talks only of Probabilitys, Suspence of Judgment, Inquiry, Search, and Caution not to be impos'd on, or deceiv'd? This is that *Academick Discipline* in which formerly \* the Youth were train'd : when *Antients.* not only Horsemanship and Military Arts had their publick Places of Exercise; but Philosophy too had its Wrestlers in repute. Reason and Wit had their *Academy*, and underwent this Trial ; not in a formal way, apart from the World ; but openly, among the better sort, and as an Exercise of the genteeler kind. This the greatest Men were not ashame'd to practise, in the Intervals of publick Affairs, in the highest Stations and Employments, and at the latest hour of their Lives. Hence that way of *DI A LOGUE*, and Patience of Debate and Reasoning, of which we have scarce a Resemblance left in any of our Conversations, at this season of the World.

\* VOL. I. pag. 333, &c. and Notes.



CONSIDER then, PALEMON, what *our Picture* is like to prove: and how it will appear; especially in the Light you have unluckily chosen to set it. For who wou'd thus have confronted Philosophy with the Gaiety, Wit, and Humour of the Age? — If this, however, can be for your Credit, I am content. The Project is your own. 'Tis you who have match'd *Philosophy* thus unequally. Therefore leaving you to answer for the Success, I begin this inauspicious Work, which my ill Stars and you have assign'd me; and in which I hardly dare ask Succour of the *Muses*, as poetical as I am oblig'd to shew my-self in this Enterprize.

## S E C T. II.

“ O WRETCHED State of Man-  
“ kind! — Hapless Nature, thus  
“ to have err'd in thy chief Workman-  
“ ship! — — Whence sprang this fatal  
“ Weakness? What Chance or Destiny  
“ shall we accuse? Or shall we mind  
“ the Poets, when they sing thy Tragedy  
“ (*PROMETHEUS!*) who with thy stoln  
“ celestial Fire, mix'd with vile Clay,  
“ didst mock Heaven's Countenance, and  
“ in abusive Likeness of the Immortals  
“ mad'st

" mad'st the compound MAN ; that Sect. 2.  
" wretched Mortal, ill to himself, and ~~the~~  
" Cause of Ill to all." —

WHAT say you, PALEMON, to this Rant, now upon second thoughts ? Or have you forgot 'twas just in such a romantick Strain that you broke out against *human Kind*, upon a Day when every thing look'd pleasing, and the *Kind* it-self (I thought) never appear'd fairer, or made a better shew ?

BUT 'twas not the whole Creation you thus quarrel'd with : Nor were you so out of conceit with *all* Beauty. The Verdure of the Field, the distant Prospects, the gilded Horizon, and purple Sky, form'd by a setting Sun, had Charms in abundance, and were able to make impression on you. Here, PALEMON, you allow'd me to admire as much as I pleas'd ; when, at the same instant, you wou'd not bear my talking to you of those nearer Beautys of our own Kind, which I thought more natural for Men at our Age to admire. Your Severity however cou'd not silence me upon this Subject. I continu'd to plead the Cause of *the Fair*, and advance their Charms above all those other Beautys of Nature. And when you took advantage from this Opposition, to shew how little there was of *Nature*, and how much

Part 1. of *Art* in what I admir'd, I made the best  
 ~~~~~ Apology I cou'd; and fighting for Beauty,  
 kept the Field as long as there was one
Fair-one present.

Gallantry. CONSIDERING how your Genius stood inclin'd to Poetry, I wonder'd most to find you on a sudden grown so out of conceit with our modern Poets, and *Galante* Writers; whom I quoted to you, as better Authoritys than any Antient in behalf of the Fair Sex, and their Prerogative. But this you treated lightly. You acknowledg'd it to be true indeed, what had been observ'd by some late Wits, "That GALLANTRY "was of a modern Growth." And well it might be so, you thought, without dis-honour to the Antients; who understood *Truth* and *Nature* too well, to admit so ridiculous an Invention.

"TWAS in vain, therefore, that I held up this Shield in my defense. I did my Cause no service, when in behalf of *the Fair* I pleaded all the fine things which are usually said, in this romantick way, to their advantage. You attack'd the very Fortress of *Gallantry*, ridicul'd *the Point of Honour*, with all those nice Sentiments and Ceremonials belonging to it. You damn'd even our Favourite *Novels*; those dear sweet natural Pieces, writ most of 'em by the Fair Sex themselves. In short, this

whole Order and Scheme of Wit you con- Sect. 2.
demn'd absolutely, as *false*, *monstrous*, and ~~wrong~~
GOTHICK; quite out of the way of Na-
ture, and sprung from the mere Dregs
of *Chivalry* or *Knight-Errantry*; a thing
which in it-self you prefer'd, as of a better
Taste than that which reigns at present in
its stead. For at a time when this Mystery
of *Gallantry* carry'd along with it the No-
tion of doughty Knighthood; when *the Fair*
were made Witnesses, and in a man-
ner, Partys to Feats of Arms, enter'd into
all the Points of War and Combat, and
were won by dint of Launce and manly
Prowess; 'twas not altogether absurd, you
thought, on such a foundation as this, to
pay 'em Homage and Adoration, make 'em
the Standard of Wit and Manners, and
bring Mankind under their Laws. But in
a Country where no *She-Saints* were wor-
ship'd by any Authority from Religion,
'twas as impertinent and sensless, as it was
profane, to deify the Sex, raise 'em to a
Capacity above what Nature had allow'd,
and treat 'em with *a Respect*, which in the
natural way of Love they themselves were
the aptest to complain of.

INDEED as for the *Moral Part*, 'twas
wonderful, you said, to observe the Lici-
entiousness which this foppish courtly Hu-
mour had establish'd in the World. What
such a flattering way of Address to all the

Part i. Sex in common cou'd mean, you knew
not ; unless it were to render 'em wholly
Gallantry. common indeed, and make each Fair-one
apprehend that the Publick had a right to
her ; and that Beauty was too communicative
and divine a Thing, to be made a Pro-
perty, and confin'd to *One* at once.

MEAN while our Company began to leave us. The *Beau-monde*, whom you had been thus severely censuring, drew off apace : for it grew late. I took notice that the approaching Objects of the Night were the more agreeable to you, for the Solitude they introduc'd ; and that the Moon and Planets which began now to appear, were in reality the only proper Company for a Man in your Humour. For now you began to talk with much Satisfaction of natural Things, and of all Orders of Beautys, MAN only excepted. Never did I hear a finer Description than you made of the Order of the heavenly Luminarys, the Circles of the Planets, and their attendant *Satellites*. And you, who wou'd allow nothing to those fair earthly Luminarys in the Circles which just now we mov'd in ; you, PALEMON, who seem'd to overlook the Pride of that Thea-
ter, began now to look out with Ravish-
ment on this other, and triumph in the new philosophical Scene of Worlds un-
known.

known. Here, when you had pretty well Sect. 2. spent the first Fire of your Imagination, I u u u wou'd have got you to reason more calmly with me upon that other Part of the Creation, your own Kind; to which, I told you, you discover'd so much Aversion, as ^{Misan-}_{thropy.} wou'd make one believe you a compleat *TIMON*, or *Man-bater*.

“ CAN you then, O PHILOCLES, (said you in a high strain, and with a moving air of Passion) “ Can you believe me “ of that Character? Or can you think it “ of me in earnest, that being MAN, and “ conscious of my Nature, I shou'd have “ yet so little of Humanity, as not to feel “ the Affections of *a Man*? Or feeling “ what is natural towards my Kind, that I “ shou'd hold their Interest light, and be “ indifferently affected with what affects “ or seriously concerns them? Am I so ill “ a Lover of *my Country*? Or is it that “ you find me indeed so ill *a Friend*? For “ what are all Relations else? What are “ the Ties of private Friendship, if that “ to *Mankind* be not obliging? Can there “ be yet a Bond in Nature, if *That* be “ none? O PHILOCLES! Believe me “ when I say I feel it one, and fully prove “ its Power within me. Think not that “ I wou'd willingly break my Chain: “ Nor count me so degenerate or unnatural, as whilst I hold this Form, and

Part I. " wear a human Heart, I shou'd throw
~~~~ " off Love, Compassion, Kindness, and  
" not befriend *Mankind.* — But O what  
" Treacherys! what Disorders! And how  
" corrupt is all! — Did you not observe  
" e'en now, when all this Space was  
" fill'd with goodly Rows of Company,  
" how peaceful all appear'd. — What  
" Charms there are in publick Companys!  
" What Harmony in Courts and Courtly  
" Places! How pleas'd is every Face!  
" How courteous and humane the gene-  
" ral Carriage and Behaviour! — What  
" Creature capable of Reflection, if he  
" thus saw us Mankind, and saw no more,  
" wou'd not believe our Earth *a very*  
" *Heaven?* What Foreigner (the Inha-  
" bitant, suppose, of some near Planet)  
" when he had travel'd hither, and sur-  
" vey'd this outward Face of things, wou'd  
" think of what lay hid beneath the  
" Mask? — But let him stay a-while.  
" Allow him leisure; till he has gain'd a  
" nearer View, and following our dis-  
" solv'd Assemblys to their particular *Re-*  
" *cesses*, he has the power of seeing 'em  
" in this new Aspect. — Here he may be-  
" hold those great Men of the Ministry,  
" who not an hour ago in publick appear'd  
" such Friends, now plotting craftily each  
" other's Ruin, with the Ruin of the State  
" it-self, a Sacrifice to their Ambition.  
" Here he may see too those of a softer  
" kind,

“ kind, who knowing not Ambition, fol- Sect. 2.  
 “ low only *Love*. Yet (PHILOCLES) ~~~  
 “ who wou’d think it?” —

AT these words, you may remember, I discover’d the Lightness of my Temper, and laugh’d aloud; which I cou’d hardly hope you wou’d have pardon’d, had I not freely told you the true reasoun. ’Twas not for want of being affected with what you spoke. I only imagin’d a more particular Cause had provok’d you, when having pass’d over the Ambitious, you were coming full-charg’d against the People of a softer Passioun. At first, I look’d on you as deeply *in the Spleen*: But now I concluded you *in love*, and so unhappily engag’d as to have reason to complain of Infidelity.  
 “ This, thought I, has mov’d PALEMON  
 “ thus. Hence the *sad World!* Here was  
 “ that *Corruption*, and those *Disorders* he  
 “ lamented!”

AFTER I had begg’d pardon for my *Cause of Ill.*  
 rude Mirth, which had the good fortune however to make some change in your Humour; we fell naturally into cool Reasoning about the Nature and Cause of ILL in general: “ Thro’ what *Contin- gency*, what *Chance*; by what fatal *Neces- cessity*, what *Will*, or what *Permission* it came upon the World; or being come “ once,

Part I. "once, shou'd still subsist." This \* *In-*  
*Cause of* *Ill.* *quiry*, which with slight Reasoners is easily  
 got over, stuck hard, I found, with one  
 of your close Judgment and Penetration.  
 And this insensibly led us into a nice Criti-  
 cism of NATURE; whom you sharply ar-  
 raignd' for many Absurditys you thought  
 her guilty of, in relation to *Mankind*, and  
 his peculiar State.

FAIN wou'd I have persuaded you to  
 think with more Equality of NATURE,  
 and to proportion her Defects a little bet-  
 ter. My Notion was, that the Grievance  
 lay not altogether in *one* part, as you  
 plac'd it; but that *every thing* had its  
 share of Inconvenience. Pleasure and Pain,  
 Beauty and Deformity, Good and Ill,  
 seem'd to me every-where interwoven;  
 and one with another made, I thought, a  
 pretty Mixture, agreeable enough, in the  
 main. 'Twas the same, I fanfy'd, as in  
 some of those rich Stuffs, where the  
 Flowers and Ground were oddly put to-  
 gether, with such irregular Work, and  
 contrary Colours, as look'd ill *in the Pat-*  
*tern*, but mighty natural and well *in the*  
*Piece*.

BUT you were still upon Extremes.  
 Nothing wou'd serve to excuse the Faults

\* Treatise IV. See the Beginning.

or Blemishes of this Part of the Creation, Sect. 2.  
MANKIND; even tho all besides were *~~~*  
fair, without a Blemish. The very Storms  
and Tempests had their Beauty in your  
account, those alone excepted which arose  
in human Breasts. 'Twas only for this  
turbulent Race of Mortals you offer'd to  
accuse Nature. And I now found why  
you had been so transported with the Sto-  
ry of PROMETHEUS. You wanted such  
an Operator as this for Mankind: And  
you were tempted to wish the Story cou'd  
have been confirm'd in modern Divinity;  
that clearing the supreme Powers of any  
Concern or Hand in the ill Workmanship,  
you might have the liberty of inveighing  
against it, without Profaneness.

THIS however, I told you, was but a  
flight Evasion of the religious Poets a-  
mong the Antients. 'Twas easy to an-  
swer every Objection by a PROME-  
THEUS: as, "Why had Mankind *origi-*  
" *nally* so much Folly and Perverseness?  
" Why so much Pride, such Ambition,  
" and strange Appetites? Why so many  
" Plagues, and Curses, entail'd on him  
" and his Posterity?" —PROMETHEUS  
was the Cause. The plastick Artist, with  
his unlucky Hand, solv'd all. " 'Twas  
" His Contrivance (they said) and *He* was  
" to answer for it." They reckon'd it  
a fair Game, if they cou'd gain *a single*  
*Remove,*

Part I. Remove, and put the *evil Cause* farther  
 ~~~~~ off. If the People ask'd a Question, they  
^{Cause of} told 'em *a Tale*, and sent 'em away sati-
 fied. None besides a few Philosophers
 wou'd be such Busy-bodys, they thought,
 as to look beyond, or ask a second
 Question.

AND in reality, continu'd I, 'tis not to
 be imagin'd how serviceable *a Tale* is, to
 amuse others besides mere Children; and
 how much easier the Generality of Men
 are paid in this Paper-coin, than in Ster-
 ling Reason. We ought not to laugh so
 readily at the *Indian* Philosophers, who to
 satisfy their People how this huge Frame
 of the World is supported, tell 'em 'tis
 by an Elephant. — And the Elephant
 how? — A shreud Question! but which
 by no means shou'd be answer'd. 'Tis here
 only that our *Indian* Philosophers are to
 blame. They shou'd be contented with *the*
Elephant, and go no further. But they have
a Tortoise in reverse; whose Back, they
 think, is broad enough. So the Tortoise
 must bear the new Load: And thus the
 matter stands worse than before.

THE Heathen Story of PROME-
 THEUS was, I told you, much the same
 with this *Indian* one: only the Heathen
 Mythologists were so wise as not to go
 beyond *the first Remove*. A single PRO-
 METHEUS

M E T H E U S was enough to take the Weight Sect. 2.
from J O V E . They fairly made J O V E a 
Stander-by. He resolv'd, it seems, to be
Neuter ; and see what wou'd come of
this notable Experiment ; how the dan-
gerous Man-moulder wou'd proceed ; and
what wou'd be the Event of his Tamper-
ing.—Excellent Account, to satisfy the
Heathen *Vulgar!* But how, think you,
wou'd a *Philosopher* digest this ? “ For
“ the Gods (he wou'd say presently)
“ either cou'd have hinder'd P R O M E -
“ T H E U S's Creation, or they cou'd not.
“ If they cou'd, they were answerable
“ for the Consequences ; if they cou'd
“ not, they were no longer Gods, being
“ thus limited and controul'd. And whe-
“ ther P R O M E T H E U S were a Name for
“ *Chance, Destiny, a plastick Nature, or*
“ *an evil Daemon* ; whatever was design'd
“ by it ; 'twas still the same Breach of
“ O M N I P O T E N C E .”

T H A T such a hazardous Affair as this
of *Creation* shou'd have been undertaken
by those who had not perfect Foresight as
well as Command, you own'd was neither
wise nor just. But you stood to Foresight.
You allow'd the *Consequences* to have been
understood by the creating Powers, when
they undertook their Work : and you de-
ny'd that it wou'd have been better for
them to have omitted it ; tho' they knew
what

Part i.what wou'd be the Event. " 'Twas bet-
 ~~~~~ " ter still that the Project shou'd be exe-  
 Cause of " cuted, whatever might become of Man-  
 Ill. " kind, or how hard soever such a Cre-  
 " ation was like to fall on the generality  
 " of this miserable Race. For 'twas im-  
 " possible, you thought, that Heaven  
 " shou'd have acted otherwise than *for*  
 " *the best*. So that even from this Mi-  
 " sery and ILL of *Man*, there was un-  
 " doubtedly some GOOD arising; some-  
 " thing which over-balanc'd all, and made  
 " full amends."

THIS was a Confession I wonder'd indeed how I came to draw from you: And soon afterwards I found you somewhat uneasy under it. For here I took up your own part against you; and setting all those Villanys and Corruptions of human Kind in the same light you had done just before, I put it upon you to tell, where possibly cou'd be the Advantage or Good arising hence; or what Excellence or Beauty cou'd redound from those tragical Pictures you your-self had drawn so well after the Life. Whether it must not be a very strong philosophical Faith, which shou'd persuade one that those dismal Parts you set to view were only the necessary Shades of a fine Piece, to be reckon'd among the Beautys of the Creation:

tion: Or whether possibly you might look Sect. 2:  
upon that Maxim as very fit for Heaven, *wave*  
which I was sure you did not approve at  
all in Mankind; " *To do ILL that GOOD*  
" *might follow.*"

THIS, I said, made me think of the manner of our modern PROMETHEUS's, *the Mountebanks*, who perform'd such Wonders of many kinds, here on our earthly Stages. They cou'd create Diseases, and make Mischief, in order *to heal*, and *to restore*. But shou'd we assign such a Practice as this to Heaven? Shou'd we dare to make such *Empiricks* of the Gods, and such *a Patient* of poor Nature? " Was " this a reason for Nature's Sickliness? " Or how else came she (poor Innocent!) " to fall sick, or run astray? Had she been " originally healthy, or created sound *at first*; she had *still* continu'd so. 'Twas " no credit to the Gods to leave her destitute, or with a Flaw which wou'd cost " dear the mending, and make them Sufferers for their own Work." —

I WAS going to bring HOMER to witness for the many Troubles of JOVE, the Death of SARPEDON, and the frequent Crosses Heaven met with, from the fatal Sisters. But this Discourse, I saw, displeas'd you. I had by this time plainly discover'd my Inclination to SCEPTICISM.

Part I. TICISM. And here not only *Religion*  
 ~~ was objected to me, but I was reproach'd  
*Scepticism.* too on the account of that *Gallantry* which  
 I had some time before defended. Both  
 were join'd together in the Charge you  
 made against me, when you saw I ad-  
 her'd to nothing: but was now as ready  
 to declaim against *the Fair*, as I had been  
 before to plead their Cause, and defend  
 the Moral of Lovers. This, you said,  
 was my constant way in all Debates: I  
 was as well pleas'd with the Reason on  
 one side, as on the other: I never troubled  
 my-self about the Success of the Argu-  
 ment, but laugh'd still, whatever way it  
 went; and even when I convinc'd others,  
 never seem'd as if I was convinc'd my-  
 self.

I OWN'D to you, PALEMON, there  
 was Truth enough in your Charge. For  
 above all things I lov'd Ease; and of all  
 Philosophers those who reason'd most at  
 their ease, and were never angry or dis-  
 turb'd; as those call'd SCEPTICKS, you  
 own'd, never were. I look'd upon this  
 kind of *Philosophy* as the prettiest, agree-  
 ablest, roving Exercise of the Mind, possi-  
 ble to be imagin'd. The other kind, I  
 thought, was painful and laborious; " To  
 " keep always in the Limits of *one Path*;  
 " to drive always *at a Point*; and hold pre-  
 " cisely to what Men, at a venture, call'd

" THE

"THE TRUTH: A *Point*, in all appearance, very unfix'd, and hard to ascertain." Besides, my way hurt no body. I was always the first to comply on any occasion; and for Matters of Religion, was further from Profaneness and erroneous Doctrine than any-one. I cou'd never have the Sufficiency to shock my spiritual and learned Superiors. I was the furthest from leaning to my own Understanding: nor was I one who exalted *Reason* above *Faith*, or insisted much upon what the dogmatical Men call *Demonstration*, and dare oppose to the sacred Mysterys of Religion. And to shew you, continu'd I, how impossible it is for the Men of our sort ever to err from the Catholick and Establish'd Faith, pray consider; That whereas *Others* pretend to see with their own Eyes, what is properst and best for them in Religion; *We*, for our parts, pretend not to see with any other than those of our spiritual Guides. Neither do we presume to judg those Guides our-selves; but submit to them, as they are appointed us by our just Superiors. In short, you who are *Rationalists*, and walk by Reason in every thing, pretend to know all things, whilst you believe little or nothing: We for our parts *know* nothing, and *believe* all.

Part I.

~~~~~

Scepticism.

HERE I ended ; and, in return, you only ask'd me coldly, " Whether with " that fine SCEPTICISM of mine, I " made no more distinction between Sin- " cerity and Insincerity *in Actions*, than I " did between Truth and Falshood, Right " and Wrong, *in Arguments?*"

I DURST not ask what your Question drove at. I was afraid I saw it too plainly ; and that by this loose way of talking, which I had learnt in some fashionable Conversations of the World, I had given you occasion to suspect me of the worst sort of *Scepticism*, such as spar'd nothing ; but overthrew all Principles, *Moral* and *Divine*.

FORGIVE me, said I, good PALEMON : you are offended, I see, and not without cause. But what if I shou'd endeavour to compensate my *Sceptical Misbehaviour*, by using a known *Sceptick Privilege*, and asserting strenuously the Cause I have hitherto oppos'd ? Do not imagine that I dare aspire so high as to defend reveal'd Religion, or the holy Mysterys of the Christian Faith. I am unworthy of such a Task, and shou'd profane the Subject. 'Tis of mere *Philosophy* I speak : And my Fancy is only to try what I can muster

muster up thence, to make head against Sect. 2. the chief Arguments of *Atheism*, and re-establish what I have offer'd to loosen in the System of *Theism*.

YOUR Project, said you, bids fair to *Deism*. reconcile me to your Character, which I was beginning to mistrust. For as averse as I am to the Cause of *Theism*, or Name of **D E I S T**, when taken in a sence exclusive of Revelation; I consider still that, in strictness, the Root of all is **T H E I S M**; and that to be a settled Christian, it is necessary to be first of all *a good Theist*. For *Theism* can only be oppos'd to * *Polytheism*, or *Atheism*. Nor have I patience to hear the Name of **D E I S T** (the highest of all Names) decry'd, and set in opposition to *Christianity*. " As if our Religion was a kind of " *Magick*, which depended not on the Belief of a single supreme Being. Or as if " the firm and rational Belief of such a Being, on philosophical Grounds, was an " improper Qualification for believing any " thing further." Excellent Presumption, for those who naturally incline to the Disbelief of Revelation, or who thro' Vanity affect a Freedom of this kind! —

BUT let me hear, continu'd you, whether in good Earnest, and thorow Sinceri-

* " To *Polytheism* (*Daemonism*) or *Atheism* :" as above, pag. 13.

Part i.ty, you intend to advance any thing in favour of that Opinion which is fundamental to all Religion ; or whether you design only to divert your-self with the Subject, as you have done hitherto ? " Whatever your Thoughts are, PHILOCLES, I am resolv'd to force 'em from you. You can no longer plead the Unsuitableness of the Time or Place to such grave Subjects. The gaudy Scene is over with the Day. Our Company have long since quitted the Field. And the solemn Majesty of such a Night as this, may justly sue with the profoundest Meditation, or most serious Discourse."

THUS, PALEMON, you continu'd to urge me ; till by necessity I was drawn into the following Vein of *Philosophical Enthusiasm.*

S E C T. III.

YOU shall find then, said I (taking a grave Air) that it is possible for me to be serious ; and that 'tis probable I am growing so, for good and all. Your Over-seriousness a-while since, at such an unseasonable time, may have driven me perhaps into a contrary Extreme, by opposition to your melancholy Humour. But I have now a better Idea of that *Melancholy*

eboly you discover'd ; and notwithstanding Sect. 3.
the humorous Turn you were pleas'd to
give it, I am perswaded it has a different
Foundation from any of those fantastical
Causes I then assign'd to it. " *LOVE, LOVE.*
" doubtless, is at the bottom ; but a no-
" bler Love than such as common Beautys
" inspire." —

HERE, in my turn, I began to raise my
Voice, and imitate the solemn way you
had been teaching me. " *Knowing* as
" you are, continu'd I, *well-knowing* and
" experienc'd in all the Degrees and Or-
" ders of Beauty, in all the mysterious *Beauty.*
" Charms of the particular Forms ; you
" rise to what is more general ; and with
" a larger Heart, and Mind more com-
" prehensive, you generously seek that
" which is highest in the kind. Not cap-
" tivated by the Lineaments of a fair
" Face, or the well-drawn Proportions of
" a human Body, you view *the Life* it-
" self, and embrace rather *the Mind*, which
" adds the Lustre, and renders chiefly
" amiable.

" NOR is the Enjoyment of such a fin- *Society.*
" gle Beauty sufficient to satisfy such an
" aspiring Soul. It seeks how to combine
" more Beautys, and by what Coalition
" of these, to form a beautiful Society.
" It views Communitys, Friendships, Re-
" O 3 " lations,

Part I. " lations, Dutys ; and confiders by what
 ~~ " Harmony of particular Minds the gene-
 " ral Harmony is compos'd, and *Common-*
 " *weal* establish'd.

" No R satisfy'd even with publick Good
 " in *one* Community of Men, it frames
 " it-self a nobler Object, and with en-
Virtue. " larg'd Affection seeks *the Good of Man-*
 " *kind*. It dwells with Pleasure amidst
 " that Reason, and those Orders on which
 " this fair Correspondence and goodly
 " Interest is establish'd. Laws, Constitu-
 " tions, civil and religious Rites ; what-
 " ever文明izes or polishes rude Mankind ;
 " the Sciences and Arts, Philosophy, Mo-
 " rals, Virtue ; the flourishing State of
 " human Affairs, and the Perfection of
 " human Nature ; these are its delightful
 " Prospects, and this the Charm of Beauty
 " which attracts it.

Univerſe. " STILL ardent in this Pursuit (such
 " is its Love of Order and Perfection) it
 " rests not here ; nor satisfies it-self with
 " the Beauty of a Part ; but extending
 " further its communicative Bounty, seeks
 " the Good of All, and affects the Interest
 " and Prosperity of *the Whole*. True to
 " its native World and higher Country,
 " 'tis here it seeks Order and Perfection ;
 " wishing the best, and hoping still to find
 " a just and wise Administration.

" AND

" AND since all Hope of this were vain
 " and idle, if no *universal Mind* presided ;
 " since without such a supreme Intelligence
 " and providential Care, the distract'd Universe must be condemn'd to
 " suffer infinite Calamitys ; 'tis here the
 " generous Mind labours to discover that
 " healing Cause by which the Interest of
 " the *Whole* is securely establish'd, the
 " Beauty of Things, and the universal
 " Order happily sustain'd.

" THIS, PALEMON, is the Labour ^{ill natural}
 " of your Soul : and This its *Melancholy* ; when unsuccessfully pursuing the
 " supreme Beauty, it meets with dark-
 " ning Clouds which intercept its Sight.
 " Monsters arise, not those from *Lybian*
 " Desarts, but from the Heart of Man
 " more fertile ; and with their horrid
 " Aspect cast an unseemly Reflection up-
 " on NATURE. She, helpless (as she is
 " thought) and working thus absurdly, is
 " contemn'd, the Government of the
 " World arraign'd, and DEITY made
 " void.

" MUCH is alledg'd in answer, to
 " shew why *Nature* errs, and how she
 " came thus impotent and erring from an
 " unerring Hand. But I deny she errs ;
 " and when she seems most ignorant or

Part I. " perverse in her Productions, I assert her
 ~~~~~ " even then as wise and provident, as in  
 Ill natural " her goodliest Works. For 'tis not then  
 and moral. " that Men complain of the World's Or-  
 der, or abhor the Face of things, when  
 " they see various Interests mix'd and inter-  
 fering ; Natures subordinate, of different  
 kinds, oppos'd one to another, and in  
 their different Operations submitted, the  
 higher to the lower. 'Tis on the con-  
 trary, from this Order of inferior and  
 superior Things, that we admire the  
 \* World's Beauty, founded thus *on Con-*  
*trarietys* : whilst from such various and  
 disagreeing Principles, *a universal Con-*  
*cord* is establish'd.

" *T H U S* in the several Orders of ter-  
 restrial Forms, *a Resignation* is requir'd,  
 " a Sacrifice and mutual yielding of Na-  
 tures one to another. The Vegetables  
 " by their Death sustain the Animals :  
 and Animal Bodys dissolv'd, enrich the  
 Earth, and raise again the vegetable  
 World. The numerous Insects are re-  
 duc'd by the superior Kinds of Birds  
 and Beasts : and these again are check'd  
 by Man ; who in his turn submits to o-  
 ther Natures, and resigns his Form a Sa-  
 crifice in common to the rest of Things.

\* See VOL. III. p. 263, 264. what is cited in the Notes  
 from the antient Author on *the World*.

" And

“ And if in Natures so little exalted or Sect. 3.  
“ pre-eminent above each other, the Sa-—  
“ crifice of Interests can appear so just;  
“ how much more reasonably may all in-  
“ ferior Natures be subjected to *the super-*  
“ *rior Nature of the World!* That World,  
“ PALEMON, which even now transport-  
“ ed you, when the Sun’s fainting Light  
“ gave way to these bright Constellations,  
“ and left you this wide System to con-  
“ template.

“ HERE are those *Laws* which ought  
“ not, nor can submit to any thing be-  
“ low. The central Powers, which hold  
“ the lasting Orbs in their just Poize and  
“ Movement, must not be controul’d to  
“ save a fleeting Form, and rescue from  
“ the Precipice a puny Animal, whose  
“ brittle Frame, howe’er protected, must  
“ of it-self so soon dissolve. The ambient  
“ Air, the inward Vapours, the impending  
“ Meteors, or whatever else is nutrimental  
“ or preservative of this Earth, must  
“ operate in a natural Course: and other  
“ Constitutions must submit to the good  
“ Habit and Constitution of the all-sustain-  
“ ing Globe.

“ LET us not therefore wonder, if by  
“ Earthquakes, Storms, pestilential Blasts,  
“ nether or upper Fires, or Floods, the ani-  
“ mal Kinds are oft afflicted, and whole  
“ Species

Part I. " Species perhaps involv'd at once in common Ruin : But much less let us account  
 Ill natural " it strange, if either by outward Shock,  
 and moral. " or some interior Wound from hostile  
 " Matter, particular Animals are deform'd  
 " even in their first Conception, when the  
 " Disease invades the Seats of Generation,  
 " and seminal Parts are injur'd and obstruc-  
 " ted in their accurate Labours. 'Tis then  
 " alone that monstrous Shapes are seen :  
 " Nature still working as before, and not  
 " perversly or erroneously ; not faintly, or  
 " with feeble Endeavours ; but o'erpower'd  
 " by *a superior Rival*, and by another  
 " Nature's *justly* conquering Force.

" No R need we wonder, if the inter-  
 " rior Form, *the Soul* and *Temper*, par-  
 " takes of this occasional Deformity, and  
 " sympathizes often with its close Partner.  
 " Who is there can wonder either at the  
 " Sickneses of Sense, or the Depravity of  
 " Minds inclos'd in such frail Bodys, and  
 " dependent on such pervertible Organs ?

Good.

" H E R E then is that Solution you re-  
 " quire : and hence those seeming Ble-  
 " misches cast upon Nature. Nor is there  
 " ought in this beside what is natural and  
 " good. 'Tis *Good* which is predominant ;  
 " and every corruptible and mortal Na-  
 " ture by its Mortality and Corruption  
 " yields only to some better, and all in

" common to that *best and highest Nature*, Sect. 3.  
" which is incorruptible and immortal." ~~~

I SCARCE had ended these Words, ere you broke out in admiration ; asking what had befall'n me, that of a sudden I had thus chang'd my Character, and enter'd into Thoughts, which must certainly, you suppos'd, have some Foundation in me, since I cou'd express them with such seeming Affection as I had done.

O, SAID I, PALEMON ! that it had been my fortune to have met you the other day, just at my Return out of the Country from a *Friend*, whose Conversation had in one day or *two* made such an Impression on me, that I shou'd have suited you to a Miracle. You wou'd have thought indeed that I had been cur'd of my *Scepticism* and Levity, so as never to have rally'd more, at that wild rate, on any Subject, much less on these which are so serious.

TRULY, said you, I cou'd wish I had met you rather at that time, or that those good and serious Impressions of your *Friend* had without interruption lasted with you till this moment.

WHATEVER they were, I told you, PALEMON, I had not so lost 'em neither,  
as

Part I. as not easily, you saw, to revive 'em on  
 occasion; were I not afraid. Afraid!  
 said you. For whose sake, good PHILOCLES,  
 I intreat you? For mine or your  
 own? For both, reply'd I. For tho  
 I was like to be perfectly cur'd of my Scep-  
 ticism; 'twas by what I thought worse,  
*Enthusiast.* downright *Enthusiasm*. You never knew  
 a more agreeable ENTHUSIAST!

WERE he my Friend, said you, I shou'd  
 hardly treat him in so free a manner. Nor  
 shou'd I, perhaps, judg that to be *Enthusiasm* which you so freely term so. I have  
 a strong suspicion that you injure him.  
 Nor can I be satisfy'd till I hear further  
 of that serious Conversation for which you  
 tax him as *Enthusiastick*.

I MUST confess, said I, he had nothing  
 of that savage Air of the vulgar enthu-  
 siastick Kind. All was serene, soft, and  
 harmonious. The manner of it was more  
 after the pleasing Transports of those an-  
 tient Poets you are often charm'd with,  
 than after the fierce unsociable way of mo-  
 dern Zealots; those starch'd gruff Gentle-  
 men, who guard Religion as Bullys do a  
 Mistress, and give us the while a very in-  
 different Opinion of their Lady's Merit,  
 and their own Wit, by adoring what they  
 neither allow to be inspected by others,  
 nor care themselves to examine in a fair  
 light.

light. But here I'll answer for it; there Sect. 3.  
was nothing of Disguise or Paint. All was   
fair, open, and genuine, as Nature her-  
self. 'Twas *Nature* he was in love with:  
'Twas *Nature* he sung. And if any-one  
might be said to have *a natural* Mistress,  
my Friend certainly might, whose Heart  
was thus ingag'd. But *Love*, I found,  
was every-where the same. And tho' the  
Object here was very fine, and the Pa-  
ssion it created very noble; yet *Liberty*, I  
thought, was finer than all: And I who  
never car'd to ingage in other Loves of the  
least continuance, was the more afraid, I  
told you, of this which had such a power  
with my poor *Friend*, as to make him ap-  
pear the perfectest ENTHUSIAST in the  
World, *Ill-humour* only excepted. For this  
was singular in him, " That tho' he had  
" all of the *Enthusiast*, he had nothing of  
" the *Bigot*. He heard every thing with  
" Mildness and Delight; and bore with me  
" when I treated all his Thoughts as visio-  
" nary; and when, Sceptick-like, I unra-  
" vel'd all his Systems."

HERE was that *Character* and *Description* which so highly pleas'd you, that you wou'd hardly suffer me to come to a con-  
clusion. 'Twas impossible, I found, to give you satisfaction, without reciting the main of what pass'd in those *two* days be-  
tween my *Friend* and me, in our Country-  
Retire-

Part 1. Retirement. Again and again I bid you  
beware: " You knew not the danger of  
*Enthusiasm.* " this *philosophical Passion*; nor consider'd  
" what you might possibly draw upon  
" your-self, and make me the Author of.  
" I was far enough engag'd already: and  
" you were pushing me further, at your  
" own hazard."

ALL I cou'd say made not the least  
impression on you. But rather than pro-  
ceed any further this night, I engag'd, for  
your sake, to turn *Writer*, and draw up  
the Memoirs of those *two* philosophical  
Days; beginning with what had pass'd  
this *last* Day between our-selves; as I have  
accordingly done, you see, by way of  
*Introduction* to my Story.

BY this time, being got late to Town,  
some hours after the latest of our Compa-  
ny, you set me down at my own Lodg-  
ing; and thus we bad Good-night.

P A R T

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P A R T II.PHILOCLES *to PALEMON.*

AFTER such a Day as Yesterday, I might well have thought it hard, when I awak'd the next Morning, to find my-self under positive Engagements of proceeding in the same philosophical way, without intermission, and upon harder terms than ever. For 'twas no longer the agreeable Part of *a Companion* which I had now to bear. Your Conversation, PALEMON, which had hitherto supported me, was at an end. I was now *alone*; confin'd to my Closet; oblig'd to meditate by my-self; and reduc'd to the hard Circumstances of *an Author*, and *Historian*, in the most difficult Subject.

BUT here, methought, propitious Heaven, in some manner, assisted me. For if *Dreams* were, as HOMER teaches, sent from

Part 2. from the Throne of Jove ; I might conclude I had a favourable one, of the *true* sort, towards the *Morning-light* ; which, as I recollect'd my-self, gave me a clear and perfect Idea of what I desir'd so earnestly to bring back to my Memory.

I FOUND my-self transported to a distant Country, which presented a pompous *rural Scene*. It was a Mountain not far from the Sea, its Brow adorn'd with antient Wood, and at its foot a River and well-inhabited Plain : beyond which the Sea appearing, clos'd the Prospect.

No sooner had I consider'd the Place, than I discern'd it to be the very same where I had talk'd with THEOCLES the second Day I was with him in the Country. I look'd about to see if I cou'd find my Friend ; and calling THEOCLES ! I awak'd. But so powerful was the Impression of my Dream, and so perfect the Idea rais'd in me, of the Person, Words, and Manner of my Friend, that I cou'd now fancy myself philosophically inspir'd, as that ROMAN Sage by his AEGERIA, and invited, on this occasion, to try my *Historical Muse*. For justly might I hope for such Assistance in behalf of THEOCLES, who so lov'd the *Muses*, and was, I thought, no less belov'd by them.

TO



TO RETURN therefore to that *original* rural Scene, and that *Heroick Genius*, the Companion and Guide of my first Thoughts in these profounder Subjects: I found him the first Morning with his belov'd *Mantuan Muse*, roving in the Fields; where, as I had been inform'd at his House, he was gone out, after his usual way, to read. The moment he saw me, his Book vanish'd, and he came with friendly haste to meet me. After we had embrac'd, I discover'd my Curiosity to know what he was reading; and ask'd, "if it were of a secret kind, to which I "cou'd not be admitted." On this he shew'd me his Poet; and looking pleasantly, Now tell me truly, said he, *PHILOCLES*, did you not expect some more mysterious Book than this? I own'd I did, considering his Character, which I took to be of so contemplative a kind. And do you think, said he, that without being contemplative, one can truly relish these diviner Poets? Indeed, said I, I never thought there was any need of growing contemplative, or retiring from the World, to read *VIRGIL* or *HORACE*.

You have nam'd *two*, said he, who <sup>Retire-</sup> can hardly be thought so very *like*; tho' <sup>mens.</sup> Vol. 2. P. they

Part 2. they were Friends, and equally good Poets.  
~~~~ Yet joining 'em, as you are pleas'd to do,  
*Retire-
ment.* I wou'd willingly learn from you, whe-
ther in your opinion there be any Disposi-
tion so fitted for reading 'em, as that in
which they writ themselves. In this, I am
sure, they both join'd heartily ; to love *Re-
tirement* : when for the sake of such a Life
and Habit as you call *contemplative*, they
were willing to sacrifice the highest Ad-
vantages, Pleasures, and Favour of a Court.
But I will venture to say more in favour of
Retirement : " That not only the best Au-
thors, but the best Company, require
" this seasoning." Society it-self cannot
be rightly enjoy'd without some Absti-
nence and separate Thought. All grows
insipid, dull, and tiresom, without the
help of some Intervals of Retirement.
Say, PHILOCLES, whether you your-self
have not often found it so ? Do you think
those Lovers understand the Interests of
their Loves, who by their good-will
wou'd never be parted for a moment ?
Or wou'd they be discreet Friends, think
you, who wou'd chuse to live together
on such Terms ? What Relish then must
the World have (that common World
of mix'd and undistinguis'd Company)
without a little Solitude ; without step-
ping now and then aside, out of the *Road*
and *beaten Track* of Life, that tedious Cir-
cle of Noise and Show, which forces wea-

ry'd Mankind to seek relief from every Sect. i.
poor Diversion ?



By your Rule, said I, THREOCLES, there shou'd be no such thing as *Happiness* or *Good* in Life, since every Enjoyment wears out so soon ; and growing painful, is diverted by some *other* thing ; and that again by some *other* ; and so on. I am sure, if Solitude serves as a Remedy or Diversion to any thing in the World, there is nothing which may not serve as Diversion to Solitude ; which wants it more than any thing besides. And thus there can be no *Good* which is regular or constant. Happiness is a thing out of the way, and only to be found in wandring.

O PHILOCLES, reply'd he, I rejoice *Happiness.*
to find you in the pursuit of *Happiness* and *Good.*
Good ; however you may wander. Nay, tho' you doubt whether there be *that Thing* ; yet if you reason, 'tis sufficient ; there is hope still. But see how you have unawares engag'd your-self ! For if you have destroy'd all *Good*, because in all you can think of, there is nothing will constantly hold so ; then you have set it as a Maxim, (and very justly in my Opinion) " *That Nothing can be good but what is constant.*"

I OWN, said I, that all I know of worldly Satisfaction is inconstant. The

Part 2. Things which give it, are never at a stay : *Happiness.* and the *Good* it-self, whatever it be, depends no less on Humour than on Fortune. *Good.*

For that which Chance may often spare, Time will not. Age, Change of Temper, other Thoughts, a different Passion, new Engagements, a new Turn of Life, or Conversation, the least of these are fatal, and alone sufficient to destroy Enjoyment. Tho' *the Object* be the same, *the Relish* changes, and the short-liv'd *GOOD* expires. But I shou'd wonder much if you cou'd tell me any thing in Life, which was not of as changeable a Nature, and subject to the same common Fate of Satiety and Disgust.

Pleasure. I FIND then, reply'd he, that the current Notion of *Good* is not sufficient to satisfy you. You can afford to *scepticize*, where no-one else will so much as hesitate. For almost every-one philosophizes dogmatically on this Head. All are positive in this, "That our real *Good* is PLEASURE."

If they wou'd inform us "*Which*, said I, or *What sort*," and ascertain once the very Species and distinct Kind; such as must constantly remain *the same*, and *equally eligible* at all times ; I shou'd then perhaps be better satisfy'd. But when *Will* and *Pleasure* are synonymous ; when every thing

thing which * *pleases us* is call'd P L E A-Sect. 1.
S U R E, and we never chuse or prefer but *as* ~~we~~
we please, 'tis trifling to say, "*Pleasure is
our Good.*" For this has as little meaning
as to say, "*We chuse what we think eligi-
ble :*" and, "*We are pleas'd with what
delights or pleases us.*" The Question is,
"*Whether we are rightly pleas'd, and
chuse as we shou'd do?*" For as highly
pleas'd as Children are with Baubles, or
with whatever affects their tender Senfes ;
we cannot in our hearts sincerely admire
their *Enjoyment*, or imagine 'em Possessors
of any extraordinary *Good*. Yet are their
Senfes, we know, as keen and susceptible
of *Pleasure* as our own. The same Re-
flection is of force as to mere Animals, who
in respect of the Liveliness and Delicacy
of Sensation, have many of 'em the advan-
tage of us. And as for some low and for-
did *Pleasures* of human Kind ; shou'd they
be ever so lastingly enjoy'd, and in the
highest credit with their Enjoyers ; I shou'd
never afford 'em the name of *Happiness* or
Good.

WOU'D you then appeal, said he, from
the immediate Feeling and Experience of
one who is *pleas'd*, and satisfy'd with what
he *enjoys* ?

* VOL. I. pag. 308. VOL. III. pag. 200.

Part 2.

Pleasure. Most certainly I shou'd appeal, said I, (continuing the same Zeal which THEOCLES had stirr'd in me, against those Dogmatizers on *Pleasure.*) For is there that Fordid Creature on earth, who does not prize his own *Enjoyment?* Does not the frowardeſt, the most rancorous distemper'd Creature do as much? Is not Malice and Cruelty of the highest relish with some Natures? Is not a hoggish Life the height of some Mens Wishes? You wou'd not ask me surely to enumerate the several Species of Sensations, which Men of certain Tastes have adopted, and own'd for their chief *Pleasure* and Delight. For with some Men even Diseases have been thought valuable and worth the cherishing, merely for the Pleasure found in allaying the Ardor of an irritating Sensation. And to these absurd *Epicures* those other are near a-kin, who by study'd Provocatives raise unnatural Thirst and Appetite; and to make way for fresh Repletion, prepare *Emeticks*, as the last Desert; the sooner to renew the Feast. 'Tis said, I know, proverbially, "That *Tastes are different, and must not be disputed.*" And I remember some such Motto as this plac'd once on a Devise, which was found suitable to the Notion. A *Fly* was represented feeding on a certain Lump. The Food, however vile, was natural to the Animal. There was no Absurdity

furdity in the Cafe. But shou'd you shew Sect. 1.
me a brutish or a barbarous Man thus ta-
ken up, and solac'd in his Pleasure ; shou'd
you shew me a Sot in his solitary Debauch,
or a Tyrant in the exercise of his Cruelty,
with this *Motto* over him, to forbid my
Appeal ; I shou'd hardly be brought to
think the better of his *Enjoyment* : Nor
can I possibly suppose that a mere sordid
Wretch, with a base abject Soul, and the
best Fortune in the World, was ever capa-
ble of any *real Enjoyment*.

BY this Zeal, reply'd THEOCLES,
which you have shewn in the refuting a
wrong Hypothesis, one wou'd imagine you
had in reality some Notion of a *right* ; and
began to think that there might possibly
be such a thing at last as *Good*.

THAT there is something nearer to
Good, and more like it than another, I
am free, said I, to own. But what *real*
Good is, I am still to seek, and must
therefore wait till you can better inform
me. This I only know ; " That either
" All Pleasure is Good, or only Some." If
all, then every kind of Sensuality must
be precious and desirable. If *some* only,
then we are to seek, *what kind* ; and dis-
cover, if we can, *what* it is which distin-
guishes between one Pleasure and another :
and makes *one* indifferent, sorry, mean ;

Part 2. another valuable, and worthy. And by ~~the~~^{Pleasure.} this *Stamp*, this *Character*, if there be any such, we must define *Good*; and not by *Pleasure* it-self; which may be very great, and yet very contemptible. Nor can any-one truly judg the Value of any immediate Sensation, otherwise than by judging first of the Situation of his own Mind. For that which we esteem a Happiness in one Situation of Mind, is otherwise thought of in another. Which Situation therefore is the justest, must be consider'd; " How " to gain that *Point of Sight*, whence " probably we may best discern; and How " to place our-selves in that unbias'd " State, in which we are fittest to pro- " nounce."

O PHILOCLES, reply'd he, if this be unfeignedly your Sentiment; if it be pos-
sible you shou'd have the Fortitude to with-hold your * Assent in this Affair, and go in search of what the meanest of Mankind think they already know so certainly: 'tis from a nobler turn of thought than what you have observ'd in any of the *modern Scepticks* you have convers'd with. For if I mistake not, there are hardly any-where at this day a sort of People more peremptory, or who deliberate less on the

* VOL. I. pag. 81.

choice of *Good*. They who pretend to Sect. 1.
such a Scrutiny of other Evidences, are ~~the~~ the
readiest to take the Evidence of the
greatest *Deceivers* in the World, *their own*
Passions. Having gain'd, as they think, a
Liberty from some seeming Constraints of
Religion, they suppose they employ this
Liberty to perfection, by following the
first Motion of their Will, and assenting to
the first Dictate or Report of any prepos-
sessing * *Fancy*, any foremost *Opinion* or
Conceit of *GOOD*. So that their Privilege
is only that of being perpetually amus'd;
and their Liberty that of being impos'd on
in their most important Choice. I think
one may say with assurance, " That the
" greatest of Fools is he who imposes on
" himself, and in his greatest Concern
" thinks certainly he *knows* that which he
" has least study'd, and of which he is
" most profoundly *ignorant*." He who is
ignorant, but knows his Ignorance, is far
wiser. And to do justice to these fashiona-
ble Men of Wit; they are not all of 'em,
indeed, so insensible as not to perceive
something of their own Blindness and
Absurdity. For often when they seriously
reflect on their past Pursuits and Engage-
ments, they freely own, " That for what
" remains of *Life*, they know not whe-
" ther they shall be of *a-piece with them-*

* VOL. I. pag. 320, &c.

" *selves*;

Part 2. "selves; or whether their Fancy, Humour, or Passion will not hereafter lead Pleasure. " 'em to a quite *different Choice* in PLEASURE, and to a Disapprobation of all "they ever enjoy'd before." — Comfortable Reflection !

To bring the Satisfactions of *the Mind*, continu'd he, and the Enjoyments of *Reason* and *Judgment* under the Denomination of PLEASURE, is only a Collusion, and a plain receding from the common Notion of the Word. They deal not fairly with us, who in their philosophical Hour, admit that for *Pleasure*, which at an ordinary time, and in the common Practice of Life, is so little taken for such. The Mathematician who labours at his Problem, the bookish Man who toils, the Artist who endures voluntarily the greatest Hardships and Fatigues; none of these are said "*To follow Pleasure.*" Nor will the Men of Pleasure by any means admit 'em to be of their number. The Satisfactions which are *purely mental*, and depend only on the Motion of *a Thought*; must in all likelihood be too refin'd for the Apprehensions of our modern *Epicures*, who are so taken up with Pleasure of *a more substantial kind*. They who are full of the Idea of such a *sensible solid Good*, can have but a slender Fancy for the mere *spiritual* and *intellectual* fort. But 'tis this latter they set up and magnify

magnify upon occasion ; to save the Ignorant Sect. I.
miny which may redound to 'em from the ~~~
former. This done, the latter may take
its chance : Its Use is presently at an end.
For 'tis observable, that when the Men of
this sort have recommended the Enjoy-
ments of the Mind under the title of
Pleasure ; when they have thus dignify'd
the Word, and included in it whatever is
mentally good or excellent, they can after-
wards suffer it contentedly to slide down
again into its own genuine and vulgar
Sense ; whence they rais'd it only to serve
a turn. When *Pleasure* is call'd in ques-
tion, and attack'd, then *Reason* and *Virtue*
are call'd in to her Aid, and made prin-
cipal parts of her Constitution. A com-
plicated Form appears, and comprehends
straight all which is generous, honest, and
beautiful in human Life. But when the
Attack is over, and the Objection once
solv'd, the Specter vanishes : *Pleasure* re-
turns again to her former Shape : She may
e'en be *Pleasure* still, and have as little
concern with *dry sober Reason*, as in the
nature of the thing, and according to
common Understanding, she really has.
For if this rational sort of Enjoyment be
admitted into the Notion of *Good*, how is
it possible to admit withal that kind of
Sensation, which in effect is rather opposite
to this Enjoyment ? 'Tis certain that in
respect of the Mind and its Enjoyments,
the

Part 2. the Eagerness and Irritation of mere *Pleasure*, is as disturbing as the Importance and *Vexation of Pain*. If either throws the Mind off its biafs, and deprives it of the Satisfaction it takes in its natural Exercise and Employment; the Mind in this case must be Sufferer as well by one as by the other. If neither does this, there is no harm on either side. —

By the way, said I, interrupting him; As sincere as I am in questioning, "Whether PLEASURE be really *Good*;" I am not such a Sceptick as to doubt "Whether PAIN be really *Ill*."

WHATEVER is grievous, reply'd he, can be no other than *ILL*. But that what is grievous to *one*, is not so much as troublesom to *another*; let Sportsmen, Soldiers, and others of the hardy Kinds be witness. Nay, that what is *Pain* to *one*, is *Pleasure* to *another*, and so alternately, we very well know: since Men vary in their Apprehension of these Sensations, and on many occasions confound one with the other. Has not even Nature her-self, in some respects, as it were blended 'em together, and (as a wise Man said once) "join'd the Extremity of " one so nicely to the other, that it ab- " solutely runs into it, and is undistin- " guishable?"

IN FINE then, said I, if *Pleasure* and *Pain* be thus convertible and mix'd; if, according to your Account, "That which " is now *Pleasure*, by being strain'd a little too far, runs into *Pain*, and *Pain*, " when carry'd far, creates again the highest *Pleasure*, by mere Cessation, " and a kind of natural Succession; if some *Pleasures* to *some* are *Pains*, and some *Pains* to *others* are *Pleasures*:" All this, if I mistake not, makes still for my Opinion, and shows That there is nothing you can assign which can really stand as **G O O D**. For if *Pleasure* be not **G O O D**,^{Good.} nothing is. And if *Pain* be **I L L**, (as I must necessarily take for granted) we have a shreud Chance on the *ill* side indeed, but none at all on the *better*. So that we may fairly doubt, "Whether *LIFE it-self* be not mere Misery;" since *Gainers* by it we can never be: *Losers* we may sufficiently, and are like to be, every hour of our Lives. Accordingly, what our *English Poetess* says of Good, shou'd be just and proper: "'Tis good not to be born."—And thus for any thing of *Good* which can be expected in Life, we may e'en "Beg pardon of Nature; and return her Present on her hands, without waiting for her Call." For

Part 2. For what shou'd hinder us? or What are
 ~~ we the better for living?
Good.

THE Query, said he, is pertinent. But why such Dispatch, if the Case be doubtful? This, surely, my good PHILOCLES! is a plain Transgression of your sceptical Bounds. We must be sufficiently *dogmatical*, to come to this Determination. 'Tis a deciding as well concerning Death as Life; "What possibly may be "hereafter, and What *not*?" Now to be assur'd that we can never be concern'd in any thing *hereafter*, we must understand perfectly what it is which concerns or engages us in any thing *present*. We must truly *know our-selves*, and in what this SELF of ours consists. We must determine against *Pre-existence*, and give a better reason for our having never been concern'd in ought before our Birth, than merely, "Because we *remember not*, "nor are *conscious*." For in many things we have been concern'd to purpose, of which we have now no Memory or Consciousness remaining. And thus we may happen to be again and again, to perpetuity, for any reason we can show to the contrary. All is *Revolution* in us. We are no more the self-same Matter, or System of Matter, from one day to another. What Succession there may be *hereafter*,

after, we know not ; since even *now*, we Sect. I.
live by Succession, and only perish and *~~~~~*
are renew'd. 'Tis in vain we flatter our-
selves with the assurance of our Interest's
ending with a certain Shape or Form.
What interested us *at first* in it, we know
not ; any more than how we have *since*
held on, and continue *still* concern'd in
such an Assemblage of fleeting Particles.
Where besides, or in *What else* we may *Futurity*.
have to do, perchance, in time to come,
we know as little ; nor can tell how
Chance or *Providence*, hereafter, may dis-
pose of us. And if *Providence* be in the
case, we have still more reason to con-
sider how we undertake to be our own
Disposers. It must needs become a S C E-
P T I C K above all Men to hesitate in mat-
ters of *Exchange*. And tho he acknow-
ledges no present Good or Enjoyment in
Life, he must be sure, however, of bet-
tering his Condition, before he attempts
to alter it. But as yet, PHILOCLES,
even this Point remains undetermin'd *be-*
tween us : " Whether in this present *Good*.
" Life there be not such a thing as *real*
" *Good*."

BE you therefore, said I, my Instruc-
tor, sagacious THEOCLES ! and inform
me, " *What* that *Good* is, or *Where*,
" which can afford Contentment and Sa-
" tisfaction always alike, without varia-
" tion

Part 2. "tion or diminution." For tho on some
 Occasions, and in some Subjects, the Mind
~~Grad.~~ may possibly be so bent, and the Passion so
 wrought up, that for the time no bodily
 Sufferance or Pain can alter it; yet this is
 what can seldom happen, and is unlikely to
 last long: since without any Pain or Incon-
 venience, the Passion in a little time does
 its own work, the Mind relaxes with its
 Bent, and the Temper weary'd with Repe-
 tition finds no more Enjoyment, but runs
 to something new.

HEAR then! said THEOCLES. For
 tho I pretend not to tell you at once the
 Nature of this which I call GOOD; yet
 I am content to shew you something of
 it, in *your-self*, which you will acknow-
 ledg to be naturally more fix'd and con-
 stant, than any thing you have hitherto
 thought on. Tell me, my Friend! if ever
 you were weary of doing good to those
 you lov'd? Say when you ever found it
~~Friendship.~~ unpleasing to serve a *Friend*? Or whether
 when you *first* prov'd this generous Plea-
 sure, you did not feel it less than at *this*
present; after so long Experience? Be-
 lieve me, PHILOCLES, this Pleasure is
 more debauching than any other. Never
 did any Soul do good, but it came readier
 to do the same again, with more Enjoy-
 ment. Never was Love, or Gratitude, or
 Bounty

Bounty practis'd but with increasing Joy, Sect. I.
which made the Practiser still more in love ^{Friendship}
with the fair Act. Answer me, PHILo-^{private,}
CLES, you who are such a Judg of *Beauty*, ^{publick.}
and have so good *a Taste* of Pleasure; is
there any thing you admire, so fair as
Friendship? or any thing so charming as *a generous Action*? What wou'd it be there-
fore, if all Life were in reality but one con-
tinu'd Friendship, and cou'd be made one
such intire Act? Here surely wou'd be that
fix'd and *constant Good* you sought. Or
wou'd you look for any thing beyond?

PERHAPS not, said I. But I can ne-
ver, surely, go beyond this, to seek for *a Chimera*, if this *Good* of yours be not
thorowly chimerical. For tho a Poet may
possibly work up such a single Action, so as
to hold *a Play* out; I can conceive but
very faintly how this high Strain of Friend-
ship can be so manag'd as to fill *a Life*.
Nor can I imagine where the Object lies of
such a sublime heroick Passion.

CAN any Friendship, said he, be so
heroick, as that towards Mankind? Do
you think the Love of Friends in general,
and of one's Country, to be nothing? or
that particular Friendship can well subsist
without such an enlarg'd Affection, and
Sense of Obligation to Society? Say, if
possible, you are a *Friend*, but hate your

Part 2. *Country.* Say, you are true to the Interest
 of a Companion, but false to that of Society.
^{Friendship}
<sub>private,
publick.</sub> Can you believe your-self? Or will
 you lay the Name aside, and refuse to be
 call'd *the Friend*, since you renounce the
 MAN?

THAT there is something, said I, due to *Mankind*, is what I think will not be disputed by one who claims the Name of *Friend*. Hardly indeed cou'd I allow the Name of *Man* to one who never cou'd call or be call'd *Friend*. But he who justly proves himself *a Friend*, is MAN enough; nor is he wanting to *Society*. A single Friendship may acquit him. He has deserv'd a Friend, and is *Man's Friend*; tho not in strictness, or according to your high moral Sense, *the Friend of Mankind*. For to say truth, as to this sort of Friendship; it may by wiser Heads be esteem'd perhaps more than ordinarily manly, and even heroick, as you assert it: But for my part, I see so very little Worth in *Mankind*, and have so indifferent an Opinion of *the Publick*, that I can propose little Satisfaction to my-self in loving either.

Gratitude. Do you, then, take *Bounty* and *Gratitude* to be among the Acts of Friendship and Good-nature? Undoubtedly: for they are the chief. Suppose then, that the oblig'd Person discovers in the Obliger

Obliger several Failings; does this exclude Sect. I.
the Gratitude of the former? Not in u u
the least. Or does it make *the Exercise* of Gratitude less pleasing? I think
rather the contrary. For when depriv'd of
other means of making a Return, I might
rejoice still in that sure way of shewing my
Gratitude to my Benefactor, by bearing
his Failings as a Friend. And as to
Bounty: Tell me, I beseech you, is it to *Bounty's*
those only who are *deserving* that we
shou'd do good? Is it only to *a good*
Neighbour, or Relation, *a good* Father,
Child, or Brother? Or does Nature, Rea-
son, and Humanity better teach us, to do
good still to a Father, because *a Father*;
and to a Child, because *a Child*; and so to
every Relation in human Life? I think,
said I, this last is rightest.

O PHILEOLES, reply'd he, consider
then what it was you said, when you ob-
jected against the Love of *Mankind* because
of human Frailty; and seem'd to scorn
the *Publick*, because of its Misfortunes.
See if this Sentiment be consistent with
that Humanity which elsewhere you own
and practise. For where can Generosity
exist, if not here? Where can we ever
exert Friendship, if not in this chief Sub-
ject? To what shou'd we be true or *Love of*
grateful in the World, if not to *Mankind*,
and that Society to which we are so deep-

Part 2. ly indebted? What are the Faults or Blen-
 ~~~~~~mishes which can excuse such an Omis-  
 sion, or in a grateful Mind can ever less-  
 en the Satisfaction of making a grateful  
Good-  
breeding. kind return? Can you then out of *Good-  
 breeding* merely, and from a Temper na-  
 tural to you, rejoice to shew Civility,  
 Courteousness, Obligingness, seek Objects  
 of Compassion, and be pleas'd with every  
 Occurrence where you have power to do  
 some service even to People unknown?  
 Can you delight in such Adventures a-  
 broad in foreign Countrys, or in the case  
 of Strangers here at home; to help, assist,  
 relieve all who require it, in the most  
 hospitable, kind, and friendly manner?  
 And can *your Country*, or what is more,  
*your K I N D*, require less Kindness from  
 you, or deserve less to be consider'd, than  
 even one of these Chance-Creatures?—

Good-na-  
ture. O PHILOCLES! how little do you know  
 the Extent and Power of *Good-nature*,  
 and to what an heroick pitch a Soul may  
 rise, which knows the thorow Force of  
 it; and distributing it rightly, frames in  
 it-self an equal, just, and universal Friend-  
 ship!

J U S T as he had ended these Words,  
 a Servant came to us in the Field, to give  
 notice of some Company, who were come  
 to dine with us, and waited our coming  
 in.

in. So we walk'd home-wards. I told Sect. I, THEOCLES, going along, that I fear'd I shou'd never make a good *Friend* or *Lover* after his way. As for a plain natural Love of *one single Person* in either Sex, I cou'd compafs it, I thought, well enough; but this *complex universal* sort was beyond my reach. I cou'd love the Individual, but not the Species. This was too *Mystical Love.* mysterious; too metaphysical an Object for me. In short, I cou'd love nothing of which I had not some sensible material Image.

How! reply'd THEOCLES, can you never love except in this manner? when yet I know that you admir'd and lov'd a Friend long ere you knew his Person. Or was PALEMON's Character of no force, when it engag'd you in that long Correspondence which preceded your *late* personal Acquaintance? The Fact, said I, I must, of necessity, own to you. And now, methinks, I understand your Mystery, and perceive how I must prepare for it: For in the same manner as when I first began to love PALEMON, I was forc'd to form a kind of material Object, and had always such a certain Image of him, ready-drawn, in my Mind, whenever I thought of him; so I must endeavour to order it in the Cafe before us: if possibly by your help I can raise any such

Part 2. such Image, or Specter, as may represent  
 ~~~ this odd Being you wou'd have me love.

METHINKS, said he, you might have the same Indulgence for NATURE or MANKIND, as for *the People of old ROME*; whom, notwithstanding their Blemishes, I have known you in love with, many ways; particularly under the Representation of a beautiful Youth call'd *Genius of a Country*. *the Genius of the People*. For I remember, that viewing once some Pieces of Antiquity, where the People were thus represented, you allow'd 'em to be no disagreeable Object.

INDEED, reply'd I, were it possible for me to stamp upon my Mind such a Figure as you speak of, whether it stood for *Mankind* or *Nature*, it might probably have its effect; and I might become perhaps *a Lover* after your way: But more especially, if you cou'd so order it, as to make things reciprocal between us, and bring me to fancy of this GENIUS, that it cou'd be "sensible of my Love, and capable of *a Return*." For without this, I shou'd make but an ill Lover, tho' of the perfectest Beauty in the World.

'Tis enough, said THEOCLES, I accept the Terms: And if you promise *to love*, I will endeavour to shew you *that BEAUTY*

BEAUTY which I count *the perfectest*, Sect. 2. and *most deserving of Love*; and which *will not fail of a Return*.—To-morrow, when the eastern Sun (as Poets describe) with his first Beams adorns the Front of yonder Hill; there, if you are content to wander with me in the Woods you see, we will pursue those *Loves* of ours, by favour of the Silvan Nymphs: and invoking first *the Genius of the Place*, we'll try to obtain at least some faint and distant View of the *sovereign Genius* and *first Genius of the World*.

This if you can come once to contemplate, I will answer for it, that all those forbidding Features and Deformitys, whether of *Nature* or *Mankind*, will vanish in an instant, and leave you that *Lover* I cou'd wish.—But now, enough!—Let us to our *Company*; and change this Conversation for some other more suitable to our *Friends* and *Table*.

S E C T. II.

YOU see here, PALEMON, what a Foundation is laid for the *Enthusiasms* I told you of; and which, in my Opinion (I told you too) were the more dangerous, because so very odd, and out of the way. But Curiosity had seiz'd you, I perceiv'd, as it had done me before. For after this first Conversation, I must own, I long'd

Part 2. for nothing so much as the next day, and
 ~~~ the appointed Morning-walk in the Woods.

WE had only a Friend or two at dinner with us; and for a good while we discours'd of News and indifferent things, till I, who had my head still running upon those other Subjects, gladly laid hold of something dropt by chance concerning *Friendship*; and said, That for my own part, truly, tho' I once thought I had known Friendship, and really counted myself *a good Friend* during my whole Life; yet I was now persuaded to believe my-self no better than a *Learner*: since THEOCLES had almost convinc'd me, " That to " be a *Friend* to any one *in particular*, " 'twas necessary to be first *a Friend to Mankind*." But how to qualify my-self for such a *Friendship*, was, methought, no little difficulty.

INDEED, said THEOCLES, you have given us a very indifferent Character of your-self, in saying so. If you had spoken thus of the *Friendship* of any *great Man at Court*, or perhaps of *a Court it-self*, and had complain'd " How hard it was " for you to succeed, or make Interest " with such as govern'd there;" we shou'd have concluded in your behalf, that there were such Terms to be comply'd with, as were unworthy of you. But  
 " To

" To deserve well of *the Publick*," and Sect. 2.  
 " To be justly styl'd *the Friend of Man*."  
 " kind," requires no more than to be *good*<sup>Virtue.</sup>  
 and *virtuous*; Terms which for one's own  
 sake one wou'd naturally covet.

How comes it then, said I, that even *Motives.*  
 these *good Terms* themselves are so ill ac-  
 cepted, and hardly ever taken, if I may so  
 express it, except on *further Terms*? For  
*VIRTUE*, by *it-self*, is thought but an ill  
 Bargain: and I know few, even of the Re-  
 ligious and Devout, who take up with it  
 any otherwise than as Children do with  
 Physick; where the Rod and Sweetmeat  
 are the potent Motives.

THEY are Children indeed, reply'd  
 THEOCLES, and shou'd be treated so,  
 who need any Force or Persuasion to do  
 what conduces to their Health and Good.  
 But where, I beseech you, are those for-  
 bidding Circumstances which shou'd make  
*Virtue* go down so hardly? Is it not, a-  
 mong other things, that you think your-  
 self by this means precluded the fine Ta-  
 bles and costly Eating of our modern *Epi-*  
*cures*; and that perhaps you fear the being  
 reduc'd to eat always as ill as now, upon a  
 plain Dish or two, and no more?

THIS, I protested, was injuriously sup-  
 pos'd of me. For I wish'd never to eat  
 2 otherwise

Part 2. otherwise than I now did, at his Table ;  
 ~~ which, by the way, had more resemblance  
 (I thought) of EPICURUS's, than those  
 which now-a-days preposterously pass'd un-  
 der his name. For if his Opinion might  
 be taken, the highest Pleasures in the  
 World were owing to *Temperance*, and  
*moderate Use.*

*Tempe-  
rance.*

IF then the mereſt Studier of *Pleasure*,  
 (anſwer'd THEOCLES) even EPICU-  
 RUS himself, made that favourable Re-  
 port of *Temperance*, so different from his  
 modern Disciples ; if he cou'd boldly say,  
 " That with ſuch Fare as a mean Garden  
 " afforded, he cou'd vie even with the  
 " Gods for Happiness ;" how ſhall we  
 ſay of this part of Virtue, that it needs  
 be *taken upon Terms*? If the immediate  
 Practice of *Temperance* be thus harmless ;  
 are its Conſequences injurious ? Does it  
 take from the Vigour of the Mind, con-  
 sume the Body, and render both the one  
 and the other leſs apt to their proper Ex-  
 ercises, " the Enjoyments of Reaſon or  
 " Sense, or the Employments and Offices  
 " of civil Life ?" Or is it that a Man's  
 Circumstances are the worse for it, as he  
 stands towards his Friends, or Mankind ?  
 Is a Gentleman in this ſense to be pity'd,  
 " As *One* burdenſom to himſelf, and o-  
 " thers ; *One* whom all Men will naturally  
 " ſhun, as an ill Friend, and a Corrupter  
 " of

“ of Society and Good Manners ?” — Shall Sect. 2.  
we consider our Gentleman in *a publick* ~~trust~~  
*Trust*, and see whether he is like to suc-  
ceed best with this restraining *Quality* ;  
or whether he may be more rely’d on, and  
thought more incorrupt, if his Appetites  
are high, and his Relish strong towards  
that which we call Pleasure ? Shall we  
consider him as *a Soldier*, in a Campain,  
or Siege ; and advise with our-selves how  
we might be best defended, if we had oc-  
casion for such a one’s Service ? “ Which  
“ Officer wou’d make the best for the  
“ Soldiers ; Which Soldier for the Offi-  
“ cers ; or Which Army for their Coun-  
“ try ? ” — What think you of our Gen-  
tleman, for *a Fellow-traveller* ? Wou’d  
he, as a temperate Man, be an ill Choice ?  
Wou’d it indeed be more eligible and de-  
lightful, “ To have a Companion, who,  
“ in any shift or necessity, wou’d prove the  
“ most ravenous, and eager to provide in  
“ the first place for himself, and his own  
“ exquisite Sensations ? ” — I know not  
what to say where *Beauty* is concern’d.  
Perhaps the *amorous Galants*, and exquisite  
*Refiners* on this sort of Pleasure, may have  
so refin’d their Minds and Tempers, that,  
notwithstanding their accustom’d Indul-  
gence, they can, upon occasion, renounce  
their Enjoyment, rather than violate Ho-  
nour, Faith, or Justice. — And thus, at  
last, there will be little Virtue or Worth  
ascrib’d

Part 2. ascrib'd to this patient sober *Character.*

*Tempe-*  
*rance.*

" The dull *temperate Man* is no fitter  
 " to be trusted than the elegant *luxuri-*  
 " *ous one.* Innocence, Youth, and For-  
 " tune may be as well committed to  
 " the Care of this latter Gentleman.  
 " He wou'd prove as good *an Executor,*  
 " as good *a Trustee,* as good *a Guardian,*  
 " as he wou'd *a Friend.* The Family  
 " which entrusted him wou'd be secure;  
 " and no Dishonour, in any likelihood,  
 " wou'd happen from the honest *Man of*  
 " *Pleasure.*"

THE Seriousness with which THE-  
 OCLES spoke this, made it the more  
 pleasant; and set our other Company up-  
 on saying a great many good things on the  
 same Subject, in commendation of *a tempe-*  
*rate Life.* So that our Dinner by this  
 time being ended, and the Wine, accord-  
 ing to Custom, plac'd before us; I found  
 still we were in no likelihood of proceed-  
 ing to a Debauch. Every-one drank only  
 as he fancy'd, in no Order or Proportion,  
 and with no regard to circular Healths or  
 Pledges: A Manner which the sociable  
 Men of another Scheme of Morals wou'd  
 have censur'd no doubt, as a heinous Ir-  
 regularity, and Corruption of *Good Fel-*  
*lowship.*

I OWN, said I, I am far from thinking TEMPERANCE so disagreeable a Character. As for this part of Virtue, I think there is no need of taking it on any other Terms to recommend it, than the mere Advantage of being fav'd from Intemperance, and from the desire of things unnecessary.

How! said THEOCLES, are you thus far advanc'd? And can you carry this Temperance so far as to Estates and Honours, by opposing it to *Avarice* and *Ambition*? — Nay, then truly, you may be said to have fairly embark'd your-self in this Cause. You have pass'd the Channel, and are more than half-seas over. There remains no further Scruple in the case of Virtue, unless you will declare your-self a *Coward*, or conclude it a happiness to be born one. For if you can be temperate withal towards LIFE, and think it not so great a busines, whether it be of fewer or more Years; but satisfy'd with what you have liv'd, can rise a thankful Guest from a full liberal Entertainment; Is not this the Sum of all? the finishing Stroke and very Accomplishment of *Virtue*? In this Temper of Mind, what is there can hinder us from forming for our-selves as heroick a Character as we please? What is there either good, generous, or great, which

Part 2. which does not naturally flow from such a  
 modest TEMPERANCE? Let us once  
 gain this simple plain-look'd *Virtue*, and  
 see whether the more shining *Virtues* will  
 not follow. See what that *Country of the*  
*Mind* will produce, when by the wholesom  
 Laws of this Legislatress it has obtain'd  
<sup>LIBER-</sup>  
<sup>TY,</sup>  
<sup>Civil.</sup>  
<sup>Moral.</sup>  
 its *Liberty*! You, PHILOCLES, who are  
 such an Admirer of *Civil Liberty*, and can  
 represent it to your-self with a thousand  
 several Graces and Advantages; can you  
 imagine no Grace or Beauty in that origi-  
 nal *native Liberty*, which sets us free from  
 so many in-born Tyrannys, gives us the  
 Privilege of our-selves, and makes us *our*  
*own*, and independent? A sort of Pro-  
 perty, which, methinks, is as material to  
 us to the full, as that which secures us our  
 Lands, or Revenues.

I SHO U'D think, said he (carrying on  
 his Humour) that one might draw the  
 Picture of this *moral Dame* to as much  
 advantage as that of her *political Sister*;  
 whom you admire, as describ'd to us " in  
 " her *AMAZON-Dres's*, with a free man-  
 " ly Air becoming her; her Guards the  
 " *Laws*, with their written Tables, like  
 " Bucklers, surrounding her; Riches, Traf-  
 " fick, and Plenty, with the *Cornucopia*,  
 " serving as her Attendents; and in her  
 " Train the *Arts and Sciences*, like Chil-  
 " dren, playing." — The rest of the Piece  
 is

is easy to imagine : " Her Triumph over Sect. 2.  
" Tyranny, and lawless Rule of Lust and Passion."  
" Passion."—But what a Triumph wou'd  
her Sister's be ! What Monsters of savage  
Passions wou'd there appear subdu'd !  
" There fierce *Ambition*, *Lust*, *Uproar*,  
" *Misrule*, with all the *Fiends* which rage  
" in human Breasts, wou'd be securely  
" chain'd. And when *Fortune* her-self, the  
" Queen of Flattery, with that Prince of  
" Terrors, *Death*, were at the Chariot-  
" wheels, as Captives ; how natural wou'd  
" it be to see *Fortitude*, *Magnanimity*,  
" *Justice*, *Honour*, and all that generous  
" Band attend as the Companions of our  
" inmate Lady LIBERTY ! She, like some  
" new-born Goddess, wou'd grace her Mo-  
" ther's Chariot, and own her Birth from  
" humble *Temperance*, that nursing Mo-  
" ther of the Virtues ; who like the Parent  
" of the Gods, old Reverend CYBELE,  
" wou'd properly appear drawn by rein'd  
" Lions, patient of the Bit, and on her  
" Head a Turret-like Attire : the Image  
" of defensive Power, and Strength of  
" Mind."

BY THIS Picture THEOCLES, I  
found, had given Entertainment to the  
Company ; who from this rough Draught  
of his fell to designing upon the same  
Subject, after the antient manner ; till

Part 2. PRODICUS and CEBES, and all the An-  
tents were exhausted.

*VIRTUE.* GENTLEMEN, said I, the Descriptions you have been making, are, no doubt, the finest in the world: But after all, when you have made *Virtue* as glorious and triumphant as you please, I will bring you an authentick Picture of another kind, where we shall see this Triumph *in reverse*; “ *VIRTUE* her-self *a Captive* in “ her turn; and by a proud Conqueror “ triumph’d over, degraded, spoil’d of all “ her Honours, and defac’d; so as to re- “ tain hardly one single Feature of real “ Beauty.” —

I OFFER'D to go on further, but cou'd not, being so violently decry'd by my two Fellow-guests; who protested they wou'd never be brought to own so detestable a Picture: And one of 'em (a formal sort of Gentleman, somewhat advanc'd in Years) looking earnestly upon me, said, in an angry Tone, “ That he had hitherto, in- “ deed, conceiv'd some hopes of me; not- “withstanding he observ'd my *Freedom* “ of *Thought*, and heard me quoted for “ such a passionate Lover of *Liberty*: “ But he was sorry to find that my Prin- “ ciple of *Liberty* extended in fine to a “ *Liberty from all Principles*” (so he ex- press'd himself) “ And none, he thought, “ beside

" beside a Libertine in Principle wou'd ap- Sect. 2.  
 " prove of such a Picture of Virtue, as on-         
 " ly an Atheist cou'd have the impudence  
 " to make."

THEOCLES the while sat silent; tho he saw I minded not my Antagonists, but kept my Eye fix'd steddyly on himself, expecting to hear what he wou'd say. At last, fetching a deep Sigh, O PHILOCLES, said he, how well you are Master of that Cause you have taken on you to defend! How well you know the way to gain advantage to the worst of Causes, from the imprudent Management of those who defend the best! — I dare not, for my own share, affirm to you, as my worthy Friends have done, " That 'tis the *Atheist* alone " can lay this load on *Virtue*, and picture " her thus disgracefully." — No — There are other over-officious and less suspected Hands, which do her perhaps more injury, tho with a better colour.

THAT *Virtue* shou'd, with any shew of Reason, be made a *Victim*, (continu'd he, turning himself to his Guests) must have appear'd strange to you, no doubt, to hear asserted with such assurance as has been done by PHILOCLES. You cou'd conceive no tolerable ground for such a Spectacle. In this *revers'd Triumph* you expected perhaps to see some foreign Con-

Part 2. queror exalted ; as either *Vice* it-self, or  
 ~~~ *Pleasure, Wit, spurious Philosophy*, or some  
false Image of Truth or Nature. Little
 were you aware that the cruel Enemy op-
 pos'd to Virtue shou'd be RELIGION it-
 self ! But you will call to mind, that even
 innocently, and without any treacherous
 design, *Virtue* is often treated so, by those
 who wou'd magnify to the utmost the
 Corruption of Man's Heart ; and in expo-
 sing, as they pretend, the Falshood of *hu-
 man Virtue*, think to extol *Religion*. How
 many religious Authors, how many sacred
 Orators turn all their edge this way, and
 strike at *moral Virtue* as a kind of *Step-
 dame, or Rival to RELIGION* !— “ * Mo-
 rality must not be nam'd ; *Nature* has
 no pretence ; *Reason* is an Enemy ; *Com-
 mon Justice*, Folly ; and *Virtue*, Misery.
 Who wou'd not be vicious, had he his
 Choice ? Who wou'd forbear, but be-
 cause he must ? Or who wou'd value
 Virtue, but for hereafter ? ”

Zeal.

TRULY, said the old Gentleman, inter-
 rupting him, if this be the *Triumph* of
 Religion, 'tis such as her greatest Enemy,
 I believe, wou'd scarce deny her : and I
 must still be of opinion, with PHILO-
 CLES's leave, that it is no great sign of
 Tenderness for *Religion*, to be so zealous in
 honouring her at the cost of *Virtue*.

* VOL. III. pag. 310.

PERHAPS

PERHAPS so, said I. Yet that there are many such Zealots in the World, you will acknowledg. And that there is a certain Harmony between this *Zeal* and what you call *Atheism*, THEOCLES, you hear, has allow'd.—But let us hear him out; if perhaps he will be so free as to discover to us what he thinks of the generality of our religious Writers, and their Method of encountering their common Enemy, *the Atheist*. This is a Subject which possibly may need a better clearing. For 'tis notorious that the chief Opposers of Atheism write upon contrary Principles to one another, so as in a manner to confute themselves. Some of 'em hold zealously for Virtue, and are *Realists* in the Point. Others, one may say, are only *nominal Moralists*, by making Virtue nothing in it-self, a Creature of Will only, *Real.* *MORALISTS,* *Nominal,* or a mere Name of Fashion. 'Tis the same in natural Philosophy: Some take one *Natural-Hypothesis*, and some another. I shou'd *lists.* be glad to discover once the true Foundation; and distinguish those who effectually refute their other Antagonists as well as the *Atheists*, and rightly assert the joint-Cause of Virtue and Religion.

HERE, PALEMON, I had my Wish.
For by degrees I engag'd THEOCLES to
R 2 discover

Part 2. discover himself fully upon these Subjects ;
 which serv'd as a Prelude to those we were
 to ingage in, the next Morning ; for the
 approach of which, I so impatiently long'd.
 If his Speculations prov'd of a rational kind,
 this previous Discourse, I knew, wou'd
 help me to comprehend 'em ; if only *pleasing Fancys*, this wou'd help me however,
 to please my-self the better with 'em.

HERE then began his Criticism of Au-
 thors ; which grew by degrees into a con-
 tinu'd Discourse. So that had this been
 at a University, THEOCLES might very
 well have pass'd for some grave Divinity-
 Professor, or Teacher of *Ethicks*, reading
 an Afternoon Lecture to his Pupils.

S E C T. III.

Divinity. IT wou'd be undoubtedly, said he, a
 happy Cause which cou'd have the be-
 nefit of such Managers as shou'd never give
 their Adversarys any handle of advantage
 against it. I cou'd wish that in the Cause
 of RELIGION we had reason to boast as
 much. But since 'tis not impossible to
 write ill even in the best of Causes, I am
 inclin'd to think this great one of Religion
 may have run at least an equal hazard
Divines. with any other ; since they who write in
 defense of it, are apt generally to use so
 much

much the less caution, as they are more Sect. 3.
exempt from the fear of Censure or Criticism in their own Person. Their Adversary is well secur'd and silenc'd to their hand. They may safely provoke him to a Field, where he cannot appear openly, or as a profess'd Antagonist. His Weapons are private, and can often reach the *Cause* without offence to its *Maintainers*; whilst no direct Attack robs them of their imaginary Victory. They conquer *for themselves*, and expect to be approv'd still for their Zeal, however the *Cause* it-self may have suffer'd in their hands. ——

PERHAPS then, said I, (interrupting him) it may be true enough, what was said once by a Person who seem'd zealous for Religion, " That none *writ well* against " the Atheists beside the Clerk, who drew *Atheist.* " the Warrant for their Execution."

IF this were the *true Writing*, reply'd he, there wou'd be an end of all Dispute or Reasoning in the Case. For where Force is necessary, Reason has nothing to do. But on the other hand, if Reason be needful, Force in the mean while must be laid aside: For there is no Enforcement of Reason, but by Reason. And therefore if *Atheists* are to be reason'd with, at all; they are to be reason'd with, like other

Part 2. Men ; since there's no other way in nature
 ~~~~~ to convince 'em.  
*Atheist.*

THIS I own, said I, seems rational and just : But I'm afraid that most of the devout People will be found ready to abandon the *patient*, for the more *concise* Method. And tho' Force without Reason may be thought somewhat hard, yet your other way of Reason without Force, I am apt to think, wou'd meet with fewer Admirers.

BUT perhaps, reply'd THEOCLES,  
 'tis a mere Sound which troubles us. The Word or Name of *Atheist* may possibly occasion some disturbance, by being made to describe two Characters so very different as His who *absolutely denies*, and His who *only doubts*. Now he who *doubts*, may possibly lament his own Unhappiness, and wish to be convinc'd. He who *denies*, is daringly presumptuous, and sets up an Opinion against the Interest of Mankind, and Being of Society. 'Tis easily seen that *one* of these Persons may bear a due respect to the Magistrate and Laws, tho' not *the other*; who being obnoxious to them, is therefore punishable. But how the former is punishable *by Man*, will be hard to say; unless the Magistrate had dominion over Minds, as well as over Actions and Behaviour; and had power to  
*Punishment.* exercise

exercise an Inquisition within the inmost Sect. 3.  
Bosoms and secret Thoughts of Men. 

I APPREHEND you, said I. And by your account, as there are *two* sorts of People who are call'd Atheists, so there are *two* ways of writing against them, which may be fitly us'd apart, but not so well jointly. You wou'd set aside mere Menaces, and separate the *Philosopher's* Work from the *Magistrate's*; taking it for granted, that the more discreet and sober part of Unbelievers, who come not under the dispatching Pen of the Magistrate, can be affected only by the more deliberate and gentle one of Philosophy. Now the Language of the Magistrate, I must confess, has little in common with that of Philosophy. Nothing can be more unbecoming the magisterial Authority than a philosophical Style: and nothing can be more unphilosophical than a magisterial one. A Mixture of these must needs spoil both. And therefore, in the Cause before us, " If any one besides the Magistrate can be said to *write well*; 'tis HE (according to your account) who writes as becomes Philosophy, with Freedom of Debate, and Fairness towards his Adversary."

ALLOW it, reply'd he. For what can be more equitable? Nothing. But

R 4

will

Part 2. will *the World* be of the same Opinion?  
 ~~~ And may this Method of writing be justly  
 practis'd in it? Undoubtedly it may.
 And for a Proof, we have many Instances
 in Antiquity to produce. The Freedom
^{Philoso-}
^{phy.} taken in this philosophical way was never
 esteem'd injurious to Religion, or prejudi-
 cial to the Vulgar: since we find it to have
 been a Practice both in Writing and Con-
 verse among the great Men of a virtuous
 and religious People; and that even those
 Magistrates who officiated at the Altars, and
 were the Guardians of the publick Worship,
 were Sharers in these free Debates.

*Fearfully
of Au-
thors.*

FORGIVE me, THEOCLES, said I,
 if I presume to say, that still this reaches
 not the Case before us. We are to con-
 sider *Christian Times*, such as are now pre-
 sent. You know the common Fate of
 those who dare to appear *fair Authors*.
 What was that pious and learned Man's
 Case, who wrote *the Intellectual System of*
the Universe? I confess it was pleasant
 enough to consider, that tho' the whole
 World were no less satisfy'd with his Ca-
 pacity and Learning, than with his Si-
 ncerity in the Cause of *Deity*; yet was he
 accus'd of giving the upper hand to the
 Atheists, for having only stated their Rea-
 sons, and those of their Adversarys, fairly
 together. And among other Writings of
 this kind, you may remember how a cer-
 tain

tain Fair INQUIRY (as you call'd it) Sect. 3.
was receiv'd, and what offence was taken ~~in~~
at it.

I AM sorry, said THEOCLES, it prov'd
so. But now indeed you have found a
way which may, perhaps, force me to
discourse at large with you on this head ;
by entering the Lists in defense of a Friend
unjustly censur'd for this philosophical Li-
berty.

I CONFESS'D to THEOCLES and the
Company, that this had really been my
Aim : And that for this reason alone I
made my-self the Accuser of this Author ;
“ Whom I here actually charg'd, as I did
“ all those other *moderate calm* Writers,
“ with no less than Profaneness, for rea-
“ soning so unconcernedly and patiently,
“ without the least shew of Zeal or Pas-
“ sion, upon the Subject of a Deity, and
“ a future State.”

AND I, on the other side, reply'd THE-
OCLES, am rather for this patient way of
Reasoning ; and will endeavour to clear my
Friend of this Imputation, if you can have
patience enough to hear me out, in an Af-
fair of such a compasf.

WE all answer'd for our-selves, and he
began thus.

O F

OF THE many Writers ingag'd in the Defense of Religion, it seems to me that the greatest part are employ'd, either in supporting the Truth of the Christian Faith in general, or in refuting such particular Doctrines as are esteem'd Innovations in the Christian Church. There are not, 'tis thought, many Persons in the World who are loose in the very Grounds and Principles of all Religion : And to such as these we find, indeed, there are not many Writers who purposely apply themselves. They may think it a mean Labour, and scarce becoming them, to argue sedately with such as are almost universally treated with Detestation and Horror. But as we are requir'd by our Religion to have Charity for all Men, so we cannot surely avoid having a real Concern for those whom we apprehend to be under the worst of Errors, and whom we find by Experience to be with the greatest difficulty reclaim'd. Neither ought they perhaps in prudence to be treated with so little regard, whose Number, however small, is thought to be rather increasing ; and this too among the People of no despicable Rank. So that it may well deserve some Consideration, “ Whether in our Age and “ Country the same Remedys may serve, “ which have hitherto been try'd ; or

“ whether some other may not be prefer’d, Sect. 3.
“ as being suitable to Times of less Strict-
“ ness in Matters of Religion, and Places
“ less subject to Authority.”

THIS might be enough to put an Author upon thinking of such a way of reasoning with these deluded Persons, as in his Opinion might be more effectual for their Benefit, than the repeated *Exclamations* and *Invectives* with which most of the Arguments us’d against them are commonly accompany’d. Nor was it so absurd to imagine that a quite different Method might be attempted; by which a Writer might offer Reason to these Men with so much more Favour and Advantage, as he appear’d un-preposseſſ’d, and willing to examine every thing with the greatest Unconcern and Indifference. For to such Persons as these, ’tis to be fear’d, ’twill always appear, “ That what was never
“ *question’d*, was never *prov’d*: and That
“ whatever Subject had not, at some time
“ or other, been examin’d with perfect In-
“ difference, was never *rightly examin’d*,
“ nor cou’d *rightly be believ’d*.” And in a Treatise of this kind, offer’d as an *Essay* or *Inquiry* only, they wou’d be far from finding that Impartiality and Indifference which is requisite: if instead of a Readiness to comply with whatever Consequences such an Examination as this, and the
Course

Part 2. Course of Reasoning brought forth, the
 Author shou'd shew a previous Inclination
^{Authors.} to the Consequences only on one side, and
 an Abhorrence of any Conclusion on the
 other.

OTHERS therefore, in different Circumstances, may perhaps have found it necessary, and becoming their *Character*, to shew all manner of Detestation both of the Persons and Principles of these Men. Our Author, on the contrary, whose Character exceeds not that of a *Layman*, endeavours to shew Civility and Favour, by keeping the fairest Measures he possibly can with the Men of this sort; allowing 'em all he is able, and arguing with a perfect Indifference, even on the Subject of a *Deity*. He offers to conclude nothing positive himself, but leaves it to others to draw Conclusions from his Principles: having this one chief Aim and Intention;

" How, in the first place, to reconcile
 " these Persons to the *Principles of Virtue* ; That by this means, a Way might
 " be laid open to *Religion*; by removing
 " those greatest, if not only Obstacles to
 " it, which arise from the Vices and Passions of Men."

Funda-
mental
Principles. "Tis upon this account he endeavours chiefly to establish *Virtue* on Principles, by which he is able to argue with those who

who are not as yet induc'd to own a *Good*, Sect. 3.
or *Future State*. If he cannot do thus *much*, he reckons he does nothing. For how can *Supreme Goodness* be intelligible to those who know not what *Goodness it-self* is? Or how can *Virtue* be understood to deserve Reward, when as yet its Merit and Excellence is unknown? We begin surely at the wrong end, when we wou'd prove *MERIT* by *Favour*, and *ORDER* by *a Deity*. — This our Friend seeks to redrefs. For being, in respect of *VIRTUE*, what you lately call'd *a Realist*; he endeavours to shew, "That it is really some-
" thing *in it-self*, and in the nature of
" Things: not arbitrary or *factitious*, (if
" I may so speak) not constituted from
" without, or dependent on *Custom*, *Fan-*
" *cy*, or *Will*; not even on the *Supreme*
" *Will it-self*, which can no-way govern
" it: but being *necessarily good*, is govern'd
" by it, and ever uniform with it." And notwithstanding he has thus made *VIRTUE* his chief Subject, and in some measure independent on Religion, yet I fansy he may possibly appear at last as high a *Divine* as he is a *Moralist*.

I wou'd not willingly advance it as *Theists*,
a Rule, "That those who make only *a Nominal*,
" *Name of VIRTUE* make no more of
" *DEITY*, and cannot without *Affecta-*
" *tion defend the Principles of Religion*:"

I

But

Part 2. But this I will venture to assert ; " That
 ~~~~~ " whoever sincerely defends VIRTUE, and  
 Theists,  
 Nominal,  
 Real. " is a *Realist* in MORALITY, must of  
 necessity, in a manner, by the same  
 Scheme of Reasoning, prove as very a  
 " *Realist* in DIVINITY."

ALL *Affectation*, but chiefly in Philosophy, I must own, I think unpardonable. And you, PHILOCLES, who can give no quarter to ill Reasoning, nor endure any unsound or inconsistent Hypothesis ; you will be so ingenuous, I dare say, as to reject our modern DEISM, and challenge those who assume a Name to which their *Philosophy* can never in the least intitle 'em.

COMMEND me to honest EPICURUS, who raises his DEITYS aloft in the imaginary Spaces ; and setting 'em apart out of the Universe and Nature of Things, makes nothing of 'em beyond a *Word*. This is ingenuous, and plain dealing : For this every one who philosophizes may easily understand.

THE same Ingenuity belongs to those Philosophers whom you, PHILOCLES, seem inclin'd to favour. When A SCEPTICK questions, " Whether a real Theology can be rais'd out of *Philosophy alone*, " without the help of *Revelation* ; " he does no more than pay a handsom Compliment

pliment to Authority and the receiv'd Re-Sect. 3.  
ligion. He can impose on no-one who ~~knows~~  
reasons deeply : since whoever does so,  
will easily conceive, that at this rate Theo-  
logy must have no Foundation at all. For  
Revelation it-self, we know, is founded  
on the Acknowledgment of a divine Ex-  
istence: And 'tis the Province of Philoso-  
phy alone to *prove* what Revelation only  
*supposes.*

I LOOK on it, therefore, as a most  
unfair way, for those who wou'd be *Buil-*  
*ders*, and undertake this *proving* part, to  
lay such a Foundation as is insufficient to  
bear the Structure. Supplanting and Un-  
dermining may, in other Cases, be *fair War* : But in philosophical Disputes, 'tis  
not allowable to work under-ground, or as  
in Sieges by *the Sap*. Nothing can be more  
unbecoming than to talk magisterially and  
in venerable Terms of "A *supreme N A-*  
" *T U R E*, an *infinite Being*, and A *D E I-*  
" *T Y*;" when all the while *a Providence* is  
never meant, nor any thing like *Order* or  
*the Government of a Mind* admitted. For  
when *these* are understood, and *real Di-*  
*vinity* acknowledg'd ; the Notion is not  
dry, and barren ; but such Consequences  
are necessarily drawn from it, as must set  
us in Action, and find Employment for  
our strongest Affections. All the *Dutys*  
of *RELIGION* evidently follow hence ;  
and

Part 2. and no exception remains against any of  
 ~~~~~ those great Maxims which *Revelation* has  
 Theists,
 Nominal,
 Real. establish'd.

Now whether our Friend be unfeignedly and sincerely of this latter sort of *real Theologists*, you will learn best from the Consequences of his *Hypothesis*. You will observe, whether instead of ending in mere *Speculation*, it leads to *Practice*: And you will then surely be satisfy'd, when you see such a Structure rais'd, as with the Generality of the World must pass at least for *high Religion*, and with some, in all likelihood, for no less than ENTHUSIASM.

FOR I appeal to you, PHILOCLES, whether there be any thing in *Divinity* which you think has more the Air of *Enthusiasm* than that Notion of *Divine Love*, such as separates from every thing worldly, sensual, or meanly-interested? A LOVE which is *simple*, *pure*, and *unmix'd*; which has no other Object than merely the Excellency of that Being it-self, nor admits of any other Thought of Happiness, than in its *single Fruition*. Now I dare presume you will take it as a substantial proof of my Friend's being far enough from Irreligion, if it be shewn that he has espous'd this Notion, and thinks of making out this *high Point of Divinity*, from Arguments familiar even to those who oppose Religion.

ACCO-

ACCORDING, therefore, to his Hypothesis, he wou'd in the first place, by way of prevention, declare to you, That tho' the *disinterested Love of God* were the most excellent Principle ; yet he knew very well, that by the indiscreet Zeal of some devout well-meaning People it had been stretch'd too far, perhaps even to Extravagance and Enthusiasm ; as formerly among the *Mysticks* of the antient Church, *Mysticks.* whom these of latter days have follow'd. On the other hand, that there were those who in opposition to this devout mystick way, and as profess'd Enemys to what they call *Enthusiasm*, had so far exploded every thing of this ecstatick kind, as in a manner to have given up Devotion ; and in reality had left so little of Zeal, Affection, or Warmth, in what they call their *Rational Religion*, as to make them much suspected of their Sincerity in *any*. For tho' it be natural enough (he wou'd tell you) for a mere political Writer to ground his great Argument for Religion on the necessity of such a Belief as that of *a future Reward and Punishment* ; yet, if you will take his Opinion, 'tis a very ill Token of Sincerity in Religion, and in the Christian Religion more especially, to reduce it to such a Philosophy as will allow no room to that other Principle of *Love* ; but treats all of that kind as *Enthusiasm*,

Part 2. for so much as aiming at what is call'd *Dif-
~ ~ ~ interestedness*, or teaching the *Love of God
or Virtue for God or Virtue's sake.*

HERE, then, we have two sorts of People (according to my Friend's account) who in these opposite Extremes expose Religion to the Insults of its Adversarys. For as, on one hand, 'twill be found difficult to defend the Notion of that high-rais'd Love, espous'd with so much warmth by those devout *Mysticks*; so, on the other hand, 'twill be found as hard a Task, upon the Principles of these cooler Men, to guard Religion from the Imputation of Mercenariness, and a slavish Spirit. For how shall one deny, that to serve God by Compulsion, or for Interest merely, is *servile* and *mercenary*? Is it not evident, that the only *true* and *liberal* Service paid either to that supreme Being, or to any other Superior, is *that*, " which proceeds from an *Esteem* or *Love* of the Person serv'd, a *Sense* of Duty or Gratitude, and a Love of the dutiful and grateful Part, as *good* and *amiable*, in *it-self?*" And where is the Injury to Religion, from such a Concession as this? Or what Detraction is it from the Belief of an After-Reward or Punishment, to own " That the Service caus'd by it, is not equal to that which is *voluntary* and *with Inclination*, but is rather disingenuous

*RELIGION,
liberal,
illiberal.*

"nuous and of the slavish kind?" Is it Sect. 3.
 not still for the Good of Mankind and ~~the~~
 of the World, that Obedience to the Rule
 of Right shou'd some way or other be
 paid; if not *in the better way*, yet at least
in this imperfect one? And is it not to be
 shewn, "That altho this Service of *Fear*
 be allow'd ever so low or base: yet *R-*
E-
L I G I O N still being *a Discipline*, and
Progress of the Soul towards Perfection,
 the Motive of Reward and Punishment *Rewards*
 is primary and of the highest moment *and Pu-*
 nishments.
 with us; till being capable of more sub-
 lime Instruction; we are led from this
servile State, to the generous Service of
Affection and Love?"

To this it is that in our Friend's Opin-
 ion we ought all of us to aspire, so as to
 endeavour "That the *Excellence of the*
Object, not the *Reward or Punishment*;
 shou'd be our Motive: But that where
 thro' the Corruption of our Nature, the
former of these Motives is found insuf-
 ficient to excite to Virtue, there the *lat-* *Supplemen-*
ter shou'd be brought in aid, and on no *tal Mo-*
account be undervalu'd or neglected."

Now this being once establish'd, how
 can RELIGION be any longer subject
 to the Imputation of *Mercenariness*? But
 thus we know Religion is often charg'd.
Godliness, say they, *is great Gain*: nor
 S 2 " is



Part 2. "is GOD devoutly serv'd for noug't."—
 ~~ Is this therefore a Reproach? Is it confess'd there may be *a better Service, a more generous Love?*—Enough, there needs no more. On this Foundation our Friend presumes it easy to defend RELIGION, and even that *devoutest Part*, which is esteem'd so great a Paradox of Faith. For if there be in Nature such a Service as that of Affection and Love, there remains then only to consider of the Object, whether there be really that *supreme-One* we suppose. For if there be *divine Excellence* in Things; if there be in Nature a *supreme Mind* or DEITY; we have then an Object consummate, and comprehensive of all which is *good or excellent*. And this Object, of all others, must of necessity be the most amiable, the most ingaging, and of highest Satisfaction and Enjoyment. Now that there is such a principal Object as this in the World, the World alone (if I may say so) by its wise and perfect Order must evince. This Order, if indeed perfect, excludes all *real ILL*. And that it really does so, is what our Author so earnestly maintains, by solving the best he can those untoward *Phænomena* and ill Signs, taken from the Course of Providence in the seemingly unequal Lot of *Virtue* in this World.

"Tis true: tho' the Appearances hold
 ever so strongly against *Virtue*, and in fa-
 vor

vour of Vice, the Objection which arises Sect. 3. hence against a DEITY may be easily remov'd, and all set right again on the supposal of a *future State*. This to a Christian, or one already convinc'd of so great a Point, is sufficient to clear every dark Cloud of Providence. For he needs not be over-and-above sollicitous as to the Fate of VIRTUE *in this World*, who is secure of *Hereafter*. But the case is otherwise as to the People we are here to encounter. They are at a loss for Providence, and seek to find it in the World. The Aggravation of the appearing Disorders in worldly Affairs, and the blackest Representation of Society and Human Nature, will hardly help 'em to this View. 'Twill be difficult for 'em to read Providence in such Characters. From so uncomely a Face of things *below*, they will presume to think unfavourably of all *above*. By the Effects they see, they will be inclin'd to judg the Cause; and by the Fate of Virtue to determine of a Providence. But being once convinc'd of Order and a Providence as *Previous Proof* to things *present*, they may soon, perhaps, be satisfy'd even of a *future State*. For if Virtue be to it-self no small Reward, and Vice in a great measure its own Punishment; we have a solid ground to go upon. The plain Foundations of a distributive Justice, and due Order in this World, may lead us to conceive a further Building.

Part 2. We apprehend a larger Scheme, and easily
resolve our-selves why Things were not
A Provi- compleated in this State ; but their Ac-
dence. *ORDER.* accomplishment reserv'd rather to some fur-
ther Period. For had the good and vir-
tuous of Mankind been wholly prosperous
in this Life ; had Goodness never met with
Opposition, nor Merit ever lain under a
Cloud ; where had been the Trial, Victo-
ry, or Crown of *Virtue* ? Where had the
Virtues had their Theater, or whence their
Names ? Where had been *Temperance* or
Self-denial ? Where *Patience*, *Meekness*,
Magnanimity ? Whence have these their
being ? What *Merit*, except from Hard-
ship ? What *Virtue* without a Conflict,
and the Encounter of such Enemys as a-
rise both within, and from abroad ?

BUT as many as are the Difficultys
which *Virtue* has to encounter in this
World, her Force is yet superior. Ex-
pos'd as she is here, she is not however
abandon'd or left miserable. She has e-
nough to raise her above Pity, tho not a-
bove our Wishes : and as happy as we see
her here, we have room for further Hopes
in her behalf. Her present Portion is suf-
ficient to shew Providence already engag'd
on her side. And since there is such Pro-
vision for her *here*, such Happiness and
such Advantages even in this Life ; how
probable must it appear, that this provi-
dential

dental Care is extended yet further to *a Sect. 3.*
succeeding Life, and perfected hereafter? *~~~~~*

THIS is what, in our Friend's opinion, may be said in behalf of a future State, to those who question Revelation. 'Tis this must render Revelation probable, and secure that first step to it, the Belief of a Deity and Providence. A Providence ^{Recapitulation.} must be prov'd from what we see of Order in things present. We must contend for Order; and in this part chiefly, where Virtue is concern'd. All must not be refer'd to *a Hereafter*. For a disorder'd State, in which all present Care of Things is given up, Vice uncontrol'd, and Virtue neglected, represents a very *Chaos*, and reduces us to the belov'd Atoms, Chance, and Confusion of the Atheists.

WHAT therefore can be worse done in the Cause of a *Deity*, than to magnify Disorder, and exaggerate (as some zealous People do) the Misfortunes of Virtue, so far as to render it an unhappy Choice with respect to this World? They err widely, who propose to turn Men to the Thoughts of a *better* World, by making 'em think so ill of *this*. For to declaim in this manner against *Virtue* to those of a looser Faith, will make 'em the less believe *a Deity*, but not the more *a future State*. Nor can it be thought sincerely

Part 2. that any Man, by having the most elevated Opinion of Virtue, and of the Happiness it creates, was ever the less inclin'd to the Belief of a future State. On the contrary, it will ever be found, that as they who are Favourers of Vice are always the least willing to hear of a future Existence; so they who are in love with Virtue, are the readiest to embrace that Opinion which renders it so illustrious, and makes its Cause triumphant.

Antients. Thus it was, that among the Antients the great Motive which inclin'd so many of the wisest to the Belief of this Doctrine unreveal'd to 'em, was purely *the Love of Virtue* in the Persons of those great Men, the *Founders* and *Preservers* of Societys, the *Legislators*, *Patriots*, *Deliverers*, *Heroes*, whose Virtues they were desirous shou'd live and be immortaliz'd. Nor is there at this day any thing capable of making this Belief more engaging among the Good and *Friendship*. Virtuous than *the Love of Friendship*, which creates in 'em a Desire not to be wholly separated by Death, but that they may enjoy the same bless'd Society hereafter. How is it possible, then, that *an Author* shou'd, for exalting *Virtue* merely, be deem'd an Enemy to a *future State*? How can our Friend be judg'd false to *Religion*, for defending a Principle on which the very Notion of *God* and *Goodness* depends?

pends? For this he says only, and this is Sect. 3.
 the Sum of all: "That by building a fu-
 ture State on the Ruins of *Virtue*, R E-
 L I G I O N in general, and the Cause of
 a Deity is betray'd; and by making Re-
 wards and Punishments the principal
 Motives to Duty, the Christian Religion
 in particular is overthrown, and its grea-
 test Principle, that of *Love*, rejected
 and expos'd."

Conclusion.

U P O N the whole then, we may justly as well as charitably conclude, that it is truly *our Author's Design*, in applying himself with so much Fairness to the Men of looser Principles, to lead 'em into such an Apprehension of the Constitution of Mankind and of human Affairs, as might form in 'em a Notion of *Order in Things*, and draw hence an Acknowledgment of that Wisdom, Goodness, and Beauty, which is supreme; that being thus far become Proselytes, they might be prepar'd for that *divine Love* which our Religion wou'd teach 'em, when once they shou'd embrace its Precepts, and form themselves to its sacred Character.

T H U S, continu'd he, I have made my Friend's Apology; which may have shewn him to you perhaps a good *Moralist*; and, I hope, no Enemy to Religion.

But

Part 2. But if you find still that *the Divine* has
 ~~
Conclusion. not appear'd so much in his Character as
 I promis'd, I can never think of satisfying
 you in any ordinary way of Conversation. Shou'd I offer to go further, I
 might be ingag'd deeply in spiritual Affairs,
 and be forc'd to make some new Model
 of a *Sermon* upon his System of Divinity.
 However, I am in hopes, now that in
 good earnest Matters are come well nigh
 to *Preaching*, you will acquit me for what
 I have already perform'd.

S E C T. IV.

JUST as he had made an end of speak-
 ing came in some Visitants, who took
 us up the remaining part of the Afternoon
 in other Discourses. But these being over,
 and our Strangers gone, (all except *the old*
Gentleman, and *his Friend*, who had din'd
 with us) we began a-new with **T H E O-**
C L E S, by laying claim to his Sermon, and
 intreating him, again and again, to let us
 hear him, at large, in his *theological* way.

THIS he complain'd was persecuting
 him: As you have seen Company, said he,
 often persecute a reputed Singer, not out
 of any fancy for the Musick, but to satisfy
 a malicious sort of Curiosity, which ends
 commonly in Censure and Dislike.

HOWEVER it might be, we told him we were resolv'd to persist. And I assur'd our Companions, that if they wou'd second me heartily in the manner I intended to press him, we shou'd easily get the better.

IN revenge then, said he, I will comply on this Condition ; That since I am to sustain the part of *the Divine and Preacher*, it shall be at PHILOCLES's cost ; who shall bear the Part of *the Infidel*, and stand for the Person *preach'd to*.

TRULY, said the old Gentleman, the *Part* you have propos'd for him is so natural and suitable, that, I doubt not, he will be able to act it without the least Pain. I cou'd wish rather, that you had spar'd your-self the trouble of putting him thus in mind of his proper *Character*. He wou'd have been apt enough of his own accord to interrupt your Discourse by his perpetual Cavils. Therefore since we have now had Entertainment enough by way of *Dialogue*, I desire the *Law of SERMON* may be strictly observ'd ; and " That " there be no *answering* to whatever is " argu'd or advanc'd."

I CONSENTED to all the Terms, and told THEOCLES I wou'd stand his Mark willingly :

Part 2. willingly : And besides, if I really were
 ~~ that *Infidel* he was to suppose me, I shou'd
 count it no Unhappiness ; since I was sure
 of being so thorowly convinc'd by him, if
 he wou'd vouchsafe to undertake me.

THEOCLES then propos'd we shou'd walk out ; the *Evening* being fine, and the free Air futing better, as he thought, with such Discourses, than a Chamber.

ACCORDINGLY we took our Evening-Walk in the Fields, from whence the laborious Hinds were now retiring. We fell naturally into the Praises of a *Country Life* ; and discours'd a-while of *Husbandry*, and the Nature of the *Soil*. Our Friends began to admire some of the *Plants*, which grew here to great perfection. And it being my fortune (as having acquir'd a little Insight into the nature of *Simples*) to say something they mightily approv'd upon this Subject, THEOCLES immediately turning about to me ; " O
 " my ingenious Friend ! " said he, " whose
 " Reason, in other respects, must be allow'd
 " so clear and happy ; How is it possible
 " that with such Insight, and accurate
 " Judgment in the *Particulars* of natural
 " Beings and Operations, you shou'd no
 " better judg of the Structure of Things
 " in general, and of the Order and Frame
 " of

“ of NATURE? Who better than your-Sect. 4.
“ self can shew the Structure of each *curve*
“ Plant and Animal-Body, declare the Of-
“ fice of every Part and Organ, and tell *Organiza-*
“ the Uses, Ends, and Advantages to *zation*.
“ which they serve? How therefore,
“ shou’d you prove so ill *a Naturalist* in
“ this WHOLE, and understand so little
“ the Anatomy of the *World* and *Nature*,
“ as not to discern the same Relation of
“ Parts, the same Consistency and Unifor-
“ mity in *the Universe!*

“ S O M E Men perhaps there are of so
“ confus’d a Thought, and so irregularly
“ form’d *within themselves*, that ’tis no
“ more than natural for them to find fault,
“ and imagine a thousand Inconsistencies
“ and Defects in this wider *Constitution*.
“ ’Twas not, we may presume, the abso-
“ lute Aim or Interest of the Universal Na-
“ ture, to render every private-one infal-
“ lible, and without defect. ’Twas not
“ its Intention to leave us without some
“ Pattern of Imperfection; such as we
“ perceive in Minds, like these, perplex’d
“ with froward Thought. But you, my
“ Friend, are Master of a nobler Mind.
“ You are conscious of better Order *with-*
“ *in*, and can see Workmanship and Ex-
“ actness in your-self, and other *innumerab-*
“ *le Parts* of the Creation. Can you an-
“ swer it to your-self, allowing thus much,
“ not

Part 2. " not to allow all ? Can you induce your-
 ~~~ " self ever to believe or think, that where  
 " there are Parts so variously united, and  
 " conspiring fitly within themselves, *the*  
*WHOLE* " *Whole* it-self shou'd have neither Union  
*and Parts.* " nor Coherence ; and where inferior and  
 " private Natures are often found so per-  
 " fect, *the Universal-one* shou'd want Per-  
 " fection, and be esteem'd like whatsoever  
 " can be thought of, most monstrous, rude,  
 " and imperfect ?

" STRANGE ! That there shou'd be *in*  
 " *Nature* the Idea of an Order and Per-  
 " fection, which *NATURE* her-self wants !  
 " That Beings which arise from *Nature*  
 " shou'd be so perfect, as to discover Im-  
 " perfection in her Constitution ; and be  
 " wise enough to correct that Wisdom by  
 " which they were made !

*Propor-*  
*tion.*

" NOTHING surely is more strongly  
 " imprinted on our Minds, or more close-  
 " ly interwoven with our Souls, than the  
 " Idea or Sense of *Order* and *Proportion*.  
 " Hence all the Force of *Numbers*, and  
 " those powerful *Arts* founded on their  
 " Management and Use. What a diffe-  
 " rence there is between *Harmony* and  
 " *Discord* ! *Cadency* and *Convulsion* ! What  
 " a difference between compos'd and or-  
 " derly Motion, and that which is ungo-  
 " vern'd and accidental ! between the re-  
 " gular

“ gular and uniform Pile of some noble Sect. 4.  
 “ Architect, and a Heap of Sand or Stones!   
 “ between an organiz'd Body, and a Mist  
 “ or Cloud driven by the Wind !

“ Now as this Difference is immediate-  
 “ ly perceiv'd by a plain internal Sensa-  
 “ tion, so there is withal in Reason this  
 “ account of it ; That whatever Things  
 “ have Order, the same have *Unity of Union.*  
 “ Design, and concur in one, are Parts  
 “ constituent of one WHOLE, or are, in  
 “ themselves, *intire Systems.* Such is a  
 “ Tree, with all its Branches ; an Animal,  
 “ with all its Members ; an Edifice, with  
 “ all its exterior and interior Ornaments.  
 “ What else is even a Tune or Symphony,  
 “ or any excellent Piece of Musick, than  
 “ a certain System of proportion'd Sounds ?

“ Now in this which we call the *System.*  
 “ UNIVERSE, whatever the Perfection  
 “ may be of any particular *Systems* ; or  
 “ whatever *single Parts* may have Pro-  
 “ portion, Unity, or Form within them-  
 “ selves ; yet if they are not united all  
 “ in general, in \* ONE *System*, but are, in  
 “ respect

\* *Vid. LOCKE of human Understanding, Book IV. Chap. 6. §. 11.*

*Ac mihi quidem Veteres illi majus quiddam animo com-  
 plexi, multo plus etiam vidisse videntur, quam quantum nos-  
 trorum ingeniorum acies intueri potest : qui omnia hæc, quæ  
 supra & subter, unum esse, & una vi, atque una conser-  
 fione*

Part 2. " respect of one another, as the driven  
 ~~ " Sands, or Clouds, or breaking Waves;  
 System. " then there being no Coherence in the  
 " Whole, there can be infer'd no Order,  
 " no Proportion, and consequently no  
 " Project or *Design*. But if none of these  
 " Parts are independent, but all apparently  
 " united, then is the WHOLE a System  
 " compleat, according to one simple, con-  
 " sistent, and uniform DESIGN.

*Animal-  
System.*

" HERE then is our main Subject, in-  
 " listed on: That neither *Man*, nor any  
 " other Animal, tho ever so compleat a  
 " System of Parts, as to all *within*, can be  
 " allow'd in the same manner compleat, as  
 " to all *without*; but must be consider'd as  
 " having a further relation abroad to the  
 " System of his Kind. So even this System  
 " of his Kind to the *Animal-System*; this to  
 " the World (our Earth); and this again  
 " to the bigger *World*, and to the *Univerſe*.

*sione naturæ conficta esse dixerunt. Nullum est enim genus*  
*rerum, quod aut avulsum à ceteris per seipsum constare,*  
*aut quo cætera si careant, vim suam, atque æternitatem con-*  
*servare possint.* Cicero de Oratore, lib. 3.

Omne hoc quod vides, quo diuina atque humana conclusa  
 sunt, unum est: membra sumus corporis magni. Seneca,  
 Epist. 95.

Societas nostra Lapidum fornicationi simillima est: quæ ca-  
 sura, nisi invicem obflarent, hoc ipso sufficeret. Ibidem.

Eſtne Dei Sedes, niſi Terra, & Pontus, & Aether,  
 Et Caelum, & Virtus? Superos quid querimus ultra?  
 Jupiter est quodcumque vides, quoctunque moveris.

Lucan. lib. 9.

" ALL

# A R H A P S O D Y.

—

Sect. 4.

“ ALL things in this World are *united*. *System of the World.*  
“ For as the *Branch* is united with the  
“ *Tree*, so is the *Tree* as immediately with  
“ the *Earth, Air, and Water*, which feed  
“ it. As much as the fertile *Mould* is  
“ fitted to the *Tree*, as much as the strong  
“ and upright Trunk of the *Oak* or *Elm*  
“ is fitted to the twining Branches of the  
“ *Vine* or *Ivy*; so much are the very  
“ *Leaves, the Seeds, and Fruits* of these  
“ *Trees* fitted to the various *Animals*:  
“ These again to one another, and to the  
“ *Elements* where they live, and to which  
“ they are, as Appendices, in a manner fit-  
“ ted and join’d; as either by *Wings* for  
“ the *Air*, *Fins* for the *Water*, *Feet* for  
“ the *Earth*, and by other correspondent  
“ inward Parts of a more curious Frame  
“ and Texture. Thus in contemplating all  
“ on Earth, we must of necessity view *All*  
“ in *One*, as holding to one common Stock.  
“ Thus too in the *System* of the bigger  
“ *World*. See there the mutual Depen-  
“ dency of Things! the Relation of one  
“ to another; of the *Sun* to this inhabited  
“ *Earth*, and of the *Earth* and other *Pla-*  
“ *nets* to the *Sun*! the Order, Union, and  
“ Coherence of the *Whole*! And know,  
“ my ingenious Friend, that by this Sur-  
“ vey you will be oblig’d to own the  
“ **UNIVERSAL SYSTEM**, and coherent *Universal System.*  
“ Scheme of Things, to be establish’d on

Part 2. " abundant Proof, capable of convincing  
 ~~~~~ " any fair and just Contemplator of the  
 " Works of Nature. For scarce wou'd
 " any-one, till he had well survey'd this
 " Universal Scheme, believe *a Union* thus
 " evidently demonstrable, by such nu-
 " merous and powerful Instances of mutual
 " Correspondency and Relation, from the
 " minutest Ranks and Orders of Beings to
 " the remotest Spheres.

Appea-
rance of Ill
necessary. " Now, in this mighty UNION, if
 " there be such Relations of Parts one to
 " another as are not easily discover'd; if
 " on this account the End and Use of
 " Things does not every-where appear,
 " there is no wonder; since 'tis no more
 " indeed than what must happen of ne-
 " cessity: Nor cou'd supreme Wisdom
 " have otherwise order'd it. For in an
 " Infinity of Things thus relative, a Mind
 " which sees not *infinitely*, can see nothing
 " *fully*: And since each Particular has re-
 " lation to all in general, it can know no
 " perfect or true Relation of any Thing,
 " in a World not perfectly and fully
 " known.

Solution.

" THE same may be consider'd in any
 " dissected Animal, Plant, or Flower;
 " where he who is no Anatomist, nor
 " vers'd in natural History, sees that the
 " many *Parts* have a relation to the *Whole*;
 " for

" for thus much even a slight View af-Sect. 4.
" fords: But he who like you, my Friend,^{~~~~~}
" is curious in the Works of Nature, and
" has been let into a Knowledge of the
" animal and vegetable Worlds, he a-
" lone can readily declare the just Rela-
" tion of all these Parts to one another,
" and the several Uses to which they
" serve.

" BUT if you wou'd willingly enter fur- *Example:*
" ther into this Thought, and consider how
" much we ought not only to be sati-
" fy'd with this our View of Things, but
" even to admire its Clearness; imagine
" only some Person intirely a Stranger to
" Navigation, and ignorant of the Nature
" of the Sea or Waters, how great his
" Astonishment wou'd be, when finding
" himself on board some Vessel, anchor-
" ing at Sea, remote from all Land-pro-
" spect, whilst it was yet a Calm, he view'd
" the ponderous Machine firm and mo-
" tionless in the midst of the smooth
" Ocean, and consider'd its Foundations
" beneath, together with its Cordage,
" Masts, and Sails above. How easily
" wou'd he see *the Whole* one regular
" Structure, all things depending on one
" another; the Uses of the Rooms *below*,
" the Lodgments, and Conveniences of
" Men and Stores? But being ignorant
" of the Intent or Design of all *above*,

Part 2. " wou'd he pronounce the Masts and Cor-
 ~ " dage to be useleſs and cumbersom, and
 " for this reaſon condemn the Frame, and
 " despise the *Archite&t?* O my Friend !
 " let us not thus betray our Ignorance ;
 " but consider where we are, and in what
 " a Universe. Think of the many Parts
 " of the vast Machine, in which we have
 " so little Inſight, and of which it is im-
 " poſſible we ſhou'd know the Ends and
 " Uſes ; when instead of ſeeing to the
 " highest *Pendants*, we ſee only ſome *lower*
 " *Deck*, and are in this dark Caſe of Fleſh,
 " confin'd even to the *Hold*, and meanest
 " Station of the Veffel.

" Now having recogniz'd this uniform
 " conſiſtent Fabrick, and own'd the *Uni-*
 " *verſal System*, we muſt of conſequence
Universal Mind. " acknowledg a *Universal MIND* ; which
 " no ingenious Man can be tempted to
 " diſown, except thro' the Imagination of
 " Diſorder in the Universe, its Seat. For
 " can it be ſuppoſ'd of any-one in the
 " World, that being in ſome Desart far
 " from Men, and hearing there a perfect
 " Symphony of Muſick, or ſeeing an ex-
 " act Pile of regular Archite&ture arising
 " gradually from the Earth in all its Or-
 " ders and Proportions, he ſhou'd be per-
 " ſuaded that at the bottom there was
 " no *Design* accompanying this, no ſecret
 " Spring of *Thought*, no active *Mind*?
 " Wou'd

" Wou'd he, because he saw no Hand, Sect. 4.
 " deny the Handy-Work, and suppose that *wave*
 " each of these compleat and perfect Sys-
 " tems were fram'd, and thus united in
 " just Symmetry, and conspiring Order,
 " either by the accidental blowing of the
 " Winds, or rolling of the Sands ?

" **W**HAT is it then shou'd so disturb *Distur-*
 " our Views of *Nature*, as to destroy that *bance,*
 " Unity of Design and Order of *a Mind*,
 " which otherwise wou'd be so apparent ?
 " All we can see either of the Heavens or
 " Earth, demonstrates Order and Perfec-
 " tion ; so as to afford the noblest Subjects
 " of Contemplation to Minds, like yours,
 " enrich'd with Sciences and Learning.
 " All is delightful, amiable, rejoicing, ex-
 " cept with relation to *Man* only, and *Human*
 " his Circumstances, which seem unequal. *Affairs.*
 " Here the Calamity and Ill arises ; and
 " hence the Ruin of this goodly Frame.
 " All perishes on this account ; and the
 " whole Order of the Universe, elsewhere
 " so firm, intire, and immoveable, is here
 " o'erthrown, and lost by this one View ;
 " in which we refer all things to our-
 " selves : submitting the Interest of *the Selfishness.*
 " *Whole* to the Good and Interest of so
 " small *a Part*.

" **B**UT how is it you complain of the
 " unequal State of Man, and of the few

Part 2. " Advantages allow'd him above the
 ~~~~~ " Beasts? What can a Creature claim, so  
 " little differing from 'em, or whose Me-  
 " rit appears so little above 'em, except in  
 " *Wisdom* and *Virtue*, to which so few  
 " conform? Man may be virtuous; and  
 " by being so, is happy. His Merit is  
 " Reward. By Virtue he deserves; and in  
 " Virtue only can meet his Happiness de-  
*Virtue and Vice.* serv'd. But if even *Virtue* it-self be un-  
 " provided for, and *Vice* more prosperous  
 " be the better Choice; if this, as you  
 " suppose, be in the Nature of Things,  
 " then is all Order in reality inverted, and  
 " supreme Wisdom lost: Imperfection and  
 " Irregularity being, after this manner, un-  
 " doubtedly too apparent in the moral  
 " World.

*Their Power, Effect.* " HAVE you then, ere you pronounc'd  
 " this Sentence, consider'd of the State of  
 " *Virtue* and *Vice* with respect to *this Life*  
 " merely; so as to say, with assurance,  
 " When, and how far, in what particu-  
 " lars, and how circumstantiated, the one  
 " or the other is *Good* or *Ill*? You who  
 " are skill'd in other Fabricks and Com-  
 " positions, both of Art and Nature, have  
 " you consider'd of the Fabrick of *the*  
*A Mind.* " *Mind*, the Constitution of the Soul, the  
 " Connexion and Frame of all its Passions,  
 " and Affections; to know accordingly  
 " the Order and Symmetry of the Part,  
 " and

" and how it either improves or suffers ; Sect. 4.  
" what its Force is, when naturally pre-  
" serv'd in its sound State ; and what be-<sup>Improve-</sup>  
" comes of it, when corrupted and a-  
" bus'd ? Till this (my Friend !) be well  
" examin'd and understood, how shall we  
" judg either of the Force of *Virtue*, or  
" Power of *Vice* ? Or in what manner  
" either of these may work to our Happi-  
" ness or Undoing ? "

" HERE therefore is that INQUIRY  
" we shou'd first make. But who is there  
" can afford to make it as he ought ? If  
" happily we are born of a good Nature ;  
" if a liberal Education has form'd in us  
" a generous Temper and Disposition, <sup>Temper.</sup>  
" well-regulated Appetites, and worthy  
" Inclinations, 'tis well for us ; and so  
" indeed we esteem it. But who is there  
" endeavours to give these to himself,  
" or to advance his Portion of Happi-  
" nes in this kind ? Who thinks of  
" improving, or so much as of preserving  
" his Share, in a World where it must of  
" necessity run so great a hazard, and  
" where we know an honest Nature is  
" so easily corrupted ? All other things  
" relating to us are preserv'd with Care,  
" and have some Art or OEconomy be-  
" longing to 'em ; this which is nearest  
" related to us, and on which our Hap-  
" piness depends, is alone committed to

Part 2. " Chance: And *Temper* is the only thing  
 ~~~ " ungovern'd, whilst it governs all the rest.

Appetites. " Thus we inquire concerning what
 " is good and suitable to our Appetites;
 " but what Appetites are good and suita-
 " bie to us, is no part of our Examina-
 " tion. We inquire what is according to
 " *Interest*, *Policy*, *Fashion*, *Vogue*; but it
 " seems wholly strange, and out of the
 " way, to inquire what is *according to NATURE*. The Balance of EUROPE, of
 " Trade, of Power, is strictly sought af-
Balance. " ter; while few have heard of the *Ba-*
 " *lance of their Passions*, or thought of
 " holding these Scales even. Few are ac-
 " quainted with this Province, or know-
 " ing in these Affairs. But were we more
 " so, as this *Inquiry* wou'd make us, we
 " shou'd then see Beauty and Decorum
 " here, as well as elsewhere in Nature;
 " and the Order of the Moral World
 " wou'd equal that of the Natural. By
 " this the *Beauty of VIRTUE* wou'd ap-
 " pear; and hence, as has been shewn,
Virtue. " the Supreme and Sovereign BEAUTY,
Deity. " the Original of all which is Good or
 " Amiable.

" BUT lest I shou'd appear at last too
 " like an *Enthusiast*, I chuse to express
 " my Sense, and conclude this *Philosophical*
 " Sermon, in the words of one of those an-
 " tient

" tient *Philologists*, whom you are us'd Sect. 4.
" to esteem. For *Divinity* it-self, says ~~~
" he, is surely beauteous, and of all
" *Beautys* the brightest; tho' not a beau-
" teous Body, but that from whence the
" *Beauty* of *Bodys* is deriv'd: Not a beau-
" teous Plain, but that from whence the
" Plain looks beautiful. *The River's Beauty*,
" the *Sea's*, the *Heaven's*, and *Heavenly Con-*
" *stellations*, all flow from hence, as from
" a *Source Eternal and Incorrputible*. As
" Beings partake of this, they are fair,
" and flourishing, and happy: As they are
" lost to this, they are deform'd, perish'd,
" and lost."

WHEN THEOCLES had thus spoken, he was formally complimented by our Two Companions. I was going to add something in the same way: but he presently stop'd me, by saying, he shou'd be scandaliz'd, if instead of commanding him, I did not, according to my *Character*, chuse rather to criticize some part or other of his long Discourse.

IF it must be so then, reply'd I; in the first place, give me leave to wonder that, instead of the many Arguments commonly brought for proof of a *Deity*, you make use only of one single-one to build on. I expected to have heard from you, in customary

Part 2. mary form, of a *first Cause*, a *first Being*,
 and a *Beginning of Motion*: How clear the
Idea was of an *immaterial Substance*: And
 how plainly it appear'd, that at some time
 or other *Matter must have been created*.
 But as to all this, you are silent. As for
 what is said, of "A material unthinking
 Substance being never able to have
 produc'd an immaterial thinking one;"
 I readily grant it: but on the condition,
 that this great Maxim of *Nothing being
 ever made from Nothing*, may hold as
 well on my side as my Adversary's: And
 then, I suppose, that whilst the World endures,
 he will be at a loss how to assign a
 Beginning to *Matter*; or how to suggest a
 Possibility of annihilating it. The spiritual
 Men may, as long as they please, repre-
 sent to us, in the most eloquent man-
 ner, "That *Matter* consider'd in a thou-
 sand different Shapes, join'd and dis-
 join'd, vary'd and modify'd to Eternity,
 can never, of it-self, afford one single
 Thought, never occasion or give rise to
 any thing like Sense or Knowledg." Their
 Argument will hold good against
 a DEMOCRITUS, an EPICURUS, or
 any of the elder or latter Atomists. But
 it will be turn'd on them by an examining
 Academist: and when the two Substances
 are fairly set asunder, and consider'd a-
 part as different kinds; 'twill be as strong
 Sense, and as good Argument, to say as

*Matter
and
Thoughts.*

well of the *immaterial kind*; “ That do Sect. 4.
“ with it as you please, modify it a thou-~~~~~
“ sand ways, purify it, exalt it, sublime
“ it, torture it ever so much, or rack it,
“ as they say, with thinking, you will
“ never be able to produce or force the
“ contrary Substance out of it.” The
poor Dregs of sorry *Matter* can no more
be made out of the simple pure Substance
of immaterial *Thought*, than the high Spi-
rits of *Thought* or *Reason* can be extracted
from the gross Substance of heavy *Matter*.
So let the *Dogmatists* make of this Argu-
ment what they can.

BUT for your part, continu'd I, as you
have stated the *Question*, 'tis not about
what was *first*, or *foremost*; but what
is *instant*, and *now* in being. “ For if
“ DEITY be now really extant; if by any
“ good Token it appears that there is *at*
“ *this present* a universal Mind; 'twill ea-
“ sily be yielded there *ever* was one.” —

This is your Argument.— You go (if I
may say so) upon *Fact*, and wou'd prove
that things *actually are* in such a state and
condition, which if they really *were*, there
wou'd indeed be no dispute left. Your
UNION is your main Support. Yet
how is it you prove this? What Demon-
stration have you given? What have
you so much as offer'd at, beyond *bare*
Probability? So far are you from *demon-*
strating

Part 2. *Strating* any thing, that if this uniting
 Scheme be the chief Argument for Deity,
 (as you tacitly allow) you seem rather to
 have demonstrated, " That the *Cafe* it-self
 " is incapable of Demonstration." For,
 " How, say you, can a narrow Mind see
 " *All Things?*" — And yet if, in reali-
 ty, It sees not *All*, It had as good see
Nothing. The demonstrable part is still
 as far behind. For grant that this *All*,
 which lies within our view or knowledg,
 is orderly and united, as you suppose:
 this mighty *All* is a mere Point still, a
 very Nothing compar'd to what remains.

Atheistical Hypothesis. " 'Tis only a separate *By-World*, we'll
 " say, of which perhaps there are, in the
 " wide Waste, Millions besides, as horrid
 " and deform'd, as this of ours is re-
 " gular and proportion'd. In length of
 " time, amidst the infinite Hurry and
 " Shock of Beings, this *single odd World*,
 " by accident, might have been struck
 " out, and cast into some Form, (as a-
 " mong infinite *Chances*, what is there
 " which may not happen?) But for the
 " rest of *Matter*, 'tis of a different hue:
 " Old *Father CHAOS* (as the Poets call
 " him) in these wild Spaces, reigns ab-
 " solute, and upholds his Realms of
 " Darkness. He presses hard upon our
 " Frontier; and one day, belike, shall
 " by a furious Inroad recover his lost
 " Right, conquer his Rebel-State, and re-
 " unite

" unite us to primitive *Discord* and Con-Sect. 4.
" *fusion.*"

THIS, said I, THEOCLES! (concluding my Discourse) is all I dare offer in opposition to your *Philosophy*. I imagin'd, indeed, you might have given me more Scope: But you have retrench'd your-self in narrower Bounds. So that to tell you truth, I look upon your *Theology* to be hardly so fair or open as that of our Divines in general. They are strict, it's true, as to *Names*; but allow a greater Latitude in *Things*. Hardly indeed can they bear a home-Charge, a downright questioning of *Deity*: But in return, they give always fair play against NATURE, NATURE and allow her to be challeng'd for her arraign'd. Failings. She may freely err, and we as freely censure. *Deity*, they think, is not accountable for her: Only she for herself. But you are straiter, and more precise in this point. You have unnecessarily brought *Nature* into the Controversy, and taken upon you to defend her Honour so highly, that I know not whether it may be safe for me to question her.

LET not this trouble you, reply'd THEOCLES: but be free to censure *Nature*; whatever may be the Consequence. 'Tis only my *Hypothesis* can suffer: If I defend it ill, my Friends need not be scandaliz'd.

Part 2. daliz'd. They are fortify'd, no doubt; ~~~ with stronger Arguments for a Deity, and can well employ those *metaphysical* Weapons, of whose Edge you seem so little apprehensive. I leave them to dispute this Ground with you, whenever they think fit. For my own Arguments, if they can be suppos'd to make any part of this Defense, they may be look'd upon only as distant Lines, or Outworks, which may easily perhaps be won; but without any danger to the Body of the Place.

NOTWITHSTANDING, then, said I, that you are willing I shou'd attack NATURE *in Form*, I chuse to spare her in all other Subjects, except MAN only. How comes it, I intreat you, that *NATURE in Man.* in this noblest of Creatures, and worshiest her Care, she shou'd appear so very weak and impotent; whilst in mere *In Brutes. Brutes,* and the irrational Species, she acts with so much Strength, and exerts such hardy Vigour? Why is she spent so soon in feeble *Man*, who is found more subject to Diseases, and of fewer years than many of the *wild Creatures*? They range secure; and proof against all the Injurys of Seasons and Weather, want no help from *Art*, but live in careless Ease, discharg'd of Labour, and freed from the cumber som Baggage of a necessitous human Life.

Life. In Infancy more helpful, vigorous Sect. 4.
in Age, with Senses quicker, and more ~~more~~
natural Sagacity, they pursue their Interests,
Joys, Recreations, and cheaply
purchase both their Food and Maintenance;
cloth'd and arm'd by Nature her-self, who
provides them both a Couch and Mansion.
So has Nature order'd for the rest
of Creatures. Such is their Hardiness,
Robustness, Vigour. Why not the same
for *Man*?—

AND do you stop thus short, said THEOCLES, in your Expostulation? Me-thinks 'twere as easy to proceed, now you are in the way; and instead of laying claim to some *few* Advantages of other Creatures, you might as well stand for *All*, and complain "That *Man*, for his part, ^{Nature is} *Man*.
 " shou'd be any thing less than a Consumption
 " of all Advantages and Privileges
 " which Nature can afford." Ask not merely, why *Man* is naked, why un-hoof'd, why flower-footed than the Beasts? Ask, "Why he has not *Wings* also for the Air, *Fins* for the Water, and so on; that he might take possession of each Element, and reign in *All*?"

NOT so, said I, neither. This wou'd be to rate him high indeed! As if he were, by Nature, L O R D of *All*: which is more than I cou'd willingly allow.

TIS

Part 2.

— 'Tis enough, reply'd he, that this is yielded. For if we allow once a *Subordination* in his Case ; if *Nature* her-self be not for *MAN*, but *Man* for *NATURE* ; then must *Man*, by his good leave, submit to the *Elements of NATURE*, and not the *Elements* to him. Few of these are at all fitted to him : and none perfectly. If he be left in *Air*, he falls headlong ; for *Wings* were not assign'd him. In *Water* he soon sinks. In *Fire* he consumes. Within *Earth* he suffocates.—

As for what Dominion he may naturally have in other Elements, said I, my concern truly is not very great in his behalf ; since by Art he can even exceed the Advantages *Nature* has given to other Creatures : But for the *Air*, methinks it had been wonderfully obliging in *Nature* to have allow'd him *Wings*.

Volatile.

AND what wou'd he have gain'd by it, reply'd *THEOCLES*? For consider what an Alteration of *Form* must have ensu'd. Observe in one of those wing'd Creatures, whether the whole Structure be not made subservient to this purpose, and all other Advantages sacrific'd to this single Operation. The Anatomy of the Creature shews it, in a manner, to be *all Wing* : its chief Bulk being compos'd of

Anatomy.

two

two exorbitant Muscles, which exhaust the Sect. 4.
Strength of all the other, and engross (if I may say so) the whole OEconomy of the Frame. 'Tis thus the aerial Racers are able to perform so rapid and strong a Motion, beyond comparison with any other kind, and far exceeding their little share of Strength elsewhere: these Parts of theirs being made in such superior proportion, as in a manner *to starve* their Companions. And in Man's Architecture, of so different an Order, were the flying Engines to be affix'd; must not the other Members suffer, and the multiply'd Parts starve one another? What think you of the Brain in this Partition? *The Brain,* Is it not like to prove a *Starveling*? Or wou'd you have it be maintain'd at the same high rate, and draw the chief Nourishment to it-self, from all the rest? —

I UNDERSTAND you, said I, THEOCLES (interrupting him:) The Brain certainly is a great *Starver*, where it abounds; and the thinking People of the World, the *Philosophers* and *Virtuoso's* especially, must be contented, I find, with a moderate Share of bodily Advantages, for the sake of what they call *Parts* and *Capacity* in another sense. The Parts, it seems, of one kind agree ill in their OEconomy with the Parts of the other. But to make this even on both sides, let us

Part 2. turn the Tables ; and the Cafè, I suppose, will stand the same with the *Milo's* of the Age, the Men of bodily Prowess and Dexterity. For not to mention a vulgar sort, such as *Wrestlers*, *Vaulters*, *Racers*, *Hunters* ; what shall we say of our fine-bred Gentlemen, our *Riders*, *Fencers*, *Dancers*, *Tennis-players*, and such like ? 'Tis the Body surely is the *Starver* here : and if the Brain were such a terrible Devourer in the other way ; the Body and bodily Parts seem to have their Reprisals in this Rank of Men.

Balance. If then, said he, the Cafè stands thus between *Man* and *Man*, how must it stand between *Man* and a *quite different Creature*? If the *BALANCE* be so nice, that the least thing breaks it, even in Creatures of the same Frame and Order ; of what fatal effect must it be to change the *Order* it-self, and make some essential Alteration in the Frame ? Consider therefore how it is we censure *Nature* in these and such-like Cafès. " Why, says one, was I " not made by Nature strong as a *Horse* ? " Why not hardy and robust as this " *Brute-Creature* ? or nimble and active " as that other ? " — And yet when uncommon Strength, Agility, and Feats of Body are subjoin'd, even in our own Species, see what befals ! So that for a Person thus in love with an *Athletick Milo-*

NEAN Constitution, it were better, me-
thinks, and more modest in him, to change
the Expostulation, and ask, " Why was
" I not made in good earnest *a very*
" BRUTE?" For that wou'd be more
futable.

I AM apt indeed, said I, to think that
the Excellence of MAN lies somewhat
different from that of *a Brute*: and that
such amongst us as are more truly *Men*,
shou'd naturally aspire to manly Quali-
tys, and leave the Brute his own. But
Nature, I see, has done well to morti-
fy us in this particular, by furnishing us
with such slight Stuff, and in such a ten-
der Frame, as is indeed wonderfully com-
modious to support that Man-Excellence
of *Thought* and *Reason*; but wretchedly
scanty and ineffectual for other Purpo-
ses. As if it were her very Design, " To
" hinder us from aspiring ridiculously
" to what was misbecoming our Cha-
" racter."

I SEE, said THEOCLES, you are not
one of those timorous Arguers, who trem-
ble at every Objection rais'd against their
Opinion or Belief, and are so intent in up-
holding their *own* side of the Argument,
that they are unable to make the least
Concession on *the other*. Your Wit allows
you to divert your-self with whatever oc-

Part 2. curs in the Debate: And you can pleasantly improve even what your Antagonist brings as a Support to his own Hypothesis. This indeed is a fairer sort of Practice than what is common now a-days. But 'tis no more than suitable to your *Character*. And were I not afraid of speaking with an Air of Compliment, in the midst of a philosophical Debate; I shou'd tell you perhaps what I thought of the becoming manner of your SCEPTICISM, in opposition to a kind of Bigot-Scepticks; who forfeit their Right to the philosophick *Character*, and retain hardly so much as that of the Gentleman or Good Companion.—But to our Argument.—

*Distribu-
tion.*

SUCH then, continu'd he, is the admirable Distribution of NATURE, her adapting and adjusting not only the *Stuff* or *Matter* to the *Shape* and *Form*, and even the *Shape* it-self and *Form* to the *Circumstance*, *Place*, *Element* or *Region*; but also the *Affections*, *Appetites*, *Sensations*, mutually to each other, as well as to the *Matter*, *Form*, *Action*, and all besides:

“ All manag'd for the best, with perfect
 “ Frugality and just Reserve: profuse to
 “ none, but bountiful to all: never em-
 “ ploying in one thing more than enough;
 “ but with exact Economy retrenching
 “ the superfluous, and adding Force to
 “ what is *principal* in every thing.” And
 is

is not THOUGHT and REASON *principal* in Man? Wou'd he have no Reserve *Principal Part.* for these? no saving for this part of his Engine? Or wou'd he have the same Stuff or Matter, the same Instruments or Organs serve alike for different purposes, and an Ounce be equivalent to a Pound? — It cannot be. What wonders, then, can he expect from a few Ounces of Blood in such a narrow Vessel, fitted for so small a District of Nature? Will he not rather think highly of that NATURE, which has thus manag'd his Portion for him, to best advantage, with this happy Reserve, (happy indeed for him, if he knows and uses it!) by which he has so much a better Use of Organs than any other Creature? by which he holds his Reason, is *a Reason.* *Man,* and not *a Beast?*

BUT * Beasts, said I, have *Instincts,* *Instinct.* which Man has not.

TRUE, said he, they have indeed Perceptions, Sensations, and † *Pre-sensations*, (if I may use the Expression) which Man, *Animals.* for his part, has not in any proportionable degree. Their Females, newly pregnant, and before they have bore Young, have a clear Prospect or *Pre-sensation* of their State

* *Supra*, p. 92, 93, &c. and 131, 132. And VOL. III.
p. 216, 217, &c.

† *Infra*, p. 412.

Part 2. which is to follow ; know what to provide, and how, in what manner, and at what time. How many things do they pre-ponderate ? How many at once comprehend ? The Seasons of the Year, the Country, Climate, Place, Aspect, Situation, the Basis of their Building, the Materials, Architecture ; the Diet and Treatment of their Offspring ; in short, the whole Economy of their Nursery : and all this as perfectly at first, and when unexperienc'd, as at any time of their Life afterwards.

*Human
Kind.*

And “ *Why not this*, say you, in Human Kind ? ” Nay, rather on the contrary, I ask “ *Why this* ? Where was “ the Occasion or Use ? Where the Necessity ? Why this Sagacity for Men ? ” Have they not what is better, in another kind ? Have they not Reason and Discourse ? Does not this instruct them ? ” What need then of the other ? Where would be the prudent Management at this rate ? Where the Reserve ? ”

THE Young of most other Kinds, continu'd he, are instantly helpful to themselves, sensible, vigorous, known to shun Danger, and seek their Good : A *human Infant* is of all the most helpless, weak, infirm. And wherefore shou'd it not have been thus order'd ? Where is the loss in such a Species ? Or what is *Man* the worse for this Defect, amidst such large Supplies ?

plies? Does not this *Defect* engage him Sect. 4.
the more strongly to Society, and force ^{Society.}
him to own that he is purposely, and not
by accident, made rational and *sociable* ;
and can no otherwise increase or subsist,
than in that *social* Intercourse and Com-
munity which is his *natural State*? Is
not both conjugal Affection, and natural
Affection to Parents, Duty to Magistrates,
Love of a common City, Community, or
Country, with the other Dutys and so-
cial Parts of Life, deduc'd from hence,
and founded in these very *Wants*? What
can be happier than such a Deficiency, as
is the occasion of so much Good ? What
better than a Want so abundantly made up,
and answer'd by so many Enjoyments ?
Now if there are still to be found among
Mankind such as even in the midst of
these Wants seem not ashame'd to affect a
Right of Independency, and deny them-
selves to be by Nature *sociable* ; where
wou'd their Shame have been, had Na-
ture otherwise supply'd these Wants ?
What Duty or Obligation had been ever
thought of ? What Respect or Reverence
of Parents, Magistrates, their Country, or
their Kind ? Wou'd not their full and
self-sufficient State more strongly have de-
termin'd them to throw off *Nature*, and
deny the *Ends* and *Author* of their Crea-
tion ?



WHILST THEOCLES argu'd thus concerning NATURE, the old Gentleman, my Adversary, express'd great Satisfaction in hearing me, as he thought, refuted, and my Opinions expos'd. For he wou'd needs believe these to be strongly my Opinions, which I had only started as Objections in the Discourse. He endeavour'd to reinforce the Argument by many Particulars from the common Topsicks of the *School-men* and *Civilians*. He added withal, " That it was better for me " to declare my Sentiments openly ; for " he was sure I had strongly imbib'd that " Principle, that * *the State of Nature* was " *a State of War.*"

*State of
Nature.*

THAT it was no *State of Government*, or *publick Rule*, reply'd I, you your-self allow. I do so. Was it then a *State of Fellowship*, or *Society*? No: " For when Men enter'd first into Society, " they pass'd from *the State of Nature* in " to that new one which is founded upon " *Compact.*" And was that former State a tolerable one? Had it been absolutely intolerable, there had never been any such. Nor cou'd we properly call that a *State*, which cou'd not stand or endure for the least time. If Man therefore

* VOL. I. p. 109, &c.

cou'd

cou'd endure to live without Society ; and Sect. 4.
if it be true that he *actually* liv'd so, when ~~~
in the State of Nature ; how can it be said,
" That he is by *Nature sociable* ? "

T H E old Gentleman seem'd a little dis-turb'd at my Question. But having recover'd himself, he said in answer, " That
" M A N indeed, from his own *natural In-*
" *clication*, might not, perhaps, have been
" mov'd to associate ; but rather from some
" particular *Circumstances*."

H I S *Nature* then, said I, was not so very good, it seems ; since having no *natural Affection*, or *friendly Inclination* belonging to him, he was forc'd into a social State, *against his will* : And this, not from any necessity in respect of outward Things, (for you have allow'd him a tolerable Sub-sistence) but in probability from such Inconveniences as arose chiefly from himself, and his own malignant Temper and Principles. And indeed 'twas no wonder if Creatures who were *naturally* thus unsociable, shou'd be as naturally mischievous and troublefom. If *according to their Nature*, they cou'd live out of Society, with so little Affection for one another's Company, 'tis not likely that upon occasion they wou'd spare one another's Persons. If they were so fullen as not to meet for *Love*, 'tis more than probable
they

Part 2. they woud fight for *Interest*. And thus
~~from~~
^{State of}
~~Nature.~~ from your own Reasoning it appears,
 " That the *State of Nature* must in all
 " likelihood have been little different from
 " *a State of W A R.*"

HE was going to answer me with some sharpness, as by his Looks appear'd; when THEOCLES interposing, desir'd, That as he had occasion'd this Dispute, he might be allow'd to try if he cou'd end it, by setting the Question in a fairer Light. You see, said he to the old Gentleman, what Artifice PHILOCLES made use of, when he engag'd you to allow, that the State of Nature, and that of Society were perfectly distinct. But let us question him now in his turn, and see whether he can demonstrate to us, " That there can be " naturally any *Human State* which is not
 " *social.*"

W H A T is it then, said the old Gentleman, which we call the *State of Nature*?

NOT that imperfect rude Condition of Mankind, said THEOCLES, which some imagine; but which, if it ever were in Nature, cou'd never have been of the least continuance, or any-way *tolerable*, or sufficient for the Support of human Race. Such a Condition cannot indeed so properly be call'd *a State*. For what if

speaking of an Infant just coming into the Sect. 4.
World, and in the moment of the Birth, ~~~
I shou'd fancy to call this *a State*; wou'd
it be proper?

HARDLY so, I confess.

JUST such *a State*, therefore, was that which we suppose of MAN, ere yet he enter'd into Society, and became in truth *a Human Creature*. 'Twas the *rough Draught* of Man, the *Essay* or *first Effort* of Nature, a Species *in the Birth*, a Kind as yet *unform'd*; not in its *natural State*, but under *Violence*, and still restless, till it attain'd its natural Perfection.

AND thus, said THEOCLES, (addressing still more particularly to the old Gentleman) the Case must necessarily stand, even on the supposal "That there was "ever such a Condition or *State* of Men, "when as yet they were unassociated, un- "acquainted, and consequently without "any Language or Form of Art." But "That it was their *natural State*, to live "thus separately," can never without Absurdity be allow'd. For sooner may you divest the Creature of any other Feeling or Affection, than that towards *Society* and his *Likeness*. Allowing you, however, the Power of divesting him at pleasure; allowing you to reduce even whole Parts

Part 2. Parts and Members of his present Frame;
 ~~ wou'd you transform him thus, and call
^{State of}
^{Nature.} him still *a Man*? Yet better might you do
 this indeed, than you cou'd strip him of
 his *natural Affections*, separate him from all
 his *Kind*, and inclosing him like some soli-
 tary *Insect* in a Shell, declare him still *a*
M A N. So might you call the human Egg,
 or Embrio, *the Man*. The Bug which
 breeds the Butterfly is more properly *a Fly*,
 tho without Wings, than this imaginary
 Creature is *a Man*. For tho his outward
 Shape were *human*, his Passions, Appetites,
 and Organs must be wholly different. His
 whole inward Make must be revers'd, to
 fit him for such a recluse OEcconomy, and
 separate Subsistence.

To explain this a little further, continu'd he: Let us examine this pretended *State of Nature*; how and on what Foundation it must stand. "For either *Man*
 " must have been from Eternity, or not.
 " If from Eternity, there cou'd be no
 " primitive or original State, no *State of*
 " *Nature*, other than we see at present be-
 " fore our eyes. If not from Eternity, he
 " arose either *all at once*, (and consequently
 " he was at the very *first* as he is *now*) or
 " *by degrees*, thro' several Stages and Con-
 " ditions, to that in which he is at length
 " settled, and has continu'd for so many
 " Generations."

FOR

FOR instance, let us suppose he sprang, as the old Poets feign'd, from *a big-belly'd Oak*: and then belike he might resemble more a *Man-drake* than a *M A N*. Let us suppose him at first with little more of Life than is discover'd in that Plant which they call *the Sensitive*. But when *the Mother-Oak* had been some time deliver'd, and the false Birth by some odd Accident or Device was wrought into Form; the Members were then fully display'd, and the Organs of Sense began to unfold themselves.

" Here sprang an *Ear* : there peep'd an
 " *Eye*. Perhaps a *Tail* too came in com-
 " pany. For what *Superfluitys* Nature
 " may have been charg'd with at first,
 " is difficult to determine. They dropt
 " off, it seems, in time ; and happily have
 " left things, at last, in a good posture,
 " and (to a wonder !) just *as they should
 " be.*"

THIS surely is the lowest View of *the original Affairs* of human Kind. For if A PROVIDENCE, and not CHANCE, gave *Man* his being, our Argument for his *social Nature* must surely be the stronger. But admitting his Rise to be, as we have describ'd, and as a certain sort of Philosophers wou'd needs have it ; Nature has then had no Intention at all, no Meaning or Design in this whole Matter. So how

Part 2. any thing can be call'd *natural* in the Case ;
 ~~~~~ how any *State* can be call'd a *State of Nature*.  
*State of Nature.* *tur*, or *according to Nature*, one more than another, I know not.

LET us go on however, and on their Hypothesis consider, Which *State* we may best call *Nature's own*. " She has by Accident, thro' many Changes and Chances, rais'd a Creature, which springing at first from rude Seeds of Matter, proceeded till it became what now it is; and arriv'd where for many Generations it has been at a stay." In this long Procession (for I allow it any length whatever) I ask, " Where was it that this *State of Nature* cou'd begin ?" The Creature must have endur'd many Changes: and each Change, whilst he was thus growing up, was as *natural*, one as another. So that either there must be reckon'd a hundred different States of Nature; or if one, it can be only *that* in which Nature was *perfect*, and her Growth *compleat*. Here where She *rested*, and attain'd her End, here must be her State, or no-where.

Cou'd she then *rest*, think you, in that desolate State before Society ? Cou'd she maintain and propagate the Species, such as it now is, without Fellowship or Community ? Shew it us in fact anywhere,

where, amongst any of our own Kind. Sect. 4.  
 For as for Creatures which may much resemble us in outward Form, if they differ yet in the least part of their Constitution, if their Inwards are of a different Texture, if their Skin and Pores are otherwise form'd or harden'd; if they have other Excrescences of Body, another Temper, other natural inseparable Habits or Affections, they are not truly *of our Kind*. If, on the other hand, their Constitution be as ours; their natural Parts or inward Facultys as strong, and their bodily Frame as weak as ours; if they have *Memory*, and *Senses*, and *Affections*, and *a Use of Organs* as ours: 'tis evident they can no more by their good-will abstain from *Society*, than they can possibly preserve themselves without it.

AND here (my Friends !) we ought to remember what we discours'd a-while since, and was advanc'd by PHILOCLES himself, concerning the \* Weakness of human Bodys, and the necessitous State of *Man*, in respect of all other Creatures;  
 " His long and helpless Infancy, his feeble  
 " and defenseless Make, by which he is  
 " more fitted to be a Prey himself, than  
 " live by Prey on others." Yet 'tis impossible for him to subsist like any of those

\* Pag. 300.

Part 2. grazing Kinds. He must have better Provision and choicer Food than the raw Herbage ; a better Couch and Covering than the bare Earth or open Sky. How many Conveniences of other kinds does he stand in need of ? What Union and strict Society is requir'd between the Sexes, to preserve and nurse their growing *Offspring* ? This kind of *Society* will not, surely, be deny'd to MAN, which to every Beast of Prey is known proper, and *natural*. And can we allow *this* social Part to Man, and go no further ? Is it possible he shou'd *pair*, and live in Love and Fellowship with his *Partner* and *Offspring*, and remain still wholly wild, and speechless, and without those Arts of Storing, Building, and other OEconomy, as natural to him surely as to the *Beaver*, or to the *Ant*, or *Bee* ? Where, therefore, shou'd He break off from this *Society*, if once begun ? For that it began thus, as early as Generation, and grew into a Household and OEconomy, is plain. Must not this have grown soon into *a Tribe* ? and this Tribe into *a Nation* ? Or tho' it remain'd *a Tribe* only ; was not this still *a Society* for mutual Defense and common Interest ? In short, if Generation be *natural*, if natural Affection and the Care and Nurture of the Offspring be *natural*, Things standing as they do with Man, and the Creature being of that Form and Constitution

*State of  
Nature.*

tion he now is; it follows, "That Society Sect. 4.  
" must be also *natural to him*;" And ~~  
" That out of Society and Community  
" he never did, nor ever can subsist."

To conclude, said he, (addressing still to the two Companions) I will venture to add a word in behalf of PHILOCLES: That since the Learned have such a fancy for this Notion, and love to talk of this imaginary *State of Nature*, I think 'tis even Charity to speak as ill of it as we possibly can. Let it be a *State of War, Rapine, and Injustice*. Since 'tis unsocial, let it e'en be as uncomfortable and as frightful as 'tis possible. To speak well of it, is to render it inviting, and tempt Men to turn Hermites. Let it, at least, be look'd on as many degrees worse than the worst Government in being. The greater Dread we have of *Anarchy*, the better *Country-men* we shall prove, and value more the *Laws* and *Constitution* under which we live, and by which we are protected from the outrageous Violences of such an unnatural State. In this I agree heartily with those Transformers of Human Nature, who considering it abstractedly and apart from Government or Society, represent it under monstrous Visages of *Dragons, Leviathans*, and I know not what devouring Creatures. They wou'd have done well however, to have express'd

Part 2. themselves more properly in their great  
~~State of Nature.~~ Maxim. For to say in disparagement of  
*Man*, "That he is *to Man a Wolf*," ap-  
 pears somewhat absurd, when one considers  
 that *Wolves* are *to Wolves* very kind and  
 loving Creatures. The Sexes strictly *join*  
 in the Care and Nurture of the Young;  
 and this *Union* is continu'd still between  
 'em. They houl to one another, to bring  
 Company; whether to hunt, or invade  
 their Prey, or assemble on the discovery of  
 a good Carcase. Even the swinish Kinds  
 want not *common Affection*, and run in Herds  
 to the assistance of their distres'd Fellows.  
 The meaning therefore of this famous  
 Sentence, if it has any meaning at all, must  
 be, "That *Man is naturally to Man, as a*  
 " *Wolf is to a tamer Creature:*" as, for  
 instance, to *a Sheep*. But this will be as  
 little to the purpose as to tell us, "That  
 " there are *different Species or Characters*  
 " of Men; That *all* have not this \* wol-  
 " fish Nature, but That *one half* at least are  
 " *naturally innocent and mild.*" And thus  
 the Sentence comes to nothing. For with-  
 out belying *Nature*, and contradicting what  
 is evident from *natural History, Fact*, and  
 the plain *Course of Things*, 'tis impossi-  
 ble to assent to this ill-natur'd Proposition,  
 when we have even done our best to make  
 tolerable sense of it. —— But such is Man-

\* VOL. I. pag. 88, and 118.

kind!

kind! And even here HUMAN NATURE Sect. 5. shews it-self, such as it is; not perfect, or ~~never~~<sup>absolutely</sup> successful, tho' rightly tending, and mov'd by proper and just Principles. 'Tis here, therefore, in *Philosophy*, as in the common *Conversations* of the World. As fond as Men are of *Company*, and as little able to enjoy any Happiness out of it, they are yet strangely addicted to the way of *Satir*. And in the same manner, as a *malicious Censure* craftily worded, and pronounced with Assurance, is apt to pass with Mankind for shread *WIT*; so a *virulent Maxim* in bold Expressions, tho' without any *Justness* of Thought, is readily receiv'd for *true PHILOSOPHY*.

## S E C T. V.

**I**N these Discourses the Evening ended; and Night advancing, we return'd home from our Walk. At Supper, and afterwards for the rest of that Night, THEOCLES said little. The Discourse was now manag'd chiefly by the *two Companions*, who turn'd it upon a new sort of Philosophy; such as you will excuse me (good PALEMON!) if I pass over with more haste.

THERE was much said, and with great *Miracles*. Learning, on the Nature of *Spirits* and *Prodigies*. *Apparitions*; of which, the most astonishing

Part 2. Accounts were the most ravishing with  
our Friends : who endeavour'd to exceed  
one another in this admirable way ; and  
perform'd to a miracle in raising one another's Amazement. Nothing was so charm-  
ing with them, as that which was disagree-  
ing and odd : nothing so soothing, as that  
which mov'd Horror. In short, what-  
ever was rational, plain, and easy, bore no  
relish ; and nothing came amiss which was  
cross to Nature, out of Sort and Order,  
and in no Proportion or Harmony with  
the rest of Things. *Monstrous Births, Pro-  
digies, Inchantments, Elementary Wars, and  
Convulsions*, were our chief Entertainment.  
One wou'd have thought that in a kind  
of Rivalship between PROVIDENCE and  
NATURE, the latter *Lady* was made to  
appear as homely as possible ; that her De-  
formitys might recommend and set off the  
Beautys of *the former*. For to do our  
Friends Justice, I must own I thought their  
Intention to be sincerely *religious*. But  
this was not a Face of Religion I was like  
to be enamour'd with. It was not from  
hence I fear'd being made *enthusiastick*, or  
*superstitious*. If ever I became so, I found  
it wou'd rather be after THEOCLES's  
manner. The Monuments and Church-yards  
were not such powerful Scenes with me,  
as the Mountains, the Plains, the solemn  
Woods and Groves ; of whose Inhabitants  
I chose much rather to hear, than of  
the

the other. And I was readier to fancy *Sect. 5:*  
 Truth in those poetical Fictions which  
 THEOCLES made use of, than in any of  
 his Friends ghastly Storys, so pompously  
 set off, after the usual way, in a lofty Tone  
 of Authority, and with an assuming Air  
 of Truth.

You may imagine, PALEMON, that *Scepticism.*  
 my \* *Scepticism*, with which you so often  
 reproach me, cou'd not well forsake me  
 here: Nor cou'd it fail to give disturbance  
 to our Companions, especially to the grave  
 Gentleman, who had clash'd with me some  
 time before. He bore with me a-while;  
 till having lost all patience, One must cer-  
 tainly, said he, be Master of no small share  
 of Assurance, to hold out against the com-  
 mon Opinion of the World, and deny  
 things which are known by the Report of  
 the most considerable part of Mankind.

THIS, said I, is far from being my  
 case. You have never yet heard me deny  
 any thing; tho' I have question'd many.  
 If I suspend my Judgment, 'tis because I  
 have less Sufficiency than others. There  
 are People, I know, who have so great a  
 regard to every Fancy of *their own*, that  
 they can believe their very *Dreams*. But

\* VOL. III. pag. 71, 2, 3, 4, 5, &c. And 241, 2, 3, 4.  
 And 316, 17, &c.

Part 2. I who cou'd never pay any such deference  
to my *sleeping Fancys*, am apt sometimes  
to question even my *waking Thoughts*, and  
examine, " Whether these are not *Dreams*  
too ;" since Men have a Faculty of dream-  
ing sometimes with their Eyes open. You  
will own, 'tis no small pleasure with Man-  
kind to make their *Dreams* pass for *Reali-  
tys* ; and that the *Love of Truth* is, in ear-  
nest, not half so prevalent as this *Passion*  
for *Novelty* and *Surprize*, join'd with a *De-  
sire of making Impression*, and *being admir'd*.  
However, I am so charitable still, as to  
think there is more of innocent *Delusion*  
*Imposture*. than voluntary *Imposture* in the World :  
and that they who have most impos'd on  
Mankind, have been happy in a certain Fa-  
culty of imposing first upon themselves ;  
by which they have a kind of Salvo for  
their Consciences, and are so much the  
more successful, as they can act their Part  
more naturally, and *to the life*. Nor is it  
to be esteem'd a Riddle, that Mens Dreams  
shou'd sometimes have the good fortune  
of passing with 'em for Truth ; when we  
consider, that in some Cafes, that which  
was never so much as *dreamt of*, or related  
as *Truth*, comes afterwards to be believ'd by  
one who has often told it.

So that the greatest *Impostor* in the  
World, reply'd he, at this rate may be al-  
low'd *sincere*.

As

As to the *main* of his Imposture, said I, *Imposture.* perhaps he may; notwithstanding some pious Frauds made use of between whiles, in behalf of a Belief thought good and wholesom. And so very natural do I take this to be, that in all Religions, except the true, I look upon the greatest Zeal to be accompany'd with the strongest Inclination to deceive. For the Design and End being *the Truth*, 'tis not customary to hesitate or be scrupulous about the Choice of Means. Whether this be true or no, I appeal to the Experience of the last Age: in which 'twill not be difficult to find very remarkable Examples, where *Imposture* and *Zeal*, *Bigotry* and *Hypocrisy* have liv'd together, in one and the same *Character*.

LET this be as it will, reply'd he, I am sorry, upon the whole, to find you of such an *incredulous Temper*.

'TIS just, said I, that you shou'd pity me as a Sufferer, for losing that Pleasure which I see others enjoy. For what stronger Pleasure is there with Mankind, or what do they earlier learn, or longer retain, than *the Love of hearing and relating Wonders*? How wonderful a thing is *the Love of wondering*, and of raising *Wonder*! 'Tis the Delight of Children to hear Tales they shiver at, and

Part 2. the Vice of Old Age to abound in strange  
 ~~~~~ Storys of Times past. We come into the  
^{Wonder-} World wondering at every thing ; and
 when our Wonder about common things is
 over, we seek something new to wonder at.
 Our last Scene is to tell Wonders of *our
 own*, to all who will believe 'em. And a-
 midst all this, 'tis well if T R U T H comes
 off, but moderately tainted.

'Tis well, reply'd he, if with this *mod-
 erate FAITH* of yours, you can believe
 any *Miracles* whatever.

No matter, said I, how incredulous I
 am of *modern Miracles*, if I have a right
 Faith in those of *former Times*, by paying
 the deference due to sacred Writ. 'Tis
^{Credulity.} here Lam so much warn'd against *Credulity*, and enjoin'd never to believe even the
 greatest Miracles which may be wrought,
 in opposition to what has been already
 taught me. And this Injunction I am so
 well fitted to comply with, that I can
 safely engage to keep still in the same *Faith*,
 and promise *never to believe amiss*.

BUT is this *a Promise* which can well
 be made ?

I F not, and that my Belief indeed does
 not absolutely depend upon my self, how
 am I accountable for it ? I may be justly
 punish'd

punish'd for Actions, in which my Will is Sect. 5.
free : but with what justice can I be chal-~~~~~
leng'd for my Belief, if in this I am not at
my liberty ? If Credulity and Incredulity
are Defects only in the Judgment ; and
the best-meaning Person in the world may
err on either side, whilst a much worse
Man, by having better Parts, may judg
far better of the Evidence of things : how
can you punish him who errs, unless you
wou'd punish *Weakness*, and say, 'tis just
for Men to suffer for their Unhappiness,
and not their Fault ?

I AM apt to think, said he, that very
few of those who are punish'd for their
Incredulity, can be said to be Sufferers for
their *Weakness*.

TAKING it for granted then, reply'd
I, that *Simplicity* and *Weakness* is more the
Character of the *Credulous* than of the *Un-*
believing ; yet I see not, but that even
this way still we are as liable to suffer by
our *Weakness*, as in the contrary Case by
an over-refin'd *Wit*. For if we cannot
command our own Belief, how are we
secure against those false Prophets, and
their deluding Miracles, of which we
have such Warning given us ? How are
we safe from Heresy and false Religion ?
Credulity being that which delivers us up
to all Impostures of this sort, and which
actually

Part 2. actually at this day hold the *Pagan* and
Mahometan World in Error and blind Su-
perstition. Either therefore there is no
Punishment due to wrong Belief, because
we *cannot* believe as we will our-selves ; or
if we *can*, why shou'd we not promise
never to believe amiss? Now in respect of
Miracles to come, the surest way never to
believe *amiss*, is never to believe *at all*.
For being satisfy'd of the Truth of our
Religion by past Miracles, so as to need
no other to confirm us ; the Belief of new
may often do us harm, but can never do
us good. Therefore as the truest Mark
of a believing Christian is to seek after
no Sign or Miracle to come ; so the safest
Station in Christianity is his, who can be
mov'd by nothing of this kind, and is
thus Miracle-proof. For if the *Miracle* be
on the side of his Faith, 'tis superfluous,
and he needs it not ; if against his Faith,
let it be as great as possible, he will ne-
ver regard it in the least, or believe it any
other than Imposture, tho coming from an
Angel. So that with all that *Incredulity*
for which you reproach me so severely, I
take my-self to be still the better and more
Orthodox Christian. At least I am more
sure of continuing so than you, who with
your Credulity may be impos'd upon by
such as are far short of *Angels*. For hav-
ing this preparatory Disposition, 'tis odds
you may come in time to believe Mi-
racles

racles in any of the different *Sects*, who, Sect. 5.
we know, all pretend to them. I am per-~~con-~~
suaded therefore, that the best Maxim to
go by, is that common one, "That *Mira-*
" *cles are ceas'd:*" And I am ready to de-
fend this Opinion of mine to be the most
probable in it-self, as well as most suitable
to Christianity.

THIS Question, upon further Debate,
happen'd to divide our *two* Companions.
For the elderly Gentleman, my Antago-
nist, maintain'd, "That the giving up of
" Miracles for the time present, wou'd be
" of great advantage to the Atheists."
The younger Gentleman, his Companion,
question'd, "Whether the allowing 'em
" might not be of as great advantage to
" the Enthusiasts and Sectarys, against
" the National Church: This of the two
" being the greatest Danger, he thought,
" both to Religion and the State." He
was resolv'd, therefore, for the future to
be as cautious in examining these modern
Miracles, as he had before been eager in
seeking 'em. He told us very pleasanly
what an Adventurer he had been of that
kind; and on how many Partys he had
been engag'd, with a sort of People who
were always on the hot Scent of some
new *Prodigy* or *Apparition*, some upstart
Revelation or *Prophecy*. This, he thought,
was

Part 2. was true *Fanaticism errant*. He had enough
Fanati- of this visionary Chace, and wou'd ramble
cism. no more in blind Corners of the World, as he had been formerly accustom'd, in ghostly Company of Spirit-hunters, Witch-finders, and Layers-out for hellish Storys and diabolical Transactions. There was no need, he thought, of such Intelligences from *Hell*, to prove the Power of *Heaven*, and Being of *a God*. And now at last he begun to see the Ridicule of laying such a stress on these Matters: As if *a Providence* depended on them, and *Religion* were at stake; when any of these wild Feats were question'd. He was sensible there were many good Christians who made themselves strong Partisans in this Cause; tho he cou'd not avoid wondring at it, now he began to consider, and look back.

THE HEATHENS, he said, who wanted Scripture, might have recourse to *Miracles*: And Providence perhaps had allow'd them their *Oracles* and *Prodigys*, as an imperfect kind of *Revelation*. The JEWS too, for their hard Heart, and harder Understanding, had this allowance; when stubbornly they ask'd for *Signs* and *Wonders*. But CHRISTIANS, for their parts, had a far better and truer *Revelation*; they had their plainer Oracles, a more rational Law, and clearer Scripture, carrying its own Force, and withal so well

well attested, as to admit of no dispute. Sect. 5.
And were I, continu'd he, to assign the exact
exact time when Miracles probably might
first have ceas'd, I shou'd be tempted to
fanfy it was when *Sacred Writ* took place,
and was compleated.

THIS is Fancy indeed, (reply'd the *Miracles*,
grave Gentleman) and a very dangerous ^{past,}
one to that Scripture you pretend is of it-
self so well attested. The Attestation of
Men dead and gone, in behalf of Miracles
past and at an end, can never surely
be of equal force with Miracles present:
And of these, I maintain, there are never
wanting a Number sufficient in the World
to warrant a *Divine Existence*. If there
were no Miracles now-a-days, the World
wou'd be apt to think there never were
any. The present must answer for the Cre-
dibility of the past. This is “GOD wit-^{Human}
nessing for himself;” not “Men for GOD.” ^{Testimony.}
For who shall witness for Men, if in the
Case of Religion they have no Testimony
from Heaven in their behalf?

WHAT it is may make the Report of
Men credible, (said the younger Gentle-
man) is another Question. But for mere
Miracles, it seems to me, they cannot be
properly said “To witness either for
GOD or Men.” For who shall witness
for the *Miracles* themselves? And what
tho

Part 2. tho they are ever so certain? What Security have we, that they are not acted by DÆMONS? What Proof that they are not wrought by *Magick*? In short, "What Trust is there to any thing above, or below, if the Signs are only of *Power*, and not of *Goodness*?"

AND are you so far improv'd then, reply'd the severe Companion, under your new *sceptical* Master, (pointing to me) that you can thus readily discard all Miracles, as useless?—

THE young Gentleman, I saw, was somewhat daunted with this rough Usage of his Friend; who was going on still with his Invective. Nay then (said I, interposing) 'tis I who am to answer for this young Gentleman, whom you make to be my Disciple. And since his Modesty, I see, will not allow him to pursue what he has so handfomly begun, I will endeavour it my-self, if he will give me leave.

THE young Gentleman assented; and I went on, representing his fair Intention of establishing in the first place a rational and just Foundation for *our Faith*; so as to vindicate it from the Reproach of having no immediate Miracles to support it. He wou'd have done this, I said, undoubtedly,

doubtedly, by shewing how good Proof Sect. 5.
 we had already for our *sacred Oracles*, *~~~~~*
 from the Testimony of the *Dead*; whose
 Characters and Lives might answer for
 them, as to the Truth of what they re-
 ported to us from God. This, however,
 was by no means "*Witnessing for GOD*,"
 as the zealous Gentleman had hastily ex-
 press'd himself. For this was above the
 reach either of Men, or Miracles. Nor
 cou'd God witness *for himself*, or assert his *Divine Testimony.*
 Being any other way to Men, than "By
 " revealing himself to their *Reason*, ap-
 " pealing to their *Judgment*, and submit-
 " ting his Ways to their *Censure*, and cool
 " *Deliberation.*" The Contemplation of
 the Universe, its Laws and Government,
 was, I aver'd, the only means which
 cou'd establish the *sound Belief* of a *DE-
 ITY*. For what tho' the innumerable *Miracles*
 from every part assail'd the Sense, and
 gave the trembling Soul no respite? What *Miracles*
 tho' the Sky shou'd suddenly open, and *no proof of
 Divinity.*
 all kinds of Prodigys appear, Voices be
 heard, or Characters read? What wou'd
 this evince more than "That there were
 " *certain POWERS* cou'd do all this?"
 But "What POWERS; Whether One, or
 " more; Whether Superior, or Subaltern;
 " Mortal, or Immortal; Wise, or Foolish;
 " Just, or Unjust; Good, or Bad:" this
 wou'd still remain a Mystery; as wou'd
 the true Intention, the Infallibility or Cer-
 tainty

Part 2. tainty of whatever *these Powers* asserted. Their Word cou'd not be taken in their own case. They might silence Men indeed, but not convince them : since " Power can never serve as Proof for " * *Goodness*; and *GOODNESS* is the only Pledg of *Truth.*" By *GOODNESS* alone, *Trust* is created. By *GOODNESS* *superior Powers* may win Belief. They must allow their Works to be examin'd, their Actions criticiz'd: And thus, *thus* only, they may be confid'd in ; " When by repeated Marks their *Benevolence* is prov'd, and their *Character* of *Sincerity* and *Truth* establish'd." To whom therefore the Laws of this Universe and its Government appear just and uniform ; to him they speak the Government of one *J U S T - O N E*; to him they *reveal* and witness a *G O D*: and laying in him the Foundation of this *first* Faith, they fit him for a † *subsequent One*. He can then hearken to *Historical Revelation*: and is then fitted, and not till then, for the reception of any *Message* or miraculous *Notice* from Above; where he knows beforehand all is just and true. But this, no Power of Miracles, nor any Power besides his *R E A S O N*, can make him know, or apprehend.

Revelation.

* VOL. I. p. 94. And VOL. III. p. 114.

† VOL. I. p. 298. And in this Volume, p. 269.

BUT

BUT now, continu'd I, since I have been thus long the *Defendent* only; I am resolv'd to take up *offensive* Arms, and be Aggressor in my turn; provided THEOCLES be not angry with me for borrowing Ground from his Hypothesis.

WHATEVER you borrow of his, reply'd my Antagonist, you are pretty sure of spoiling it: And as it paffes thro' your hands, you had best beware lest you seem rather to reflect on *Him* than *Me*.

I'LL venture it, said I; whilst I maintain that most of those Maxims you build upon, are fit only to betray your own Cause. For whilst you are labouring to unhinge Nature; whilst you are searching Heaven and Earth for Prodigys, and studying how to *miraculize* every thing; Atheism from Superstition. you bring Confusion on the World, you break its Uniformity, and destroy that admirable Simplicity of Order, from whence the ONE infinite and perfect Principle is known. Perpetual Strifes, Convulsions, Violences, Breach of Laws, Variation and Unsteddiness of Order, shew either no Controul, or several uncontroul'd and unsubordinate Powers in Nature. We have before our eyes either the *Chaos* and *Atoms* of the ATHEISTS, or the *Magick* and

Part 2. *Dæmons* of the POLYTHEISTS. Yet is
Atheism
~~from Su-~~
~~perception.~~ this tumultuous System of the Universe asserted with the highest Zeal by some who wou'd maintain a DEITY. This is that Face of Things, and these the Features by which they represent *Divinity*. Hither the Eyes of our more inquisitive and ingenuous Youth are turn'd with care, lest they see any thing otherwife than in this perplex'd and amazing View. As if *Atheism* were the most natural Inference which cou'd be drawn from a regular and orderly State of Things! But after all this mangling and disfigurement of *Nature*; if it happens, as oft it does, that the amaz'd Disciple coming to himself, and searching leisurely into *Nature's Ways*, finds more of *Order*, *Uniformity*, and *Constancy* in Things than he suspected; he is of course driven into *Atheism*: And this merely by the Impressions he receiv'd from that preposterous System, which taught him to seek for DEITY in *Confusion*, and to discover PROVIDENCE in *an irregular disjointed World*.

AND when you, reply'd he, with your newly-espous'd System, have brought all things to be as *uniform*, *plain*, *regular*, and *simple*, as you cou'd wish; I suppose you will send your Disciple to seek for DEITY in *Mechanism*; that is to say, in some exquisite System of *self-govern'd Matter*.
 For

For what else is it you Naturalists make of Sect. 5.
the World, than a mere *Machine*? 

NOTHING else, reply'd I, if to the Machine you allow *a Mind*. For in this case 'tis not a *Self-govern'd*, but a *God-govern'd* Machine.

AND what are the Tokens, said he, which shou'd convince us? What Signs shou'd this dumb *Machine* give of its being thus govern'd?

THE present, reply'd I, are sufficient. It cannot possibly give stronger Signs of Life and steddy Thought. Compare *our own Machines* with this *great-ONE*; and see, Whether by their Order, Management and Motions, they betoken either so perfect a Life, or so consummate an Intelligence. The *one* is regular, steddy, permanent; the *other* are irregular, variable, inconstant. In one there are the Marks of Wisdom and Determination; in the other, of Whimsy and Conceit: In one there appears Judgment; in the other, Fancy only: In one, Will; in the other, Caprice: In one, Truth, Certainty, Knowldg; in the other, Error, Folly, and Madnes. — — — But to be convinc'd there is something above, which thinks and acts, we want, it seems, the *latter* of these Signs; as supposing there can be no

Part 2. Thought or Intelligence beside what is like *our own*. We ficken and grow weary with the orderly and regular Course of Things. Periods, and stated Laws, and Revolutions just and proportionable, work not upon us, nor win our Admiration. We must have Riddles, Prodigys, Matter for Surprize and Horror! By Harmony, Order and Concord, we are made *Atheists*: By Irregularity and Discord, *we are convinc'd of DEITY!* "The World is " mere Accident, if it proceeds in Course; " but an Effect of Wisdom, if it runs " mad!"

THUS I took upon me the part of a found THEIST, whilst I endeavour'd to refute my Antagonist, and shew that his Principles favour'd *Atheism*. The zealous Gentleman took high Offence: And we continu'd debating warmly, till late at night. But THEOCLES was Moderator: And we retir'd at last to our Repose, all calm and friendly. However, I was not a little rejoic'd to hear that our Companions were to go away early the next Morning, and leave THEOCLES to me alone.

FOR now (PALEMON!) that Morning was approaching, for which I so much long'd. What your Longing may prove,

I may have reason to fear. You have had Sect. 5. enough, one wou'd think, to turn the ~~the~~ edge of your Curiosity in this kind. Can it be imagin'd, that after the Recital of *Two* such Days already past, you can with patience hear of *Another* yet to come, more Philosophical than either?—But you have made me promise; and now, whate'er it cost, take it you must, as follows.

P A R T III.

PHILOCLES to PALEMON.

IT was yet deep Night, as I imagin'd, when I wak'd with the noise of People up in the House. I call'd to know the matter; and was told that THEOCLES had a little before parted with his Friends; after which he went out to take his Morning-Walk, but wou'd return, they thought, pretty soon: For so he had left word; and that no-body in the mean time shou'd disturb my Rest.

THIS was Disturbance sufficient, when I heard it. I presently got up; and finding it light enough to see the Hill, which was at a little distance from the House, I soon got thither; and at the foot of it, overtook THEOCLES; to whom I complain'd of his Unkindness. For I was not certainly, I told him, so effeminate and weak a *Friend*, as to deserve that he shou'd treat

treat me like a *Woman*: Nor had I shown Sect. 1. such an Aversion to his Manners or Conversation, as to be thought fitter for the dull Luxury of a soft Bed and Ease, than for Busines, Recreation, or Study with an early Friend. He had no other way therefore of making me amends, than by allowing me henceforward to be a Party with him in his *serious Thoughts*, as he saw I was resolv'd to be in his *Hours* and *Exercises* of this fort.

Y
OU have forgot then, said THEOCLES, the Asignation you had yesterday with the *Silvan Nymphs* at this Place and Hour? No, truly, said I: For, as you see, I am come punctually to the Place appointed. But I never expected you shou'd have come hither without me. Nay then, said THEOCLES, there's hope you may in time become a Lover with me: for you already begin to shew *Jealousy*. How little did I think these *Nymphs* cou'd raise that Paſſion in you? Truly, said I, for the *Nymphs* you mention, I know little of 'em as yet. My Jealousy and Love regard *You* only. I was afraid you had a mind to escape me. But now that I am again in possession of you, I want no *Nymph* to make me happy here; unless it were perhaps to join Forces against you, in the manner your belov'd Poet makes the *Nymph* *ÆGLE*

Part 3. join with his two Youths, in forcing the
~~~~ God SILENUS to sing to 'em.

I DARE trust your Gallantry, reply'd THEOCLES, that if you had such fair Company as you speak of, you wou'd otherwise bestow your time than in an Adventure of *Philosophy*.—But do you expect I shou'd imitate the Poet's God you mention'd, and sing "The Rise of " Things from Atoms; the Birth of Or- " der from Confusion; and the Origin of " Union, Harmony, and Concord, from the " sole Powers of CHAOS, and blind " Chance?" The Song indeed was fitted to the God. For what cou'd better suit his jolly Character, than such a drunken Creation; which he lov'd often to celebrate, by acting it to the life? But even this Song was too harmonious for the Night's Debauch. Well has our Poet made it of the Morning, when the God was fresh: For hardly shou'd we be brought ever to believe that such harmonious Numbers cou'd arise from a mere Chaos of the Mind. But we must hear our Poet speaking in the Mouth of some soberer Demi-God or Hero. He then presents us with a different Principle of Things, and in a more proper Order of Precedency, gives Thought the upper hand. He makes MIND originally to have govern'd Body; not BODY Mind: For this had

had been a C H A O S everlasting, and must Sect. 1.  
have kept all things in a *Chaos-State* to ~~the~~ this day, and for ever, had it ever been.  
But,

*The active M I N D, infus'd thro' all the  
Space,  
Unites and mingles with the mighty Mass:  
Hence Men and Beasts.—*

HERE, PHILOCLES, we shall find our *sovereign Genius*; if we can charm the *Genius* of the Place (more chaste and sober than your SILENUS) to inspire us with a truer Song of Nature, teach us some celestial Hymn, and make us feel *Divinity* present in these solemn Places of Retreat.

HASTE then, I conjure you, said I, good THEOCLES, and stop not one moment for any Ceremony or Rite. For well I see, methinks, that without any such Preparation, some *Divinity* has approach'd us, and already moves in you. We are come to the sacred Groves of the *Hamadryads*, which formerly were said to render Oracles. We are on the most beautiful part of the Hill; and the Sun, now ready to rise, draws off the Curtain of Night, and shews us the open Scene of Nature in the Plains below. Begin: For now I know you are full of those Di-

vine

Part 3.vine Thoughts which meet you ever in  
 ~~~~~ this Solitude. Give 'em but Voice and Accents : You may be still as much *alone* as you are us'd, and take no more notice of me than if I were absent.

JUST as I had said this, he turn'd away his Eyes from me, musing a-while by himself : and soon afterwards, stretching out his Hand, as pointing to the Objects round him, he began.

*Medita-
tion.*

" Y E Fields and Woods, my Refuge
 " from the toilsome World of Busines, re-
 " ceive me in your quiet Sanctuaries, and
 " favour my Retreat and thoughtful Soli-
 " tude.—Ye verdant Plains, how glad-
 " ly I salute ye!—Hail all ye blissful
 " Mansions ! Known Seats ! Delightful
 " Prospects ! Majestick Beautys of this
 " Earth, and all ye Rural Powers and
 " Graces !—Bles'd be ye chaste Abodes
 " of happiest Mortals, who here in peace-
 " ful Innocence enjoy a Life un-envy'd,
 " tho Divine ; whilst with its bles'd Tran-
 " quillity it affords a happy Leisure and
 " Retreat for Man ; who, made for Con-
 " templation, and to search his own and
 " other Natures, may here best meditate
 " the Cause of Things ; and plac'd amidst
 " the various Scenes of Nature, may nearer
 " view her Works.

" O

“ O GLORIOUS *Nature* ! supremely
“ Fair, and sovereignly Good ! All-lov-
“ ing and All-lovely, All-divine ! Whose
“ Looks are so becoming, and of such
“ infinite Grace ; whose Study brings
“ such Wisdom, and whose Contempla-
“ tion such Delight ; whose every single
“ Work affords an ampler Scene, and is
“ a nobler Spectacle than all which ever
“ Art presented ! — O mighty *Nature* !
“ Wise Substitute of *Providence* ! impow-
“ er'd *Creatress* ! Or Thou empowering
“ DEITY, supreme Creator ! Thee I in-
“ voke, and Thee alone adore. To thee
“ this Solitude, this Place, these Rural
“ Meditations are sacred ; whilst thus in-
“ spir'd with Harmony of Thought, tho
“ unconfin'd by Words, and in loose Num-
“ bers, I sing of Nature's Order in crea-
“ ted Beings, and celebrate the Beautys
“ which resolve in Thee, the Source
“ and Principle of all Beauty and Per-
“ fection.

“ THY Being is boundless, unsearch-
“ able, impenetrable. In thy Immensity
“ all Thought is lost ; Fancy gives o'er its
“ Flight : and weary'd Imagination spends
“ it-self in vain ; finding no Coast nor Li-
“ mit of this Ocean, nor in the widest
“ Tract thro' which it soars, one Point
“ yet nearer the Circumference than the
“ first

Part 3. " first Center whence it parted.—Thus
 having oft essay'd, thus fally'd forth in-
Medita-
 " to the wide *Expanse*, when I return again
 " within *my-self*, struck with the Sense of
 " this so narrow Being, and of the Fulness
 " of that Immense-one; I dare no more
 " behold the amazing Depths, nor found
 " the Abyss of DEITY.—

" Y E T since by Thee (O *Sovereign*
 " MIND !) I have been form'd such as I
 " am, intelligent and rational; since the
 " peculiar Dignity of my Nature is to
 " know and contemplate Thee; permit
 " that with due freedom I exert those Fa-
 " cultys with which thou hast adorn'd
 " me. Bear with my ventrous and bold
 " Approach. And since nor vain Curiosi-
 " ty, nor fond Conceit, nor Love of ought
 " save Thee alone, inspires me with such
 " Thoughts as these, be thou my Assistant,
 " and guide me in this Pursuit; whilst I
 " venture thus to tread the Labyrinth of
 " wide Nature, and endeavour to trace
 " thee in thy Works."—

HERE he stop'd short, and starting,
 as out of a Dream; Now, PHILOCLES,
 said he, inform me, How have I ap-
 pear'd to you in my Fit? Seem'd it a
 sensible kind of Madness, like those Trans-
 ports

ports which are permitted to our Poets ? Sect. I.
or was it downright Raving ?



I ONLY wish, said I, that you had been a little stronger in your Transport, to have proceeded as you began, without ever minding me. For I was beginning to see Wonders in that *Nature* you taught me, and was coming to know the Hand of your divine *Artificer*. But if you stop here, I shall lose the Enjoyment of the pleasing Vision. And already I begin to find a thousand Difficultys in fansyng such a *Universal Genius* as you describe.

WHY, said he, is there any difficulty *Unity*. in fansyng the Universe to be *One Intire Thing*? Can one otherwise think of it, by what is visible, than that All hangs together, as of a *Piece*? Grant it: And what follows? Only this; that if it may indeed be said of the World, "That "it is simply *One*," there shou'd be something belonging to it which makes it *One*. As how? No otherwise than as you may observe in every thing. For to instance in what we see before us; I know you look upon the *Trees* of this vast Wood to be different from one another: And this tall *Oak*, the noblest of the Company, as it is by it-self a different thing from all its Fellows of the Wood, so with its own Wood of numerous spreading

Part 3.ing Branches (which seem *so many different TREES*) 'tis still, I suppose, one and *the Unity.* *self-same TREE.* Now shou'd you, as a mere Caviller, and not as a fair *Sceptick*, tell me that if a Figure of Wax, or any other Matter, were cast in the exact Shape and Colours of this Tree, and temper'd, if possible, to the same kind of Substance, it might therefore possibly be *a real Tree* of the same Kind or Species ; I wou'd have done with you, and reason no longer. But if you question'd me fairly, and desir'd I shou'd satisfy you what I thought it was which made this *Oneness* or *Sameness* in the Tree or any other Plant ; or by what it differ'd from the waxen Figure, or from any such Figure accidentally made, either in the Clouds, or on the Sand by the Sea-shore ; I shou'd tell you, that neither the *Wax*, nor *Sand*, nor *Cloud* thus piec'd together by our Hand or Fancy, had any real relation within themselves, or had any Nature by which they corresponded any more in that near Situation of Parts, than if scatter'd ever so far asunder. But this I shou'd affirm, " That wherever there was such a *Sympathizing of Parts*, as we saw here, in our *real TREE* ; Wherever there was such a plain Concurrency in one common End, and to the Support, Nourishment, and Propagation of so fair a Form ; we cou'd not be mistaken in saying there was a peculiar

" Nature belonging to this *Form*, and com- Sect. 1.
" mon to it with others of the same
" kind." By virtue of this, our Tree is
a real *Tree*; lives, flourishes, and is still
One and the same; even when by Vegeta-
tion and change of Substance, not one
Particle in it remains *the same*.

AT this rate indeed, said I, you have found a way to make very adorable Places of these *Silvan* Habitations. For besides the living *Genius* of each Place, the Woods too, which, by your account, are animated, have their *Hamadryads*, no doubt, and the Springs and Rivulets their *Nymphs* in store belonging to 'em: And these too, by what I can apprehend, of immaterial and immortal Substances.

WE injure 'em then, reply'd THEOCLES, to say " *they belong to these Trees*;" and not rather " *these Trees to them*." But as for their *Immortality*, let them look to it themselves. I only know, that both *theirs* and all other *Natures* must for their Duration depend alone on *that Nature* on which the World depends: And that every *Genius* else must be subordinate to that *One good GENIUS*, whom I wou'd willingly persuade you to think *belonging to this World*, according to our present way of speaking.

LEAVING,

Part 3.

*Personality.**Self.*

LEAVING, therefore, these Trees, continu'd he, to personate themselves the best they can, let us examine this thing of *Personality* between you and me; and consider how you, PHILOCLES, are *You*, and I'm *My-self*. For that there is a Sympathy of Parts in these Figures of ours, other than in those of *Marble* form'd by a PHIDIAS or PRAXITELES; Sense, I believe, will teach us. And yet that our own *Marble*, or *Stuff*, (whate'er it be, of which we are compos'd) wears out in seven, or, at the longest, in twice seven Years, the meanest Anatomist can tell us. Now where, I beseech you, will that same *One* be found at last, supposing it to lie in the *Stuff* it-self, or any part of it? For when that is wholly spent, and not one Particle of it left, we are *Our-selves* still as much as before.

WHAT you Philosophers are, reply'd I, may be hard perhaps to determine: But for the rest of Mankind, I dare affirm, that few are so long themselves as *half* seven Years. 'Tis good fortune if a Man be *one and the same* only for a day or two. A Year makes more Revolutions than can be number'd.

TRUE, said he: But tho' this may happen to a Man, and chiefly to one whose contrary

contrary Vices set him at odds so often Sect. I.
 with himself ; yet when he comes to suffer, or be punish'd for those Vices, he finds himself, if I mistake not, still *one and the same*. And you (PHILOCLES !) who, tho' you disown Philosophy, are yet so true a Proselyte to *Pyrrhonism* ; shou'd you at last, feeling the Power of the G E N I U S I preach, be wrought upon to own the divine Hypothesis, and from this new *Identity* : Turn of Thought admit a total Change in all your Principles and Opinions ; yet wou'd you be still the self-same PHILOCLES : tho' better yet, if you will take my Judgment, than the present-one, as much as I love and value him. You see therefore, there is a strange Simplicity in this Y O U and M E, that in reality they shou'd be still *one and the same*, when neither *one Atom* of Body, *one Passion*, nor *one Thought* remains the same. And for that poor Endeavour of making out this *Sameness* or *Identity* of Being, from some self-same Matter, or Particle of Matter, ^{Matter.} suppos'd to remain with us when all besides is chang'd ; this is by so much the more contemptible, as that *Matter* it-self is not really capable of such Simplicity. For I dare answer, you will allow this *You* and *Me* to be each of us simply and individually *One*, better than you can allow the same to any thing of mere Matter ; unless, quitting your Inclination for *Scepticism*,

Part 3. *ticism*, you fall so in love with the Notion
 of an A T O M , as to find it full as intelligible and certain to you, as that *You* are
 Y O U R - S E L F .

BUT whatever, continu'd THEOCLES,
 be suppos'd of *uncompounded Matter*, (a Thing, at best, pretty difficult to conceive) yet being compounded, and put together in a certain number of such Parts
^{Form.} as unite and conspire in these Frames of ours, and others like them ; if it can present us with so many innumerable Instances of particular Forms, who share this simple Principle, by which they are really *One*,
^{A Genius.} live, act, and have a *Nature* or *Genius* peculiar to themselves, and provident for their own Welfare ; how shall we at the same time overlook this in the *Whole*, and deny the Great and General-*ONE* of the World ? How can we be so unnatural as to disown divine Nature, our common Parent, and refuse to recognize the *universal* and *sovereign GENIUS* ?
^{The Supreme One.}

SOVEREIGNS, said I, require no *Notice* to be taken of 'em, when they pass *incognito*, nor any *Homage* where they appear not in *due Form*. We may even have reason to presume they shou'd be displeas'd with us for being too officious, in endeavouring to discover them, when they keep themselves either wholly invisible, or in

in very dark disguise. As for the *Notice* *Sect. I.* we take of these *invisible Powers* in the common way of our Religion, we have our *visible Sovereigns* to answer for us. Our lawful Superiors teach us what we are to *own*, and to *perform*, in Worship. And we are dutiful in complying with them, and following their Example. But in a philosophical way, I find no warrant for our being such earnest Recognizers of a controverted Title. However it be, you must allow one at least to understand the Controversy, and know the Nature of these *Powers* describ'd. May one not inquire, "What *Substances* they are of? whether *material* or *immaterial*?"

*Substance
Material,
Immate-
rial.*

MAY one not, on the other hand, reply'd THEOCLES, inquire as well, "What *Substance*, or which of these two *Substances* you count your real and proper *SELF.*" Or wou'd you rather be *no Substance*, but chuse to call your-self a *Mode* or *Accident*?

TRULY, said I, as accidental as my Life may be, or as that random Humour is, which governs it; I know nothing, after all, so *real* or *substantial* as *MYSELF*. Therefore if there be that Thing you call *a Substance*, I take for granted I am one. But for any thing further relating to this Question, you know my

Part 3. *Sceptick Principles*: I determine neither
 ~~~~~ way.

ALLOW me then, reply'd he (good PHILOCLES!) the same Privilege of *Scepticism* in this respect; since it concerns not the Affair before us, Which way we determine, or Whether we come to any Determination at all in this point. For be the Difficulty ever so great; it stands the same, you may perceive, against *your own Being*, as against *that* which I am pretending to convince you of. You may raise what Objections you please on either hand; and your Dilemma may be of notable force against the manner of such a supreme Being's Existence. But after you have done all, you will bring the same Dilemma home to you, and be at a loss still about *YOUR-SELF*.

*Metaphysics.* When you have argu'd ever so long upon these Metaphysical Points of *Mode* and *Substance*, and have philosophically concluded from the Difficultys of each Hypothesis, "That "there cannot be in Nature such a *Universal-One* as *This*;" you must conclude, *A Mind.* from the same Reasons, "That there "cannot be any such *particular One* as "Your-self." But that there is actually such a one as *this latter*, your own Mind, 'tis hop'd, may satisfy you. And of this *Mind* 'tis enough to say, "That it is some- "thing which *acts* upon a Body, and has "some-

" something *pensive* under it, and subject Sect. i.  
 " to it : That it has not only *Body* or mere *matter*  
 " *Matter* for its Subject, but in some re-  
 " spect even *it-self* too, and what pro-  
 " ceeds from it : That it superintends and  
 " manages its own *Imaginations*, *Appearan-*  
 " *ces*, *Fancies*; correcting, working, and  
 " modelling these, as it finds good ; and  
 " adorning and accomplishing, the best it  
 " can, this composite Order of Body and  
 " Understanding." Such a MIND and  
 governing Part, I know there is somewhere  
 in the World. Let PYRRHO, by the  
 help of such another, contradict me, if he  
 pleases. We have our several Understand- *Particular*  
 ings and Thoughts, however we came by *Minds*.  
 'em. Each understands and thinks the  
 best he can for his own purpose : He  
 for *Himself*; I for another *Self*. And  
 who, I beseech you, for the WHOLE ?  
 — No-one ? Nothing at all ? — The  
 World, perhaps, you suppose to be mere *Body*: A Mass of *modify'd Matter*. The  
 Bodys of Men are part therefore of this  
*Body*. The Imaginations, Sensations, Ap-  
 prehensions of Men are included in this  
*Body*, and inherent in it, produc'd out of  
 it, and resum'd again into it ; tho' the  
*Body*, it seems, never dreams of it ! The  
 WORLD *it-self* is never the wiser for all  
 the Wit and Wisdom it breeds ! It has  
 no Apprehension at all of what is doing ;  
 no Thought kept to *it-self*, for its own

Part 3. proper use, or purpose ; not a single Imagination or Reflection, by which to discover or be conscious of the manifold Imaginations and Inventions which it sets a-foot, and deals abroad with such an open hand ! The goodly Bulk so prolifick, kind, and yielding for every-one else, has nothing left at last for its own share ; having unhappily lavish'd all away ! — By what Chance I wou'd fain understand. “ How ? ” or by what necessity ? — Who gives the “ Law ? — Who orders and distributes “ thus ? ” NATURE, say you.

*Nature.* And what is Nature ? Is it Sense ? Is it a Person ? Has *she* Reason or Understanding ? No. Who then understands for her, or is interested or concern'd in her behalf ? No-one ; not a Soul ; But *Every one for himself*.

COME on then. Let us hear further, Is not this *Nature* still a SELF ? Or, tell me, I beseech you, How are You *one* ? By what Token ? Or by virtue of What ?

“ By a Principle which joins certain Parts, and which thinks and acts consonantly for the Use and Purpose of those Parts.” Say, therefore, What is your whole System a Part of ? Or is it, indeed, no Part, but a Whole, by *it-self*, absolute, independent, and unrelated to any thing besides ? If it be indeed a Part, and really related ; to what else, I beseech

befeech you, than to *the Whole of N A-Sect. 1.*  
 TURE ? Is there then such a *uniting Prin-*  
*inciple in NATURE?* If so, how are you <sup>Nature</sup>  
 then a *Self*, and *Nature* not so ? How <sup>subject to</sup>  
 a *Mind*. have you something to understand and act  
 for you, and NATURE, who gave this  
 Understanding, nothing at all to under-  
 stand for her, advise her, or help her out  
 (poor Being !) on any occasion, whatever  
 Necessity she may be in ? Has the WORL D  
 such ill fortune *in the main* ? Are there so  
 many *particular* understanding active Prin-  
 ciples every where ? And is there No-  
 thing, at last, which thinks, acts, or un-  
 derstands for *All* ? Nothing which admi-  
 nisters or looks after *All* ?

No (says one of a modern Hypothesis) <sup>Contrary Belief.</sup>  
 for the WORL D was from Eternity, as  
 you see it ; and is no more than barely  
 what you see : " *Matter modify'd* ; *a Lump*  
 " *in motion, with here and there a Thought,*  
 " *or scatter'd Portion of dissoluble Intelli-*  
 " *gence.*" — No (says one of an antienter  
 er Hypothesis) for the World was once  
 without any Intelligence or Thought at  
 all ; " *Mere Matter, Chaos, and a Play of* <sup>Two sorts.</sup>  
 " *Atoms* ; till *Thought*, by chance, came  
 " *into play, and made up a Harmony*  
 " *which was never design'd, or thought*  
 " *of.*" — Admirable Conceit ! — Believe <sup>Faith of</sup>  
 it who can. For my own share (thank <sup>Atheism.</sup>  
 Providence) I have a MIND in my  
 Z 4 possession,

Part 3. possession, which serves, such as it is, to  
 keep my Body and its Affections, my Passions, Appetites, Imaginations, Fancys, and the rest, in tolerable *Harmony* and *Order*. But the *Order of the UNIVERSE*, I am persuaded still, is much the better of the two. Let EPICURUS, if he please, think his *the better*; and believing no Genius or *Wisdom* above his own, inform us by what Chance 'twas dealt him, and how *Atoms* came to be so wise.

*Faith of Theism.*

IN fine, continu'd THEOCLES (raising his Voice and Action) being thus, even by *Scepticism* it-self, convinc'd the more still of my own Being, and of this *Self* of mine,  
 " That 'tis a *real Self*, drawn out, and  
 " copy'd from another principal and *original* *SELF* (*the Great-one of the World*)  
 I endeavour to be really *one* with it, and conformable to it, as far as I am able. I consider, That as there is *one* general Mass, *one* Body of the Whole; so to this Body there is *an Order*, to this *Order* a MIND: That to this *general MIND* each *particular-one* must have relation; as being of like Substance, (as much as we can understand of *Substance*) alike active upon Body, original to Motion and Order; alike simple, uncompounded, individual; of like Energy, Effect, and Operation; and more like still, if it co-operates with it to general Good, and strives *to will* according

according to the best of *Wills*. So that Sect. I.  
it cannot surely but seem natural, " That the  
" the *particular MIND* shou'd seek its  
" Happiness in conformity with the *gene-*  
" *ral-one*, and endeavour to resemble it  
" in its highest Simplicity and Excel-  
" lence."

THEREFORE, Now, said I, good THEOCLES, be once again the *Enthusiast*; and let me hear a-new that divine Song with which I was lately charm'd. I am already got over my *Qualm*, and begin better than ever to fancy such a *Nature* as you speak of; insomuch that I find myself mightily in its Interest, and concern'd that all shou'd go happily and well with it. Tho at the rate it often runs, I can scarce help being in some pain on its account.

FEAR not, my Friend, reply'd he. For *Nature* <sup>Energy of</sup> certainly and constantly produces what is good to it-self; unless something *foreign* disturbs or hinders it, either by overpowering and corrupting it *within*, or by Violence *from without*. Thus *Nature* in the Patient struggles to the last, and strives to throw off the Distemper. Thus even in these Plants we see round us, every par-

Part 3. *particular NATURE* thrives, and attains its Perfection, if nothing from *without* obstructs it, nor any thing *foreign* has already impair'd or wounded it: And even in this case, it does its utmost still to redeem it-self. What are all Weaknesses, Distortions, Sickneses, imperfect Births, and the seeming Contradictions and Perversitys of Nature, other than of this sort? And how ignorant must one be of all natural Causes and Operations, to think that any of these Disorders happen by a Miscarriage of the *particular Nature*, and not by the Force of some *foreign Nature* which over-powers it? If therefore every *particular Nature* be thus constantly and unerringly *true* to it-self, and certain to produce only what is good for it-self, and conduced to its own right State; shall not the *general-one*, *The NATURE of the Whole*, do full as much? Shall *That* alone miscarry or fail? Or is there any thing *foreign*, which shou'd at any time do violence upon it, or force it out of its natural way? If not, then all it produces is to its own advantage and good; the *Good* of *All* in general: And what is for the good of all in general, is *Just* and *Good*.

*General Good.*

"Tis so, said I, I confess.

THEN you ought to rest satisfy'd, reply'd he; and not only so, but be pleas'd and

and rejoice at what happens, knowing Sect. 1.  
*whence* it comes, and to *what Perfection* *Refigna-*  
it contributes. *tion.*

BLESS me! said I, THEOCLES, into what a Superstition are you like to lead me! I thought it heretofore the Mark of a superstitious Mind, to search for Providence in the common Accidents of Life, and ascribe to the Divine Power those common Disasters and Calamitys which Nature has entail'd on Mankind. But now, I find, I must place all in general to one Account; and viewing things thro' a kind of Magical Glass, I am to see the worst of *Ills* transform'd to *Good*, and admire equally whatever comes from one and the same perfect Hand.—But no matter; I can surmount all. Go on, THEOCLES, and let me advise you in my own behalf, that since you have rekindled me, you do not by delaying give me time to cool again.

I wou'd have you know, reply'd he, I scorn to take the advantage of a warm Fit, and be beholden to Temper or Imagination for gaining me your Assent. Therefore ere I go yet a step farther, I am resolv'd to enter again into cool Reason with you; and ask, If you admit for Proof what I advanc'd yesterday upon that

Part 3. that head, " Of a Universal UNION,  
 ~~~~~ " Coherence, or Sympathizing of Things?"  
*Principle
of Order.*

BY Force of Probability, said I, you overcame me. Being convinc'd of a Consent and Correspondence in *all* we saw of Things, I consider'd it as *unreasonable* not to allow the same *thro'out*!

Why universal. UNREASONABLE indeed! reply'd he. For in the infinite *Residue*, were there no Principle of Union; it wou'd seem next to impossible, that things within our Sphere shou'd be consistent, and keep their Order. " For what was infinite, wou'd be " predominant."

It seems so.

TELL me then, said he, after this *Union* own'd, how you can refuse to allow the name of Demonstration to the remaining Arguments, which establish the Government of a perfect Mind.

Phænomena of Ill. YOUR Solutions, said I, of the ill *Appearances* are not perfect enough to pass for Demonstration. And whatever seems vicious or imperfect in the Creation, puts a stop to further Conclusions, till the thing be solv'd.

DID you not then, said he, agree with me, when I aver'd that the *Appearances* must

must of necessity stand as they are, and Sect. I. things seem altogether as imperfect, even ~~as~~ on the Concession of a perfect Supreme Mind existent?

I did so.

AND is not the same Reason good still? viz. "That in an infinity of Things, mutually relative, a Mind which sees not infinitely, can see nothing fully; and must whence, therefore frequently see that as imperfect, which in it-self is really perfect."

The Reason is still good.

ARE the Appearances, then, any Objection to our Hypothesis?

None, whilst they remain Appearances only.

CAN you then prove them to be any more? For if you cannot, you prove nothing. And that it lies on you *to prove*, you plainly see: since the Appearances do not only agree with the Hypothesis, but are a necessary Consequence from it. To bid me *prove*, therefore, in this case, is, in a manner, the same as to bid me *be infinite*. For nothing beside what is *infinite* can see *infinite Connexions*.

THE Presumption, I must confess, said I, by this reckoning, is wholly on your side. Yet still this is only *Presumption*.

TAKE

Part 3.

Demonstration. TAKE Demonstration then, said he, if you can endure I shou'd reason thus abstractedly and drily. The Appearances of ILL, you say, are not necessarily that ILL they represent to you.

I own it.

THEREFORE what they represent may possibly be GOOD.

It may.

AND therefore there may possibly be no *real* ILL in things: but all may be perfectly concurrent to one Interest; the Interest of that Universal ONE.

It may be so.

WHY, then, if it may be so, (be not surpriz'd) " It follows that it must be so ;" on the account of that great *Unit*, and simple *Self-principle*, which you have granted in the WHOLE. For whatever is possible in the Whole, the Nature or Mind of the Whole will put in execution for the Whole's Good: And if it be possible to exclude ILL, it will exclude it. Therefore since notwithstanding the Appearances, 'tis possible that ILL may actually be excluded; count upon it, " That actually it is excluded." For nothing merely *passive* can oppose this universally *active* Principle. If any thing

active oppose it, 'tis *another Principle*.

Allow it.

Sect. I.
~~~~~  
Mani-  
cheism.

'Tis impossible. For were there in Nature *Two* or more Principles, either they must agree, or not. If they agree not, all must be Confusion, till one be predominant. If they agree, there must be some natural Reason for their Agreement; and this natural Reason cannot be from *Chance*, but from some particular *Design*, *Contrivance*, or *Thought*: which brings us up again to ONE Principle, and makes the other *two* to be subordinate. And thus when we have compar'd each of the *Three* Opinions, viz. "That *there* <sup>Conclusion.</sup> *is no designing active Principle*; That *there is more than one*;" or, "That *nally there is but ONE*;" we shall perceive, that the only consistent Opinion is *the last*. And since *one* or *other* of these Opinions must of necessity be true; what can we determine, other than that the *last* is, and must be so, demonstrably? if it be Demonstration "That in *Three Opinions*, *One* of which must necessarily be *true*, *Two* being plainly absurd, the *Third* *must be the Truth*."

ENOUGH, said I, THEOCLES. My Doubts are vanish'd. MALICE and CHANCE (vain *Phantoms!*) have yielded to that *all-prevalent WISDOM* which you have

Part 3. have establish'd. You are Conqueror in  
 the cool way of *Reason*, and may with  
 Honour now grow warm again, in your  
*poetick Vein*. Return therefore, I intreat  
 you, once more, to that *Perfection of Being* ; and address your-self to it as before,  
 on our Approaches to these Silvan Scenes,  
 where first it seem'd to inspire you. I  
 shall now no longer be in danger of ima-  
 gining either *Magick* or *Superstition* in the  
 case ; since you invoke no other P O W E R  
 than that single O N E, which seems so  
 natural.

*Medita-  
tion.*

THUS I continue then, said THEOCLES, addressing my-self, as you wou'd have me, to that *Guardian-Deity* and *Inspirer*, whom we are to imagine present here; but not *here* only. For, " O migh-  
 ty G E N I U S ! Sole-animating and in-  
 spiring Power ! Author and Subject of  
 these Thoughts ! Thy Influence is uni-  
 versal : and in all Things, thou art in-  
 most. From Thee depend their secret  
 Springs of Action. Thou mov'it them  
 with an irresistible unwear'y'd Force,  
 by sacred and inviolable *Laws*, fram'd  
 for the Good of each particular Being ;  
 as best may sute with the Perfection,  
 Life, and Vigour of the *Whole*. The  
 vital Principle is widely shar'd, and in-  
 finitely vary'd : dispers'd thro'out ; no-  
 where

“ where extinct. All lives ; and by Suc- Sect. I.  
“ cession still revives. The temporary U  
“ Beings quit their borrow'd Forms, and  
“ yield their elementary Substance to  
“ New-Comers. Call'd, in their several  
“ turns, to Life, they view the Light,  
“ and viewing pass ; that others too may  
“ be Spectators of the goodly Scene, and  
“ greater numbers still enjoy the Privilege  
“ of NATURE. Munificent and Great,  
“ she imparts her-self to most ; and makes  
“ the Subjects of her Bounty infinite.  
“ Nought stays her hastning Hand. No  
“ Time nor Substance is lost or un-im-  
“ prov'd. New Forms arise : and when  
“ the old dissolve, the Matter whence  
“ they were compos'd is not left uselesſ,  
“ but wrought with equal Management  
“ and Art, even in *Corruption*, Nature's  
“ seeming Waste, and vile Abhorrence.  
“ The abject State appears merely as *the Way* or *Passage* to ſome better. But  
“ cou'd we nearly view it, and with In-  
“ difference, remote from the Antipathy  
“ of Sense ; we then perhaps ſhou'd highest  
“ raife our Admiration : convinc'd that  
“ even *the Way it-self* was equal to the  
“ End. Nor can we judg leſs favourably  
“ of that consummate Art exhibited thro'  
“ all the Works of Nature ; ſince our  
“ weak Eyes, help'd by mechanick Art,  
“ discover in these Works a hidden Scene  
“ of Wonders ; Worlds within Worlds,

Part 3.<sup>“</sup> of infinite Minutenes, tho as to Art  
 ~~~~~ “ still equal to the greatest, and pregnant  
^{Medita-} “ with more Wonders than the most dif-
 “ cerning Sense, join’d with the greatest
 “ Art, or the acutest Reason, can pene-
 “ trate or unfold.

“ But ’tis in vain for us to search the
 “ bulky Mass of MATTER: seeking to
 “ know its Nature; how great *the Whole*
 “ it-self, or even how small its *Parts*.

“ IF knowing only some of the Rules
 “ of MOTION, we seek to trace it fur-
 “ ther, ’tis in vain we follow it into the
 “ Bodys it has reach’d. Our tardy Ap-
 “ prehensions fail us, and can reach no-
 “ thing beyond the Body it-self, thro’
 “ which it is diffus’d. Wonderful *Being*,
 “ (if we may call it so) which Bodys ne-
 “ ver receive, except from others which
 “ lose it; nor ever lose, unless by impart-
 “ ing it to others. Even without Change
 “ of Place it has its Force: And Bodys
 “ big with Motion labour to move, yet
 “ stir not; whilst they express an Energy
 “ beyond our Comprehension.

“ IN vain too we pursue that *Phantom*
 “ TIME, too small, and yet too mighty
 “ for our Grasp; when shrinking to a
 “ narrow point, it scapes our Hold, or
 “ mocks our scanty Thought by swelling
 “ to

“ to Eternity, an Object unproportion'd to Sect. I.
 “ our Capacity, as is thy Being, O thou ~~W W W~~
 “ Antient Cause! older than Time, yet
 “ young with fresh Eternity.

“ IN vain we try to fathom the Abyss
 “ of SPACE, the Seat of thy extensive
 “ Being; of which no Place is empty, no
 “ Void which is not full.

“ IN vain we labour to understand that
 “ Principle of SENSE and THOUGHT,
 “ which seeming in us to depend so
 “ much on Motion, yet differs so much
 “ from it, and from Matter it-self, as not
 “ to suffer us to conceive how Thought
 “ can more result from this, than this a-
 “ rise from Thought. But *Thought* we
 “ own pre-eminent, and confess the real-
 “ left of Beings; the only Existence of
 “ which we are made sure, by being con-
 “ scious. All else may be only Dream and
 “ Shadow. All which even Sense suggests
 “ may be deceitful. The SENSE *it-self*
 “ remains still; REASON subsists; and
 “ THOUGHT maintains its *Eldership* of
 “ Being. Thus are we in a manner con-
 “ scious of that *original* and *eternally ex-*
“ istent THOUGHT, whence we derive
 “ our own. And thus the Assurance we
 “ have of the Existence of Beings above
 “ our Sense, and of THEE, (the great
 “ Exemplar of thy Works) comes from

Part 3. "Thee, the ALL-TRUE, and Perfect,
 ~~~~~ " who hast thus communicated thy-self  
 Medita- " more immediately to us, so as in some  
 tion. " manner to *inhabit* within our *Souls* ;  
 " Thou who art *Original SOUL*, diffusive,  
 " vital in all, inspiriting the *Whole*.

" ALL Nature's Wonders serve to ex-  
 " cite and perfect this Idea of their *Au-*  
 " *thor*. 'Tis here he suffers us to see, and  
 " even converse with him, in a manner  
 " suitable to our Frailty. How glorious is  
 " it to contemplate him, in this noblest  
 " of his Works apparent to us, *The System*  
 " of the bigger *World*!" —

HERE I must own, 'twas no small Comfort to me, to find that, as our Meditation turn'd, we were likely to get clear of an entangling abstruse *Philosophy*. I was in hopes THEOCLES, as he proceeded, might stick closer to *Nature*, since he was now come upon the Borders of our World. And here I wou'd willingly have welcom'd him, had I thought it safe at present to venture the least Interruption.

" BESIDES the neighbouring Planets,  
 (continu'd he, in his rapturous Strain)  
 " what Multitudes of fix'd STARS did  
 " we see sparkle, not an hour ago, in the  
 " clear Night, which yet had hardly  
 " yielded

“ yielded to the Day ? How many others Sect. I.  
“ are discover’d by the help of Art ? Yet ~~~~~~~  
“ how many remain still, beyond the reach  
“ of our Discovery ! Crouded as they  
“ seem, their Distance from each other is  
“ as unmeasurable by Art, as is the Dif-  
“ tance between them and us. Whence  
“ we are naturally taught the Immensity  
“ of that BEING, who thro’ these im-  
“ mense Spaces has dispos’d such an Infi-  
“ nite of Bodys, belonging each (as we  
“ may well presume) to Systems as com-  
“ pleat as our own World : Since even the  
“ smallest Spark of this bright *Galaxy* may  
“ vie with this our *SUN* ; which shining  
“ now full out, gives us new Life, exalts  
“ our Spirits, and makes us feel *DIVINI-*  
“ *TY* more present.

“ PRODIGIOUS ORB ! Bright Source  
“ of vital Heat, and Spring of Day ! —  
“ Soft Flame, yet how intense, how ac-  
“ tive ! How diffusive, and how vast a  
“ Substance ; yet how collected thus with-  
“ in it-self, and in a glowing Mass con-  
“ fin’d to the Center of this *planetary*  
“ World ! — *Mighty* Being ! Brightest  
“ Image, and Representative of the *Al-*  
“ *mighty* ! Supreme of the corporeal  
“ World ! Unperishing in Grace, and of  
“ undecaying Youth ! Fair, beautiful,  
“ and hardly mortal Creature ! By what  
“ secret ways dost thou receive the Sup-

*Part 3.* " plies which maintain Thee still in such  
*Medita-* " unwearied Vigour, and un-exhausted  
*tion.* " Glory ; notwithstanding those eternal-  
" ly emitted Streams, and that continual  
" Expence of vital Treasures, which in-  
" lighten and invigorate the surrounding  
" Winds ?—

" AROUND him all the PLANETS,  
" with this *our Earth*, single, or with At-  
" tendants, continually move ; seeking to  
" receive the Blessing of his Light, and  
" lively Warmth ! Towards him they  
" seem to tend with prone descent, as to  
" their Center ; but happily controul'd  
" still by another Impulse, they keep their  
" heavenly Order ; and in just Numbers,  
" and exactest Measure, go the eternal  
" Rounds.

" BUT, O thou who art the *Author*  
" and *Modifier* of these various Motions !  
" O *sovereign* and *sole Mover*, by whose  
" high Art the rolling Spheres are go-  
" yern'd, and these stupendous Bodys of  
" our World hold their unrelenting Cour-  
" ses ! O wise OEconomist, and power-  
" ful Chief, whom all the Elements and  
" Powers of Nature serve ! How hast  
" thou animated these moving Worlds ?  
" What Spirit or Soul infus'd ? What  
" Biass fix'd ? Or how encompas'd them  
" in liquid *Aether*, driving them as with  
" the

“ the Breath of living Winds, thy active Sect. I.  
“ and unwearied Ministers in this intricate  
“ and mighty Work?

“ Thus powerfully are the *Systems* held  
“ intire, and kept from fatal interfering.  
“ Thus is our *ponderous GLOBE* directed  
“ in its annual Course; daily revolving on  
“ its own Center: whilst the obsequious  
“ *Moon* with double Labour, monthly  
“ surrounding this our bigger Orb, attends  
“ the Motion of her Sister-Planet, and  
“ pays in common her circular Homage  
“ to the *Sun*.

“ YET is this *Mansion-GLOBE*, this  
“ *Man-Container*, of a much narrower  
“ compass even than other its Fellow-  
“ Wanderers of our System. How nar-  
“ row then must it appear, compar'd with  
“ the capacious *System* of its own *Sun*?  
“ And how narrow, or as nothing, in re-  
“ spect of those *innumerable Systems* of o-  
“ ther apparent *Suns*? Yet how immense  
“ a Body it seems, compar'd with ours  
“ of human Form, a borrow'd Remnant  
“ of its variable and oft-converted Sur-  
“ face? tho animated with a sublime Ce-  
“ lestial Spirit, by which we have Rela-  
“ tion and Tendency to *Thee* our Heaven-  
“ ly *Sire*, Center of Souls; to whom these  
“ Spirits of ours by Nature tend, as earth-  
“ ly Bodys to their proper Center.—

Part 3. " O did they tend as unerringly and con-  
 stantly ! — But *Thou* alone compostest  
<sup>Medita-</sup> " the Disorders of the corporeal World,  
 " and from the restless and fighting *Ele-*  
 " *ments* raisest that peaceful Concord, and  
 " conspiring Beauty of the ever-flourish-  
 " ing Creation. Even so canst thou con-  
 " vert these jarring Motions of intelligent  
 " Beings, and in due time and manner  
 " cause them to find their Rest ; making  
 " them contribute to the Good and Per-  
 " fection of the UNIVERSE, thy *all-good*  
 " and *perfect Work.*" —

HERE again he broke off, looking on me as if he expected I shou'd speak ; which when he found plainly I wou'd not, but continu'd still in a posture of musing Thought : Why PHILOCLES ! (said he, with an Air of Wonder) What can this mean, that you shou'd suffer me thus to run on, without the least Interruption ? Have you at once given over your scrupulous Philosophy, to let me range thus at pleasure thro' these aerial Spaces and imaginary Regions, where my capricious Fancy or easy Faith has led me ? I wou'd have you to consider better, and know, my PHILOCLES, that I had never trusted my-self with you in this Vein of Enthusiasm, had I not rely'd on you to govern it a little better.

I FIND then, said I, (rouzing my-self  from my musing Posture) you expect I shou'd serve you in the same capacity as that Musician, whom an antient Orator made use of at his Elbow, to strike such moving Notes as rais'd him when he was perceiv'd to sink ; and calm'd him again, when his impetuous Spirit was transported in too high a Strain.

YOU imagine right, reply'd THEOCLES ; and therefore I am resolv'd not to go on, till you have promis'd to pull me by the Sleeve when I grow extravagant.

Be it so, said I ; you have my Promise. But how if instead of rising in my Transports, I shou'd grow flat and tiresom : What Lyre or Instrument wou'd you employ to raise me ?

THE Danger, I told him, cou'd hardly be suppos'd to lie on this hand. His *Vein* was a plentiful one ; and his *Enthusiasm* in no likelihood of failing him. His Subject too, as well as his Numbers, wou'd bear him out. And with the Advantage of the rural Scene around us, his number'd Prose, I thought, supply'd the room of the best Pastoral Song. For in the manner I was now wrought up, 'twas as agreeable to me to hear him, in this kind of *Passion*, invoke his *Stars* and *Elements*, as  
to

Part 3. to hear one of those amorous *Shepherds*  
 ~~~~~ complaining to his *Flock*, and making the  
~~Media-~~ Woods and Rocks resound the Name of
~~tion.~~ *Her* whom he ador'd.— Begin therefore
 (continu'd I, still pressing him) Begin a-
 new, and lead me boldly thro' your *Ele-
 ments*. Wherever there is danger, be it on
 either hand, I promise to give you warn-
 ing, when I perceive it.

LET us begin then, said he, with this
 our *Element* of EARTH, which yonder
 we see cultivated with such Care by the
 early Swains now working in the Plain be-
 low.— “ Unhappy restless Men, who
 “ first disdain'd these peaceful Labours,
 “ gentle rural Tasks, perform'd with such
 “ Delight! What *Pride* or what *Ambition*
 “ bred this Scorn? Hence all those fatal
 “ Evils of your Race! Enormous Luxu-
 “ ry, despising homely Fare, ranges thro'
 “ Seas and Lands, rifles the Globe; and
 “ Men ingenious to their Misery, work
 “ out for themselves the means of heavier
 “ Labour, anxious Cares, and Sorrow:
 “ Not satisfy'd to turn and manure for
 “ their Use the wholesom and beneficial
 “ Mould of this their EARTH, they
 “ dig yet deeper, and seeking out imagi-
 “ nary Wealth, they search its very En-
 “ trails.

“ HERE,

" HERE, led by Curiosity, we find
" Minerals of different Natures, which
" by their Simplicity discover no less of
" the Divine Art, than the most com-
" pounded of Nature's Works. Some are
" found capable of surprizing Changes ;
" others as durable, and hard to be de-
" stroy'd or chang'd by Fire, or utmost
" Art. So various are the Subjects of
" our Contemplation, that even the Study
" of these inglorious Parts of Nature, in
" the nether World, is able it-self alone
" to yield large Matter and Employment
" for the busiest Spirits of Men, who in
" the Labour of these Experiments can
" willingly consume their Lives.—But
" the noisom poisonous Steams which
" the Earth breathes from these dark Ca-
" verns, where she conceals her Treas-
" ures, suffer not prying Mortals to live
" long in this Search.

" How comfortable is it to those who
" come out hence alive, to breathe a pu-
" rer AIR ! to see the rejoicing Light of
" Day ! and tread the fertile Ground !
" How gladly they contemplate the Sur-
" face of the Earth, their Habitation,
" heated and enliven'd by the Sun, and
" temper'd by the fresh AIR of fanning
" Breezes ! These exercise the resty Plants,
" and scour the unactive Globe. And
" when

Part 3. " when the *Sun* draws hence thick clou-
 ~~~~~ " ded Steams and Vapours, 'tis only to di-  
*Medita-* " gest and exalt the unwholesom Particles,  
 " and commit 'em to the sprightly AIR ;  
 " which soon imparting its quick and vi-  
 " tal Spirit, renders 'em again with im-  
 " provement to the Earth, in gentle  
 " Breathings, or in rich Dews and fruit-  
 " ful Showers. The same AIR, moving  
 " about the mighty Mass, enters its Pores,  
 " impregnating the Whole : And both the  
 " Sun and AIR conspiring, so animate  
 " this *Mother-Earth*, that tho ever breed-  
 " ing, her Vigour is as great, her Beauty  
 " as fresh, and her Looks as charming, as  
 " if she newly came out of the forming  
 " Hands of her Creator.

" How beautiful is the WATER a-  
 " mong the inferior Earthly Works !  
 " Heavy, liquid, and transparent : with-  
 " out the springing Vigour and expansive  
 " Force of *Air* ; but not without Activi-  
 " ty. Stubborn and un-yielding, when  
 " compress'd ; but placidly avoiding Force,  
 " and bending every way with ready Flu-  
 " ency ! Insinuating, it dissolves the lum-  
 " pish Earth, frees the intangled Bodys,  
 " procures their Intercourse, and summons  
 " to the Field the keen terrestrial Parti-  
 " cles ; whose happy Strifes soон ending  
 " in strict Union, produce the various  
 " Forms which we behold. How vast  
 " are

“ are the Abysses of the *Sea*, where this Sect. I.  
“ soft Element is stor’d ; and whence the *Waves*.  
“ Sun and Winds extracting, raise it in-  
“ to Clouds ! These soon converted in-  
“ to Rain, water the thirsty Ground,  
“ and supply a-fresh the Springs and Ri-  
“ vers ; the Comfort of the neighbouring  
“ Plains, and sweet Refreshment of all  
“ Animals.

“ **B**UT whither shall we trace the  
“ Sources of *the Light*? or in what  
“ Ocean comprehend the luminous Mat-  
“ ter so wide diffus’d thro’ the immense  
“ Spaces which it fills ? What Seats shall  
“ we assign to that fierce Element of *Fire*,  
“ too active to be confin’d within the  
“ Compas of the *Sun*, and not excluded  
“ even the Bowels of the heavy *Earth*?  
“ The *Air* it-self submits to it, and serves  
“ as its inferior Instrument. Even this  
“ our *Sun*, with all those *numerous Suns*,  
“ the glittering Host of Heaven, seem to  
“ receive from hence the vast Supplies  
“ which keep them ever in their splendid  
“ State. The *invisible etherial Substance*,  
“ penetrating both liquid and solid Bodys,  
“ is diffus’d thro’out the Universe. It  
“ cherishes the cold dull massy *Globe*,  
“ and warms it to its Center. It forms  
“ the Minerals ; gives Life and Growth  
“ to Vegetables ; kindles a soft, invisible,  
“ and vital *Flame* in the Breasts of living  
“ Creatures ;

Part 3. " Creatures ; frames, animates, and nurses  
 ~~~~~ " all the various Forms ; sparing, as well  
^{Medita-} " as employing for their Use, those *sulphurous*
 " and *combustible* Matters of which
 " they are compos'd. Benign and gentle
 " amidst all, it still maintains this happy
 " Peace and Concord, according to its
 " stated and peculiar Laws. But these
 " once broken, the acquitted *Being* takes
 " its Course unrul'd. It runs impetuous
 " thro' the fatal Breach, and breaking into
 " visible and fierce *Flames*, passes trium-
 " phant o'er the yielding Forms, convert-
 " ing all into it-self, and dissolving now
 " those Systems which it-self before had
 " form'd. 'Tis thus" —

HERE THEOCLES stopt on a sud-
 den, when (as he imagin'd) I was put-
 ting my Hand out, to lay hold on his
 Sleeve.

O PHILOCLES, said he, 'tis well re-
 member'd. I was growing too warm, I
 find ; as well I might indeed, in this *hot*
 Element. And here perhaps I might have
 talk'd yet more mysteriously, had you
 been one who cou'd think otherwise than
 in the common way of the soft Flames of
Love. You might, perhaps, have heard
 Wonders in this kind : " How all things
 " had their Being *hence*, and how their
 " noblest

" noblest End was to be *here* wrapt up, Sect. I:
" consum'd and lost." — But in these high  Flights, I might possibly have gone near to
burn my Wings.

INDEED, said I, you might well ex-
pect the Fate of ICARUS, for your high-
soaring. But this, indeed, was not what
I fear'd. For you were got above Dan-
ger; and, with that devouring Element
on your side, had master'd not only the
Sun himself, but every thing which stood
in your way. I was afraid it might, in
the issue, run to what they tell us of a
universal Conflagration; in which I knew
not how it might go, possibly, with our
GENIUS.

I AM glad, said he, PHILOCLES! to
find this grown such a Concern with
you. But you may rest secure here, if the
Case you meant were that *periodical Con-
flagration* talk'd of by some *Philosophers*.
For there the GENIUS wou'd of necessity
be *all in all*: And in those Intervals of
Creation, when no Form, nor Species ex-
isted any-where out of the *Divine Mind*, all
then was DEITY: All was that ONE,
collected thus within it-self, and subsisting
(as they imagin'd) rather in a more sim-
ple and perfect manner, than when mul-
tiply'd in more ways; and becoming pro-
ductive,

Part 3. ductive, it unfolded it-self in the various
 ↪ Map of *Nature*, and this fair visible *World*.

BUT for my part, said I, (interrupting him) who can much better see DIVINITY *unfolded*, than in that *involv'd* and *solitary* State before Creation; I cou'd wish you wou'd go a little further with me in the Map of *Nature*; especially if descending from your lofty Flights, you wou'd be content to pitch upon this humble Spot of EARTH; where I cou'd better accompany you, where'er you led me.

BUT you, reply'd he, who wou'd confine me to this heavy *Earth*, must yet allow me the same Wings of Fancy. How else shall I fly with you, thro' different Climates, from Pole to Pole, and from the Frigid to the Torrid Zone?

O, SAID I, for this purpose I will allow you the PEGASUS of the Poets, or that wing'd *Griffin* which an *Italian* Poet of the Moderns gave to one of his Heroes: Yet on this Condition, that you take no such extravagant Flight, as his was, to the *Moon*; but keep closely to this Orb of *Earth*.

SINCE you will have it so, reply'd THEOCLES, let us try first on the darkest and

and most imperfect Parts of our Map, Sect. 1.
and see how you can endure the Pro-
spect.

" How oblique and faintly
" looks the Sun on yonder Climates, far
" remov'd from him ! How tedious are
" the *Winters* there ! How deep the Hor-
" rors of the Night, and how uncom-
" fortable even the Light of Day ! The
" freezing Winds employ their fiercest
" Breath, yet are not spent with blowing.
" The Sea, which elsewhere is scarce con-
" fin'd within its Limits, lies here im-
" mur'd in Walls of Chrystal. The Snow
" covers the Hills, and almost fills the
" lowest Valleys. How wide and deep
" it lies, incumbent o'er the Plains, hiding
" the sluggish Rivers, the Shrubs, and
" Trees, the Dens of Beasts, and Man-
" sions of distress'd and feeble Men ! —
" See ! where they lie confin'd, hardly
" secure against the raging Cold, or the
" Attacks of the wild Beasts, now Mas-
" ters of the wasted Field, and forc'd by
" Hunger out of the naked Woods. —
" Yet not dishearten'd (such is the Force
" of human Breasts) but thus provided
" for, by Art and Prudence, the kind
" compensating Gifts of Heaven, Men
" and their Herds may wait for a Re-
" lease. For at length the Sun approach-
" ing, melts the Snow, sets longing Men
" at liberty, and affords them Means and
" Time to make provision against the

Part 3. " next Return of Cold. It breaks the
 ~~~~~ " icy Fetters of the Main ; where vast Sea-  
 Medita- " Monsters pierce thro' floating Islands,  
 " with Arms which can withstand the  
 " Chrystal Rock : whilst others, who of  
 " themselves seem great as Islands, are by  
 " their Bulk alone arm'd against all but  
 " Man ; whose Superiority over Creatures  
 " of such stupendous Size and Force, shou'd  
 " make him mindful of his Privilege of  
 " Reason, and force him humbly to adore  
 " the great Composer of these wondrous  
 " Frames, and Author of his own superior  
 " Wisdom.

" BUT leaving these dull Climates, so  
 " little favour'd by the Sun, for those hap-  
 " pier Regions, on which he looks more  
 " kindly, making perpetual *Summer*; How  
 " great an Alteration do we find ? His  
 " purer *Light* confounds weak-fighted Mor-  
 " tals, pierc'd by his scorching *Beams*.  
 " Scarce can they tread the glowing  
 " Ground. The Air they breathe can-  
 " not enough abate the *Fire* which burns  
 " within their panting Breasts. Their  
 " Bodys melt. O'ercome and fainting,  
 " they seek the Shade, and wait the cool  
 " Refreshments of the Night. Yet oft  
 " the *bounteous* C R E A T O R bestows other  
 " Refreshments. He casts a veil of *Clouds*  
 " before 'em, and raises gentle *Gales*; fa-  
 " vor'd by which, the Men and Beasts

“ pursue their Labours ; and Plants re-Sect. I.  
“ fresh'd by Dews and Showers, can glad-~~~~~  
“ ly bear the warmest Sun-beams.

“ AND here the varying Scene opens  
“ to new Wonders. We see a Country  
“ rich with *Gems*, but richer with the  
“ fragrant *Spices* it affords. How gravely  
“ move the largest of *Land-Creatures* on  
“ the Banks of this fair River ! How  
“ ponderous are their Arms, and vast  
“ their Strength, with Courage, and a  
“ Sense superior to the other Beasts !  
“ Yet are they tam'd, we see, by Man-  
“ kind, and brought even to fight their  
“ Battels, rather as Allies and Confede-  
“ rates, than as Slaves.—But let us turn  
“ our Eyes towards these smaller, and  
“ more curious Objects ; the numerous  
“ and devouring *Insects* on the Trees in  
“ these wide Plains. How shining, strong,  
“ and lasting are the subtle Threds spun  
“ from their artful Mouths ! Who, beside  
“ the *All-wise*, has taught 'em to compose  
“ the beautiful soft Shells, in which re-  
“ cluse and bury'd, yet still alive, they  
“ undergo such a surprizing Change ;  
“ when not destroy'd by Men, who  
“ clothe and adorn themselves with the  
“ Labours and Lives of these weak Crea-  
“ tures, and are proud of wearing such in-  
“ gloriouſ Spoils ? How sumptuously ap-  
“ parel'd, gay, and splendid, are all the va-

Part 3. " rious *Insects* which feed on the other  
 ↗ " Plants of this warm Region ! How  
<sub>Medita-</sub> " beautiful the *Plants* themselves in all  
 " their various Growths, from the trium-  
 " phant *Palm* down to the humble *Moss* !

" Now may we see that *happy* Country  
 " where precious *Gums* and *Balsams* flow  
 " from Trees ; and Nature yields her most  
 " delicious Fruits. How tame and trac-  
 " table, how patient of Labour and of  
 " Thirst, are those large Creatures ; who  
 " lifting up their lofty Heads, go led and  
 " loaden thro' these dry and barren Places !  
 " Their Shape and Temper show them  
 " fram'd by Nature to submit to Man,  
 " and fitted for his Service : who from  
 " hence ought to be more sensible of his  
 " Wants, and of the Divine Bounty, thus  
 " supplying them.

" BUT see ! not far from us, that *fer-  
 tileſt* of Lands, water'd and fed by a  
 " friendly generous Stream, which, ere  
 " it enters the Sea, divides it-self into ma-  
 " ny Branches, to dispense more equally  
 " the rich and nitrous Manure, it bestows  
 " so kindly and in due time, on the ad-  
 " jacent Plains. — Fair Image of that  
 " fruitful and exuberant Nature, who  
 " with a Flood of Bounty blesses all  
 " things, and, Parent-like, out of her ma-  
 " ny Breasts feeds the nutritious Draught  
 " in

“ in various Streams to her rejoicing Off-Sect. 1.  
“ spring ! — Innumerable are the dubious ~~~  
“ Forms and unknown Species which drink  
“ the slimy Current : whether they are  
“ such as leaving the scorch'd Desarts, sa-  
“ tiate here their ardent Thirst, and pro-  
“ miscuously engendring, beget a mon-  
“ strous Race ; or whether, as it is said,  
“ by the Sun's genial Heat, active on the  
“ fermenting Ooze, new Forms are gene-  
“ rated, and issue from the River's fertile  
“ Bed. — — See there the noted Tyrant  
“ of the Flood, and Terror of its Bor-  
“ ders ! when suddenly displaying his hor-  
“ rid Form, the *amphibious* Ravager in-  
“ vades the Land, quitting his watry Den,  
“ and from the deep emerging, with hi-  
“ deous rush, sweeps o'er the trembling  
“ Plain. The Natives from afar behold  
“ with wonder the enormous Bulk, sprung  
“ from so small an Egg. With Horror  
“ they relate the Monster's Nature, cruel  
“ and deceitful : how he with dire Hypo-  
“ crify, and false Tears, beguiles the Sim-  
“ ple-hearted ; and inspiring Tenderness  
“ and kind Compassion, kills with pious  
“ Fraud. — Sad Emblem of that spiritual  
“ Plague, dire *Superstition* ! Native of this  
“ Soil ; where first \* Religion grew unfo-  
“ ciable, and among different Worshipers  
“ bred mutual Hatred, and Abhorrence of

\* VOL. III. pag. 59, 60, &c.

Part 3. " each others Temples. The Infection  
 ~~~~~ " spreads : and Nations now profane one  
^{Medita-} " to another, war fiercer, and in Religion's
 " Cause forget Humanity : whilst savage
 " Zeal, with meek and pious Semblance,
 " works dreadful Massacre ; and for Hea-
 " ven's sake (horrid Pretence !) makes
 " desolate the Earth.—

" HERE let us leave these Monsters
 " (glad if we cou'd here confine 'em !)
 " and detesting the dire prolifick Soil, fly
 " to the vast *Desarts* of these Parts. All
 " ghastly and hideous as they appear, they
 " want not their peculiar Beautys. The
 " Wilderness pleases. We seem to live alone
 " with Nature. We view her in her in-
 " most Recesses, and contemplate her
 " with more Delight in these original
 " Wilds, than in the artificial Labyrinths
 " and feign'd Wildernesses of the Palace.
 " The Objects of the Place, the scaly Ser-
 " pents, the savage Beasts, and poisonous
 " Insects, how terrible soever, or how
 " contrary to human Nature, are beau-
 " ous in themselves, and fit to raise our
 " Thoughts in Admiration of that *Divine*
 " *Wisdom*, so far superior to our short
 " Views. Unable to declare the Use or
 " Service of all things in this Universe,
 " we are yet assur'd of the Perfection of
 " *all*, and of the Justice of that *OEconomy*,
 " to which all things are subservient, and
 " in

" in respect of which, Things seemingly Sect. I.
" deform'd are amiable; Disorder becomes
" regular; Corruption wholesom; and
" Poisons (such as these we have seen)
" prove healing and beneficial.

" BUT behold ! thro' a vast Tract of
" Sky before us, the mighty ATLAS rears
" his lofty Head, cover'd with Snow a-
" bove the Clouds. Beneath the Moun-
" tain's foot, the rocky Country rises into
" Hills, a proper Basis of the ponderous
" Mass above : where huge embody'd
" Rocks lie pil'd on one another, and
" seem to prop the high Arch of Heaven.
" — See ! with what trembling Steps
" poor Mankind tread the narrow Brink
" of the deep Precipices ! From whence
" with giddy Horror they look down, mis-
" trusting even the Ground which bears
" 'em ; whilst they hear the hollow Sound
" of Torrents underneath, and see the
" Ruin of the impending Rock ; with fal-
" ling Trees which hang with their Roots
" upwards, and seem to draw more Ruin
" after 'em. Here thoughtless Men, seiz'd
" with the Newness of such Objects, be-
" come thoughtful, and willingly con-
" template the incessant Changes of this
" Earth's Surface. They see, as in one
" instant, the Revolutions of past Ages,
" the fleeting Forms of Things, and the
" Decay even of this our *Globe* ; whose

Part 3. " Youth and first Formation they consider, whilst the apparent Spoil and irreparable Breaches of the wasted Mountain shew them the World it-self only as a noble Ruin, and make them think of its approaching Period.—But here mid-way the *Mountain*, a spacious Border of thick Wood harbours our weary'd Travellers: who now are come among the ever-green and lofty Pines, the Firs, and noble Cedars, whose towering Heads seem endless in the Sky; the rest of Trees appearing only as Shrubs beside them. And here a different Horror seizes our shelter'd Travellers, when they see the Day diminish'd by the deep Shapes of the vast Wood; which closing thick above, spreads Darkness and eternal Night below. The faint and gloomy Light looks horrid as the Shade it-self: and the profound Stillness of these Places imposes Silence upon Men, struck with the hoarse Echoings of every Sound within the spacious Caverns of the Wood. Here *Space* astonishes. *Silence* it-self seems pregnant; whilst an unknown Force works on the Mind, and dubious Objects move the wakeful Sense. Mysterious *Voices* are either heard or fansy'd: and various Forms of *Deity* seem to present themselves, and appear more manifest in these sacred Silvan

" Scenes;

" Scenes ; such as of old gave rise to Tem- Sect. 2.
" ples, and favour'd the Religion of the ~~~
" antient World. Even we our-selves, who
" in plain Characters may read DIVINI-
" TY from so many bright Parts of Earth,
" chuse rather these obscurer Places, to
" spell out that mysterious Being, which
" to our weak Eyes appears at best under
" a Veil of Cloud." —

HERE he paus'd a-while, and began to cast about his Eyes, which before seem'd fix'd. He look'd more calmly, with an open Countenance and free Air ; by which, and other Tokens, I cou'd easily find we were come to an end of our *Descriptions* ; and that whether I wou'd or no, PHILOCLES was now resolv'd to take his leave of the *Sublime* : the Morning being spent, and the Forenoon by this time well advanc'd.

S E C T. II.

METHINKS, said he, PHILOCLES ! (changing to a familiar Voice) we had better leave these unsociable Places, whither our Fancy has transported us, and return to our-selves here again, in our more conversable Woods, and temperate Climates. Here no fierce Heats nor Colds
annoy

Part 3. annoy us, no *Precipices* nor *Cataracts* amaze us. Nor need we here be afraid of our own Voices; whilst we hear the Notes of such a cheerful *Quire*, and find the *Echoes* rather agreeable, and inviting us to talk.

I confess, said I, those foreign *Nymphs* (if there were any belonging to those miraculous Woods) were much too awful Beautys to please me. I found our familiar Home-*Nymphs* a great deal more to my humour. Yet for all this, I cannot help being concern'd for your breaking off just when we were got half the World over, and wanted only to take AMERICA in our way home. Indeed as for EUROPE, I cou'd excuse your making any great *Tour* there, because of the little Variety it wou'd afford us. Besides that it wou'd be hard to see it in any view, without meeting still that *politick* Face of Affairs, which wou'd too much disturb us in our *philosophical* Flights. But for the Western Tract, I cannot imagine why you shou'd neglect such noble Subjects as are there; unless perhaps the *Gold* and *Silver*, to which I find you such a bitter Enemy, frightened you from a Mother-Soil so full of it. If these Countrys had been as bare of those Metals as old SPARTA, we might have heard more perhaps of the PERU's and MEXICO's than of all

ASIA

ASIA and AFRICA. We might have Sect. 2.
had *Creatures, Plants, Woods, Mountains,* 
Rivers, beyond any of those we have
pass'd. How sorry am I to lose the noble
AMAZON! How sorry—

HERE as I wou'd have proceeded, I
saw so significant a Smile on THEOCLES's
Face, that it stopt me, out of Curiosity,
to ask him his Thought.

NOTHING, said he; nothing but *this*
very Subject it-self.—Go on.—I see you'll
finish it for me. The Spirit of this sort
of Prophecy has feiz'd you. And PHILOCLES,
is become a Pursuer of the same mysterious
BEAUTY.

'TIS true, said I, (THEOCLES!) I
own it. Your Genius, the Genius of the
Place, and the GREAT GENIUS have
at last prevail'd. I shall no longer resist
the Passion growing in me for Things of
a natural kind; where neither Art, nor *Natural*
the Conceit or Caprice of Man has spoil'd *Beautys.*
their genuine Order, by breaking in upon
that primitive State. Even the rude Rocks,
the mossy Caverns, the irregular unwrought
Grotto's, and broken Falls of Waters, with
all the horrid Graces of the Wilderness it-
self, as representing NATURE more, will
be the more engaging, and appear with a
Magni-

Part 3. Magnificence beyond the formal Mockery
 ~~ of princely Gardens.—— But tell me,
 I intreat you, how comes it, That, ex-
 cepting a few *Philosophers* of your sort,
^{Passion of} *this kind.* the only People who are enamour'd in
 this way, and seek the *Woods*, the *Ri-*
vers, or *Sea-shores*, are your poor vulgar
 LOVERS?

SAY not this, reply'd he, of LOVERS only. For is it not the same with POETS, and all those other *Students* in NATURE, and the *Arts* which copy after her? In short, is not this the real Case of all who are *Lovers* either of the MUSES or the GRACES?

ENTHU-
SIASTM.

HOWEVER, said I, all those who are deep in this *romantick* way, are look'd upon, you know, as a People either plainly out of their wits, or over-run with *Melancholy* and * ENTHUSIASM. We always endeavour to recall 'em from these *solitary* Places. And I must own, that often when I have found my Fancy run this way, I have check'd my-self; not knowing what it was possess'd me, when I was passionately struck with Objects of this kind.

* See *Letter of Enthusiasm*, towards the end. See also above, p. 75. And VOL. III. p. 30, &c.

No wonder, reply'd he, if we are at a loss, when we pursue the *Shadow* for the *Substance*. For if we may trust to what our Reasoning has taught us; whatever in Nature is beautiful or charming, is only the faint Shadow of that *First Beauty*. So that every *real Love* depending on the *Contemplation of Beauty*, either as it really is *in it-self*, or as it appears imperfectly in the Objects which strike the *Sense*; how can the rational Mind rest here, or be satisfy'd with the absurd *Enjoyment* which reaches the *Sense alone*?

FROM this time forward then, said I, I shall no more have reason to fear those *Beautys* which strike a sort of *Melancholy*, like the Places we have nam'd, or like these solemn *Groves*. No more shall I avoid the moving Accents of *soft Musick*, or fly from the enchanting *Features* of the fairest *human Face*.

IF you are already, reply'd he, such a *Proficient* in this *new Love*, that you are sure never to admire the *Representative-BEAUTY*, except for the sake of the *Original*; nor aim at other *Enjoyment*, than of the *rational kind*; you may then be confident. I am so; and presume accordingly, to answer for my-self. However I shou'd

Part 3. shou'd not be ill satisfy'd, if you explain'd
 your-self a little better as to this Mistake
 of mine you seem to fear. Wou'd it
 be any help to tell you, " That the Ab-
Enjoyment. " surdity lay in seeking *the Enjoyment*
 " elsewhere than in the *Subject lov'd?*"

The Matter, I must confess, is still myster-
 ious. Imagine then, good PHILOCLES,
 if being taken with the Beauty of
 the Ocean which you see yonder at a dis-
 tance, it shou'd come into your head, to
 seek how to command it; and like some
 mighty Admiral, ride Master of the Sea;
 wou'd not the Fancy be a little absurd?

Absurd enough, in conscience. The next
 thing I shou'd do, 'tis likely, upon this
 Frenzy, wou'd be to hire some Bark, and
 go in Nuptial Ceremony, VENETIAN-
 like, to wed the *Gulf*, which I might call
 perhaps as properly *my own*.

LET who will call it theirs, reply'd
 THEOCLES, you will own *the Enjoyment*
 of this kind to be very different from that
 which shou'd naturally follow from the
 Contemplation of the Ocean's *Beauty*. The
 Bridegroom-Doge, who in his stately *Bu-*
centaur floats on the Bosom of his THE-
 TIS, has less *Poffession* than the poor *Shep-*
herd, who from a hanging Rock, or Point
 of some high Promontory, stretch'd at his
 ease, forgets his feeding Flocks, while he
 admires *her Beauty*.—But to come nearer
 home,

home, and make the Question still more Sect. 2.
familiar. Suppose (my PHILOCLES!)  that, viewing such a Tract of Country,
as this delicious Vale we see beneath us,
you shou'd for the Enjoyment of the Pro-
spect, require the Property or Possession of
the Land.

THE covetous Fancy, reply'd I, wou'd
be as absurd altogether, as that other am-
bitious one.

O PHILOCLES! said he; May I bring
this yet a little nearer? And will you
follow me once more? Suppose that be-
ing charm'd, as you seem to be, with the
Beauty of these Trees, under whose shade
we rest, you shou'd long for nothing so
much as to taste some delicious *Fruit* of
theirs; and having obtain'd of Nature
some certain *Relish* by which these *Acorns*
or *Berrys* of the Wood became as palatable
as the *Figs* or *Peaches* of the Garden, you
shou'd afterwards, as oft as you revisited
these *Groves*, seek hence the *Enjoyment* of
them, by satiating your-self in these new
Delights.

THE Fancy of this kind, reply'd I,
wou'd be fordinly *luxurious*; and as ab-
surd, in my Opinion, as either of the for-
mer.

Part 3.

Enjoyment. CAN you not then, on this occasion, said he, call to mind some other *Forms* of a fair kind among us, where the Admiration of Beauty is apt to lead to as irregular a Consequence?

I FEAR'D, said I, indeed, where this wou'd end, and was apprehensive you wou'd force me at last to think of certain powerful FORMS in *human Kind*, which draw after 'em a Set of eager *Desires, Wishes* and *Hopes*; no way suitable, I must confess, to your rational and refin'd Contemplation of *Beauty*. The Proportions of this *living Architecture*, as wonderful as they are, inspire nothing of a *studious* or *contemplative* kind. The more they are view'd, the further they are from satisfying by mere View. Let that which satisfies be ever so disproportional an Effect, or ever so foreign to its Cause; censure it as you please, you must allow however that it's *natural*. So that you, THEOCLES, for ought I see, are become the *Accuser* of NATURE, by condemning a *natural Enjoyment*.

FAR be it from us both, said he, to condemn a Joy which is from Nature. But when we spoke of the *Enjoyment* of these Woods and Prospects, we understood by it a far different kind from that
of

of the inferior Creatures, who rifling in Sect. 2. these places, find here their choicest *Food*. *~~~~~*
Yet we too live by tasteful *Food*; and feel those other Joys of *Sense* in common with them. But 'twas not here, my PHLOCLES! that we had agreed to place our *Good*; nor consequently our *Enjoyment*. We who were rational, and had Minds, methought, shou'd place it rather in those MINDS; which were indeed abus'd, and cheated of their real *Good*, when drawn to seek absurdly the *Enjoyment* of it in the Objects of *Sense*, and not in those Objects they might properly call *their own*: in which kind, as I remember, we comprehended all which was truly *Fair, Generous, or Good*.

So that BEAUTY, said I, and GOOD, *Beauty* with you, THEOCLES, I perceive are *and Good*. still * *one and the same*.

'TIS SO, said he. And thus are we return'd again to the Subject of our Yesterday's Morning-Conversation. Whether I have made good my Promise to you, in shewing † the true *Good*, I know not. But so, doubtless, I shou'd have done with good success, had I been able in my poetick Extasys, or by any other Efforts, to have

* *Supra*, p. 238, &c.

† *Supra*, p. 245.

Part 3. led you into some deep View of *Nature*,
 and the *Sovereign GENIUS*. We then
^{Beauty}
^{and Good.} had prov'd the *Force of Divine BEAUTY* ;
 and form'd in our-selves an *Object* capable
 and worthy of *real Enjoyment*.

O THEOCLES ! said I, well do I remember now the Terms in which you engag'd me, that Morning when you spoke my *Love* of this *mysterious Beauty*. You have indeed made good your part of the Condition, and may now claim me for a *Proselyte*. If there be any seeming Extravagance in the case, I must comfort myself the best I can, and consider that all found *Love* and *Admiration* is * ENTHUSIASM : "The Transports of *Poets*, the Sublime of *Orators*, the Rapture of *Musicians*, the high Strains of the *Virtuosi* ; all mere ENTHUSIASM ! Even Learning it-self, the Love of *Arts* and *Curiosities*, the Spirit of *Travellers* and *Adventurers* ; *Gallantry*, *War*, *Heroism* ; All, all ENTHUSIASM!" — 'Tis enough : I am content to be this *new Enthusiast*, in a way unknown to me before.

AND I, reply'd THEOCLES, am content you shou'd call this *Love* of ours ENTHUSIASM : allowing it the Privilege of its Fellow-Passions. For is there

* VOL. I. p. 53, 54.

a fair and plausible *Enthusiasm*, a reasonable *Extasy* and *Transport* allow'd to other ~~other~~ Subjects, such as Architecture, Painting, Musick ; and shall it be exploded *here* ? Are there Senses by which all those other Graces and Perfections are perceiv'd ? and none by which this higher Perfection and Grace is comprehended ? Is it so preposterous to bring that *Enthusiasm* hither, and transfer it from those *secondary* and *scanty* Objects, to this *original* and *comprehensive* One ? Observe how the Case stands in all those other Subjects of Art or Sci-*Arts.* ence. What difficulty to be in any degree knowing ! How long ere a true *Taste* ^{A Judg-} is gain'd ! How many things shocking, ^{ment,} *Taste.* how many offensive at first, which afterwards are known and acknowledg'd the highest *Beautys* ! For 'tis not instantly we acquire the *Sense* by which these Beautys are discoverable. *Labour* and *Pains* are requir'd, and *Time* to cultivate a natural *Genius*, ever so apt or forward. But Who is there once thinks of cultivating *this* Soil, or of improving any Sense or Faculty ^{Improve-} which Nature may have given of *this* ^{ment.} kind ? And is it a wonder we shou'd be dull then, as we are, confounded, and at a loss in *these* Affairs, blind as to *this* higher Scene, *these* nobler Representations ? Which way shou'd we come to understand better ? which way be knowing in *these* Beautys ? Is Study, Science, or

Part 3. Learning necessary to understand all Beau-
 ~~~~~~tys else? And for the Sovereign BEAUTY,  
 Chief Science. is there no Skill or Science requir'd? In  
 Painting there are *Shades* and *masterly Strokes*, which the Vulgar understand not, but find fault with: in Architecture there is the *Rustick*; in Musick the *Chromatick* kind, and skilful Mixture of *Diffonancys*. And is there nothing which answers to this, in *The WHOLE*?

I MUST confess, said I, I have hitherto been one of those Vulgar, who cou'd never relish the *Shades*, the *Rustick*, or the *Diffonancys* you talk of. I have never dreamt of such *Master-pieces* in NATURE. 'Twas my way to censure freely on the first view. But I perceive I am now oblig'd to go far in the pursuit of *Beauty*; which lies very absconded and deep: And if so, I am well assur'd that my *Enjoyments* hitherto have been very shallow. I have dwelt, it seems, all this while upon the Surface, and enjoy'd only a kind of slight superficial Beautys; having never gone in search of *Beauty it-self*, but of what I *fanfy'd* such. Like the rest of the unthinking World, I took for granted that what I liked was *beautiful*; and what I rejoic'd in, was my *Good*. I never scrupled loving what I *fanfy'd*; and aiming only at the Enjoyment of what I lov'd, I never troubled my-self with examining

amining what the Subjects were, nor ever Sect. 2.  
hesitated about their Choice.



BEGIN then, said he, and chuse. See what the Subjects are; and which you wou'd prefer; which honour with your Admiration, Love and Esteem. For by these again you will be honour'd in your turn. Such, PHILOCLES, as is the Worth of these Companions, such will your Worth be found. As there is Emptiness or Fulness here, so will there be in your Enjoyment. See therefore where Fulness is, and where Emptiness. See in what Subject resides the chief Excellence: where BEAUTY reigns: where 'tis intire, perfect, absolute; where broken, imperfect, short. View these terrestrial Beautys, and whatever has the appearance of Excellence, and is able to attract. See that which either really is, or stands as in the room of Fair, Beautiful, and Good: "A Mass of Metal; a Tract of Land; a Number of Slaves; a Pile of Stones; a human Body of certain Lineaments and Proportions." Is this the highest of the kind? Is BEAUTY founded then in Body only; and not in Action, Life, or Operation?—

HOLD! hold! said I, good THEOCLES! you take this in too high a Key, above my reach. If you wou'd have me

Part 3. accompany you, pray lower this Strain a  
 little ; and talk in a more familiar way.  
*Beauty.*

THUS THEN, said he, (smiling) Whatever Passion you may have for other Beautys ; I know, good PHILOCLES, you are no such Admirer of *Wealth* in any kind, as to allow much Beauty to it ; especially in a rude Heap or Mass. But in Medals, Coins, Imbost-work, Statues, and well-fabricated Pieces, of whatever sort, you can discover *Beauty*, and admire the Kind. True, said I ; but not for the Metal's sake. 'Tis not then the *Metal* or *Matter* which is beautiful with you.

No. But the *Art*. Certainly. The *Art* then is the *Beauty*.

Right. And the *Art* is that which beautifies. The same. So that the Beautifying, not the Beautify'd, is the really *Beautiful*. It seems so. For that which is beautify'd, is beautiful only by the accession of something beautifying : and by the recess or withdrawing of the same, it ceases to be beautiful.

Be it. In respect of Bodys therefore, *Beauty* comes and goes. So we see. Nor is the Body it-self any Cause either of its coming or staying. None.

So that there is no Principle of Beauty in *Body*. None at all. For Body can no-way be the Cause of Beauty to it-self,

self. No-way. Nor govern nor re- Sect. 2.  
gulate it-self. Nor yet this. Nor mean  
mean nor intend it-self. Nor this nei-  
ther. Must not *that* therefore, which  
means and intends for it, regulates and  
orders it, be the Principle of Beauty to  
it? Of necessity. And what  
must that be? MIND, I suppose;  
for what can it be else?

HERE then, said he, is all I wou'd  
have explain'd to you before: "That the  
"Beautiful, the Fair, the Comely, were  
"never in the Matter, but in the Art and  
"Design; never in Body it-self, but in the  
"Form or forming Power." Does not the  
beautiful Form confess this, and speak the  
Beauty of the Design, whene'er it strikes  
you? What is it but the Design which  
strikes? What is it you admire but  
MIND, or the Effect of Mind? 'Tis Mind  
alone which forms. All which is void of  
Mind is horrid: and Matter formless is  
*Deformity it-self.*

OF all Forms then, said I, Thoſe (ac-  
cording to your Scheme) are the most  
amiable, and in the first Order of Beauty,  
which have a power of making other  
Forms themselves: From whence methinks  
they may be styl'd the forming Forms.  
So far I can easily concur with you, and  
gladly give the advantage to the human  
C c 4 Form,

Part 3. *Form*, above those other Beautys of Man's *Beauty*. Formation. The Palaces, Equipages and Estates shall never in my account be brought in competition with the original *living Forms* of Flesh and Blood. And for the other, the *dead Forms* of Nature, the Metals and Stones, however precious and dazzling ; I am resolv'd to resist their Splendour, and make abject Things of 'em, even in their highest Pride, when they pretend to set off human Beauty, and are officiously brought in aid of *the Fair*.

*Orders of Beauty.* Do you not see then, reply'd THEOCLES, that you have establish'd *Three Degrees or Orders of Beauty?* As how ?

*First Order.* Why first, *the dead Forms*, as you properly have call'd 'em, which bear a Fashion, and are form'd, whether by Man, or Nature ; but have no forming Power, no Action, or Intelligence. Right. Next, and as the *second kind*, *the Forms which der.* *Second Order-form* ; that is, which have Intelligence, Action, and Operation. Right still.

Here therefore is double Beauty. For here is both the Form (*the Effect* of Mind) and *Mind it-self* : The first kind low and despicable in respect of this other ; from whence the dead Form receives its Lustre and Force of Beauty. For what is a mere *Body*, tho' a human one, and ever so exactly fashion'd, if inward

ward Form be wanting, and the *Mind* Sect. 2. be monstrous or imperfect, as in *an Idiot*,  or *Savage*? This too I can apprehend, said I; but where is the *third Order*?

HAVE patience, reply'd he, and see first whether you have discover'd the whole Force of this *second Beauty*. How else shou'd you understand the Force of Love, or have the Power of Enjoyment? Tell me, I beseech you, when first you nam'd these *the Forming Forms*, did you think of no other Productions of theirs besides the *dead Kinds*, such as the Palaces, the Coins, the Brazen or the Marble Figures of Men? Or did you think of something nearer *Life*?

I COULD easily, said I, have added, that these *Forms* of ours had a Virtue of producing *other living Forms*, like themselves. But this Virtue of theirs, I thought was from *another Form* above them, and cou'd not properly be call'd *their Virtue* or *Art*; if in reality there was *a superior Art*, or something *Artifit-like*, which guided their Hand, and made Tools of them in this specious Work.

HAPPILY thought, said he! You have prevented a Censure which I hardly imagin'd you cou'd escape. And here you

Part 3. have unawares discover'd that *third Order*  
~~Third Order.~~ of Beauty, which forms not only such as  
 we call mere Forms, but even *the Forms*  
*which form.* For we our-selves are nota-  
 ble Architects in Matter, and can shew  
 lifeles Bodys brought into Form, and  
 fashion'd by our own hands: but that  
 which fashions even Minds themselves,  
 contains in it-self all the Beautys fashion'd  
 by those Minds; and is consequently the  
 Principle, Source, and Fountain of all  
*Beauty.*

It seems so.

THEREFORE whatever Beauty ap-  
 pears in our *second Order* of Forms, or  
 whatever is deriv'd or produc'd from  
 thence, all this is eminently, principally,  
 and originally in this *last Order* of *Supreme*  
*and Sovereign Beauty.*

True.

THUS Architecture, Musick, and all  
 which is of human Invention, resolves it-  
 self into this *last Order.*

Right, said I: and thus all the *Enthusiasms* of other kinds resolve themselves into ours. The fashionable Kinds borrow from us, and are nothing without us: We have undoubtedly the Honour of being *Originals.*

NOW

NOW therefore say again, reply'd THEOCLES; Whether are those Fabricks of *Architecture, Sculpture*, and the rest of that sort, the greatest Beautys which Man forms; or are there greater and better? None which I know, reply'd I. Think, think again, said he: and setting aside those Productions which just now you excepted against, as Master-pieces of *another Hand*; think What there are which more immediately proceed from us, and may more truly be term'd *our Issue*. I am barren, said I, for this time: you must be plainer yet, in helping me to conceive. How can I help you, reply'd he? Wou'd you have me be conscious for you, of that which is immediately *your own*, and is solely in, and from *your-self*? You mean my *Sentiments*, said I. Certainly, reply'd he: and together with your *Sentiments*, your *Resolutions, Principles, Determinations, Actions*; whatsoever is handsom and noble in the kind; whatever flows from your good *Understanding, Sense, Knowledg and Will*; whatever is ingender'd in your *Heart*, (good PHILOCLES!) or derives it-self from your *Parent-MIND*, which, unlike to other *Parents*, is never spent or exhausted, but gains Strength and Vigor by producing. So You, my Friend! have prov'd

*Beauty moral.*

*Offspring Generation.*

Part 3. prov'd it, by many a Work : not suffering  
 ~~~~~ that fertile *Part* to remain idle and un-  
 active. Hence those good Parts, which
 from a natural Genius you have rais'd by
 due Improvement. And here, as I can-
 not but admire the pregnant Genius, and
Parent-Beauty; so am I satisfy'd of the
Offspring, that it is and will be ever beau-
 tiful.

Sauræ.

I TOOK the Compliment, and wish'd
 (I told him) the Case were really as he ima-
 gin'd; that I might justly merit his Esteem
 and Love. My Study therefore shou'd be
 to grow *beautiful*, in his way of *Beauty*;
 and from this time forward I wou'd do all
 I cou'd to propagate that lovely Race of
 mental Children, happily sprung from such
 a high Enjoyment, and from a Union with
 what was *Fairest* and *Best*. But 'tis you,
 THEOCLES, continu'd I, must help my
 labouring Mind, and be as it were the
 Midwife to those Conceptions; which else,
 I fear, will prove abortive.

Pregnant-
g.

YOU do well, reply'd he, to give me
 the Midwife's part only: For the Mind
 conceiving of *it-self*, can only be, as you
 say, *afflsted in the Birth*. Its *Pregnancy* is
 from its *Nature*. Nor cou'd it ever have
 been thus *impregnated* by any other *Mind*,
 than that which form'd it at the begin-
 ning; and which, as we have already
 prov'd,

prov'd, is Original to all *mental*, as well Sect. 2.
as other Beauty.

Do you maintain then, said I, that
these *mental* Children, the Notions and
Principles, of *Fair*, *Just*, and *Honest*, with
the rest of these *Ideas*, are *innate*? *Innate Ideas.*

ANATOMISTS, said he, tell us that
the Eggs, which are Principles in Body,
are *innate*; being form'd already in the
Fœtus before the Birth. But *When* it is,
whether *before*, or *at*, or *after* the Birth,
or at *What* time after, that either these,
or other Principles, Organs of Sensation,
or Sensations themselves, are *first* form'd
in us, is a matter, doubtless, of curious
Speculation, but of no great Importance.
The Question is, whether the Principles
spoken of are *from Art*, or *Nature*? If
from *Nature* purely; 'tis no matter for the
Time: nor wou'd I contend with you, tho' you shou'd deny *Life* it-self to be *innate*,
as imagining it follow'd rather than
preceded the moment of Birth. But this
I am certain of; that *Life*, and the *Sensations*
which accompany *Life*, come when
they will, are from *mere Nature*, and no-
thing else. Therefore if you dislike the
word *Innate*, let us change it, if you will,
for *INSTINCT*; and call *Instinct*, that *Instinct*,
which *Nature* teaches, exclusive of *Art*,
Culture, or *Discipline*.

Content, said I.

LEAVING

Part 3.

Genera-
tion.Pre-con-
ceptions.

LEAVING then, reply'd he, those admirable Speculations to the *Virtuosi*, the *Anatomists*, and *School-Divines*; we may safely aver, with all their Consents, that the several Organs, particularly those of Generation, are form'd by *Nature*. Whether is there also from *Nature*, think you, any *Instinct* for the after-Use of them? Or whether must *Learning* and *Experience* imprint this Use? 'Tis imprinted, said I, enough in Conscience. The Impression, or *Instinct*, is so strong in the Case, that 'twou'd be absurdity not to think it *natural*, as well in our own Species, as in other Creatures: amongst whom (as you have already taught me) not only the mere engendring of the Young, but the various and almost infinite Means and Methods of providing for them, are all foreknown. For thus much we may indeed discern in the preparatory Labours and Arts of these wild Creatures; which demonstrate their anticipating *Fancys*, *Pre-conceptions*, or *Pre-sensations*; if I may use a word you taught me * yesterday.

I ALLOW your Expression, said THEOCLES, and will endeavour to show you that the same *Pre-conceptions*, of a higher degree, have place in human Kind. Do

* Pag. 307.

so, said I, I intreat you: For so far am Sect. 2.
I from finding in my-self these Pre-con-
ceptions of *Fair* and *Beautiful*, in your
sense, that methinks, till now of late, I
have hardly known of any thing like
them in Nature. How then, said he,
wou'd you have known that *outward Fair*
and *Beautiful* of human Kind; if such an
Object (a fair fleshly one) in all its Beau-
ty, had *for the first time* appear'd to you,
by your-self, this morning, in these Groves?
Or do you think perhaps you shou'd have
been unmov'd, and have found no diffe-
rence between *this Form* and any *other*; if
first you had not been *instructed*?

I HAVE hardly any Right, reply'd I,
to plead this last Opinion, after what I
have own'd just before.

WELL then, said he, that I may ap-
pear to take no advantage against you;
I quit the dazzling *Form*, which carrys such
a Force of *complicated Beautys*; and am
contented to consider separately each of
those *simple Beautys*, which taken all to-
gether, create this wonderful effect. For
you will allow, without doubt, that in
respect of *Bodys*, whatever is commonly
said of the unexpressible, the unintelligible,
the *I-know-not-what* of Beauty; there can
lie no Mystery here, but what plainly
belongs

Part 3. belongs either to *Figure, Colour, Motion or Sound.* Omitting therefore the three latter, and their dependent Charms; let us view the Charm in what is simplest of all, *mere Figure.* Nor need we go so high as Sculpture, Architecture, or the Designs of those who from this Study of Beauty have rais'd such delightful Arts. 'Tis enough if we consider the simplest of Figures; as either a round *Ball*, a *Cube*, or *Dye.* Why is even an Infant pleas'd with the first View of these Proportions? Why is the *Sphere* or *Globe*, the *Cylinder* and *Obelisk* prefer'd; and the irregular Figures, in respect of these, rejected and despis'd?

I AM ready, reply'd I, to own there is in certain *Figures* a natural * Beauty, which the Eye finds as soon as the Object is presented to it.

Is there then, said he, a natural Beauty of *Figures?* and is there not as natural a one of *ACTIONS?* No sooner the Eye opens upon *Figures*, the Ear to *Sounds*, than straight the *Beautiful* results, and *Grace* and *Harmony* are known and ac-
knowledg'd. No sooner are *ACTIONS* view'd, no sooner the *human Affections* and

* Pag. 28.

Passions discern'd (and they are most of Sect. 2.
'em as soon discern'd as felt) than straight *an inward EYE* distinguishes, and sees the
Fair and Shapely, the Amiable and Admirable, apart from the *Deform'd, the Foul*, the *Idea Natural.*
Odious, or the Despicable. How is it possi-
ble therefore not to own, " That as these
" *Distinctions* have their Foundation in
" *Nature*, the Discernment it-self is *natu-*
" *ral, and from NATURE alone?*"

IF this, I told him, were as he repre-
sented it ; there cou'd never, I thought,
be any Disagreement among Men concern-
ing Actions and Behaviour : as which was
Base, which *Worthy* ; which *Handsom*, and
which *Deform'd*. But now we found per-
petual Variance among Mankind ; whose
Differences were chiefly founded on this
Disagreement in Opinion ; " The one *af-*
" *firming, the other denying, that this, or*
" *that, was fit or decent.*"

EVEN by this then, reply'd he, it ap-
pears there is Fitness and Decency in Ac-
tions ; since the *Fit* and *Decent* is in this *The Fit,*
Controversy ever pre-suppos'd : And whilst *and De-*
Men are at odds about the Subjects, the *cent.*
Thing it-self is universally agreed. For
neither is there Agreement in Judgments
about other *Beautys.* 'Tis controverted
" Which is the finest *Pile*, the loveliest
Shape, or Face :" But without controversy,
Vol. 2. D d 'tis

Part 3.'tis allow'd "There is a BEAUTY of
 each kind." This no-one goes about to
 teach : nor is it learnt by any ; but *confess'd*
^{Standard} by All. All own the Standard, Rule,
 and Measure : But in applying it to Things,
 Disorder arises, Ignorance prevails, Interest
 and Passion breed Disturbance. Nor can it
 otherwise happen in the Affairs of Life,
 whilst that which interests and engages
 Men as *Good*, is thought different from
 that which they admire and praise as *Honest*.— But with us, PHILOCLES ! 'tis
 better settled ; since for our parts, we
 have already decreed, "That * *Beauty* and
 " *Good* are still the same."

Confirmation.

I REMEMBER, said I, what you
 forc'd me to acknowledg more than once
 before. And now, good THEOCLES !
 that I am become so willing a Disciple, I
 want not so much to be *convinc'd*, me-
 thinks, as to be *confirm'd* and *strengthen'd*.
 And I hope this last Work may prove your
 easiest Task.

NOT unless you help in it *your-self*, re-
 ply'd THEOCLES : For this is necessary,
 as well as becoming. It had been indeed
 shameful for you to have yielded without
 making good Resistance. To help one's-

* Pag. 238, 245, 399.

self to be convine'd, is to prevent Reason, Sect. 2.
and bespeak Error and Delusion. But upon fair Conviction, to give our heart up to the evident side, and reinforce the Impression, this is to help Reason heartily. And thus we may be said honestly to persuade our-selves. Shew me then how I may best persuade my-self.

HAVE courage, said he, PHILOCLES! (raising his Voice) Be not offended that I say, *Have Courage!* 'Tis COWARDICE alone betrays us. For whence can *false Shame* be, except from Cowardice? To be ashamed of what one is sure can never be shameful, must needs be from the want of Resolution. We seek the *Right* and *Wrong* in things; we examine what is *Honourable*, what *Shameful*: and having at last determin'd, we dare not stand to our own judgment, and are ashamed to own there is really a *Shameful* and an *Honourable*.
 "Hear me (says one who pretends to value PHILOCLES, and be valu'd by him) There can be no such thing as real *Valuableness* or *Worth*; nothing in it-self estimable or amiable, odious or shameful. All is OPINION: 'Tis *Opinion*, *Opinion* which makes Beauty, and unmakes it. The Graceful or Ungraceful in things, the Decorum and its Contrary, the Amiable and Un-amiable, Vice, Virtue, Honour, Shame, all this is founded *Measure of Virtue and Vice*.

Part 3. "in *Opinion* only. OPINION is the
 ~~ " *Law* and *Measure*. Nor has *Opinion* any
 " Rule besides mere CHANCE; which
 " varys it, as *Custom* varys: and makes
 " now this, now that, to be thought wor-
 " thy, according to the Reign of *Fashion*,
 " and the ascendent Power of *Educa-
 tion*." What shall we say to such
Falshood of this. a one? How represent to him his Absur-
 dity and Extravagance? Will he desist the
 sooner? Or shall we ask *what Shame*,
 of one who acknowledges no *Shame-
 ful*? . Yet he derides, and cries, *Ridic-
 ulous!* By what Right? what Ti-
 tle? For thus, if I were PHILOCLES,
 wou'd I defend my-self: "Am I ridi-
 " lous? As how? *What* is ridiculous?
 " *Every-thing*? or *Nothing*?" Ridiculous
 indeed! But something then, something there is *Ridiculous*: and the Notion, it seems, is right, "of a
Shameful and a *Ridiculous*, in things."

How then shall we apply the Notion? For this being wrong apply'd, cannot it-self but be ridiculous. Or will he who cries SHAME, refuse to acknowledg *any* in his turn? Does he not blush, nor seem discontenanc'd on any occasion? If he does, the Case is very distinct from that of mere Grief or Fear. The Disorder he feels is from a Sense of what is shameful and odious in it-self, not of what is hurtful or dangerous in its Consequences. For

For the greatest Danger in the world can Sect. 2.
never breed Shame: nor can the *Opinion* ^{~~~} of all the World compel us to it, where *Shame,*
our own Opinion is not a Party. We may
be afraid of appearing impudent, and may
therefore feign a Modesty. But we can
never really blush for any thing beside
what we think truly *Shameful*, and what
we shou'd still blush for, were we ever
so secure as to our Interest, and out of the
reach of all Inconvenience, which cou'd
happen to us from the thing we were a-
sham'd of.

Thus, continu'd he, shou'd I be able,
by Anticipation, to defend my-self; and
looking narrowly into Mens Lives, and
that which influenc'd 'em on all occasions,
I shou'd have Testimony enough to make
me say within my-self, " Let who will
" be my Adversary in this Opinion, I shall
" find him some way or other prepossess'd
" with that of which he wou'd endeavour *an Ac-*
" to dispossess me." Has he Gratitude or *knowledg-*
Resentment, Pride or Shame? Which-
ever way it be, he acknowledges a Sense *moral*
of *Just* and *Unjust*, *Worthy* and *Mean*. If *Beauty*
he be Grateful, or expects Gratitude, I *and De-*
ask " *Why?* and on What account?" If *Anger.*
he be angry, if he indulges Revenge, I *Anger.*
ask " How? and in what Case? Re-
" veng'd of *What?* of a Stone, or Mad-
" man?" Who is so mad? " But
D d 3 " for

Part 3. " for What ? For a Chance-hurt ? an
Accident against Thought, or Inten-
tion ? " Who is so unjust ?
Therefore there is *Just* and *Unjust* ; and
belonging to it *a natural Presumption* or
Anticipation, on which the RESEN-
TMENT or ANGER is founded. For
what else shou'd make the wickedest of
Mankind often prefer the Interest of their
Revenge to all other Interests, and even to
Life it-self, except only *a Sense of Wrong*,
natural to all Men, and *a Desire to prose-
cute that Wrong* at any rate ? Not for their
own sakes, since they sacrifice their very
Being to it ; but out of hatred to *the ima-
gin'd Wrong*, and from a certain *Love of
JUSTICE*, which even in *unjust* Men is
by this Example shewn to be beyond *the
Love of LIFE it-self*.

Pride, Thus as to PRIDE, I ask, " Why
" proud? Why conceited? and of What?
" Does any-one who has Pride, think mean-
" ly or indifferently of himself?" No;
but honourably. And how this, if
there be no real Honour or Dignity pre-
suppos'd? For Self-valuation supposes Self-
worth; and in a Person conscious of real
Worth, is either no Pride, or a just and
noble one. In the same manner, Self-con-
tempt supposes a Self-meanness or Defec-
an Ac-
knowledg-
ment of
Worth and tiveness; and may be either a just Mo-
desty, or unjust Humility. But this is cer-
tain,
Baseness.

tain, that whoever is proud, must be proud Sect. 2.
of something. And we know that Men of ~~the~~
thorow Pride will be proud even in the
meanest Circumstances, and when there is
no visible Subject for them to be proud of.
But they descry *a Merit* in themselves,
which others cannot: And 'tis this *Merit*
they admire. No matter whether it be
really in them, as they imagine: It is *a Worth* still, *an Honour*, or *Merit* which
they admire, and wou'd do, wherever they
saw it, in any Subject besides. For *then*
it is, *then only*, that they are humbled,
“ When they see in a more eminent degree
“ in others, What they respect and admire
“ so much *in themselves.*” — And thus
as long as I find Men either *angry* or *re-
vengeful*, *proud* or *asham'd*, I am safe:
For they conceive *an Honourable* and *Dis-
honourable*, a *Foul* and *Fair*, as well as I.
No matter where they place it, or how they
are mistaken in it: This hinders not my
being satisfy'd “ That the Thing *is*, and is
“ universally *acknowledg'd*; That it is of
“ Nature's Impression, naturally conceiv'd, *Natural*
“ and by no *Art* or *Counter-Nature* to be ^{Impression.}
“ eradicated or destroy'd.”

AND NOW, what say you, PHILOCLES, continu'd he, to this Defense I have been making for you? 'Tis grounded, as you see, on the Supposition of

Part 3. your being deeply ingag'd in this philosophical Cause. But perhaps you have yet many Difficultys to get over, ere you can so far take part with *Beauty*, as to make this to be your *Good*.

I HAVE no difficulty so great, said I, as not to be easily remov'd. My Inclinations lead me strongly this way: for I am ready enough to yield there is no real *Good* beside *the Enjoyment of Beauty*. And I am as ready, reply'd THEOCLES, to yield There is no real Enjoyment of Beauty beside what is *Good*. Excellent! But upon reflection, I fear I am little behoden to you for your Concession.

*Mental
Enjoy-
ment.*

Body.

As how? Because shou'd I offer to contend for any Enjoyment of Beauty out of your mental Way, you wou'd, I doubt, call such Enjoyment of mine *absurd*; as you did once before. Undoubtedly I shou'd. For what is it shou'd enjoy, or be capable of Enjoyment, except MIND? Or shall we say, *Body enjoys?* By the help of *Sense*, perhaps; not otherwise. Is BEAUTY, then, *the Object of Sense?* Say how? Which way? For otherwise the help of *Sense* is nothing in the Case: And if *Body* be of it-self incapable, and *Sense* no help to it, to apprehend or enjoy *Beauty*, there remains only the MIND which is capable either to apprehend or to *enjoy*.

TRUE, said I ; but show me, then, ~~~
“ Why BEAUTY may not be *the Object*
“ *of the Sense?*” Shew me first, I *Sense.*
intreat you, “ *Why, Where,* or in *What*
“ *you fancy it may be so?*” Is it not
Beauty which first excites the *Sense*, and
feeds it afterwards in the *Passion* we call
Love? Say in the same manner,
“ That it is *Beauty* first excites the *Sense*,
“ and feeds it afterwards in the *Passion* we
“ call *Hunger.*”— You will not say it.
The Thought, I perceive, displeases you.
As great as the Pleasure is of good Eating,
you disdain to apply the Notion of *Beauty*
to the good Dishes which create it. You
wou’d hardly have applauded the pre-
posterous Fancy of some luxurious Ro-
MANS of old, who cou’d relish a Fri-
caffe the better for hearing it was com-
pos’d of Birds which wore a beautiful Fea-
ther, or had sung deliciously. Instead of
being incited by such a historical Account
of Meats, you wou’d be apt, I believe, to
have less Appetite, the more you search’d
their Origin, and descended into the *Kitch-*
in-Science, to learn the several Forms and
Changes they had undergone, ere they
were serv’d at this elegant voluptuous Ta-
ble. But tho the *Kitchin-Forms* be ever
so disgraceful, you will allow that the *Ma-*
terials of the *Kitchin*, such, for instance,
as the *Garden* furnishes, are really fair and
beautiful

Part 3. beautiful in their kind. Nor will you deny Beauty to the wild *Field*, or to these *Flowers* which grow around us, on this verdant Couch. And yet, as lovely as are these Forms of Nature, the shining *Grafs*, or silver'd *Moss*, the flowry *Thyme*, wild *Rose*, or *Honey-suckle*: 'tis not their BEAUTY allures the neighbouring Herds, delights the brouzing Fawn, or Kid, and spreads the Joy we see amidst the feeding Flocks: 'Tis not the *Form* rejoices; but that which is beneath the Form: 'tis *Savouriness* attracts, *Hunger* impels; and *Thirst*, better allay'd by the clear Brook than the thick Puddle, makes the fair NYMPH to be prefer'd, whose Form is otherwise slighted. For never can the *Form* be of real force where it is un-contemplated, unjudg'd of, unexamin'd, and stands only as the accidental Note or Token of what appeases provok'd Sense, and satisfies the brutish Part. Are you per-suaded of this, good PHILOCLES? or rather than not give Brutes the advantage of *Enjoyment*, will you allow them also a Mind and rational Part?

Not so, I told him.

IF BRUTES therefore, said he, be incapable of knowing and enjoying Beauty, as being *Brutes*, and having SENSE only (the brutish part) for their own share; it follows, " That neither can MAN by
" the

" the same *Sense* or brutish Part, conceive Sect. 2.
" or enjoy *Beauty*: But all the *Beauty* and *Good* he enjoys, is in a nobler way, and
" by the help of what is noblest, his
" MIND and REASON." Here lies his *Reason*.
Dignity and highest *Interest*: Here his *Capacity* toward Good and Happiness. His *Ability* or *Incompetency*, his *Power* of Enjoyment, or his *Impotence*, is founded in this alone. As this is *sound, fair, noble, worthy*; so are its Subjects, Acts and Employments. For as the *riotous MIND*, captive to *Sense*, can never enter in competition, or contend for Beauty with the *virtuous MIND* of Reason's Culture; so neither can the *Objects* which allure the former, compare with those which attract and charm the latter. And when each gratifies it-self in the Enjoyment and Possession of its Object; how evidently fairer are the Acts which join the *latter Pair*, and give a Soul the Enjoyment of what is *generous and good*? This at least, PHILOCLES, you will surely allow, That when you place a Joy elsewhere than in the Mind; the Enjoyment it-self will be no beautiful Subject, nor of any graceful or agreeable Appearance. But when you think how *Friendship* is enjoy'd, how *Honour, Gratitude, Candour, Benignity*, and all internal Beauty; how all the *social Pleasures, Society* it-self, and all which constitutes the Worth and Happiness

Part 3. ness of Mankind ; you will here surely
 allow Beauty in the *Aet.*, and think it
 worthy to be view'd, and pass'd in re-
 view often by the glad Mind, happily
 conscious of the generous Part, and of
 its own Advancement and Growth in
 Beauty.

*Recapitu-
lation.*

THUS, PHILOCLES, (continu'd he,
 after a short Pause) thus have I presum'd
 to treat of *Beauty* before so great a Judg,
 and such a skilful Admirer as your-self.
 For taking rise from Nature's *Beauty*,
 which transported me, I gladly ventur'd
 further in the Chase ; and have accompa-
 ny'd you in search of *Beauty*, as it re-
 lates to us, and makes our highest *Good*,
 in its sincere and natural Enjoyment.
 And if we have not idly spent our hours,
 nor rang'd in vain thro' these deserted Re-
 gions ; it shou'd appear from our strict
 Search, that there is nothing so divine as
BEAUTY : which belonging not to *Body*,
 nor having any Principle or Existence ex-
 cept in *MIND* and *REASON*, is alone
 discover'd and acquir'd by this diviner Part,
 when it inspects *it-self*, the only Object
 worthy of *it-self*. For whate'er is void of
 Mind, is *Void* and *Darkness* to the *Mind's*
EYE. This languishes and grows dim,
 whene'er detain'd on foreign Subjects ;
 but thrives and attains its natural Vigour,
 when

when employ'd in Contemplation of what Sect. 2.
is like it-self. 'Tis thus the *improving* ~~W~~
M I N D, slightly surveying other Objects,
and passing over Bodys, and the common
Forms, (where only a Shadow of Beauty
rests) ambitiously presses onward to its
Source, and views the *Original* of Form
and Order in that which is intelligent.
And thus, O PHILOCLES! may we im-
prove and become Artists in the kind ;
learning " To know *Our-selves*, and what ^{Knowledg}
" *That* is, which by improving, we may ^{of our-}
" be sure to advance our Worth, and real
" *Self-Interest.*" For neither is this *Know-Interest.*
ledg acquir'd by Contemplation of Bodys,
or the outward Forms, the View of Pa-
geantrys, the Study of Estates and Ho-
nours : nor is He to be esteem'd that
self-improving Artist, who makes a For-*Ability.*
tune out of these ; but he, *He* only, is
the *wise* and *able* Man, who with a slight
regard to these Things, applies himself
to cultivate another Soil, builds in a dif-
ferent Matter from that of Stone or Mar-
ble ; and having righter Models in his
Eye, becomes in truth the *Architeet* of
his own Life and *Fortune* ; by laying with-
in himself the lasting and sure Foundations
of *Order*, *Peace*, and *Concord*. — But now
'tis time to think of returning home.
The Morning is far spent. Come ! Let
us away, and leave these uncommon Sub-
jects ;

Part 3.jects ; till we retire again to these remote
and unfrequented Places.

AT THESE words THEOCLES mending his pace, and going down the Hill, left me at a good distance ; till he heard me calling earnestly after him. Having join'd him once again, I begg'd he wou'd stay a little longer : or if he were resolv'd so soon to leave both the Woods, and that Philosophy which he confin'd to 'em ; that he wou'd let me however part with 'em more gradually, and leave the best Impression on me he cou'd, against my next Return. For as much convinc'd as I was, and as great a Convert to his Doctrine, my Danger still, I own'd to him, was very great : and I foresaw that when the Charm of these Places, and his Company was ceas'd, I shou'd be apt to relapse, and weakly yield to that too powerful Charm, *the World*. Tell me, continu'd I, how is it possible to hold out against it, and withstand the general Opinion of Mankind, who have so different a Notion of that which we call *Good*? Say truth now, THEOCLES, can any thing be more odd, or dissonant from the common Voice of the World, than what we have determin'd in this matter ?

W H O M

W H O M shall we follow then? reply'd he. Whose Judgment or Opinion shall we take, concerning What is *Good*, What *contrary*? If *All*, or *any part* of Mankind are consonant with themselves, and can agree in this; I am content to leave *Philosophy*, and follow them: If otherwise; Why shou'd we not adhere to what we have chosen?—Let us then, in another View, consider how this Matter stands.

S E C T. III.

WE THEN walk'd gently home-wards, it being almost Noon; and he continu'd his Discourse.

ONE Man, said he, affects the *Hero*; ^{Manners} esteems it the highest Advantage of Life, ^{of Men.} to have seen War, and been in Action in the Field. Another laughs at this Humour; counts it all Extravagance and Folly; prizes his own *Wit* and *Prudence*; and wou'd take it for a Disgrace to be thought adventurous. One Person is af-^{Contrary} fiduous and indefatigable in advancing ^{Pursuits.} himself to the Character of a *Man of Bu-*
finess. Another on the contrary thinks this impertinent; values not Fame, or a Character in the World: and by his good-will

Part 3. will wou'd always be in a *Debauch*, and never live out of the *Stews* or *Taverns*; where he enjoys, as he thinks, his highest Good. One values Wealth, as a means only to indulge his *Palat*, and to eat finely. Another leaths this, and affects *Popularity*, and a *Name*. One admires *Musick* and *Paintings*, *Cabinet-Curiositys*, and in-door *Ornaments*: Another admires *Gardens*, *Architecture*, and the Pomp of *Buildings*. Another, who has no *Gusto* of either sort, believes all those they call *VIRTUOSI* to be half-distracted. One looks upon all Expence to be Madness; and thinks only *Wealth* it-self to be Good. One games; another dresses, and studys an *Equipage*; another is full of *Heraldry*, *Points of Honour*, a *Family*, and a *Blood*.

Disagreement with one another; One recommends *Gallantry* and *Intrigue*; another ordinary *Good-fellowship*; another *Buffonery*, *Satir*, and the common *Wit*; another *Sports*, and the *Country*; another a *Court*; another *Travelling*, and the sight of foreign *Parts*; another *Poetry*, and the fashionable *Learning*. — All these go dif-

And with themselves. ferent ways. All censure one another, and are despicable in one another's eyes. By fits too they are as despicable in their own, and as often out of conceit with themselves, as their Humour changes, and their Passion turns from one thing to another.—

What is it then I shou'd be concern'd for ?

Whose

Whose Censure do I fear? Or by whom, Sect. 3.
after all, shall I be guided?

IF I ask, "Are RICHES good, when *Riches.*
" only heap'd up, and un-employ'd?"
One answers, "They are." The rest de-
ny. "How is it then they are to be
" employ'd in order to be good?" All
disagree. All tell me different things.

"Since therefore RICHES are not, of
"themselves, good, (as most of you de-
"clare;) And since there is no Agree-
"ment among you *which way* they become
"good; why may not I hold it for my
"Opinion, that they are neither good *in*
"*themselves*, nor *directly* any Cause or
"Means of Good?"

IF there be those who wholly despise *Fame and Honour.*
FAME; And if among those who covet it, he who desires it for one thing, despises it for another; he who seeks it with some Men, despises it with others: Why may not I say, "That neither do I know how any *Fame* can be call'd a *Good*?"

IF of those who covet PLEASURE, *Pleasure.*
they who admire it in *one* kind, are supe-
rior to it *in another*; Why may not I say, "That neither do I know *which* of these Pleasures, or how *Pleasure* it-self,
"can be call'd *Good*?"

Part 3.

Life. IF among those who covet LIFE ever so earnestly, that Life which *to One* is eligible and amiable, is *to Another* despisable and vile; Why may I not say, " That neither do I know how *Life* it-self can, " *of it-self*, be thought *a Good?*"

*Infla-
ment.*

IN the mean time, This I know certainly; " That the necessary Consequence of esteeming these things highly, is to be *a Slave*, and consequently miserable." — But perhaps, PHILOCLES, you are not yet enough acquainted with this odd kind of Reasoning.

*LIBER-
TY.**Goods of
Fortune.*

MORE, said I, than I believe you can easily imagine. I perceiv'd the goodly Lady, your celebrated Beauty, was about to appear a-new: and I easily knew again that fair Face of LIBERTY, which I had seen but once in the.* Picture you drew yesterday of that Moral Dame. I can assure you, I think of her as highly as possible: and find that without her Help, to raise one above these seemingly essential Goods, and make one more easy and indifferent towards *Life*, and towards *a Fortune*; 'twill be the hardest thing in the world to enjoy either. Sollicitude, Cares,

* *Supra*, p. 252. And VOL. III. p. 201, 307, &c.

and Anxiety, will be multiply'd: and in Sect. 3: this unhappy Dependency, 'tis necessary to ~~wave~~ make court, and be not a little servile. To flatter the Great, to bear Insults, to stoop, and fawn, and abjectly resign one's Sense and Manhood; all this must courageously be endur'd, and carry'd off, with as free an Air, and good Countenance as possible, by one who studys Greatness of this sort, who knows the general way of Courts, and how to fix unsteddy Fortune: I need not mention the Envyings, the Mistrusts, and Jealousys—

No truly, said he, interrupting me; neither need you. But finding you so sensible, as I do, of this unhappy State, and of its inward Sores, (whatever may be its outward Looks) How is it possible but you must find the Happiness of that other contrary State? Can you not call to mind what we resolv'd concerning *Nature*? Can any thing be more desirable than *to follow* her? Or is it not by this Freedom from our Passions and low Interests, that we are reconcil'd to the goodly *Order* of the Universe; that we harmonize with *Nature*; and live in Friendship both with **GOD** and Man?

LET us compare, continu'd he, the *Goods of the Mind.* Advantages of each State, and set their *Goods*

Part 3. Goods one against another : On one side, ~~those~~ those which we found were *uncertainly* so ;
Compari- and depended both on Fortune, Age,
son. Circumstances, and Humour : On the other side, these which being *certain* themselves, are founded on the Contempt of those others so uncertain. Is manly *Liberty*, *Generosity*, *Magnanimity*, not a *Good*? May we not esteem as Happiness, that *Self-Enjoyment* which arises from a Consistency of Life and Manners, a Harmony of Affections, a Freedom from the Reproach of Shame or Guilt, and a Consciousness of Worth and Merit with all Mankind, our Society, Country, and Friends : all which is founded in Virtue only? A *Mind* subordinate to Reason, a *Temper* humaniz'd, and fitted to all natural Affection ; an Exercise of *Friendship* uninterrupted ; a thorow *Candor*, *Benignity*, and *Good Nature* ; with constant *Security*, *Tranquillity*, *Equanimity*, (if I may use such *philosophical Terms*) are not these ever, and at all seasons *Good*? Is it of *these* one can at any time nauseate and grow weary ? Are there any particular Ages, Seasons, Places, Circumstances, which must accompany *these*, to make 'em agreeable ? Are *these* variable and inconstant ? Do *these*, by being ardently belov'd, or sought, occasion any Disturbance or Misery ? Can *these* be at any time overvalu'd ? Or, to

to say more yet, can these be ever taken *Sect. 3.*
from us, or can we ever be hinder'd in *the Enjoyment of 'em,* unless by our-
selves? How can we better praise the
Goodness of *Providence,* than in this,
" That it has plac'd our Happiness and
" Good in things *We* can bestow upon *our-*
" *selves?*"

IF this be so, said I, I see no reason we
have to accuse Providence on any account.
But Men, I fear, will hardly be brought to
this good Temper, while their Fancy is
so strong, as it naturally is, towards those
other movable *Goods.* And in short, if
we may depend on what is said commonly,
" All *Good* is merely as we fancy it. 'Tis
" *Conceit* which makes it. All is *OPI-*^{*Opinion*}
" *NION* and *Fancy* only." ^{All.}

WHEREFORE then, said he, do we
act at any time? Why *chuse*, or why *pre-*
fer one thing to another? You will
tell me, I suppose, 'tis because we fancy it,
or fancy *Good* in it. Are we there-
fore to follow every *present* Fancy, Opin-
ion, or Imagination of Good? If so, then
we must follow that at *one* time, which we
decline at *another*; approve at *one* time,
what we disapprove at *another*; and be at
perpetual variance with our-selves. But
if we are not to follow *all* Fancy or Opin-
E e 3 nion

Part 3. nion alike ; If it be allow'd, " That of
Opinion. " Fancys, some are *true*, some *false* ;" then
we are to examine every Fancy ; and there
is some Rule or other, by which to judg,
and determine. 'Twas the Fancy of one
Man to set fire to a beautiful Temple, in
order to obtain immortal Memory or
Fame. 'Twas the Fancy of another Man
to conquer the World, for the same Rea-
son, or what was very like it. If this
were really the Man's *Good* ; Why do we
wonder at him ? If the Fancy were *wrong* ;
say plainly in What it was so ; or Why the
Subject was not *Good to him*, as he fan-
fy'd ? Either therefore, " That is every
" Man's *GOOD* which he *fansys*, and
" because he *fansys* it, and is *not content*
" without it :" Or otherwise, " There is
" That in which the *Nature* of Man is
" satisfy'd ; and which alone must be *his*
" *GOOD*." If That in which the *Nature*
of Man is satisfy'd, and can *rest contented*,
be *alone his GOOD* ; then he is a Fool
who follows that with Earnestnes, *as his*
Good, which a Man can be without, and
yet be *satisfy'd* and *contented*. In the same
manner is he a Fool who flies that *earnestly*
as his ILL, which a Man may *endure*, and
yet be *easy* and *contented*. Now a Man
may possibly not have burnt a Temple, as
EROSTRATUS, and yet may be *con-*
tented. Or tho he may not have con-
quer'd

quer'd the World, as ALEXANDER, Sect. 3.
 yet he may be easy and *contented*: as he ~~may~~
 may still without any of those Advantages
 of *Power*, *Riches*, or *Renown*; if his FANCY
 hinders not. In short, we shall find,
 " That without any one of those which
 " are commonly call'd *Goods*, a Man may
 " be *contented*:" As, on the contrary,
 " He may possess them all, and still be
 " *discontented*, and not a jot the happier." If so; it follows, " That Happiness is
 " from *within*, not from *without*." *A*
good FANCY is the Main. And thus,
 you see, I agree with you, " That * OPI-^{Opinion}
 " NION is all in all." — But what is ^{All, in}
 this, PHILOCLES, which has seiz'd you? ^{what}_{sense.}
 You seem of a sudden grown deeply
 thoughtful.

To tell you truth, said I, I was considering What wou'd become of me, if, after all, I shou'd, by your means, turn *Philosopher*. The Change, truly, wou'd be somewhat extraordinary, reply'd THEOCLES. But be not concern'd. The Danger is not so great. And Experience shews us every day, That for talking or writing *Philosophy*, People are not at all the nearer being PHILOSOPHERS.

* VOL. I. pag. 307, 320, 324, &c. VOL. III. p.
 196, 199, &c.

Part 3.

~~~~~ BUT, said I, the very *Name* is a kind of Reproach. The word IDIOT stood formerly as the Opposite to *Philosopher*; but now-a-days it means nothing more commonly than the PHILOSOPHER himself.

*Philoso-  
phy.*

YET, in effect, reply'd he, what else is it we all do in general, than *philosophize*? If PHILOSOPHY be, as we take it, the *Study of Happiness*; must not everyone, in some manner or other, either skilfully or unskilfully *philosophize*? Is not every Deliberation concerning our main Interest, every Correction of our Taste, every Choice and Preference in Life to be reckon'd of this kind? For "If Happiness be not allow'd to be from *Self*, and "from *within*; then Either is it from *outward Things* alone, or from *Self* and *outward Things* together." If from *outward Things* alone; shew it us, in fact, "That all Men are happy in proportion to these; and that no one who possesses them is ever miserable by his own fault."

But this, it seems, hardly any-one will pretend to evince: All own the contrary. Therefore "If Happiness be partly from *Self*, partly from *outward Things*; then Each must be consider'd, and a certain Value set on the Concerns "of

" of an *inward* kind, and which depend Se&t. 3.  
" on *Self* alone." If so: and that I con- ~~~~~  
sider " *How*, and *in What* these are to be  
" prefer'd; When and on what occasion  
" they are in season, or out of season;  
" When properly to take place, when to  
" yield :" What's this, after all, but to *phi-*  
*losophize*? Yet even this, still, is e-  
nough to put one out of the ordinary way  
of thinking, and give one an unhappy turn  
for Business, and the World. Right!  
For this also is to be consider'd, and well  
weigh'd. And therefore *This*, still, is P H I-  
L O S O P H Y ; " To inquire Where, and in  
" what respect one may be most *a Loser*;  
" Which are the greatest *Gains*, the most  
" profitable *Exchanges*;" since every thing  
in this World goes by *Exchange*. No-  
thing is had for nothing. *Favour* requires  
*Courtship*: *Interest* is made by *Solicita-*  
*tion*: *Honours* are acquir'd with *Hazard*;  
*Riches* with *Pains*; *Learning* and *Accom-*  
*plishments* by *Study* and *Application*. *Se-*  
*curity*, *Rest*, *Indolence* are to be had at  
other Prices. They may be thought, per-  
haps, to come easy. For " *What Hard-*  
" *ship* is there? *Where* is the *Harm*?"  
'Tis only to abate of *Fame* and *Fortune*.  
'Tis only to wave the *Point of Honour*,  
and share somewhat less of *Interest*. If  
this be easy; all is well. Some *Patience*,  
you see, is necessary in the case. *Privacy*  
must

Part 3. must be endur'd ; even *Obscurity* and *Contempt*. — Such are the Conditions. And thus every-thing has its CONDITION. Power and Preferments are to be had at one rate ; Pleasures at another ; LIBERTY and HONESTY at another. A good MIND must be paid for, as other things.

But we had best beware lest, perhaps, we pay *too dear* for It. Let us be assur'd we have a good Bargain. Come on then.—Let us account.—“ What is a “ MIND worth ? What Allowance may “ one handsomly make for it ? Or What “ may one well afford it for ? ” — If I part with It, or abate of It, 'tis not for Nothing. Some value I must needs set upon my Liberty, some upon my inward Character. Something there is in what we call WORTH ; something in Sincerity, and a sound HEART. Orderly Affections, generous Thoughts, and a commanding REASON, are fair Possessions, not lightly to be given up. I am to consider first, “ What “ may be their Equivalent ? Whether I “ shall find my Account in letting these “ inward Concerns run as they please ; or “ Whether I shall not be better secur'd “ against Fortune by adjusting Matters “ at home, rather than by making In- “ terest abroad, and acquiring first one “ great Friend, then another, to add still “ more and more to my Estate or Qua- “ lity ? ”

" lity?" For Where am I to take up? Sect. 3.  
Begin; and set *the Bounds*. Let me hear U  
positively " How far I am to go, and  
" Why no further?" What is *a moderate*  
*Fortune*, *a Competency*, and those other *Degrees*  
commonly talk'd of? Where is my  
*Anger* to stop? or how High may I suf-  
fer it to rise? How far may I engage in  
*Love*? How far give way to *Ambition*?  
How far to other *Appetites*? Or am I to  
let all loose? Are *the Passions* to take  
their swing; and no Application to be  
given to 'em, but all to *the outward Things*  
they aim at? Or if any Application be  
requisite; say plainly, " How much to  
" one, and how much to *the other*?"  
How far are the *Appetites* to be minded,  
and how far *outward Things*? Give us  
the Measure and Rule. See Whether this  
be not to *philosophize*? and Whether wil-  
lingly or unwillingly, knowingly or un-  
knowingly, directly or indirectly, Every-  
one does not as much? " Where, then,  
" is *the Difference*? Which Manner is *the*  
" best?" Here lies the Question. This  
is what I wou'd have you weigh and ex-  
amine. " But the Examination, say  
" you, is troublesom; and I had better  
" be without it." Who tells you thus?  
" Your REASON, you say, whose Force,  
" of necessity, you must yield to."  
Tell me therefore, have you fitly culti-  
vated

Part 3. vated that REASON of your's, polish'd *Philoso-*  
*phy.* it, bestow'd the necessary Pains on it, and exercis'd it on this Subject? Or is it like to determine full as well when un-exercis'd, as when thorowly exercis'd, or ever so expert? Consider, pray, in *Mathematicks*; Whose is the better REASON of the two, and fitter to be rely'd on? The Practiser's, or his who is unpractis'd? Whose in the way of *War*, of *Policy*, or *Civil Affairs*? Whose in *Merchandize*, *Law*, *Phyfick*? — And in MORALITY and LIFE, I ask still, *Whose*? May he not, perhaps, be allow'd the best Judg of *Living*, who *studys* LIFE, and endeavours to form it by some *Rule*? Or is he indeed to be esteem'd most knowing in the matter, who *slightly* examines it, and who *accidentally* and *unknowingly* *philoso-*  
*phizes*?

THUS, PHILOCLES (said he, concluding his Discourse) Thus is PHILOSOPHY establish'd. For Every-one, of necessity, must reason concerning his own Happiness; "What his *Good* is, and what his *Ill.*" The Question is only, "Who reasons best?" For even he who rejects this *reasoning* or *deliberating Part*, does it from a certain Reason, and from a Persuasion "That this is best."

BY this time we found our-selves insensibly got home. Our *Philosophy* ended, and we return'd to the common Affairs of Life.

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*The End of the Second Volume.*

